

Educating World Citizens: Toward Multinational Curriculum Development

Walter C. Parker
University of Washington
Akira Ninomiya
Hiroshima University
John Cogan
University of Minnesota

School curricula are virtually everywhere developed nationally and intranationally—by national or local curriculum committees. Ironically, even the portion of the curriculum that involves world study (e.g., courses in world history, world geography, world problems) is developed within nations. Has the time not come to create some portions of the school curriculum multinationally? A multinational research team from nine nations used Cultural Futures Delphi procedures to interview then survey iteratively a multinational panel drawn from an array of fields in the same nine nations. The panelists reached consensus on (a) complex global crises that humans will face in the next 25 years, (b) human characteristics needed for dealing with these crises, and (c) education strategies needed for developing these characteristics. Interpreting these findings, the research team developed a curriculum geared to the development of world citizens capable of dealing with the crises.

WALTER C. PARKER is Professor of Education, College of Education, University of Washington, 115 Miller Hall, Box 353600, Seattle, WA 98195-3600. His specializations are democratic education and social studies education.

AKIRA NINOMIYA is Professor of Education, Hiroshima University, 1-1-2 Kagamiyama, Higashi-Hiroshima-shi 724, Japan. His specializations are comparative education and international education.

JOHN COGAN is Professor of Education, University of Minnesota, 125 Peik Hall, Minneapolis, MN 55455-0208. His specializations are citizenship education and global education.

On a rainy morning at a coffeehouse near campus, one of the authors of this article was telling a colleague about the research we report here. "Educators from nine nations in Asia, North America, and Europe have developed a set of school curriculum recommendations based on interviews and surveys with policy leaders in each of those nations," he began. "The world is changing, and the world studies curriculum in the schools needs to change with it." "Sure it does," replied the colleague, "but when hasn't the world been changing? And when haven't educators been revising the curriculum to keep up with it? Didn't you read *The Saber-Tooth Curriculum*?" She was referring to the famous satire on curricular entrenchment written by Harold Benjamin in 1939. Benjamin, under the pseudonym J. Abner Peddiwell, described a prehistoric society in which the major survival tasks were scaring away saber-toothed tigers with fire and catching fish with bare hands. The schools in this society had tailored a utilitarian curriculum to these tasks, teaching students to grab fish by hand and use fire to frighten away tigers. In time, the world changed: Glaciers muddied the rivers and drove the tigers south. Fish nets were invented, since the fish couldn't be seen, let alone grabbed. Yet, the school curriculum continued to feature tiger scaring and fish grabbing. These had served society well in the past and were by now thought to be estimable human achievements in their own right. They were the things anyone with an ounce of intelligence knew how to do, and knowing how to do them well made one a well-educated person.

Benjamin's book both expressed and fueled the instrumentalist desire among educators in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s to remake the curriculum, clearing it of what they believed were outdated subject matters tied to retrograde social aims and realities (e.g., Caswell & Campbell, 1935; Counts, 1932; Kilpatrick, 1936).¹ The destabilization of traditional communities by the modern forces of capitalism, industrialization, secularization, metropolitanism, rationality, democracy and immigration had loaded a buzzing array of topics and concerns onto the schools. Accordingly, updating the curriculum was the order of the day. Our colleague's point was that it is *still* the order of the day; she wondered what we were getting excited about. For better or worse, the rapid pace of change throughout this century in both developed (e.g., Canada, Japan) and developing² (e.g., Thailand, Hungary) societies has made instrumentalists, and therefore forecasters, of most educators. Educators are joined across the decades and across national and cultural boundaries with the belief that children should be educated for what is always a combination of existing and anticipated states of affairs. They are perennially trying to forecast and decipher social trends and develop the next in a long line of "next" curricula dating back to the saber-toothed curriculum and whatever preceded it.

This is no easy task. First, the rate and volatility of modern social change makes curriculum development an endless task. The job is never done. Second, the difficulty of forecasting makes curriculum development inevitably off-target. The job is never done "just right." Third, value conflicts within societies make the school curriculum a hotly contested social terrain.

Stakeholders argue vehemently over aims and procedures. North Americans, for example, divide their loyalty between market-oriented and democracy-oriented curriculum reform. In Japan, educators struggle to internationalize the curriculum, which they are convinced has been insular and chauvinist; at the same time, nostalgia for homogeneity and exceptionalism runs strong. Hungarian educators debate the school curriculum in the same terms used to debate the social and political aims of the broader society, chief among which is the contest between social democracy and capitalist democracy. Everywhere, *relevance* is the watchword as educators attempt to tailor the curriculum to anticipated social needs.

Amid the perennial updating, however, curriculum renewal efforts have been largely national and local as distinct from regional or multinational. The tools and perspectives employed by curriculum workers in these nations thus have been limited in perspective and reach. The national and intranational cast of their work has accomplished important goals, among them nation-building, civic cohesion, employment training geared to the national and local political economy, and military-industrial competition and cooperation with other nations. Other goals, however, are removed from consideration or placed so far out on the periphery of curriculum deliberation as to be taken seriously by almost no one, even if they are included with some regularity in official curriculum documents (e.g., "to prepare young people . . . for citizenship . . . in an interdependent world," Michigan State Board of Education, 1995, p. 1). Chief among these marginalized goals is civic education of a global kind—education for shared problem solving on messy international problems and, thereby, the cultivation of a global perspective on such problems (Case, 1993; Hanvey, 1978; Willinsky, 1992) and the eventual emergence of what Elise Boulding (1988) calls a "global civic culture" in her book of the same name.

Even reform efforts aimed ostensibly at "global education" or "international studies" or "world problems" proceed in ways that are heavily nation-bound—that is, supposedly international curricula are typically developed nationally. Exceptions can be found but typically there are *calls* for this sort of work³ as distinct from *projects* that attempt it. National or local committees, along with textbook authors, do most of the actual curriculum theorizing and curriculum decision making, and, because they are no more superhuman than the rest of us in their capacity to transcend their vantage points, their work is constrained by local and/or national conceptual frameworks and representations of "the world." It could not be otherwise, for locus matters; there is no neutral ground. It matters where and with whom one is planning.

The study we report here shares one key similarity with the conventional approach to curriculum development: Our effort was a continuation (for better or worse) of the instrumentalist tradition of remaking curricula for the purpose of achieving relevance to extant and forecasted social realities. However, it was different in both locus and focus. As for locus, it was situated multinationally from the start. It was by purposes and procedures

a multinational effort to develop both the forecast and the set of curriculum recommendations tailored to it. This will be detailed in the next section. As for focus, the object of our inquiry was education for citizenship, which has been predominantly a national and intranational concern in virtually every nation. By definition, modern citizenship is closely aligned to national borders and national identities (Beiner, 1995; Oommen, 1997) and, in federated nations, to states and provinces as well. By contrast, this study broached the subject of world or what we will call *multidimensional* citizenship as the aim of curriculum development. It rested on the view that the time has come for the next curriculum to be in some respects a shared world curriculum, developed at least in part by a multinational team, since the next world to which the curriculum must be made relevant is increasingly a shared world.

