The Venezuelan people comprise a combination of European, indigenous, and African heritages. About 85% of the population live in urban areas in the northern portion of the country. While almost half of Venezuela's land area lies south of the Orinoco River, this region contains only 5% of the population.

At the time of the Spanish discovery, the indigenous people were mainly agriculturists and hunters living in groups along the coast, the Andean mountain range, and along the Orinoco River. The first permanent Spanish settlement in South America--Nuevo Toledo--was established in Venezuela in 1522. Venezuela was a relatively neglected colony in the 1500s and 1600s as the Spaniards focused on extracting gold from other areas of their empire in the Americas.

The Venezuelans began to grow restive under colonial control toward the end of the 18th century. After several unsuccessful uprisings, the country achieved independence from Spain in 1821 under the leadership of its most famous son, Simon Bolivar. Venezuela, along with what are now Colombia, Panama, and Ecuador, was part of the Republic of Gran Colombia until 1830, when Venezuela separated and became a sovereign country.

Much of Venezuela's 19th century history was characterized by periods of political instability, dictatorial rule, and revolutionary turbulence. The first half of the 20th century was marked by periods of authoritarianism--including dictatorships from 1908-35 and from 1950-58. The Venezuelan economy shifted after the first World War from a primarily agricultural orientation to an economy centered on petroleum production and export.

Since the overthrow of Gen. Marcos Perez Jimenez in 1958 and the military's withdrawal from direct involvement in national politics, Venezuela has enjoyed an unbroken tradition of civilian democratic rule. Until the 1998 elections, the Democratic Action (AD) and the Christian Democratic (COPEI) parties dominated the political environment at both the state and federal level.

Today, Venezuela is a democratic republic, with an estimated population (2001) of 24.6 million people (OCEI, 2000). It attained formal independence from Spain in 1830 and was largely ruled by autocrats until 1958, when democratic movements ousted the military President Marcos Pérez Jiménez. During the 19th century, Venezuela's economy was overwhelmingly agrarian, relying principally on exports of cocoa and coffee. The discovery and exploitation, starting in 1907 (Fundación Polar, 1988:130), of rich petroleum reserves around Lake Maracaibo marked the transition to an oil-based economy, which was favored by the discovery of other large reserves in the east of the country and in the River Orinoco basin. Although Venezuela has considerable natural resources (agricultural, hydrological, iron ore, aluminum and gold), the economy is still largely sustained by oil revenues, which currently account for about 33% of the GDP, 80% of export earnings, and more than 50% of governmental revenues. During the second half of the 20th century, the country experienced rapid modernization, with the development of manufacturing and the movement of population from rural to urban areas. In 2000, 87% of the population was estimated to live in settlements of more than 2,500 population. The capital Caracas, had an estimated population in 2000 of 2.3 million (OCEI, 2000).

CIVIL DISORDER

In the early 1990s, Venezuela demonstrated comparative domestic tranquility by Latin American standards. It did not exhibit the severe disturbances of leftist guerrilla insurgency and widespread drug trafficking so evident in neighboring Colombia. Generally speaking, threats to internal security could be cited as follows: the activities of radical leftist student groups and political parties, the expansion of drug trafficking and domestic drug abuse, and popular discontent resulting from economic constriction restructuring.

Venezuela has had a number of small radical leftist student groups and political parties. Although the parties achieved little support among the electorate, student groups attracted a more activist membership that sometimes exercised disproportionate influence among the university population. Student demonstrations always had the potential to erupt into violence, whether their inspiration was domestic-- student privileges or other parochial concerns--or foreign, as in protests against United States foreign policy. Although university students eventually became the political and technocratic leaders of the country, the general public has shown no inclination since the reestablishment of civilian democratic rule in 1958 to look to student leadership as a political vanguard. In more general terms, the Venezuelan consensus in favor of social programs has long had the effect of diluting the appeal of violent leftist ideology. By the early 1990s, the collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe had also had an effect in this regard.

The expansion of illicit drug production and transportation appeared to have the potential to disrupt Venezuelan internal security significantly in the 1990s. As the decade began, most illegal drug activity in Venezuela resulted from a spillover effect from Colombia, the world's leading distributor of cocaine. Venezuela's long Caribbean coastline and large expanses of sparsely populated territory made it attractive as a transshipment point for cocaine products in transit from Colombia to the United States. The gravity of the security situation along the western border was brought home to the Venezuelan public during the presidential election campaign of late 1988, when the media publicized an incident that took place on October 29 near the town of El Amparo along a tributary of the Rio Arauca. What was originally reported as an ambush of Colombian guerrillas by Venezuelan troops eventually turned out to have been the inadvertent murder of sixteen Venezuelan fishermen. The revelation that security forces had mistakenly fired on peaceful residents, then apparently attempted to cover up their error, caused a political furor. It also highlighted the increasing confusion along the frontier that resulted from the activities of drug traffickers and Colombian guerrillas. The overreaction of the Venezuelan forces also suggested that they were not properly prepared to deal with the situation.

