

FORWARD:

A Dimension of PERSONAL Experience

by  
Allan W. Anderson

A paper presented in partial fulfillment of  
requirements for Philosophy 127.  
Class Instr: Professor Herbert W. Schneider

*Table of Contents:*

<i>Foreword</i>	(ii)
<i>Toward an open system of Co-inherence</i>	52
<i>Addenda</i>	71
<i>Bibliography</i>	93

## Foreword

There are two terms used in this study which may seem oddly employed. They are the pronoun I (used in place of the more conventional terms subject or ego) and the Kingdom of Heaven.

The reason for employing I in this manner is not so much to avoid the precise denotations of subject and ego, as to allow for the broader connotations of the personal pronoun. A certain awkwardness results but this was thought preferable to the pedantry that so often attends the use of the other terms. This license was taken since the essay is one of suggestion as well as one of analyses.

The term Kingdom of Heaven is used almost exclusively as denoting time present rather than an eschatological projection into some remote future. Again, the choice was based upon the term's power of suggestibility when employed in a relatively fresh way.

The paper is in the main the result of reflections on and from personal experience, the works adduced being largely a means to further explication or challenge. With the exception of Sartre, no criticism of the author's works or points of view is intended.

While the addenda, as such, are not necessary to the thesis, nevertheless they represent problems which bear closely upon the argument. In a sense, if the foundation of our approach is sound, this topic can never be exhausted since it conceives the human person in terms of a transformational continuum within which the person, as a triunity, functions. Although this tri-dimensional unity has not been the subject undertaken, it is implicit in the approach.

The weight of emphasis has been given to the function of the will. The primacy of the will is believed to be functionally sound, though as a function it stands in no static, absolute authoritarian relationship to the other dimensions, the aesthetic and intellectual. In any healthy person the three

function in mutual cooperation and co-inherence. The will is conceived in this study to be essentially superior to the intellect, since the intellect is ordered to the will, though the will proceeds from the act of knowing. This Augustinian and Scotistic view underlies some of the conclusions which follow.

Generally in one's personal experience he will unconsciously, through habit, order his decisions according to some basic assumption which he is likely to find explicated in the history of philosophy. In some measure, then, this paper has its origin in a point of view of ancient lineage which many think has borne some curious children.

And they heard the sound of  
the Lord God walking in the garden  
in the cool of the day, and the  
man and his wife hid themselves  
from the presence of the Lord God  
among the trees of the garden.  
But the Lord God called to the  
man, and said to him, "Where  
are you?"

Gen. 3: 8, 9. R.S.V.

# I

Human experience is the fundamental datum of ontological enquiry. This is obvious in the fact that all objective enquiry needs an enquirer and the relationship between the object and subject is apprehended in terms of the subject's experiences of the object as sensory or intelligible data. Psychology attempts to better understand the subject. Our natural sciences are concerned to explain the object while ontology as the science of being has for its province the enquiry into such ultimate distinctions between subject and object as shall elucidate the relationships between the two as they are experienced. Therefore such a statement as "I fell over myself trying to get at the root of that difficulty," or, "a man's reach should exceed his grasp," or, "I feel I have taken a step forward," are expressions of ontological significance.

The expression, "to take a step

forward," assumes the notion of place metaphorically conceived. Forward, then, refers to this particular dimension.

Once, in conversation, Prof. Schneider suggested to me that this study might begin with God's first recorded question to man, "Adam where art thou?" As he pointed out, this question is singularly profound. This paper is an enquiry into that question. Since the approach is chiefly experimental the form of the study resembles somewhat a letter to oneself. The idiom is theological, but in no sense is it intended dogmatically. (One usually prefers, when convenient and to the point, to speak in his mother tongue.)

Ontology throws us back continually upon the ultimate questions. Merri definitions avail us nothing final, for experience is at root a trying out, a moving toward relatively unknown situations. A trying out is, as long as it operates, a continuing process. Experience cannot truly be conceived

except in principle. When we assume individuality as a true distinction we are obliged to answer somehow, Where, Who, What, When, Why and How am I? In this particular respect we have not advanced beyond Socrates. Definitions apart from experience are ephemeral. In any case, the movement forward requires an awareness of here.

Why should where come as the first in such a series of questions? Perhaps a whole study could be based on just such an enquiry. A little reflection inclines one to consider how uniquely comprehensive it is. Who seems too subjective for a beginning. What, would require more knowledge of particulars than is first offered, and how could Adam have answered this at the time? In a profound sense he was not himself. When presupposes where; Why, presupposes that one has lost the sense of being anywhere; in other words, only a person

with a sense of radical displacement can ask this question seriously. Adam was, at this time, still in the Garden. How, acquires a creeping triviality when abstracted and made irrespective of what.

So I take my start with where. It has all the advantages of drawing from both sides of the question, that is, it straddles both sides of the subject-object polarity. I am somewhere in the midst of something — therefore there is a me, (object), surrounded by things, the environment, (objects), and an I, (subject), who am aware of me and the thingness of the environment. The problem: I think I can pretty well establish where is me as object to myself (I); for instance: I look at my hand and say, it is mine. The me is a biological datum. But the I? Where am I? Can I ever objectify my I except as a postulated

term of the future, or as agent in a past action? I as a future term is not experienced as here. If I recollect a past intention, I did such and such, I have said nothing explicit concerning this I at this express moment. I point back and say, I was there, not I am here. Yet it seems relatively easy to project I into the future as well as to show where I was in the past. Nevertheless it still remains to find out where I am.

God Knew Adam was in the Garden. He knew that Adam was aware his me was in the Garden. But God was curious to ask whether Adam could say just where was his I. Could Adam have answered the question?

It depends, perhaps, upon whether we can equate simple consciousness with I, in this sense:

Am I the point of reference by which all objects are described, or am I isolated in reference to the given objects. It is important to note that the discussion is not concerned with a spatio-temporal field, but with awareness itself. As such, if all objects are described with reference to I, I must be 'prior' to them and not here. If, on the other hand, I am subsumed under the objects then the objects are 'prior' and I in turn, am put there and cannot be here. Now can I truly say which come first in point of my awareness, not as Chronological sequence? Clearly, if I say I am 'first' then the objects must proceed from me. This is absurd. If I say I derive from them, I assert the impossible. I am led to say we are both (subject and object) here at once. The opacity, which Gabriel Marcel speaks of

as that "reality impenetrable to me just in proportion as I am involved in it (Being and Having, p. 13) is the ontological fact.

It seems that in point of awareness I can make no ultimate distinction between I and the objects around me even though I engage spatio-temporal distinctions with habitual ease. It seems also that I am unable to claim consciousness as prior with me or as ultimately proper to me, which is to say: I cannot equate consciousness with this I in any exclusive or generative sense. (Neither does it aid me at this point of enquiry to postulate I as a segment of consciousness). Then where is I? It is here, of course, but not as simple location, not as clocked or fenced, but simply here as present, not there, not yet to come but 'here'. This is really not the case. However, say it is.

Then how should Adam have answered? A reply suggests itself in the context of this examination: "Wherever Thou art!" But he answered instead, "I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself." He remembers his I was once naked, wholly open and exposed in the Garden. We come to an exceedingly difficult stage in the Fall. It cannot have been that Adam had no self-awareness prior to this fateful occasion. He had already named all living things. A name implies distinction. Then this was not the dawn of self-awareness in the evolutionary scale from animal to human-animal as some have thought. Neither was it the beginning of conscience. Eve possessed this at the time, for we are clearly told how she had to be persuaded. Adam and Eve were in no sense a variety of

trained seals. Perhaps the key to the puzzle lies in verse 6: (Gen. 3.)

So when the woman saw the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise she took of its fruit and ate; and she also gave some to her husband, and he ate. v. 7: Then the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons.

That judgment was exercised by our mother Eve, prior to eating the fruit, is quite clear. She could have been trusted to go to market for She knew good food from bad. She was also aesthetically mature and distinguished the beautiful. One thing She lacked, and the

exceeding depth of the myth is shown by indicating that she was aware that she lacked. But this lack she could not conceive in a discursive sense, for in the fullness of having she could not at the same time experience want. We are given only one considerable reason that could seriously appeal to an intelligent mind:

the tree was desired to make  
one wise.