Purpose and Method

Our purpose was to generate school curriculum recommendations that were multinational in origin, perspective, and aim and that were responsive to a crisis-laden, interconnected world. Such recommendations, we reasoned, would have to be developed by a multinational research team, the members of which would decide together which data to gather and what sense to make of it. Such a research team was drawn from nine nations in four geopolitical regions: East Asia (Japan), Southeast Asia (Thailand), Europe (United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Hungary, Germany, Greece), and North America (Canada, The United States).⁴ Over a 4-year period, this team, numbering 26, collaboratively planned the study, gathered and analyzed data, deliberated the findings, and transformed them into a set of curriculum recommendations. To facilitate regional planning meetings between meetings of the entire research team, the researchers were divided among four smaller groups corresponding to the geopolitical regions; hence, there was a Japanese team (five members), a Thai team (six members), a European team (five members, each from a different nation), and a North American team (three Canadians, seven from the United States), adding up to 26.

Data

First, we needed to apprehend this crisis-laden, interconnected world. Accordingly, we identified a multinational panel of informants composed of 182 scholars, practitioners, and policy leaders selected from the fields of science and technology; health and education; politics and government; business, industry, and labor; and the arts in each of the nine nations above. Each of the four research subteams met to identify a pool of potential panelists. Many more were identified than could be included, and so decisions were made for each category by the regional subteams. Four decision criteria were developed to guide this decision making, and each panelist had to meet each criterion. The criteria, as they eventually settled out from negotiations among research team members, were (as translated into English):

- *future orientation* as demonstrated by the ability to envision changes and opportunities in the future;
- *leadership* in one's field as demonstrated in speeches, writings, or their esteem among peers;
- *interest in civic affairs* as demonstrated in speeches, writings, policies implemented, or participation in civic groups;
- *knowledge of global trends and issues* as demonstrated in speeches, writings, and policies.

Additionally, the research team agreed that the selection of panelists by each subteam would reflect as much as possible balance in gender, ethnicity, and between scholars and practitioners in the several categories.

Cross-cultural methods of data gathering and analysis were required. The research team selected a cross-cultural adaptation of the Ethnographic Delphi Futures Research model (Linstone & Turoff, 1975; Poolpatarachewin, 1980), which has been widely used to forecast future circumstances for the purpose of informing policymaking in government, civil society, and industry. The adaptation, called Cultural Futures Delphi, begins with interviews of a subset of the panel and proceeds to iterative surveys of the entire panel. Our interview subset was large: 110 members of the 182-member panel participated in the interview round. These interviews were conducted for the purpose of developing a survey instrument, which was administered subsequently to the entire panel. We were seeking the panelists' agreement on global *trends* over the next 25 years, the desirable citizen *characteristics* they believed were needed for dealing with these changes, and the *strategies* likely to develop such citizens. Hence, the interview schedule had three main questions:

1. What are the major global trends likely to have a significant impact on the lives of people during the next 25 years?
2. What will be the characteristics required of individuals in order to cope with and manage these trends?
3. How might these characteristics be developed? What approaches, strategies, or innovations might best implement these characteristics?

Next, using the data gathered in the interviews, a survey was developed. This work was done by the entire research team meeting face-to-face in Minneapolis. The survey contained 106 items including 60 trend statements, 20 characteristics, and 26 strategies for achieving those characteristics. The entire panel (not only the subset that was interviewed) was asked to complete the survey. They were instructed to rate each of the trends on two 6-point scales—one indicating the desirability of that trend, the other indicating the probability of it actually occurring during the next 25 years. They were instructed to rate each of the strategies on another 6-point scale, this one indicating how strongly they would recommend that strategy. (See Figures 1 and 2.) With the 20 characteristics, they were asked to select five

Desirability					
Highly desirable			Not desirable		
6	5	4	3	2	1

Probability					
Highly likely			Not likely		
6	5	4	3	2	1

Figure 1. Trend: People will continue to support economic expansion even though it may increase stress on the environment

they judged to be most important. The instrument was translated into the relevant languages, then back-translated to assure validity.

After this survey was returned by the panelists, a second survey was created. It contained the same items as on the first survey, except that it contained feedback: Now panelists could see how one another had responded on the first survey. Alongside each trend and strategy statement was given the interquartile range and median value of the ratings on the first survey. Also given was with the individual panelist's own response (as a reminder). On the citizen characteristics statements, the feedback given was the percentage of panelists that had selected each characteristic for their priority list of five. In this way, a panelist was given aggregate international data in the light of which his or her own response could be reconsidered and changed if desired. Panelists thus were afforded an exchange of views—albeit a virtual exchange—which gave them an opportunity to learn of one another's judgments, rethink their own responses, and record any change of mind. This is the advantage of the Delphi survey method, all the moreso given the multinational composition of the panel.

Analysis and Interpretation

Following the administration of the second survey, the research team analyzed the results first for the purpose of finding areas of consensus among the panelists and then for the purpose of formulating curriculum recommendations. Accordingly, the consensus trends, characteristics, and

Recommend					
Highly recommended			Not recommended		
6	5	4	3	2	1

Figure 2. Strategy: Promote schools as active centers of community life and as agents for community development

strategies were the first set of findings, and they are presented next. There was a second, interpretive set of findings as well, which is presented subsequently. These are the curriculum recommendations developed by the research team *using as a shared text the earlier analytic findings*. The interpretive method used to develop these recommendations was deliberation: face-to-face discussion for the purpose of decision making (Reid, 1981; Schwab, 1970). Team members together deliberated the trends, characteristics, and strategies and developed from them a set of education policy recommendations directed at educators in the nine nations. These recommendations fall into four categories: school-community interaction, classroom practice, teacher education, and curriculum. This report deals with the last of these: curriculum.⁵ We present first the analytic findings.

Analytic Findings: Consensus Trends, Characteristics, and Strategies

We begin with the consensus findings of the Cultural Futures Delphi. The decision rules for determining consensus were as follows: A trend or strategy was said to have achieved consensus if the mode minus the median on the 6-point scale for that item was less than or equal to 1.0 and if the interquartile range was less than or equal to 1.5. A characteristic was said to have achieved consensus if the characteristic was selected by 25% or more of the panelists for inclusion in their list of the top five (of 20) characteristics.⁶

Trends

The 182 members of the international panel reached consensus on 19 of 60 trends. These fell into three categories, which the research team named Increasingly Significant Challenges, Areas to Monitor, and Areas to Encourage (see Table 1). Each category represents a particular blend of desirability and probability and, thus, demands a particular level of consideration by citizens and policymakers so that policies are developed that might encourage desirable trends and discourage or manage undesirable trends.

The category called Increasingly Significant Challenges contains seven trends that are undesirable but highly probable (i.e., crises). The dominant theme is increasing inequality coupled with increasing resource scarcity. The second category, Areas to Monitor, contains seven middle-ground trends identified by the panel as either undesirable but only moderately probable, or very probable but only moderately desirable. Not quite crises, they deserve attention. An ominous theme in this group of trends is a general increase in undesirable life conditions, such as drug-related urban crime, combined with a decrease in citizens' ability to do anything about it. The third category, Areas to Encourage, contains five trends identified by panelists as highly or very highly desirable and highly to moderately probable. These trends provide some grounds for optimism—that is, they are good, and they are likely.