Although Venezuela's role in the international drug trade was limited in 1990 to the transshipment of drugs and precursor chemicals, there were signs that this role was expanding. In November 1989, authorities made the largest cocaine seizure in the country's history, taking 2,220 kilograms in transit through Valencia. It has been estimated that 130 tons of cocaine and basuco (semirefined paste) entered the country during 1990. There was no evidence that Venezuela was a major drugproducing country in 1990, but some marijuana was grown along the Sierra de Perija, in the northwestern part of Venezuela along the border with Colombia. The National Guard has carried out eradication programs in the area, with financial and material assistance from the United States.

The Perez administration appeared to take seriously the threat of increased drug activity. In July 1990, the president raised the National Drug Commission to the status of a cabinet ministry. In November of the same year, the governments of Venezuela and the United States signed a bilateral agreement to restrict money laundering by Venezuelan banks. Some elements of the FAN assisted law enforcement agencies in counternarcotics efforts; the navy, in particular, stepped up its interdiction activity in conjunction with the coast guard. As in other countries, however, the effort has been hampered by judicial, and possibly political, corruption. In September 1987, a penal judge of the Supreme Court was arrested and dismissed after he ordered the release of seven drug traffickers in return for a bribe of 10 million bolivars (for value of the bolivar--see Glossary). At the time, the justice minister publicly claimed knowledge of 400 other similar cases of corruption.

The riots in Venezuelan cities following President Perez's second inaugural in February 1989 shocked many Venezuelans and made headlines across the world. Many observers described these disturbances as a precursor of further violence in heavily indebted Third World nations. The riots began in response to government austerity measures that included a jump of almost 100 percent in domestic gasoline prices and a 30 percent increase in public transportation fares. In less than a week of rioting and looting, some 300 Venezuelans died and some 1,800 were wounded. The army reinforced police forces in the capital and elsewhere in order to restore order. The riots, which were marked by widespread looting, apparently expressed the frustration of the Venezuelan urban poor with its lack of economic progress. The disturbances had been preceded by a week of student demonstrations, some of which had resulted in violence.

Disturbances of a similar character but more limited scope erupted in February and July 1990. The February riots followed student protests in Caracas, scheduled to mark the one-year anniversary of the 1989 riots. Police contained the looting and sporadic violence. President Perez called in National Guard and air force units to reinforce the police in the eastern port cities of Barcelona and Puerto La Cruz, where rioting was more intense. Scattered violence in July followed another increase in bus fares. The most serious disturbances took place in Maracaibo and Maracay. In both instances, university students were reported to have been the primary instigators of the violence.

As of 1990, Venezuela had only one insurgent/terrorist group, the Red Flag (Bandera Roja--BR), and it was largely inactive. The BR, a splinter group of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria--MIR), continued the armed struggle against the democratic system after the MIR put down its arms in 1969. In the early 1980s, the BR staged a number of terrorist actions--kidnappings, bank robberies, and airline hijackings. Counterstrikes by the police and army eventually eliminated BR's urban capabilities and drove the remnants of the group into the Colombian frontier region, where some members reportedly still operated, perhaps in association with Colombian guerrilla groups.

ECONOMY

Real GDP increased by 20.4% in January-September 2004 compared to the same period of 2003, after two consecutive years of deep economic recession (in 2003, Venezuelan GDP contracted 7.6%, after contracting 8.9% in 2002), and overall 2004 predictions range from 14 to 18% growth, with expectations for 2005 growth of 4 to 5%. However, the January-September 2004 GDP level is still below the GDP level for the same period of 2001. The 2004 economic recovery has been driven by a large increase in government expenditures, based on higher than expected oil prices, which in turn has generated higher consumption levels.

The Consumer Price Index increase was expected to be approximately 20% at the end of 2004, following increases of 27.1% in 2003 and 31.2% in 2002.

As of January 23, 2003, all foreign exchange requests have required approval from the National Exchange Control Administration (CADIVI). This exchange control regime fixed the U.S. dollar exchange rate at Bs. 1,596=U.S. $1.00 for purchase operations, and Bs. 1,600=U.S. $1.00 for sale operations, and established the compulsory purchase and sale of foreign currency through the Central Bank. On February 7, 2004, the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank devalued the Bolivar 20%, to 1,920.00. As official foreign exchange liquidations have increased over the course of 2004, the exchange rate in the quasi-legal parallel market has decreased. The national budget for 2005 assumes that the new official exchange rate will be 2,150/USD, representing a devaluation of 12%. The parallel market exchange rate closed at around 2,500/USD at the end of November 2004.