What sort of wisdom is it that gives one to distinguish between exposure and concealment in being? It is not the epistemological distinction between subject and object through self-consciousness. It is the knowledge of that power within the self to include the being of another or to infinitely withdraw, to crouch alone in a living, private grave; to choose not to be as a little child, but as the "wise and understanding, from whom

the things of the Kingdom of Heaven are hidden (Matt. 11: 25; Luke 10: 21.), who carry their own castles and moats with them, from which they never venture forth. The movement of the "wise and prudent" is a doubling in upon oneself. And so in the Acts of Philip 34, we are reminded: "Unless you change your 'down' to 'up' (and 'up' to 'down' and 'right' to 'left') and 'left' to 'right,' you shall not enter my Kingdom (of heaven)." But to return to Adam and his situation:

He remembers his I was once naked, wholly open and exposed in the Garden, continuous with the presence of all the individuals who made up the world of that Garden. But when he hid

himself he did not retract an empathy. An empathy suggests volition, the will to be and share in communion and a state in which things are potentially not intrapsychable. Clearly, Adam was unaware, his eyes were not open to the fact that any thing could withdraw

and close in upon itself, for having not made this movement himself, all things were 'known' to him as he was known to them. Upon eating the fruit though, he found himself possessed of an unshared identity. Now he was over there, somewhere where God was not fully present, some where where Eve was not, where the animals and the trees were not. He came to depend on these distinctions and to imprison himself within the dualism of discursive thought where he remains by and large to this day. He can never return to Eden, but what in a sense he could not will then, he can will now. Formerly he chose not to be intrapenetrable. Now he may choose to be so. Having once given over Eden, he may choose the Kingdom of Heaven as present here and now.

<sup>7</sup> Then, is involved in consciousness as consciousness related to itself and possessing a potential qualitative

unrelatedness to others. Hereness is directly proportional to a 'nakedness' in Being which cannot be thought except as willed and experienced. It is therefore, grounded in action. I can never unconditionally assert that I am here, for the moment I become aware of my I as such, I have made the qualitative movement which puts me there and not here. Kierkegaard's definition is apropos: "The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self." (The Sickness unto Death, Chap. I)

Since I cannot say unconditionally I am here, it does not follow that I cannot remember when I was where I experienced some hereness, some essential openness to another; but this memory is dependent upon a voluntary step into some measure of hereness, some degree of ego undress, exposure, some essential involvability, as willed by me.

To sum up: (1) I cannot be here unless I is exposed and intrepindable. (2) I is not identical with consciousness simple, but is consciousness related to itself, aware of itself as itself, distinguished from another. If the experience of full being requires total exposure, then a measure of reality is, in a sense, the price of self-awareness of I, and this reality, as a form of exchange, is recoverable only upon an act of my will to be present, here, not there. The recovery effects the new consciousness. This new consciousness relates itself to its own self only in the sense that it considers another itself. It is wholly indifferent to whether the other be self-conscious or not self-conscious.

(3) Hereness, as a term, implies retrospect. Until I learn how to be continually 'nakedly' here, I have but memory to fall back upon. Memory recovers for me those occasions when I ventured into a far country beyond the bounds of the sovereign state of this I.

Hereness, then, 'increases' with every new movement into this particular experience; an experience in which all things are forever new in mutual revelation. And so a systematic description of the forward movement, as a dimension of experience, is essentially a philosophy of adventure.

II

The previous chapter discussed the problem of location. The attempt was made to distinguish between being here and being there. In this sense one is either present or absent. The steps toward presence has been traditionally treated by the use of two different metaphors. Proceeding toward presence is referred to as returning home or as moving toward and into the unknown as "Abraham was said to have set out into a land he knew not of." In this study the movement into the unknown will determine the language of analysis.

The movement forward is contingent upon vision; a vision of the kind without which the people perish. A vision is essentially dynamic. It is not merely what is seen; it confers a particular quality on the sight. When this quality is lacking we have nothing more than a simple picture - a static

thing to hang upon the wall. A picture on the wall evokes its movement from us. On the other hand our movement is evoked from the vision. It seems there are two kinds of immediacy here. One, wholly dependent upon our aesthetic response, as in the case of the picture. The other, the vision, conduces to an act, for it brings the will forward. The difference is simple and qualitative. I am 'moved' by a picture. I walk toward the vision. Another distinction is necessary: I am not drawn by the vision like one whose power of choice is nullled. Then I should have been hoodwinked, and made to think myself an agent, whilst bereft of will I am no more than a patient. There are many dreamers that have drawn men, but it was necessary that they first give over the will, their individual spring of action. A simple dreamer

is no true seer or prophet.

The dialectical relationships, or the conflict, consists in the interaction between two poles : vision / dream. Many philosophies have been formal descriptions of dreams, the blue prints of otherwise impalpable pictures hung in the mansions of ideas. Few visions have been wholly known or described. A vision is never possessed by pure reason and since it eludes the vice of discursive thought it is not exhausted by rational description. Though Plato railed against poets he resorted to myth.

A vision is always before a man as a dream is always behind. One is a command, the other prompts a wish. A vision compels an act while a dream invites a contemplation, a review and caustic analysis. Shakespeare, as a man of vision, was

able to make the distinction which most fits us: we are such stuff as dreams are made on, and our little life is rounded with a sleep.

The immediacy of a dream I have sole agency for and may take it up or set it down as one who sorts among his souvenirs. The immediacy of a vision is not mine to control in the same sense, for the dynamic field it presents is never under my feet but just one step forward from where I stand. It is at once most elusive and most real. It is never captured anesthetized and put up as a bottled specimen. Some say it is consequently non-existent. But should I take a step toward it, the step is real, and some such steps are indexed in a thousand history books. For the vision evokes decision and decision is the source of all historical time. A dream, a contemplation, is always ready to hand should I about face from the vision and drift down

the river of natural time and over the  
falls into the bottomless pit.

Visions are rejected by many practical and contemplative men. The practical man who rejects the vision knows that it cannot be turned to account, that is, since it cannot be possessed, it cannot be sold. Furthermore, he observes, those who followed visions too often tended to 'rock the boat.' The Contemplative man who rejects the vision knows the vision requires an unpremeditated step forward, into the unknown, with no hope of reward that can be adequately conceived prior to taking this step. Such a step is for him truly unthinkable.

Such a first step is theologically described as a step toward the Kingdom of Heaven, not as remotely conceived, but as that which is in our midst. As such it is a continuum of endless steps forward, an intensely dynamic field which does not wait upon the

philosopher and esthetic to execute its portrait. It cannot be rendered in static terms. It is hardly to be wondered that Plato chose the dialogue to render an essentially dynamic experience in which he invites us to participate. Such participation is not possible in a closed system. Presence, for this reason, requires the language of metaphor and myth.

The vision hovers. One takes a step toward that which attends but is never touched. Has this silent partner an objective reality? This much is sure and ready to hand: the results of the partnerships are not imaginary. The step forward is as positive and obvious as a change of station, say a bridge crossing. Clearly, I am no longer 'where' I was in awareness.

The forward movement must be voluntary. We are tempted to think otherwise when using such expressions as "we are carried

forward on the stream of life," — a simple confusion of natural time with historical time. Were it not for this cultural or historical time Keats' Endymion, as a thing of beauty, should not be a joy forever, and would indeed pass into nothingness. The stream of life must be defined against some person's life. Defined as such the forward movement is a movement within movement, for historical time is made upstream. From the point of view of historical time, natural time flows downstream. To continue the metaphor: I have three possibilities: floating; sinking; propulsions.

In floating, I drift with natural time, always in the wake of historical time that diminishes into the continuing stream of the natural past. While I float in this wake I feel "in touch with current events." Whose? This should be an uncomfortable question. (If it is not, then I have no real sensitivity to historical time since the personal element is of the essence of historical time).