Table 1

Trends

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- I. Increasingly significant challenges (crises)
- The economic gap among countries and between people within countries will widen significantly.
 - Information technologies will dramatically reduce the privacy of individuals.
 - The inequalities between those who have access to information technologies and those who do not will increase dramatically.
 - Conflict of interest between developing and developed nations will increase due to environmental deterioration.
 - The cost of obtaining adequate water will rise dramatically due to population growth and environmental deterioration.
 - Deforestation will dramatically affect diversity of life, air, soil, and water quality.
 - In developing countries, population growth will result in a dramatic increase in the percentage of people, especially children, living in poverty.
- II. Areas to monitor
- Undesirable but only moderately probable:
- Individuals, families, and communities will lose political influence due to the increased level of regulation and control by governments.
 - It will be increasingly difficult to develop a shared belief of the common good.
 - Drug-related crime will increasingly dominate social life in urban areas.
 - People's sense of community and social responsibility will decline significantly.
 - Consumerism will increasingly dominate social life.
- Very probable but only moderately desirable:
- Migration that flows from poor to rich areas, both within countries and between countries, will have a major impact on the internal and external order of nations.
 - The increased use of genetic engineering will create more complex ethical questions.
- III. Areas to encourage
- Highly desirable and highly probable:
- Economic growth will be fueled by knowledge (ideas, innovations, and inventions) more than by natural resources.
- Very highly desirable but only moderately probable:
- Corporations will increasingly adopt measures of environmental conservation in order to remain competitive.
 - Systematic inequalities (e.g., racism, ethnocentrism, sexism) will decrease significantly.
- Highly desirable and moderately probable:
- Previously marginalized groups of individuals (e.g., women, ethnic minorities) will occupy more positions of power.
 - More regional alliances will be developed as a way of achieving peace and security.
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Citizen Characteristics

The panel reached consensus on 8 of 20 competencies that citizens will need for dealing with the undesirable trends and encouraging the desirable ones. The eight are presented in descending order of importance as judged by the panelists. Note, in light of the trends above, that the most important

characteristic of the eight is the ability to deal with serious worldwide problems as a member of a worldwide society. Easy to overlook or to dismiss as utopian, perhaps because of the national framework that is entrenched in thought and custom, this characteristic undergirds each of the others, and it powered the research team's curriculum recommendations (presented next).

- Ability to look at and approach problems as a member of a global society.
- Ability to work with others in a cooperative way and to take responsibility for one's roles/duties within society.
- Ability to understand, accept, appreciate, and tolerate cultural differences.
- Capacity to think in a critical and systemic way.
- Willingness to resolve conflict in a nonviolent manner.
- Willingness and ability to participate in politics at local, national, and international levels.
- Willingness to change one's lifestyle and consumption habits to protect the environment.
- Ability to be sensitive toward and to defend human rights (e.g., rights of women, ethnic minorities).

Educational Strategies

The panel reached consensus on 16 of 26 strategies that are very highly or highly recommended for consideration and action by policymakers. Critical thinking is the most highly recommended strategy. Critical thinking⁷ has been a favorite cause among educators for decades, of course, but here we have an international panel of scholars and practitioners, a minority of whom were educators, giving its strongest joint recommendation to it. The curriculum recommendations that are presented next will express this strategy recommendation directly: It is a question-driven (not answer-driven) curriculum with deliberation (not transmission) the pedagogy of choice. Note also, in these consensus strategies, the emphasis on multinational contacts and cooperation. "Critical thinking with different others on the crises named in the trends section" is how the research team summed up the consensus strategies.

Very highly recommended:

- Support the teaching of subject matter in a manner that encourages children to think critically.
- Emphasize students' ability to critically assess information in an increasingly media-based society.

Highly recommended:

- Establish a curriculum which uses the potential of information-based technologies.
- Establish extensive international links among educational institutions at all levels to support international studies and research and curriculum development focusing on citizenship education.

- Cultivate a teaching population with international experience and cross-cultural sensitivity.
- Implement programs of international student exchange in order to promote mutual understandings among different cultures.
- Increase attention in the curriculum to global issues and international studies.
- Establish extensive liaisons and joint projects among schools and other social institutions (e.g., industry, NGOs, churches, community groups) to support education.
- Require that opportunities for community action and involvement be an important feature of the school curriculum.
- Promote schools as active centers of community life and as agents for community development.
- Decentralize decision making so that local communities and individual schools have considerable control of curriculum and educational administration.
- Increase opportunities for students to be involved in cooperative learning activities.
- Demand that the mass media act in a socially responsible, educative manner.
- Implement programs that effectively use the talents and skills of an aging population.
- Demand that all major social institutions and their officials set high standards of civic responsibility.
- Ensure that all social institutions (including the family and educational religious institutions) have an abiding respect for the basic rights of children and contribute to their well-being.

Interpretive Findings: Curriculum Recommendations

Now to the interpretive findings. Arriving at these was neither a matter of description nor analysis-by-decision-rules but, as Harry Wolcott (1994) describes the interpretive mode, an attempt to stretch beyond rule-bound analyses for broader and less constrained discussions about what is to be made of the data and the analysis for the purpose at hand.⁸ Our purpose, recall, was to decide on a set of multinational curriculum recommendations that were derived from the panel's judgments on world trends, needed human characteristics, and strategies for developing them. Accordingly, research team members together examined the consensus findings, now using them as the shared text for a series of interpretive discussions with the aim to decide on curriculum recommendations. Discussion with an eye toward curriculum decision making is otherwise known as *curriculum deliberation*.⁹ This was done across four days at a research team meeting in Hiroshima, Japan. Hiroshima is not just any modern city, of course; thus, it provided a historically unique and compelling locale for the interpretive work.

The set of recommendations that resulted is, in brief, a multinational, deliberation-based school curriculum focused on complex worldwide ethical problems. It is to be undertaken by students in each of the nine nations, and its goal is the development of multidimensional citizens. In this section, we elaborate this recommendation. We begin by defining the terms *multidimensional*, *multinational*, and then *deliberation*, then we describe the four components of the curriculum: (a) ethical questions for deliberation and (b) related concepts, (c) skills, and (d) attitudes.

Multidimensional Citizenship

Multidimensional citizens are men and women who possess the consensus characteristics described earlier and are thereby enabled (at least more than without them) to anticipate and grapple with the trends that make these characteristics necessary in the first place. We are well aware that these same men and women have numerous other characteristics as well, both cultural and individual. The citizen identity is surely not the only identity modern people have; they also have ethnic and gender identities, vocational and social class identities, religious and racial, regional and local; they have identities as individuals, memberships in faith communities and other associations, and avocations of all sorts. To the extent that they have a citizen identity, they have it in widely varying degrees of elaboration and self-consciousness, and they value it, or do not, in many ways. One person may surmise legalistically, "I am a citizen of Canada; my grandparents are citizens of Japan." Another may think, "My citizenship is Canadian, and that refers to the laws and protections and obligations I have; but my culture is Japanese-Canadian, my faith is Catholic, my race is Asian, and I am first and foremost a mother."