Central Bank-held international reserves increased from U.S.$21.39 billion in January to U.S.$23.91 billion in November 2004, after growing U.S. $6.6 billion in 2003. There are three primary reasons that reserves did not increase more, even though oil prices averaged about $6.50 (25%) more per barrel in 2004 than in 2003. State oil corporation PDVSA bought back USD 2.5 billion in external debt in August; CADIVI is on track to liquidate more than USD 12 billion in 2004 (approximately 2.7 times as much as in 2003), and the government diverted, amid great controversy, at least USD 2.0 billion to a new Social Development Fund run by PDVSA.

Venezuelan sovereign debt, both internal and external, has been increasing, but in 2004 the government succeeded in extending its debt profile and reducing near-term debt service. While Venezuela’s debt/GDP ratio is low by Latin American standards, it has increased in recent years. Venezuela’s Emerging Markets Bond Index investment risk rating, at 398 basis points, has dropped somewhat over 2004, but remains higher than all countries in the region except Argentina.

There is considerable income inequality. The Gini coefficient was 0.618 during 2003. According to private sources, the percentages of poor and extremely poor among Venezuelan population were 74.6% and 39.3%, respectively, in 2003. These high ratios are due primarily to lower real wages earned by employees, and high rates of un- and underemployment.

BELIEFS

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, on the condition that its practice does not violate public morality, decency, or the public order, and the Government generally respected this right in practice.

The Government and the Holy See have signed a concordat that underscores the country's historical ties to the Roman Catholic Church and provides government subsidies to the Church, including to its social programs and schools. Other religious groups are free to establish and run their own schools. While these groups do not receive subsidies from the Government, they may receive funding to repair buildings for religious use.

Religious groups must register with the Ministry of Interior and Justice's Directorate of Justice and Religion to hold legal status as a religious organization and to own property. The requirements for registration are largely administrative; however, some groups complained that the process was slow and inefficient. Foreign missionaries must have a special visa to enter the country. Missionaries generally were not refused entry but faced the general bureaucratic inefficiency of the Government taking months or years to process a request.

Several senior government officials, including the President, personally attacked Catholic Church leaders and made numerous public statements intended to intimidate the Church. In April, President Chavez denounced the country's Catholic Church leadership as "immoral liars."

Statements by senior government officials supporting Iraq's Saddam Hussein and Islamic extremist movements raised tensions and intimidated the country's Jewish community. In April, the office of Vice President Rangel released a press statement referring to the owners of a business involved in a labor dispute as being "of Jewish nationality," although they were citizens of the country. Anti-Semitic leaflets also were available to the public in an office waiting room at the Ministry of Interior and Justice.

On May 27, small explosive devices went off near two Mormon churches. Damages were slight, and there were no injuries. Anti-Mormon propaganda pamphlets were found at each site.

In November, CICPC officers investigating the killing of prosecutor Danilo Anderson searched the Hebrew Center of Caracas, just as a school on the site was opening. Jewish community leaders expressed outrage and indicated doubt regarding the authorities' explanation for the search.

CRIMINAL CODES

The Venezuelan Penal Code distinguishes between crimes, punishable by imprisonment, and misdemeanors (faltas), punishable by arrests or fines. In the Penal Code, crimes are classified by major types, as follows: crimes against national sovereignty and national security -- treason; crimes against national and state government; crimes against international law; crimes against liberty -- crimes against political, personal, religious freedom, etc.Corruption -- these are defined in a special anti-corruption law, enacted in 1982 (Venezuela, 1982). Crimes against the administration of justice -- simulating crimes, false testimony, collusion, concealment, etc. Crimes against public order -- conspiracy to commit crime; incitement to crime; manufacture and carrying of weapons, etc. Forgery -- false currency; forged seals, fiscal stamps, documents, passports, licenses, etc. Crimes against public and private interests -- arson, causing floods, etc. against public health and nutrition; crimes against public morals and the family -- rape, seduction, prostitution, corrupting minors, adultery, bigamy, etc. Crimes against persons -- homicide, battery, abortion, abandoning children, slander, etc. Crimes against property -- theft, robbery, extortion, kidnaping, fraud, etc.

Drug and environmental crimes are defined in separate laws (Venezuela, 1984; 1992;1993a).