I sink whenever I choose unconsciousness by any of the thousand subtle means or gross. For instance, should I be asked by a friend, "What are you doing?" and I reply, "Just killing time," how shall I object when he exclaims, "Why don't you just shoot yourself, it's quicker?"

Propulsion! A fascinating thought. First of all what do I mean by here as a term of historical time? I have no here except I move self-properly myself into the course of historical time—the self-created, self-chosen time which I share with other SELVES so engaged. When we have formed this aggregate into a corporate moment we have cultural time. A mere collection of random historical times, that is to say, individual person's awareness without organic relationship, gives no cultural time.

Civilization declines when it falls into the wake of historical time, when it no longer creates historical time by moving upstream of natural time. There is some analogous point to Spengler's notion of organism. He was quite wrong in the notion of inevitability. This latter results upon confusing natural with historical time. Clearly, there is an observable rhythm to growth and decay, but the difference between a man and a plant lies not so much in this rhythm as in the quality of transformation during the term of their natural lives. Should we be unable to make a true distinction between them, qualitatively, in regard of transformation, we shall be hard pressed to define a philosophy not purely biological; and a philosophy of adventure, <sup>must</sup> show itself idle. We should be obliged to define adventure with terms of luck and happenstance and come to worship the goddesses Tyche.

and Fortuna unaware.

There is a polar relationship between my historical time as singular person and the time of the culture in which I participate. Ultimately, cultural time is dependent upon persons, individual persons, who test the given cultural form against the map, or pattern of their personal historical adventure which they engage ahead of cultural time. The cultural pattern or form is a metaphoric expression of the richness or poverty of current historical experience enjoyed by the cultural body, the corporate individual. In this sense it is the signature of a corporate individual's experience. Clearly in terms of historical time (as we are defining it), this signature may be assessed, or read, meaning fully by only those persons who have a foothold in historical time ahead of the age and Zeitgeist of the individual culture in which these

critics participate. A critic who has not made the personal thrust ahead of cultural time could make no prophetic judgment worth more than mere clairvoyance. In regard to culture and personhood, Arthur O'Shaughnessy's lines are relevant:

Each age is a dream that is dying  
Or one that is coming to birth.

Objects and symbols tend to disuse and neglect when they no longer represent the cultural mood or present age. It becomes the task of a creative theology to offer a "present" symbol or to transform the obsolescent. Finally, it must necessarily be metaphor that expresses each new thrust into that unknown ahead of cultural time; and then from the pool of collective experiences, principles may be abstracted for scientific formulation which shall serve to enrich the cultural enterprise.

Science finds its true function in such a society: science as an instrument and not a solution. The solution to the problem of a dying culture rests neither in oracles nor <sup>in</sup> a modern recapitulation of the ideals of former ages. These, like corpses, toss in the wake of historical time. Rather, the solution rests with those individual persons who engage the frontiers of the forward dimension, who discover hitherto unknown areas of all fruitful dimensions of experience.

The aforementioned polar relationship is felt most intensely by these individual adventurers, for their personal inwardness is productive only in relationship with cultural pattern. Without this relatedness with community, their subjectivity becomes wholly irrelevant, a free wheeling in meaningless space and outer darkness. Without a positive

relationship with my culture I am excluded from any reckoning of cultural time; in other words, I have no cultural existence outside of this polar tension. On the other hand I can never wholly identify myself with cultural time. It should remain for me the negative pole in our exchange. I may swim alongside others but must propel myself alone. Otherwise I am certain to slip back toward the abyss.

Any golden age is never the product of chance, nor can it be satisfactorily accounted for by impersonal process. It flowers out of creations in concert by the most daring persons of the age. These persons are never simply the children of circumstance and unexpected events. In tension with his age, each is an event in himself.

This trinity, then, we have always

with us. The vision; our person; society. On the face of it, of the three, the vision appears the most illusive and illusory. Yet this is not so. Actually, what seems, of the three, most ready to hand namely, our person, is the one most illusive and illusory. One can only speak of knowing himself-as an action- never of himself as known. None of the three is handed to one upon purchase like a loaf of bread over the counter. Gabriel Marcel has observed that "there is no question of response to something which is, absolutely speaking, given; and the essential of a being is just that-not being 'given' either to another or to himself." (Being and Having, p. 47) Our thesis would seem to concur in this definition—assuming we understand Marcel correctly—and this being so a striking conclusion offers itself: This which is

not 'given' cannot be the product of my imagination either as datum at hand or absent, for then I should have given it to myself. This something is, therefore, not an illusion and each member of this trinity is a primary. This trinity offers a structure for enquiry into the function of each member and the relationship of each to each in their dynamic interdependence. Such a structural conception offers a ground for exploration into the individual character of each member. However, no such enquiry could result in a closed system since it would require to address itself to the forward movement which is conceived as being experienced in partipke. Such an experience is the awareness in oneself of the union of repetition and novelty whose issue are regeneration and transformation without which repetition cannot address itself to the future nor novelty to the past.

It is the thesis of this study that regeneration and transformation, with the self as subject, are consequent upon a particular movement of the will conduced to particular action. It is the one movement for which the human being is ultimately responsible wholly to himself, and without which the distinction between man and male, or woman and female would be impossible. It is a movement into which Behaviourism does not enquire.

III

The movement forward is a step into the new. There is here a real element of novelty, not mere difference. There is something in this newness which is as we say, beyond comparison - is this not, after all, the essence of newness? Radical newness - this is almost redundant - must have about it something of the novel, the wholly unexpected; and this is always encountered in the movement forward. The world becomes transformed, and so the relationships between what was and what is now is not adequately rendered by the term proportional. On the other hand, metaphor is not wholly satisfactory either. Metaphor tends to express discontinuity, except in the imagination, yet this movement is wholly real. It is indeed a step into what is, for some, poetically best described as the 'Kingdom of Heaven'; the place

where one lives the new awareness while spatio-temporally unremoved from this world either in mind or deed. While in this world, it is a different experience of it. A hint of this present Kingdom of Heaven is shown in the expression, 'parting is such sweet sorrow'. It is a statement of more than sweet sentiment - which can only address itself to the past. Sorrow attends the severance of any cherished biological propinquity. But the sweetness? The depth of the sweetness? Is it not the response of inner depths to this parting; seeing parting with that inward eye when its sight is too young and uncoordinated; seeing parting as a dream, a negative metaphor of something new to come?

There are a thousand hints of the Kingdom of Heaven among us, but not knowing its presence we must continually refer it to the future.

This Kingdom is at once our deepest intuition and rebuke. We whisper to ourselves, when most alone, that it is somewhere here; we shout to each other that, of course it is to come.

It is not hard to imagine that the experience of acute separation gave an early religious consciousness the notion that the soul is a stranger in a foreign land. Any poet could have conjured such a doctrine. (The theory that some ecstatic trance-like flight from the every day world suggested this doctrine is a wholly unnecessary assumption). The trouble from such a notion follows upon its left-handed compliment to spirit. Spirit, above all things, longs for union with the flesh and that beatific consummation this doctrine must deny. Consequently, man is split in half and spirit, at first affronted, soon leaves the

puritan gnostic to vent his anguish on his fellows, so eventually a bortific is such a notion.

Every step forward is a new birth, and endless seems their possible succession. As St. Paul said, "I die daily." Clearly, such was impossible without a daily resurrection. In this lies the incomparable novelty of the experience. No new birth has ever been duplicated - just as no two women may bear the same child. The price of birth is also as intensely individual as is every new born child.

The movement forward, as a new birth, requires a certain hardness as distinct from simple hardness. Kierkegaard was aware of this hardness. It is not the tenacity, the endurance required of prolonged and successful defence. It is the will and nerve to

press the attack to a successful conclusion rather than settle for just enough as the jackals do. Ambition is never its source; for the forward movement is no calculated gamble. It requires nothing short of unconditional assault upon one's private Castle of Refuge in which quasi-ideals hang with ineffectual splendour from all walls.