By multidimensional citizenship, we mean to capture the personal, social, spatial, and temporal aspects of the citizen identity that are necessary for meeting the challenges of the early 21st century. The *personal* dimension involves mainly the personal commitment to nurture a citizen identity among one's other identities and with it a civic ethic characterized by socially responsible habits of mind, heart, and action. The *social* dimension involves the ability and willingness to work with other citizens in a variety of public settings creating common ground and respectfully deliberating public problems with one another, especially those who are different culturally or politically from oneself. The *spatial* dimension refers to the modern requirement that citizens see themselves as members of multiple overlapping communities: local, regional, national, and global. The challenges of the 21st century transcend national boundaries—we could call them supranational or transnational challenges. Persons and groups who are going to face those challenges together, forging action in concert, must be able to think and act flexibly within multiple community affiliations. The *temporal* dimension means that citizens need to mount simultaneously a past-present-and-future outlook. Citizens cannot be so preoccupied with the present that they lose sight of the past and the future, nor can they be so preoccupied with the

past that they undermine inventive thought in the present. Heritage and tradition matter tremendously in personal development, politics, and social relations, yet so does imaginative, future-oriented problem solving about the increasingly significant challenges of the coming century. Citizens must be well-informed by history, yet they cannot be trapped by the past in a way that prevents them from creating a good future.

This is a tall order. The personal, social, and temporal dimensions of contemporary citizenship are difficult enough, let alone the spatial. The intention to get along with others significantly different from oneself and the willingness to reason historically are long-standing human goals that appear to have barely taken hold in any society. Wishful thinkers are reminded by those who have seen in history, whether in Hiroshima, Auschwitz, Bosnia, Cambodia, or Rwanda, that “the world was and is a charnel house” (Rieff, 1997, p. 2). Yet, the spatial dimension asks educators to aim still higher, for here is the requirement for divided sovereignty and multiply situated selves. Two millennia ago, Cicero (1960) argued for a similar kind of world citizenship in his *Duties and Commonwealth*, saying that humans owed recognition and respect to one another regardless of their immediate interests and affiliations—their being Romans or Greeks, for example. This line of reasoning made him and the Stoics famous—they were the West’s first multiculturalists—but let us remember that he was beheaded and a needle stuck through his tongue for saying such things. Michael Sandel clarifies for our own time what Cicero was driving at in his:

Since the days of Aristotle’s polis, the republican tradition has viewed self-government as an activity rooted in a particular place, carried out by citizens loyal to that place and the way of life it embodies. Self-government today, however, requires a politics that plays itself out in a multiplicity of settings, from neighborhoods to nations to the world as a whole. Such a politics requires citizens who can abide the ambiguity associated with divided sovereignty, who can think and act as multiply situated selves. The civic virtue distinctive to our time is the capacity to negotiate our way among the sometimes overlapping and sometimes conflicting obligations that claim us, to live with the tension to which multiple loyalties give rise. (1996, p. 350)

Is the notion of “multiple loyalties” utopian? Are those who espouse it doomed to mockery and having needles stuck through their tongues by cultural nationalists and other patriots? The research team believes not, because there already are so many movements in this direction. Multiple loyalties are a well established necessity in many, perhaps most, modern societies: kinship, ethnic, racial, occupational, gender, and class affiliations, to name a few, are experienced simultaneously. Furthermore, migrations within and between societies require the assumption and abandonment of political and national identities. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (1992) captures the pluralization of identity in his examination of human rights from a cross-cultural perspective. Culture itself is dynamic, recall, not the fixed and

intensely homogeneous entity we are inclined to make it when we stereotype the members of a particular cultural group (Tibetans are Ibo are non-Westerners are Women are My people are). "Internal cultural discourse," as An-Na'im terms it, is usually more common within a cultural boundary than outsiders are wont to notice; it is the chief means by which disadvantaged individuals and groups *within* a culture press the entrenched powers for negotiation of the societal norms to which members are held. This internal cultural discourse, along with cross-cultural dialogue (e.g., Catholics and Buddhists sitting together on a village council in Japan), indicates that multiple identities are increasingly a fact of modern life. This in turn provides a foundation for widening the identity array to include that of global citizen.¹⁰

Multinational

The curriculum we propose is multinational in two ways. First, its core subject matter is explicitly organized around pressing and complex problems that affect persons across national boundaries. The primary subject matter of the curriculum is a set of six ethical questions that the research team derived from the consensus trends, characteristics, and strategies. The ethical questions are:

1. What should be done in order to promote equity and fairness within and among societies?
2. What should be the balance between the right to privacy and free and open access to information in information-based societies?
3. What should be the balance between protecting the environment and meeting human needs?
4. What should be done to cope with population growth, genetic engineering, and children in poverty?
5. What should be done to develop shared (universal, global) values while respecting local values?
6. What should be done to secure an ethically based distribution of power for deciding policy and action on the above issues?

These questions are augmented by a set of related concepts, skills, and attitudes. Each is pertinent to considering the six ethical questions knowledgeably, critically, cooperatively—as members of a global public. (Recall the top-ranked characteristic above. We will have more to say about this concept shortly.)

Second, the curriculum is multinational by virtue of the fact that its implementation is intended to occur across national boundaries. The research team recommends that curriculum committees in the nine nations specify primary and secondary grade course experiences that have students join these questions, form these concepts, and develop these skills and attitudes over a number of years. It recommends, further, that specific courses be designed as capstone experiences in which students address this subject matter squarely as the core focus of the course. A common syllabus dealing with these four components could unite sections of a high-school

Contemporary World Problems course *in each nation*. This course could share a broad syllabus that is elaborated locally and shared by electronic or other means with course participants in other nations. Students' work on the questions could be shared and discussed multinationally.

Deliberation

The proposed curriculum is *deliberation-based*. This means that the core practice in the curriculum is discussion of the ethical questions themselves with the intention of recommending suitable public action. The English word deliberation derives from the Latin *libra* for *scale*. Deliberation means to weigh, as in weighing which actions will best address a problem. Here, deliberation is used to mean making choices about what to do about problems a group is facing in common. Neither negotiation nor debate, deliberation is making decisions together about the kind of world a "we" wants to forge.

The research team understands that goals are transformed right within the process of public discourse. For this reason, deliberation is not only an instructional means but a curriculum outcome itself, for it creates a particular kind of democratic public culture among the deliberators: listening as well as talking, sharing resources, forging decisions together rather than only advocating positions taken earlier, and coming to disagreement. Because the issues being deliberated in the curriculum are multinational issues, and because students are conjoining in some way (e.g., face-to-face, electronic) on these common problems, this curriculum has the potential to contribute to the development of what Elise Boulding (1988) called a "global civic culture" or what today might be called a transnational civil society.¹¹ That is, by moving purposefully toward a multinational perspective on citizenship and citizenship education, this project loosens somewhat the conventional meaning of *citizen* as one who has membership in a political entity, such as a nation or province, and raises the concept *world citizen*. There is no world political entity (a world state) in which an individual might have membership, of course, and the participants in this study—the panelists and the researchers alike—were not interested in advocating such an entity; rather, *world citizen* comes to mean, as in the spatial dimension of citizenship discussed earlier, one for whom the commonwealth is not only a local or national political community but, alongside these, a transnational civic culture concerned with global problems and global problem solving.

Ethical Questions

We are not recommending an international relations curriculum. Our goal is different: a multinational problems curriculum featuring six ethical questions as the core subject matter. Each question is built around ideas and tensions that were judged to be central to understanding and acting on the trends identified by the panel: equity and fairness, privacy and access to information, environmental stewardship and human prosperity, population growth and child care, universalism and particularism, and power relations.