Misdemeanors are divided into:public order -- for example, failure to obey an order, begging, disorderly behavior; public safety -- proper manufacture and sale of arms; faulty construction practices; illegal elimination of waste materials; etc. Public morals -- betting and gaming, insobriety, offenses to public decency, etc. Public protection of property -- for example, unlawful possession of weights and measures; unlawful copying of keys.

State police codes also include many of the same misdemeanors, that are similarly punishable by arrest or fine.

The law creates a conceptual distinction between drug users and persons involved in the production, distribution, possession, and sale of drugs. The former are sentenced to treatment, while the latter are punished. However, a study of the application of this law between 1984 and 1988 found that many people sentenced for drug possession, actually had such small amounts of the drug that they should have been considered drug users (Borrego and Rosales, 1992). A 1993 reform (Venezuela, 1993a) setting the amounts of substances corresponding to specific types of drug crime seems to have done little to diminish criticism (Rosales, 1996).

Contraventions (contravensiones) represent the most minor criminal category. They normally carry small sanctions or fines, and are tried at the lowest trial courts level. Contraventions are not considered part of crime families.

Individuals are treated as adults at age 18. For individuals under 18 years of age, there exists a separate judicial system.

The law makes reference to those drugs banned by the 1961 United Nations Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1991 U.N. Agreement on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1991 U.N. guidance on Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics and Narcotic Drugs.

There is also a Venezuelan law that sanctions. all crimes related to drugs. The following actions are penalized: production, refining, transformation, extraction, and preparation of drugs; importing and exporting drugs; selling, distributing, doing business with drugs; consumption and possession of drugs; drug trafficking; drug warehousing; financing any type of drug related activity; facilitating, inducing or motivating the consumption of drugs.

The person that uses drugs and the person that is found in possession of drugs for his or her own personal use is subject to security measures, usually for an indeterminate time, and rehabilitation.

Recently, and largely as a result of U.S. and European influences, Latin American countries have adopted special legislation to facilitate the prosecution of drug traffickers. These policies include accepting the results of electronic surveillance as evidence and the use of plea bargaining to obtain the testimony of informants.

INCIDENCE OF CRIME

The crime rate in Venezuela is very high in regard to murder, but low to medium in regard to other crimes. An analysis was done using INTERPOL data for Venezuela. For purpose of comparison, data were drawn for the seven offenses used to compute the United States FBI's index of crime. Index offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The combined total of these offenses constitutes the Index used for trend calculation purposes. Venezuela will be compared with Japan (country with a low crime rate) and USA (country with a high crime rate). According to the INTERPOL data, for murder, the rate in 2000 was 33.2 per 100,000 population for Venezuela, 1.10 for Japan, and 5.51 for USA. For rape, the rate in 2000 was 12.13 for Venezuela, compared with 1.78 for Japan and 32.05 for USA. For robbery, the rate in 2000 was not reported. For aggravated assault, the rate in 2000 was 105.32 for Venezuela, 23.78 for Japan, and 323.62 for USA. For burglary, the rate in 2000 was not reported. The rate of larceny for 2000 was 6.73 for Venezuela, 1401.26 for Japan, and 2475.27 for USA. The rate for motor vehicle theft in 2000 was 101.01 for Venezuela, compared with 44.28 for Japan and 414.17 for USA. The rate for all index offenses combined was not computable because of the omission of robbery and burglary from the data.

TRENDS IN CRIME

Between 1996 and 2000, according to INTERPOL data, the rate of murder increased from 23.21 to 33.2 per 100,000 population, an increase of 43%. The rate for rape decreased from 16.19 to 12.13, a decrease of 25.1%. The rate of robbery was reported for neither 1996 nor 2000. The rate for aggravated assault decreased from 143.92 to 105.32, a decrease of 26.8%. The rate for burglary was reported for neither 1996 nor 2000. The rate of larceny was not reported for 1996. The rate of motor vehicle theft increased from 97.72 to 101.01, an increase of 3.4%. The trend in index offenses could not be computed due to the omission of data for the two years.

LEGAL SYSTEM

The legal system of Venezuela is based on a civil or Napoleonic model largely influenced by the historic European dominance. The Penal Code (Codigo Penal de Venezuela) and the Criminal Procedure Code (Codigo de Enjuiciamientio Criminal) are characterized by their emphasis on codification, formalism, and reliance on abstract principles set forth in treaties. Constitutional review is limited and judges do not normally have authority to interpret legislation. While the trend in Latin America is to move toward a common law model, Venezuela largely continues to rely on civil law practices.