We are faced with the question of the relation between action and contemplation. St. Thomas was of the opinion that the contemplative life holds preminence over the political life and attempted to show that as Maritain has it, "the resemblance to God is less in the practical than the speculative intellect." (The Person and the Common Good, Review of Politics, 10.48) And from

St. Thomas himself: "Just as that which is already perfect is superior to that which is practical for perfection, so the life of the solitaries is superior to the life in society." (Sum. Theol. II-II, 188, 8).

But is the problem so neatly solved? The saint seems so pallidly precise in his game of heavenly chess that one for bears to say he risked his move. Even in chess action and contemplation are evenly balanced. So much of psychology enters the game that if anything the bold player has the advantage and action seems euthanized. But perhaps St. Thomas was concerned to play just problems.

Yet, life is always across the board play, against an opponent whose moves are rarely expected as to position or time; the board has multiple dimensions and in the final analysis the game is decided on our moves, decisions, acts

and not on what we think. In point of fact, our thinking is conditioned so much by our last move, as was our move by our last thought. Indeed, the game was designed for contemplative players, not playing contemplatives.

Dostoevsky, in his Notes from Underground, describes the torment of a man who thinks himself too sensitive and intelligent to commit himself to anything - too intelligent to act. Part I, V., dramatizes this attitude: "I repeat, I repeat with emphasis: all "direct" persons and men of action are active just because they are stupid and limited. How explain that? I will tell you: in consequence of their limitation they take immediate and secondary causes for primary ones, and in that way persuade themselves more quickly and easily than other people do that they have found an infallible

foundation for their activity, and their minds are at ease and you know that is the chief thing. To begin to act you know, you must first have your mind completely at ease and no trace of doubt left in it."

There is some truth to the reflection of Dostoevsky. But there are three men and not merely two. It is never so neatly divided between action and contemplation as the novelist's character and St. Thomas lead us to think. There are the (1) man of action, (2) man of reflection and (3) the man who acts through overcoming the seduction of reflection. He acts without infallible foundation for he acts into the future as the man of mere action reacts upon the rule of the past, the mechanical habit of authority. He walks toward the vision knowing not

Is it intended ever to be reached?  
If so, why is it not in the future?  
It is present to be contemplated not  
"assaulted"! "Adventure" is a "coming  
toward", so action may be conceived  
as coming toward the present or  
"given". The vision attracts us +  
we leavitate toward it, but what  
we actually enter upon is never  
the K. of Heaven.

where it will lead while the man of reflection assaults castles in the air.

Can the Kingdom of Heaven be reached by contemplation? We should first of all ask ourselves whether little children contemplate, since we are instructed to become as they. Do they not rather fling themselves into the infinity of the moment? Heaven can never be deduced.

?

If immediacy means "without distance", I doubt that the K of H is "here" in that sense. Like Adam we do not say that the divine presence is hidden in clouds, we protect our nakedness from immediate exposure to it.

The "becoming as little children", "rebirth", etc is part of the vision and hence we never actually enter.

cf. p. 50

IV

Immediacy is the primary datum of the Kingdom of Heaven. The Kingdom of Heaven is not derived from, nor deduced, nor in any sense built up. To speak of it as the terminus of our journey is a useful metaphor, but one that can mislead. Can one say, "I am on my way to heaven or hell," without implying these ends in themselves? This is an important question since heaven is not a true subject for faith, and hell requires none. It seems, then, that the idea of "becoming" is not proper to the Kingdom of Heaven (one must have become as a little child before he can enter), neither is 'being' conceived as stasis. Does it fall somewhere between these two?

Consider the case of a man who, riding in a train, loses his sense of identity. He becomes an amnesiac. He is still travelling somewhere — somewhere he once preached the terminus of this train-ride. Now he is merely travelling without his consent. He is forced to travel in that he cannot

refer the action to himself as the result of choice. He suffers all the ambiguity of fate. Later, through adequate medical attention he regains his name and all that it once implied. On looking back could he say he had arrived at self-identification? Had he really travelled toward it? Of course not. He made a rediscovery that is all. He came upon nothing new when he reassessed his name.

Here we have a distinction between the concept of 'individuation,' held by a particular school of psychoanalysis, and religious awareness. In the practice of analysis the patient (and it is very necessary that he learn complete dependence at first) is worked upon by an expert until the patient comes upon some small measure of analytical ability himself. He learns to cooperate with the analyst until he comes to know himself, to see himself in some sense apart from himself. He

becomes the object of his introspection. He comes to distinguish more clearly the poles: subject/object, ego/world, and relearns their fruitful relationships. His sense of personal sovereignty is restored. His proper and rational relationship to the group is restored. He learns to adjust where he adjusted before, prior to the onset of the illness. Adjustment is a conscious process requiring a controlled self-consciousness. But is not this very self-consciousness an awareness of his distance from the others? Must he not forever be asking in every successive experience, "who are all these others and what are they to me?" The more self conscious he becomes, the more he differentiates himself. Such differentiation might be called an ontological dissipation. He becomes to himself a 'marked' man and the mark of this discontinuity with his fellows he attempts to conceal.

by taking upon himself such blemishes as will assure his anonymity. It is necessary that he possess some badge of distinction; the least troublesome for him is the quantitative distinction. Today, each of us has a number. The census knows us as numbers, as does the military, as does the educational system. We are numbered from birth. It is not often we remind ourselves of the yawning gulf that separates a number from a name. This distinction is an ontological one. A name personifies, presupposes a person. A name is given to a person, not a person to a name.

Can one really 'give' a number to a person; is it not rather the other way around? A person is 'given' to a number. When a person is 'given' to a number, the person is the only concrete member in the partnership, and, being so, is the one thing that can be 'given'. An abstraction cannot be given. The essence of abstraction is removal, not bestowal. A name, though not corporeal, is still a personification

and has about it all the magic of poetry. The essence of poetry is its reference to concreteness, that which we think we can give. Numbers apply only to what is first 'given' to them, and this that we think we give to number we qualify with a name since quantity can afford no ultimate distinction. Names are, or should be, chosen with care while numbers can never be matters of real choice. A number is always there waiting to receive whatever is hurled its way by chance. In this sense, numbers are always prior. Perhaps this is why they have been objects of awe.

Self-dissipation, ontologically considered, is a retreat into number. When numerical differentiation is the mode, the person is lost in the perdition of abstraction, and the privacy he sought vanishes into air, into thin air. This is one of the greatest ironies, that we seek privacy by the very means which annihilates it. Perhaps no age before us so confused anonymity with privacy.

Religious awareness is at the furthest remove from this hell. Here the question is not one of adjustment. It concerns personhood. Personhood is a quality and palpable reality. It cannot be given, absolutely speaking, though in common speech we speak of people being given or giving themselves. It is not given absolutely as the axle to the wheel, but offered somewhat as one offers a morsel to a wild creature.

This, then, is what is required in order to make the forward movement; that we should accept what is offered. But the ancient perversity in us, that seeing so much to choose from, whispers, "Choose not to choose!" At times the pressure of the offering is so great that a man will tell himself his independence is threatened and imagine himself forced. He may remind himself of Duns Scotus' distinction: to be unable to refuse is not to be save as to consent, so that in the face of the beatific vision he may, though

having eyes to see, choose to see not. And even a child when being read a tale he wishes not to attend to will shout, "I'll listen, but I don't have to hear it!" Is this our original sin, that we should be unable to gratefully accept that which is offered? When that which is offered is measured against that which can take it away, the miracle of its presence vanishes. But it is so, that we are accustomed to estimate value.

'Mary hath chosen the better part and it shall not be taken away.' It can never be taken away. Personhood is offered, never abstracted. It is shared. 'The poor we have always with us.' There is such a thing as experiencing an ontological poverty - the ultimate destitution.

The forward movement concerns person-qua person, is made toward the other and not directly toward the self.

?