But why ethical questions? The research team was struck by the ethical mandates embedded in the consensus characteristics and strategies. The Thai and Japanese members of the research team repeatedly brought the team's attention to one of the consensus educational strategies: "Ensure that all social institutions (including the family and educational religious institutions) have an abiding respect for the basic rights of children and contribute to their well-being." Keeping children uppermost in mind—not just our children but all children—keeps the global responsibilities of citizenship in the foreground, and focusing on children's well-being requires the continual enactment of an ethical imagination—seeing what can be done that is not now being done, anticipating conflict and preventing it, planning ahead for coming crises (e.g., water shortage), and, most of all, paying close and continual attention to the lives of children. We look more closely now at why the team decided on questions and why deliberation was selected as the pedagogic vehicle for the curriculum.

First, why questions? There were two reasons. A consensus item on the strategies list, "Support the teaching of subject matter in a manner that encourages children to think critically," suggests that students should be helped to join questions rather than merely learn answers. More basic than this pedagogical reason, however, is a substantive one: The team did not believe that answers were available. The consensus trends identified by the multinational panel pose extraordinarily complex social, cultural, and environmental problems. These are messy, real problems of the sort that, in John Dewey's words, are "set by actual social situations which are themselves conflicting and confused" (1939, p. 498). "Actual" problems, particularly world civic problems, are inherently woolly and controversial. They do not fit easily into disciplinary frameworks taken from the inventories of knowledge amassed in each academic field. Such frameworks are important to problem-solving, to be sure, and are one of the four components of the recommended curriculum, but they are resources to the problem-solving activity and no substitute for it. In fact, such frameworks are revised during the activity of problem solving.

Accordingly, the six questions confront students with what psychologists call "ill-structured" problem arenas.¹² Scholars and citizens are barely able to define, let alone understand or solve, them. Consider the trend, "Conflicts of interest between developing and developed nations will increase due to environmental deterioration." Much of the information that would be helpful in an attempt, first, to understand this problem and then to reason toward a course of action is absent from the presentation of the problem, and competing perspectives and value orientations can and will be brought to bear on it. Numerous solutions are possible, assuming one ever grasps the problem itself, and citizens are bound to disagree on the best course of action. In brief, these are both serious and difficult problems. Our recommendation is that students in diverse nations be taught to tackle them together, striving to forge policy recommendations together and to communicate with one another and officials their understanding of the problems.

Moreover, why deliberation? When a group deliberates, it is trying to decide on the best course of action from among the alternatives. Deliberation ends, therefore, not in action itself but in a decision to take a particular course of action. Forging that decision together, reasoning together, generating and weighing alternatives together, is the main activity of deliberation. It is, practically speaking, discussion with an eye toward decision making. It is thus a prudential, moral, and circumstantial activity. Before it begins, the parties to it have experienced a problematic situation together which motivates the deliberation in the first place. Of course, in heterogeneous societies, deliberation is done with persons who are more or less different from one another (in political views, religion, language, gender, race, ethnicity, social status, income, and power); we recommend for pedagogical purposes, therefore, that the deliberative groups—schools and classrooms—be as diverse as possible in these ways. What the participants have in common are the problems they experience together and must work out together. It is a problematic situation that has brought them together in the first place; this is the common ground that makes of them a single public, a “We the people,” at least for the time being.

In addition to the problems themselves, what brings the participants together is dialogue itself:

Dialogue is not a matter of two isolated persons who simply decide to start talking with one another Once constituted as a relation, the dialogical encounter engages the participants in a process at once symbiotic and synergistic; beyond a particular point, no one may be consciously guiding or directing it, and the order and flow of the communicative exchange itself take over. The participants are *caught up*; they are *absorbed*. (Burbules, 1993, p. 21)

There are ways other than deliberation for publics to decide the question, “What should we do?” Voting is one way. In a plurality, the alternative that receives the most votes wins; in a majority system, a decision is not reached until one of the options wins at least 51% of the votes. Either way, the give-and-take of discussion is not required. In the electronic at-home systems being considered in numerous nations, the decision could be made by individuals having utterly no interaction with one another. Debate is another way for groups to make a decision without discussion. The proposals being debated were not themselves forged by the group that is debating them but by subsets (e.g., debate teams) of the group or by parties outside the group. Either way, it is an adversarial process; one proposal wins, and another loses. Negotiation is a third way. Here discussion is involved, certainly, but the group is assuming competing interests, and the discussion is guided by calculating constantly the gains and losses of each interest. As in debate, there is not actually one group but at least two groups present in the same forum engaged in a contest. Deliberation, by contrast, involves everyone in the group forging together the alternatives and making a decision.¹³

Of course, “everyone in the group forging together the alternatives” is hugely problematic in actually existing societies where power and status control participation in deliberation as well as the topics considered appropriate for deliberation. The poor, women, and subordinate ethnic, religious, and racial minorities are the first to suffer de facto exclusion from ostensibly open forums in most societies. And, by virtue of this exclusion, the issues they would raise for discussion are never placed on the table. Measures to increase equity of access must be in place, therefore, before any pretense to deliberation can be taken seriously. Numerous political theorists have made helpful suggestions, including the idea that multiple deliberative forums are desirable because they allow a range of access points and deliberative styles (Benhabib, 1996; Fraser, 1995; Mansbridge, 1991). A church basement, a parliament, a union hall, a rural health center, a farmers’ cooperative, and a classroom, for example, each affords a particular context for public talk. None of them assures that all voices and topics are welcome, certainly, for within them status and power are at work (e.g., within a women’s study group in the Netherlands, race still matters; within an African-American church in urban America, gender still counts; within a farmers’ cooperative in the hill country of Thailand, ethnic tensions can shape most interactions). Expanding the array of forums, however, seems likely to foster the diversity of persons speaking and listening, the communicative practices that are admitted (e.g., storytelling in addition to critical argument)¹⁴ and, in general, the depth and breadth of public space formation and public problem solving. Let us summarize now the several reasons why deliberation was selected.

First, deliberation is a democratic way for a diverse group to grapple with shared problems and to try to reach a shared decision about what to do. It is thus an authentic democratic activity and arguably the single most important activity in which democratic citizens must engage. Second, deliberation is a form of pedagogy that is bound up with the problems being deliberated. In fact, it is absolutely meaningless when separated from problems worth deliberating; therefore, it cannot be linked—not logically at least—to the process-without-content pedagogies roundly criticized by cognitive psychologists, educational researchers, and parent groups worried about lowered expectations for their children in the name of “progressive education.” Third, disciplined deliberation by students on pressing multinational problems should produce two socially valued results. On the one hand, students are learning by experience the democratic problem-solving ability at which they are expected to be skilled as adult citizens of their various communities. This is an important curriculum outcome. On the other hand, they are helping actually to sort out and solve, or at least think about, the pressing global problems they are asked to deliberate. This is an important local and world community service. Fourth, deliberation on common problems is a public-building activity. *Publics* are groups that come together to decide what to do about common problems (e.g., Dewey, 1927; Mathews, 1994; Parker, 1996). Within a nation’s public schools, deliberation

helps bring students together in relations as public citizens for public purposes, tackling public problems. When students within classrooms in several nations are deliberating roughly the same set of cross-culturally felt problems, then a larger multinational relation—a global civil society—emerges. This strikes us as the major contribution of our curriculum recommendations.

Ancillary Components

Deliberation on shared ethical problems is the primary component of the curriculum, and there are three ancillary components: concepts, skill, and attitudes. We regard each of these as instrumental to the achievement of right deliberation on the ethical questions and, in turn, right action. Together these enable students to bring knowledge, know-how, and favorable dispositions to the ethical questions. (Deliberation should not be confused with blather.)