I think he hid in shame rather than fear. His eyes were opened to see himself (self-consciousness) and this self-awareness came between him and the Divine Presence.

yes! }

The self may be offered but not owned. Its possession is an hypostasization, for the moment it is affirmed as exclusively 'mine' it is lost. This is the point of the Fall. Adam hid himself because he was afraid, afraid of the new knowledge that one could decline what was offered, but fascinated to exercise this power to separate himself from the Other. He so removed himself from presence he could no longer say where he was; but simply that his self was hidden, concealed and so lost.

The forward movement into presence is achieved by indirection, about facing, going the opposite way from that we habitually believe the direction of self affirmation. It heals the breach between individual as number and the individual as person.

It is told how a Zen master once

The reply was, "She tempted me!"

asked his pupil, "Who are you?" The pupil left, unable to say. After a very long time he returned and replied to that question: "When I say who I am, it is gone."

When asked "Adam, where art thou?" no reply is forthcoming unless it include the Other. Not the Other as Thou alone, but the Other as inclusive of us, ourselves. Here a distinction seems necessary. We do not simply penetrate the Other, neither does the Thou merely penetrate us. We both subsist within the Kingdom of Heaven which is right here, now, upon this very instant. Such a relationship affirms the polarity: transcendence / immanence. God is the Other, the wholly Other, but not in this sense, exclusively. For I am in Him and He in me. Transcendence affirms our personhood. Immanence affirms our

communion. Neither subsists alone, yet each is distinct with sovereign will.

Immediacy is the primary datum of the Kingdom of Heaven — but in no sense as a final achievement. It is discovered in movement and is not a terminus. Immediacy, though not a datum of self-consciousness, is the food of the self, by which we take our continuing steps forward seeking the presence which is offered us. "Let not him who seeks cease until he finds; and when he finds he will wonder; and wondering he will reign; and reigning he will rest." (Oxyrhynchus Papyrus 645, Logion 1.) Clearly, he does not reign because he rests but rests because he reigns. He continues to move forward.

This food of the self is our daily bread. Jerome in his Commentary on Math. 6.11 observes concerning the Lord's prayer: "In the gospel according to the Hebrews, for 'substantial bread' I

Give us tomorrow's bread in order  
that we may always remain with  
Thee, who moves ahead from day  
to day!

found "maha," which means "of the morrow;" so that the sense is: our bread of the morrow, that is, of the future, give us this day." It is the food for the movement forward for which we pray, that is, Lord, the bread of the future give us this day that time may be one with eternity, this day, that I may be where thou art, right where I am.

This is not very good!

We are one body not in suffering  
but in together enduring the Vision.

Christ was alienated from the Father  
on the cross

A certain brother said: "It is right for a man to take up the burden for them who are near to him, whatever it may be, and so to speak, to put his own soul in the place of that of his neighbour, and to become, if it were possible, a double man, and he must suffer, and weep, and mourn with him, and finally the master must be accounted by him as if he himself had put on the actual body of his neighbour, and as if he had acquired his countenance and soul, and he must suffer for him as he would for himself. For thus it is written We are all one body ---

Charles Williams, The Descent of the Dove, 1956,  
p. 55.

"Your life and your death are with your neighbour"

Op. cit., p. 57.

V

Toward an Open System of Co-inherence.

The purpose of this chapter is to show in what sense the existentialist approach to the movement forward differs from the emphasis of this paper. Much of the discussion has involved the problem of personal decision but is not on that account to be labeled a testimony to the validity of atheistic existentialism. The term Christian-existentialism is most confusing and as such serves little purpose. There is a sense in which Christianity is existentialist but it is also an affirmation of something which the fashionable existentialism of the moment does not apprehend. For this reason the term Kingdom of Heaven was chosen and, admittedly, interpreted in such a way as might not invite the approval of all theologians in order to introduce a category peculiar to Christianity. Of course there are aspects of this category which are treated by other religions. Nevertheless this specific category as

described in the Gospels offers an alternative view.

An examination of Sartre's Existentialism is a Humanism. Should reveal the profound difference separating the two approaches to life. Granted that this lecture of Sartre's is not a definitive statement of existentialism, it nevertheless expresses quite lucidly a point of view with which one can deal.

Sartre claims that existentialists are "reproached as people who deny the reality and seriousness of human affairs. For since we ignore the commandments of God and all values prescribed as eternal, nothing remains but what is strictly voluntary. Everyone can do what he likes, and will be incapable, from such a point of view, of condemning either the point of view or the action of anyone else." Now if Sartre is correctly reporting the criticism he says he has received from Christians, he is right to object for this criticism does not address itself to the main

question, namely, what a man can do with his life. It is irrelevant to answer by pointing to a system. But the objection to Sartre's view is not grounded in a system as such but upon just what the existentialists make so much of: Choice.

Is a man to choose himself for himself or for another? This is the question, the answer to which will decide which camp I choose for Sartre is quite right in showing there is no middle ground. This is his position:

"When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that every one of us must choose himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he chooses for all men. For in effect, of all the actions a man may take in order to create himself as he wills to be there is not one which is not creative, at the same time, of an image of man

such as he believes he ought to be. To choose between this or that is at the same time to affirm the value of that which is chosen; for we are unable ever to choose the worse. What we choose is always the better; and nothing can be better for us unless it is better for all... In fashioning myself I fashion man."

This doctrine gives a peculiar twist to "I am my brother's keeper," for my concern is to myself, not to him yet somehow by choosing myself I fashion him. Further, it is not at all clear how by choosing I should categorically be unable to choose the worse. In order to accomplish any of these I should require absolute choice. It is not too difficult to conclude that such is not man's lot. Such would require that a man stand outside of existence itself, something the existentialist seems concerned to do, but man is not given such a ground. How shall he choose freedom

except he be a slave and vice versa? But if a man were able to choose between being free or being a slave and this were offered him while yet legally a slave, then for the moment he should find himself in a no-man's land, neither free nor slave. Clearly, he has a choice between better or worse, but only for the duration of the choosing, not before, not after. This being the case, he can choose the worse. On the other hand, Sartre has man, by definition, suspended in this moment of himself, and not through the agency of another. Then, of course, it must seem that anything is better than nothing, so what shall I choose? myself. But what can this avail me since I had myself to begin with? It seems I must either be in engagement or disengagement. If in disengagement I must at one time have been engaged, but as an existentialist I am not permitted this deduction. By definition I must

begin with nothing. There is no terror greater than to be in need of something while surrounded and besieged by nothing. It is as though some stranded mice were to take counsel among themselves as to how to get home. In such a strait there is no choice but home, and what one does he must needs do for all.

Sartre further dramatizes the situation by quoting Descartes: "Conquer yourself rather than the world," and tells us then what Descartes meant — "that we should act without hope." Now this is an impossibility. Every action implies hope. That one should act without hope of reward is a teaching not new with Sartre. This is underscored in the Gospels and the Bhagavad Gita. It is not that we should act without hope as such, but that we act in the hope of a right choice, not just any choice, and with the other as

our frame of reference, not ourselves. If it be objected that we have only ourselves one can reply that this assumption requires to be demonstrated, and seems, outside of one's intransigence and preference for outsideness, much the more difficult to prove.

Sartre makes much of the Cartesian cogito. He says, "And at the point of departure there cannot be any other truth than this I think, therefore I am, which is the absolute truth of consciousness as it attains to itself." But it does not follow that, as he goes on to say, "...outside of the Cartesian cogito, all objects are no more than probable..." The cogito itself is not an accurate statement. It requires that a being think. I should be just as accurate were I to declare, I am, therefore I think, and probably closer to the truth since I should exclude

less beings from the 'privilege' of Being.

It would not be fair to Sartre to exclude from this discussion his curious conclusion concerning the cogito. "In the second place, this theory alone is compatible with the dignity of man, it is the only one which does not make man into an object. All kinds of materialism lead one to treat every man including oneself as an object - that is, a set of pre-determined reactions, in no way different from the patterns qualities and phenomena which constitute a table, or a chair or a stone. Our aim is precisely to establish the human kingdom as a pattern of values in distinction from the material world. But the subjectivity which we thus postulate as the standard of truth is no narrowly individual subjectivism, for as we have demonstrated, it is not only one's own self that one discovers in the cogito, but those of others too. Contrary to (the) the philosophy of Descartes, contrary to that

of Kant, when we say "I think" we are attaining to ourselves in the presence of the other, and we are just as certain of the other as we are of ourselves. Thus the man who discovers himself directly in the cogito also discovers all the others, and discovers them as a condition of his own existence. He recognizes that he cannot be anything (in the sense in which one says one is spiritual, or that one is wicked or jealous) unless others recognize him as such. I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about myself, except through the mediation of another. The other is indispensable to my existence, and equally so to any knowledge I can have of myself...  
...Thus, at once, we find ourselves in a world which is, let us say, that of inter-subjectivity."

It is strange that Descartes, he who was responsible for the cogito, should have failed to reach this conclusion if it has such an intimate connection with the

But for Sartre "inter-subjectivity" means:  
never treat another as an object but  
always as another subject.  
That is the "hell" of it! It prevents  
me from choosing what is authentically  
the better - my own better.

Cogito. Nowhere is it clear how Sartre moves from cogito to this fraternal concern, or shall we rather say, that which appears fraternal. It is also difficult to entertain the notion of inter-subjectivity. It seems both forced and artificial. It is also presumptuous. The other person's subjectivity as such is not mine to pry into and were this possible his subjectivity would vanish. There is no possibility or need to banish the object as also a category of man qua man. In fact his dignity requires it since my responsibility toward him is not by way of myself first but by way of him first as person, as object, in which both subject as self and person as object co-inhere. I present the same co-inherence to him, though from his point of view, not mine.

We require a life-and-world-view more comprehensive and reasonable than the one offered by Sartre despite some

of his valuable psychological insights.

If the cogito is faulty, and if the category of personhood requires both subject and object then what shall this view be?

There are three steps involved. In the natural world, the world of physical and so called unself-conscious being we are not averse to recognizing a co-inherence, a sharing of being, an interdependence. A functional view, that is to say a biological view of life requires such an observation. Next, we classify man as peculiar in that he is a self-conscious organism to whom Aristotle grants the distinction of purpose. But man is not wholly to and for himself since he is also a member of the natural world. Therefore, he becomes truly man, not through the exercise of the cogito, but the awareness that he may consciously direct and participate in this co-inherence and so reach the third step.

I am somewhat dubious about  
"co-inherence" - your idea is good, but  
the term is confusing.

The cogito should read:

Cogito ergo sumus (do I follow you)  
in this?

Good!

I think this idea is better expressed  
by the term consciousness  
even self-consciousness has a co-factor  
There is no "sciousness" (as Montague used  
to say)

But reciprocal inhering seems to  
me to be an exaggerated version  
of the idea.

toward the fullness of being. Not that he arrives once and for all upon this step, for all of these steps are not ends in themselves but functions which by definition require continuous action to exist. The principle of being then, is not thinking but offering. There are these three levels:

- (1) Unconscious co-inherence
- (2) Conscious self-inherence
- (3) Conscious co-inherence

John Dewey is reported to have said that had Descartes declared 'I have; therefore I am,' then Descartes would have said something. Clearly, this having differentiates man from other beings in the natural world. A man can say, 'I have a body.' But this is not the last word in describing man nor in distinguishing him from other beings. Is possession then the criterion of man? Does he not also dispose? In point of fact

Having is not acquiring but  
appropriating

This is, of course, not Marcel's  
doctrine; he contrasts having  
and personal being.

he is no less conscious of his disposing than of his having. Indeed, he must have in order to dispose. But in a different sense the unself-conscious creatures both have and dispose, since it is the alternation between having and disposing that functions for their existence. Were the tree self-conscious it too would 'have' leaves as a man has fingers and would 'acquire' food as a man acquires sustenance. But we do not speak of a tree's owning anything. Yet the function of acquiring is not altered by the fact that one is consciously acquiring and the other not. It is different, however, with disposing or offering. A tree cannot help giving up its leaves according to season. Yet a man can refuse to offer or give over what he has acquired; or, negatively expressed, he can alter the functional pattern of acquiring at will, and convert the process to bestowal or offering. It is this which distinguishes him from a mere

self-generating efficient and voracious machine; that he should offer even his life, not by instinct but by will. He is not so much distinguished by his having self-consciously as by his self-conscious will to offer since this requires of him a movement, as we say, 'against nature'. It is not really 'against nature' as offering but the time of offering is, from the Standpoint of nature, unseasonable. He may acquire and so have unseasonably also, but this acquisition he generally finds disagreeable to his body and is chided for the indulgence by his more temperate fellows. On the other hand, should he wish to offer himself unseasonably for some cause which he puts above the function of acquiring, he is generally showered with honors as showing himself essentially a man. It is this then which distinguishes him as a human being from his fellow creatures and this distinction he bears often.

This was true in the Garden before  
the Fall, but natural openness is  
no longer open to man.

to a superlative degree, namely, that he should be willing and able to offer himself unseasonably.


Heraclitus said, "Nature loves to hide" (Frag. 10.), but this is only true as regards her language which should be to man a meta phonetic expression of his own experience. In this sense she conceals meanings within meanings. But functionally she is open, exposed in all her particulars, one to the other, in second mutual interdependence. This is the glorious risk which all her innumerable creatures prodigally engage. The same sage observed, "The bow (Bios) is called life (Bios), but its work is death." (Frag. 66)

This, then, is what distinguishes the full measure of man: that he should be, not for himself except indirectly, but for another. He can say, I offer, therefore I am, and so preserve his continuity with the natural world and yet achieve

Co-inherence in God Yes,  
but not in nature.


that third level of Being, conscious co-inherence, which is most uniquely his own. And this is the Kingdom of Heaven, that we should experience this co-inherence consciously in a continuing holy communion; that we should experience the living process stated in the Athanasian Creed: "Not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh but by taking of the manhood into God."

Diagram of the forward movement relative to ascent and decent as terms of progress and retrogression.



The movement forward expands the point of view of the above, the behind and the beneath. The above, the region of values (from the point of view of one beneath) discloses nothing new to one refusing to risk one more step into the unknown! Contemplation qua contemplation has no rightful pre-eminence over action.

The myth of the eternal return is a metaphorical statement of the process of the forward movement. It fails, however, to render the ascent, the progress in knowing. A similar failure is apparent in the mythical image of Time as an arrow, for while it renders the feeling of forward, it fails to show the renewed or return, or as Kierkegaard called



But I would picture such "return" by  
imagining the K. of H. to move forward <sup>correct</sup>  
with us as "a pillar of fire", always  
present, so that we can return to it  
without retracing our steps.

## the experience, Repetition.

Return or repetition is also an Ascent or Descent. The movements are determined, respectively by the will to move forward or to recapitulate that past which is memory. But as Edgar Allan Poe acutely felt, the land of memory is the realm of Nevermore. The return or repetition experienced in the forward movement is the encountering of experiences which appear governed by laws and circumstances met before, but to see only this in them is to lose oneself in abstraction and rote function. No repetition is without some novelty could we but apprehend it. It is in the recognition and offering of oneself to this novelty that ascent is made. The movement forward is the conscious widening of the spiral's circumference by the thrust outward. Withdrawn from the awareness of the being of another conduces to decent, meaninglessness.

The return is not made to the same point on the two dimensional circle; it is a return by way of ascent and so involves three dimensions. As the circumference increases so the spiral ascends. The sign of the cross is made unaware. As one 'returns' he stands over where he stood, having made the movement laterally and vertically. His new position puts him in

a position obliquely distant from where he once stood. Therefore he appears to an observer from the lower coil as an outsider. On the contrary, from his point of view he is not outside, since his position includes that of the observer. An example of how one may be in the world but not of it, since from the observer's point of view, one is out of his world as a member of it.

## Addenda

### I

When the forward movement is considered not from an examination of the steps into the unknown, but from the point of view of an offering, a self-disposing, it begs a relation to the theological virtue āyatīy, translated in the King James Version as Charity.