The first are generative ideas or concepts. Instruction on well-chosen concepts related to the six ethical questions is recommended for two reasons: so that deliberation is enriched by knowledge and so that the knowledge fund in turn can be revised and refined by the deliberation. Conceptual clarity is sorely needed for transnational deliberation, and its pursuit is a major purpose of that deliberation. T. K. Oommen (1997, pp. 3–4) notes that even a quick perusal of social science writing “unfolds a widespread prevailing ambiguity. For example, *nationalism* is qualified by the following terms: autonomist, anticolonial, bureaucratic, Black, bourgeois, civic, colonial . . . , linguistic, liberal, mass, Marxist . . . , separatist, sub-, supra-, sacred, socialist, secessionist” The same goes for *citizenship*:

Today we have advocates of active, democratic, cultural, communitarian, earth, European, ecological, environmental, gender-neutral, global, individualistic, liberal, participatory, race-neutral, republican, neo-republican, and world citizenship, to list a few. (Oommen, p. 224)

Concepts for study should be decided locally and shared eventually with course participants in other nations. Concepts drawn directly from the six ethical questions might be equity, fairness, privacy, access to information, population growth, genetic engineering, children in poverty, distribution of power and wealth, as well as tensions such as those between protecting the environment and meeting human needs, between privacy and access to information, and between universal and local values. There are also concepts that undergird these but are not specifically stated in the questions themselves—for example, citizen, citizenship, nationality, ethnicity, human rights, democracy, social class, status, culture, pluralism, political economy, ecosystem, and sustainable future.

We recommend, further, that only a small group of concepts be targeted

for intensive study so that meaningful learning might occur (e.g., in-depth, sustained study on a limited number of topics) and so that faculty can focus limited resources on key instructional objectives. Over and above these instructional reasons, to push for a limited set of key concepts is to encourage consideration of the all-important curricular question, Which concepts are of most worth? Curriculum decision making among students, faculty, and community members on this question is precisely the dialogue we hope to achieve. Such deliberation could well lead to a revision of the set of ethical questions. The revisions and the rationale for them can be shared with course participants in other nations, thus contributing substantively to the overall multinational public-building project.

In addition to instruction on key ideas, the research team recommends instruction on skills. Specifically, the team recommends instruction on skills related to researching and deliberating the six issues. By research, the team means scientific inquiry or critical thinking: that cluster of activities centering on finding and framing worthy problems, making and testing hypotheses, evaluating the quality of evidence, judging the strength of arguments, and exposing one's conclusions to the criticism of peers. By deliberation, as defined above, we mean cooperative discussion with an eye toward decision. Related skills include data-gathering and data-analysis procedures, participating in and moderating discussions of controversial issues, seeking opposing points of view, expressing positions and the reasoning that supports them, searching for missing voices and perspectives, weighing alternatives, and predicting consequences of alternatives.

Particular attitudes should be singled out for cultivation as well. Key are those that support inquiry and deliberation on ill-structured ethical questions and development of a global perspective. Not merely tolerating diversity, but respecting it, is one attitude. Respecting evidence over prejudice and disciplining oneself to form tentative conclusions are others. The willingness actually to listen to opposing points of view and to be skeptical of one's own position are two more.

Discussion

Historical study has enjoyed considerable attention in the United States. Still, most American historians are Americanists doing research and teaching on matters relating principally or exclusively to the United States (Graubard, 1997). Scholarly parochialism may or may not be exceptional among modern nations (it probably is not—think of Japan or England), but clearly it has had its costs. Leaving aside United States foreign policy, one glaring cost is the American school curriculum's limited attention to world studies. Two courses are the mainstays in the United States: world geography in the junior high school and world history in the senior high school (Woyach & Remy, 1989). Most school districts in the United States require the world geography course; less than half requires the world history course. By contrast, to give just one example, world history (and a second language, too) is required in Japan *even in the vocational track*.

But this is a curriculum matter, and popular fashion in educational research today does not permit much attention to the school curriculum. The field of educational psychology is pre-eminent still, and it is interested mainly in questions of knowing and learning. Driven by its cognitive revolution and, recently, the constructivism craze, this field skirts the myriad questions of curriculum planning, particularly the mundane, on-the-ground questions of scope and sequence: *Which* subject matter should be learned, when, in relation to what other subject matter, by whom, with whom, in what sorts of activity settings, and why? A required world geography course in the seventh grade and an elective world history course in the 10th grade have been better than nothing, certainly, but presently they function as place holders for curriculum deliberation about the proper education of citizens for anticipated world situations. Are they saber-toothed curricula? Only curriculum deliberation will tell. That is, a diverse group of teachers—and scholars, parents, students, and other stakeholders—needs to engage in shared inquiry and decision making about what in the world is worth knowing and learning and, therefore, teaching. This activity mirrors the broader scholarly challenge today: “to know which areas of the world merit particular study and whether the national frameworks, so useful in the past, still retain some validity” (Graubard, 1997, p. xix).

We doubt whether the national framework “so useful in the past” retains its validity as the driving paradigm for curriculum development in the schools today. The study reported here was a foray into an alternative paradigm: multinational curriculum development. By interviewing and surveying a multinational panel drawn from an array of fields, then identifying consensus concerns among the panelists, the research team was able to construct an empirical platform for multinational curriculum deliberation. Certainly this is not the only valid platform, but it served a key purpose in relation to the alternative, multinational paradigm we are exploring: The consensus findings became a shared text—a *multinational* shared text—which was the focal point of the multinational research team’s curriculum deliberation. This text grounded our deliberation, linking our curriculum decision making to a common set of data that propelled us outside our own heads and locales into one another’s heads and locales—not fully, of course, but at least to some meaningful extent. The research team at this point took the role of a curriculum development committee—a multinational one—that was intent on deliberating rather than negotiating. The research team then decided on deliberation as the driving pedagogy for a world problems curriculum. By this route, not only would key world problems be studied but, through deliberation, a new kind of public—a global public—and with it an expanded civic identity might be encouraged. The pivotal assumption here is that students’ study of world subject matter must go hand in hand with a mode of study that is geared to building multinational publics.

Deliberation, then, played multiple roles in the study. The nine-nation research team agreed *through* deliberation *on* deliberation as the pedagogy of choice for addressing the set of ethical questions. That is, deliberation was

the interpretive method used by the research team to transform the findings from the multinational panel into a set of policy recommendations, and it was the teaching-learning method recommended for the six ethical questions that are the core of the recommended curriculum. Deliberation also will be relevant in subsequent research, for it may well be the method used locally as school policymakers set about examining these recommendations and deciding how and whether to implement any portion of them. Follow-up studies on this next phase of deliberation should contribute a needed multinational perspective to the literature concerned with local curriculum development (e.g., Ben-Peretz, 1990; Schwab, 1970).

Limitations

Clearly, this study is only a beginning, and a limited one at that. It counts at least as a beginning because it is, most importantly, a multinational attempt to develop a multinational curriculum geared to multinational problems. Such an effort counters a pervasive, taken-for-granted norm, which is to undertake such work only provincially (i.e., nationally or intranationally). Still, the study is *only* a beginning on a number of counts.