The last chapter of this study implied that āyatīy is the fundamental of ontology, if by that we mean the bond through which all beings co-inhere consciously or unconsciously. In its narrower sense, āyatīy is a movement of the will, but there is the need to answer how beings are held together in contextual relationships. Through what do they co-inhere?

Āyatīy, in the narrower sense, as a human virtue, cannot be exercised apart from the self's taking upon itself, in full awareness, the ontological risk. In Being lies the most terrifying risk of all—the continued threat of change, the transformation of a cherished self. My separateness, the self I think the work of my own hands is

I hesitate to agree, for if you mean by "will" the axis of action forward, I am more inclined to put ~~of~~<sup>ity</sup> on the vertical axis with Vision.

There is a genuine "Offering of self," I agree, but toward Heaven rather than toward neighbors, it exists primarily in communion, secondarily in community

(Tillich mixes these two)

imperiled. This self, garnished and hoarded with infinite pains seems often on the point of melting away into the surrounding Nothing — so I think. But this is what Ayatîy requires — a literal offering of it to the Nothing. Truly, the will is puzzled and the threatened disposal, not conscience makes cowards of us all. Ayatîy asks not an end to being, but an offering, a 'dying' in being. Physical death, for what it is, is not a matter of ultimate choice. It requires but resignation. Ayatîy asks not resignation but resolution and therefore it is a matter of ultimate choice. It is involved in duration as death is not; it asks a living death, a perpetual dying to the particular self, the consciously differentiated ego.

When the ego is asserted over against Being, it supports a fiction, since, with Being, no such assertion is, absolutely speaking, valid. Yet how infinitely precious is this dream, that I am alone, a pilgrim and a stranger.

The self's identity is not lost in being but shared in conscious community, or, in unconscious community it sleeps in potency

until perceived. Once perceived it mistakes itself for being and asserts its fictional isolation against all other beings. In this it is most deluded. It can do nothing of itself to be, since it already is, though unaware.\* It is not heroism but intransigence

\* Nietzsche, possessed of the most acute perception of personal identity, seemed fatally blind to its true relationship to Being. He correctly saw himself in dialectical opposition to Christianity, yet few thinkers have served it so well. He is the invaluable critic of Christendom which imagines itself saved where it is "lost." How much more agonizingly near the Cross he was than complacent "Christians."

that asserts identity over against Being conceived as Nothing. Herein lies the most fundamental conflict of all, love / fear. Hatred wills to murder that which thwarts the ego's desire toward absolute exclusiveness.

It is not difficult to see a parallel between the problem of love and the problem

of knowledge. A description of the psychology of Duns Scotus by Christopher Delvin is provocative in this regard:

"The first act of the mind, with its primitive awareness of Being, which plays so important a part in the soul's knowledge of God, plays a part equally important for its knowledge of the outside world. It is... the species or reflection of created nature, or of nature being created, which is the innate form of the intellectual memory. It is also the tendency or habitus of human nature towards completion. It gives the assurance that the mind despite its absorption in material essences, has the whole range of 'Being' for its <sup>p</sup> and adequate object. It also supplies the intention or tendency which adapts the mind to individual reality outside itself. The process of habitual and actual knowing equated with unconscious and conscious, are in inverse order. Unconscious knowing is an evolutionary process - via generationis vel originis - from the most indeterminate, universal

But the person is an individual will  
which does not share the mind's predicament

and generic to the most particular and special, i.e. from nature as the simple subject of creation to the species speciosissima which is the beginning of conscious knowing. Conscious knowing on the other hand, proceeds from the confused intuition of the species speciosissima to the distinct understanding of the most universal concepts of all, namely, being — ens.

"Thus after the first confused contact with reality in the species speciosissima every increase of conscious knowledge consists in a going back over the ground already covered by unconscious knowing — enriched now of course with acquired species. For, although the mind's goal is individuality, it never quite reaches that goal in reality; all its knowledge is in the form of qualities, essences, intentions, rationes, aspects of reality." \*

---

\* C. Delvin, Paper #15, Aquinas Society of London,  
p. 14.

We are presented with this profound irony: Consciousness in order to increase its own knowledge associates more intimately with that which it would escape, namely, the unconscious - which obeys the first law of being: there shall be no qualitative differentiation. Consciousness may not move in one direction except it also move in the other. Again, as observed before, self-consciousness makes the sign of the cross unaware. These two, consciousness and unconsciousness, remain in perpetual wedlock though still relatively independent. Man's freedom, then, consists in his will to dissolve this bond, which in effect is dissolved for him when he so wills it. His head may be forced but never his consent. The real terror lies in his freedom to shatter this union at will yet his terror is that he is chained by love to co-inherence. Theologically stated this is the situation: That God should grant the grace whereby I will His will is His

benignity; that He should grant the grace whereby I may refuse His will is, indeed His charity. Though I turn my back to Him He wills that I shall not be cast out from being; but in His charity He gives me to think myself self-contained and as the dreamer who knows not he dreams I inhabit a nightmare of my own creation, while pursuing a solitary heaven. Love, as the "law of Co-inherence," is inexorable; it is a coin whose other side is justice.

It is not an idle theological speculation to entertain the thought of God's suffering, for where love is refused it can never on that account be withdrawn. Love is not an idea but an act in being—an offering of identification with another—even with his sorrow. Love does not seek to identify with another's love, but with his being and is indifferent to the state of that being. We are invited to enlarge our love toward our neighbour since we are not restricted to seeing merely ourselves, as subjects, in him. It is given to us, if we

choose, to see him as the object of our love, and at all times, since love does not see by estimations.

It is necessary that love should suffer, but though should come to know the fullness of grief, to it is also given all the riches and splendours of the Kingdom of Heaven. The rainbow of being lies in God's hands as in our own.

Clearly, in Avathy, the individual self reaches its superlative expression and returns from where it once had wandered far, alone, without a name.

II

In the second chapter a basic trinity was affirmed as "always with us": the vision; person; and society. Had this study been more comprehensive and specific it should have required a detailed treatment of the relationship of each to each in this trinity. A fundamental question suggests itself. How is this trinity related, if at all, to the faith, hope, and charity trinity of I. Cor. 13. Is the movement forward three basic movements in one? Is it possible that one should never advance beyond the first, faith? Why should St. Paul have asserted that the greatest of the three was charity, or love? He says, in effect, that though I have vision (prophetic powers), all faith, and delivers up my body to be burned (hope?), without love I am nothing!

The vision which I walk toward by faith, since it is not absolutely given,

Faith most fragile  
Hope falls next  
Agape endureth all things !

But such love transforms the "society"  
of the faithful into the less willful,  
less militant body of the K. of H.

my person, an operation whose actions imply hope - the food of the self - are both, vision and person, referred to me and not to another. Still I am nothing. Society, the remaining member, is not referred to me, but by me to another through which I may be in another and another in me - according to my will - this requires love as the bond of co-inherence. "Love never ends," he says, and through its exercise in and by me I am something. All else passes away. Yet love requires persons for its exercise, as persons require love for their life. But now it appears that without love there would be no persons and this would seem to be what he had in mind. As for prophecy, as for knowledge, (as for vision, as for hope) these will pass away but love never ends. Is it to be wondered then, that of the Holy Trinity, the Father,

the Son, the Holy Spirit, the latter should be so little known theologically since He is not referred exclusively to the self?

There seems to be a definite relationship between the Persons and the three-ness of our existence - vision, person, society. St. Augustine spoke of the three things in ourselves,...To Be, to Know, and to Will.\* By faith through the vision we 'create'; by action in hope we know and learn, and that relation between subject and object is dependent upon our will to so relate them. The co-inherence of the Three is the co-inherence of the three in us.

---

\* Aug. Conf. bk. xiii

---

(It is interesting to note that the Sufi Al-Hajwiri speaks of the 'station' (magam) peculiar to Jesus as that of hope as was that of praise (dhikr) to Mohamed.)  
(See T. Wach, Types of Religious Experience, p. 88, Chicago, '51.)

A further question: In what sense do THESE three, vision, person, society share each other's attributes as, for instance, do the Persons of the Blessed Trinity who coalesce in the Unity of the Godhead?