It should be clear by now that the consensus findings and curriculum recommendations are multinational in origin and intent; however, they do not speak for or to all persons in all nations. *Multi-* means in this study not worldwide by any stretch of the imagination but beyond the provincial, involving cross-national discussions of cross-national problems. We do not pretend to have a world-wide panel or research team. Quite the contrary, we have only a small multinational panel and research team, and both were drawn from only nine nations. These nine do not represent the people and nations of Earth; they are skewed to the “first world”—to the industrialized, democratized, and secularized world—and, generally speaking, to the colonizers, not the colonized.¹⁵ We are in no position to generalize either the analytic or interpretive findings to other societies, therefore; doing so was never our intent and would constitute a serious misreading of the results. We feel confident that the involvement of panelists from Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa would challenge the present findings—both the consensus findings and the curriculum recommendations—in interesting and no doubt surprising ways. Wealth distribution within societies, for example, which is only implied somewhat in the first and sixth ethical questions, may emerge fully and sharply as a matter for deliberation (or it may not); the themes of decolonization and resistance—long prevalent in the literature (e.g., Fanon, 1963; Ngugi wa Thiong’o, 1986)—may be emphasized (or not).

In other words, the multinational curriculum we recommend here cannot be confused with the curriculum recommendations that would emerge from other groups of deliberators, whether they are the dispossessed in these same societies or panelists and researchers from other world regions. The findings of the present study, then, are open to challenges from other data sets, particularly from contrasting data sets, and we welcome

them. Using grounded theory research procedures, the findings presented here—both analytic and interpretive—can be treated as hypotheses to be tested with data gathered from additional samples that are selected because they are theorized as likely to challenge the present conclusions.¹⁶ Or, leaving aside grounded theory procedures, other approaches can be taken up that intentionally privilege views and viewpoints that counter the findings and interpretations of the present study: phenomenological, autobiographical, and ethnographic methods, for example (Eisner & Peshkin, 1990; Kincheloe, 1991). The advantage of subsequent investigations of this sort is straightforward: an enlarged understanding of multinational problems, as identified and described from diverse subject positions, and another multinational curriculum recommendation that could be developed to address those problems.

Let us move to a limitation of a different sort. This study was constrained by the spotty conceptual frameworks within which our effort had to take place. Forecasting the future, then employing that forecast in deciding which action to take in the present, is a notoriously unreliable enterprise. This doesn't mean that it cannot be attempted; it is commonplace in ordinary life, happening daily around the world in pubs, markets, board rooms, faculty clubs, and legislatures. But to do it well, to attempt in a disciplined and reflective way to utilize forecasts in curriculum decision making, is bounded on one side by the complexity of the task, on another by the unpredictability of social and natural events, and on another by the inevitably partial and biased knowledge of the forecasters and the curriculum developers. Witness only the unexpected collapse of the Soviet empire in Europe and apartheid in South Africa together with ethnic genocide on several continents: All this took social scientists by surprise and "has taught most experts a modicum of humility in prognostication" (Tiryakian, 1997, p. 147).

More generally, there was the weak theoretical base in precisely those literatures on which this kind of work should rely: citizenship, citizenship education, globalization, and global education. Let us exemplify the weak theoretical base by considering two of these: globalization and global education. Following Anthony Giddens (1990), let us agree that globalization concerns the intensification of something that has been happening for some time already—specifically, "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa" (p. 64). Indeed, the world appears to be "in the midst of a deep sea change in the ways people experience, understand, negotiate, and represent global relationships" (Buell, 1994, p. 6). Everyone seems cognizant of this shift. Concern with "the world" and its anticipated transformation has become "a central hermeneutic" (Robertson, 1990, p. 19); that is, across the fields of politics, health, business, art, anthropology, education, and so on, it is increasingly the norm to try to make sense of social phenomena with reference to *globalization*. However, the sheer trendiness of the idea and the highly exercised way in which it often is invoked act as serious threats to

thinking about it. To wit: Ideas such as the global economy, the third world, and developing nations are wielded confidently as though they were referential terms pointing to something positively “out there” when they are instead rough working tools that serve mainly the arguments and purposes of their wielders. For example, it is not uncommon in some quarters to believe that nations of the third world are defective versions of the genuine article. “Things are filthy there, and nothing works,” goes this complaint. Not surprisingly, this view is held by many people in the “first” world. On the other side of the same coin (the side popular among multiculturalists, anthropologists, and some members of third world societies), one often finds the veneration of the third world as sacred ground—as an untainted realm of cultural integrity and human authenticity.¹⁷ Either way, reviled or revered, *it* is not *us*, and the difference between the two is used to bolster someone’s argument.¹⁸

A second example of inadequate theorizing on globalization is the paucity of work on the fate of the nation-state framework during this intensification of transnational relations. “It is striking,” writes David Held, “that there has been no systematic and coherent attempt within contemporary political theory to theorize the changing form of the modern polity in its global setting” (1991, p. 9). Perhaps some sort of transnational legal system and transnational norms of justice are needed just now as transnational corporations and popular culture wield increasing power over daily life. But this has scarcely been examined. The national framework holds social theorists (including educators) rather firmly in its grasp.¹⁹ This is ironic, given the hermeneutic centrality of globalization, and the situation may be changing. “As is often the case in periods of momentous transformations such as the ones we have been living through since 1989, old and new definitions, presuppositions, currents of thought, assumptions, and values mix, mingle, and clash in inchoate ways,” observes Seyla Benhabib (1996, p. 5). This stepped-up mixing, mingling, and clashing may press social theorists to extend their reach.

Moving now from globalization theory to *global education* theory, consider the manner in which multinational curriculum development efforts might proceed. As we have said, the practice of curriculum development typically is done nationally and intranationally. Even global education curricula, ironically, usually are developed nationally and intranationally. Our move in this study was to attempt this development activity in a multinational milieu. This was an important move, we believe, but still the findings and recommendations are not global—not world-wide. They are (always and already) limited by the commitments, knowledge, and experiences of the participants—now a multinational group rather than a national group, but still only a partially multinational group that possesses the biases and interests one might expect. Is *impartiality* possible? Certainly not from mortals. Accordingly, the road ahead is very much a practical, on-the-ground one that includes varied efforts at multinational curriculum theorizing and development, always reflecting the authors’ positions. These efforts might

eventually be cobbled together into something more elegant than the sum of the parts, or they may remain an array of alternatives that local curriculum planners can consider. Either way, a multinational curriculum move has been made, which we believe is needed, yet it is made—returning now to the point of the limitation under discussion—on thin theoretical ice.

We turn now to limitations in our method. An adaptation of Ethnographic Delphi Futures Research (Linstone & Turoff, 1975; Poolpatarachewin, 1980) was employed. We caution readers on three points. First, the consensus trends, characteristics, and strategies that form the analytic platform for the research team's interpretive curriculum deliberation were the product of a set of quantitative decision rules. For example, panelists were said to have achieved consensus on a trend if the mode minus the median on the 6-point scale for that trend was less than or equal to 1.0 and if the interquartile range was less than or equal to 1.5. A somewhat different set of consensus findings could be produced, therefore, with a strategic turn of the quantitative dial. The term *consensus* functions rhetorically to belie this fact and suggest a more nuanced and dialogic agreement than was the case in these findings. Second, ours was a methodological search for consensus, not an informal one, and for this reason we were attracted to the Delphi procedure. This choice, however, turned our attention away from *disagreement*, which can be just as informative a resource as agreement. As one reviewer of a prior version of this article gently asked, "Can 'consensus' be used to rationalize differing opinions based on empirical evidence?" Indeed it can, and for this reason the contingent origin of a consensus finding in the Delphi procedure generally and our decision rules particularly needs to be remembered when examining both the consensus findings themselves and the curriculum decisions that were derived from them. Third, research methods themselves are without exception social constructs. The Delphi method, like other methods, is contingent on historical forces and relations. Named after the ancient Greek town that housed a renowned oracle, this forecasting method was developed in the cold war 1950s by the RAND Corporation, on contract with the U.S. Air Force, to ascertain U.S. military preparedness. The irony of meeting in Hiroshima to interpret the Delphi findings did not escape the members of the research team and, in fact, shaped our decision to meet there and, no doubt, the deliberations we conducted there.

Finally, there was the recognition that curriculum updating itself is loaded with pitfalls. The instrumentalist bias for relevance carries, we recognize, viral strains of presentism, vocationalism, and anti-intellectualism (DuBois, 1903/1990) which contribute to the long-standing suspicion, at least in North America, of theorizing and reflection. A sober comprehension of this danger and an abiding respect for liberal studies—learning for its own sake—undergirded the research team's deliberations. Nonetheless, the presence of grave world problems requiring increased multinational attention, together with the widespread comprehension that yesterday's answers (e.g., the nation-state curriculum development framework) are not fruitfully focusing this attention, motivated the research team to conduct a study and

recommend a curriculum that was capable of paying attention to these problems. To do less, to flee the practical realm of decision, action, and consequence would be irresponsible and, as several Thai and Japanese members of the research team emphasized repeatedly, irresponsible particularly to children who must inhabit a world fashioned by their elders.²⁰

The project will have achieved its aim if it sparks discussions of the multinational consensus findings, the curriculum recommendations, and, most of all, the desirability of the trajectory we support: multinational curriculum-development efforts geared to creating and educating a world public for world problem solving.

Conclusion

Consensus views on world trends, citizen characteristics, and education strategies were developed in interviews and surveys of a multinational panel composed of opinion makers, scholars, and practitioners in the arts, health, education, science, technology, politics, religion, business, industry, and labor. With these findings in hand, the research team, also multinational in composition, deliberated a set of school curriculum recommendations. The recommendations consist of a goal (multidimensional citizenship), subject matter (a set of ethical questions, plus related concepts, skills, and attitudes), and a global civic culture-building pedagogy (inquiry and deliberation). We can imagine a set of primary and secondary course experiences in which students across nations join a common set of complex ethical questions that address problems—some of them crises—which increasingly are confronting the world's people. Through inquiry, students will search for and interpret data that are pertinent to the questions. Through deliberation, they will clarify the problems, weigh solutions, and in so doing constitute a different kind of public—an international public—and an additional identity: world citizen. This identity will not replace the others (that would be no gain) but run alongside them. A contemporary world problems course for high school seniors could serve as the capstone experience of this curriculum. Offered simultaneously in various nations, with communication among project sites, it could sponsor a kind of relating that may deserve, at least somewhat, the name *global civic culture*.

Motivating this project was a prior question. It rested on the knowledge that school curricula everywhere are sociopolitical artifacts and are virtually everywhere, therefore, developed nationally and intranationally—by national or local curriculum committees. Even the portion of the curriculum that involves world study (e.g., courses in world history; world geography; contemporary world problems) is developed within nations. Has the time not come to create multinationally some portions of the school curriculum? Would it not be wise and prudent especially to develop multinationally a curriculum concerned to teach young people to grapple with multinational issues together and to seek one another's counsel? We believe that such inclinations (versus tiger scaring or fish-grabbing by hand) will mark the well-educated world citizen of tomorrow.

Notes

This research was supported by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo. The authors are grateful to Somwung Pitiyanuwat (Chulalongkorn University, Thailand) and Ken Osborne (University of Manitoba, Canada) for insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article and to three anonymous reviewers for *AERJ* whose suggestions proved enormously helpful.

¹Our audience in this article is mainly North American. We reference here, therefore, mainly North American educational literature. This creates the confounding problem of casting the project further in North American terms and viewpoints (further than is already the case with two of the three authors being steeped in this milieu). For present purposes, we accept this trade-off.

²These are problematic terms, which we discuss under "Limitations."

³Some of these are quite helpful. See Lynch (1989) and reviews of Carson, Willinsky, Gutek, Wilson, Thelin, and others in chapter 14 of *Understanding Curriculum* (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, & Taubman, 1995).

⁴The nine member nations were selected because of already existing relationships on other projects (comparative educational research, university student exchanges). They were selected purposively, then, to deepen existing multinational relationships while affording an array of societies from four world regions: Southeast Asia, East Asia, North America, and Europe. Funding from the supporting foundation (in Japan) was limited, which prohibited the involvement in this phase of researchers and panelists from additional world regions (the Middle East, South Asia, Latin America, Africa). Whether and in what direction involvement from other regions would change the analytic or interpretive findings of the present study—we assume it would—is both a theoretical and an empirical question. It can be investigated by deploying the present findings as hypotheses to be disconfirmed or refined, per the grounded theory tradition (see Strauss & Corbin, 1990) or by setting aside the present findings altogether (de-privileging them) and beginning anew with a panel thought to hold sharply different views (see McCarthy, 1990). We welcome such studies before history intervenes to make meaningful comparisons with the present findings impossible.

⁵For reports on the other categories see Cogan and Derricott (1998).

⁶*Consensus findings* can be a misleading term because consenses were not so much found as constructed. In other words, they were artifacts of our decision rules. We discuss this further under "Limitations."

⁷On critical thinking: Through a psychological lens, see Perkins (1981) and Chipman, Segal, and Glaser (1985); through a philosophical lens, see Paul (1990) and Toulmin (1958).

⁸In this sense, interpretation is even more transparently tied to researchers' interests and commitments than analysis.

⁹See Reid (1981) and the collection by Dillon (1994).

¹⁰On the necessity and associated problems of divided sovereignty and multiple identities, see Habermas (1997), Young (1989), and Kymlicka and Norman (1995).

¹¹Civil society is a different public realm from government. It counterbalances government and is important, therefore, in preventing state tyranny. See Jeffrey Alexander's (1997) sociological (versus economic) account of civil society as a realm of nongovernmental solidarity.

¹²On the informal reasoning needed for addressing ill-structured problems, see Perkins (1985).

¹³This typology is from Dillon (1994).

¹⁴Iris Marion Young (1996) distinguishes three discursive modes in addition to critical argument: "storytelling, greeting, and rhetoric."

¹⁵Nor do the panelists or researchers represent the populations of the nations from which they/we were drawn. To the contrary, they are skewed sharply to the moderately affluent, professional-class, symbol managers of these societies.

¹⁶See the discussion of *theoretical sampling* in Glaser and Strauss (1967).

¹⁷That the latter view is not widely held *within* these societies is explained by Buell, 1994.

¹⁸Similarly, we use the terms *multinational* and *consensus* in a rhetorical milieu that credits these terms with goodness and intelligence.

¹⁹Exceptions include An-Na'im (1992), Beiner (1995), Boulding (1988), Habermas (1997), Oommen (1997), and Said (1993).

²⁰See Joseph Schwab's (1970) account of such flights.

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Manuscript received May 12, 1998
Revision received September 3, 1998
Accepted October 21, 1998