See Coleridge's theory of the Trinity as the "perfect society".

III

There is in the language of ontology an incurable tendency toward metaphor. In fact there is no hard and fast line that can be drawn between mythology and ontology as for instance one can draw between the media of expression in other disciplines. The reason for this is worth exploring since it is an enquiry into the nature of our apprehension of Being. Perhaps, after all, metaphor is the natural key. Not the metaphor we apply to a description of our "recollections in tranquillity" but the metaphor under our very noses as the natural objects of our daily experience — the flat of concrete, a small child's hand, the lily in the field... the infinite vocabulary of nature. These and not our dreams are the prophecies of first importance. Psychoanalysis has taught us that our dreams are records of where

where we have 'been' — at least those dreams significant for analysis. Even when they have some prognosticative value they prophesy like Jonah and we should not forget that Nineveh repented as can we.

There is a language of daylight in objective nature. The Thomists claim this as their doctrine but this is not at all what is intended by 'daylight language.' This daylight metaphor proves nothing for Nature is not dogmatic and lives 'by uncertainty; not by deductions, not by the round and round business of impersonal process but in the glorious risk of life lived, somehow, not for bread alone.'

It is not by one leap that we move but by leaps. Nothing worth while at any moment can be proved upon that particular moment — but there is a chart under our eyes. As Blake said, "If the doors of perception were cleansed . . . !" If they were, more of us should see visions.

IV

There is a theological doctrine which seems uniquely related to the movement forward! It is perhaps the most obscure doctrine for our time despite our interest in eschatology. It is the doctrine of the second coming of Christ. Various interpretations have been offered ranging from its being described as a physical event to come, with catastrophic consequence to the planet, to an apocalyptic notion misunderstood by Christ himself and St. Paul. After all say some, he has just not returned.

Neither of these views is satisfactory. The first, from the point of view of life in the Spirit tends to the trivial. The second fails to account for the fact that religious teaching has generally been embodied in the language of metaphor. The explanation that the metaphor was taken literally, and therefore in error, tells us nothing of what the metaphor itself means. Furthermore such an explanation suggests that Jesus was himself deluded.

This is not at all clear. It is one thing to suggest he was ignorant of many things that are common possessions today. It is quite another to say that as regards matters of religious experience, doctrinally expressed, we are more in the know.

Clearly, there is a qualitative difference between the first advent and the second. The first is an historical datum — something expressed as occurring once in the simple past. That is to say, one man, Jesus of Nazareth realized Christ in himself and the Eternal Christ, God Expressed, realized himself in a particular man during the term of that man's particular life.

Except for the fact that this life witness demonstrated the Logos en-fleshed, the first advent is of little moment to me who am removed some 2,000 yrs. from it in time. To say one's salvation wholly depends upon this historical

Satum seems arbitrary and artificial.  
In this sense, my salvation is not his  
salvation; that is, fulfillment into  
God-manhood is the relationship awarded  
to anyone in Christ, in completeness,  
since one is not in Christ wholly except  
Christ be wholly in him.

On the other hand, the second  
advent, better described as a second  
coming, is by function a different  
event. It is difficult to see how it can  
be grasped conceptually as other than in  
participle. If Christ were to reappear  
only in historical time as we measure it  
by the calendar, it would be for some  
the first time, for others the alleged  
second. (There would then be real  
significance to a repetition of the first  
advent.

The second advent can be  
understood as qualitatively a double  
movement in time. It is both an

intra- and trans-historical event. If he is to come again it must be as more than simple physical appearance since, as one might say, God never does the same thing twice. Consequently the Church has ever emphasized the eschatological significance of the second coming, — an event in time, bringing about, at that precise time a new order. But this is ambiguous. Is the order in time only? Clearly, it cannot be so restricted. Is it then out of time (and so out of this world) only? Then it could not be perceived by every eye as scripture foretells. It must be in time and out of it at the same time, the same instant. This is not just a clever riddle.

A man, who upon hearing of Jesus Christ, comes into knowledge of the Kingdom of Heaven may become fully in Christ and Christ may indeed him. At that instant he is truly a son of God — in God-manhood — a state which shares in this world a

corporal existence and at the same time union with the Eternal Logos. This is a very difficult doctrine but one which the Christian mystics stress continually. In and out of time: in time as participant in the finite flesh (Christ in me); out of time, since the Kingdom of Heaven is un-perishable, eternal, not here, not there, an experience not susceptible of rational description except as a mortal in time is the subject of the ineffable through Christ. When the actuality of Christ combines fully with the potentiality of the human person, indeed, for that person there is a new heaven and a new earth. But this by no means exhausts the concept of the second coming.

The material manifestation of a new earth, in time, is not to be lightly dismissed. A human community could be composed of men and women wholly "in Christ" and "Christ wholly in them".

On the other hand it is manifestly naïve to expect this new earth to appear miraculously by some divine fiat just because a community of self-styled saints assert they have 'faith' in an historical datum, namely, the first advent two millennia ago.

It is instructive to note Jesus saying: (John 14.) "I go to prepare a place for you... that where I am there ye may be also." He did not say, where I will be, but where I am, which must have included 'where' he was at the very time he made this promise. Where had he to go? Nowhere as place, since the Kingdom of Heaven is 'not here,' 'not there,' but in our midst had we eyes to see, and if anyone was in the Kingdom of Heaven it was he. If not a place spatio-temporally conceived then to where? Where else except right where he was metaphorically expressed. In any case,

the disciples had at the time no notion of where he was at the time he spoke with them, let alone whenever he might come to be in their imaginations later. He was preparing a place for them right there, through his instruction, a table prepared for them, but strangely extra-dimensional.

It is idle to talk of "a new order of time," for this is manifestly still metaphysical and can have no substantially rational meaning. The Kingdom of Heaven as a future term on the calendar is just as remote a point in time — as we experience it — as it is in some mythical new kind of time. Let us face it: Time is Time and we require something other than merely a different kind of the same if this doctrine is to have meaning.

Again, the Second Coming is an event in principle — a continuous action, world without end. Within this spiritual

I think your version of the  
K. of H. is an adequate doctrine  
of the Second Coming, his coming  
"in power" as a presence.

In general, this makes an interesting  
and instructive "metaphysical journal"  
but Marcel is a dangerous model!  
For he encourages writers to let their  
minds wander and record all the wanderings.  
This makes for tedious literature except to  
psycho-analysts!

context any number of physical  
appearances, mutations, novelties and  
transformations may come and go, none  
being definitive or final in themselves;  
for the Kingdom of Heaven is nothing  
unless it illuminate these corporeal date;  
it is nothing unless it flood our very  
midst with incomparable grandeur,  
nothing unless it seeps into every hidden  
pore and crevice as silently as mist. It  
is a living continuum perpetually in our  
midst; it was, is, and ever shall be  
the one world without end.

Bibliography of Works Cited.

St. Augustine, Confessions, Pocket Books Inc.,  
Condensed ed., C-27, 1953.

Delvin, Christopher, The Psychology of Duns  
Scotus, Paper #15, Aquinas  
Society of London, Blackfriars,  
Oxford.

Dostoevsky, F.M., Notes from the Underground,  
quoted in Existentialism from  
Dostoevsky to Sartre, Meridian Books,  
M 39 N.Y. 1956

Gospel Parallels, Thos. Nelson and Sons, Toronto;  
N.Y.; Edinburgh, 1949

Kierkegaard, S., Fear and Trembling and  
The Sickness Unto Death, Double-  
day Anchor Book A 30, N.Y. 1955

Marcel, G., Being and Having, trans.  
K. Farrer, The Beacon Press, Boston  
1951

Martain J., The Person and the Common Good, Review of Politics, Vol. 8,  
#4, 10. 46

Sartre, Jean-Paul, Existentialism is a Humanism, Meridian Books,  
1939, op. cit.

Wach, J., Types of Religious Experience,  
University of Chicago, 1951

Williams, Chas., The Descent of the Dove,  
Living Age Books, LAS,  
Meridian Books, N.Y. 1956.