Although the Venezuelan charter has been overturned with persistent regularity, the country's constitutional roots can be traced to the U.S. Constitution. To date, Venezuela bears the unfortunate distinction of having adopted 22 constitutions since its independence from Spain in 1811. Constitutional reform became a means of legitimizing an illegal and often violent change in government rather than representing a true constitutional shift.

The first post-independence penal code was issued in 1863. Prior to its independence, Venezuela followed the legislation applicable to the colonies ruled by Spain. Like many other Latin American countries, Venezuela's codes have been strongly influenced by foreign legislation. For example, the 1897 criminal code was an exact, although inaccurate, translation of the Italian Penal Code of 1890 (Aqua, 1964).

Criminal justice decisions are made by each of the implementing agencies. The Executive plays a strong role since it oversees the Ministries of Interior Relations and Justice while also determining what to include within the Executive's budget request to the parliament. The Congress oversees the power of appointment, impeachment, adoption of substantive legislation, and approval of budget requests. There is no one entity which plans for or coordinates the criminal justice sector.

Corruption has been a problem for Venezuela throughout its history. Commentators have complained that every democratic government has been a little more corrupt than the preceding one. This has led to low public confidence in the justice system.

Many observers believed that the Venezuelan criminal justice system was inadequate to deal with the rising crime rate of the late 1980s and 1990. The most glaring deficiency of the system was the high percentage of incarcerated prisoners awaiting trial. As of 1989, only some 25 percent of all prisoners had been tried and convicted.

This situation appeared to be attributable to a shortage of judges, the automatic review of lower court decisions, and the general inability of the courts to keep pace with an increasingly crowded calendar. The highly bureaucratized court system, which generated thick written records for each case, sometimes delayed trials for years.

The Venezuelan system also suffered from corruption and political influences. Although the judiciary was an independent branch of government, the system of appointing judges traditionally introduced political considerations and personal connections into the process. A five-member Judicial Council attempted to regulate this process by way of its power to nominate, train, and discipline judges. One member of the council was named by the Congress, one by the president, and three by the Supreme Court.

Since the criminal justice system was based largely on Spanish, Napoleonic, and Italian influences, the burden of proving innocence fell upon the accused. Defendants theoretically had access to legal representation through the public defenders program. In the late 1980s, however, there were only 350 attorneys employed under this program. This further delayed legal procedures and made for inadequate representation for many prisoners.

POLICE

Many different organizations carried out Venezuelan law enforcement in 1990. Including the paramilitary National Guard, there were four national-level police forces. In addition, over 450 state and municipal police forces functioned throughout the country. Although state and municipal police normally operated independently, they could be mobilized under emergency conditions into a Unified Police Command.

The Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services (Direccion de Seguridad e Inteligencia Policial--Disip) was a nonuniformed force of some 3,000 personnel under the Ministry of Interior. Disip's nationwide jurisdiction included the investigation of crimes involving subversion, narcotics, and arms smuggling. Disip's responsibilities include operations against terrorists and other potentially violent groups, including organized crime. Disip's director was appointed by the minister of interior. The organization maintained its headquarters in Caracas, with field offices in principal cities throughout the country.

The Technical and Judicial Police (Policia Tecnica y Judicial-- PTJ) was a component of the Ministry of Justice. It fielded over 3,000 plainclothes personnel in 1990. The PTJ handled most of the country's investigative police work; other police agencies passed on all cases requiring investigation to the PTJ. The president, on the advice of the minister of justice, appointed the organization's director, who was required to be a lawyer. Most PTJ personnel were assigned to its headquarters in Caracas. Numerous divisions and subdivisions throughout the country handled field work. New agents were required to have completed at least three years of secondary education and to undergo several months of training at the National Academy in Caracas before assuming their duties.

The Traffic Police was a force of about 2,000 under the Ministry of Transport and Communications. In addition to national traffic control, the Traffic Police were responsible for issuing and regulating drivers' licenses and for determining public transportation routes and services.

Venezuela's state, metropolitan, and municipal police forces totaled some 18,000 personnel. The largest such force was the Metropolitan Police Force of Caracas, with about 9,000 members. All local police forces received their funding through the Ministry of Interior but responded to state governors under normal conditions. The Metropolitan Police Force, which maintained a Police Academy in El Junquito near Caracas, were comparatively well trained. In contrast, other state and municipal forces fielded largely untrained personnel and suffered from deficiencies in communications, transportation, supplies, and facilities.

Today, the security apparatus includes civilian and military elements, both accountable to elected authorities. The Interior and Justice Ministry controls the Technical Judicial Police (PTJ), which conducts most criminal investigations, and the State Security Police (DISIP), which is primarily responsible for investigating cases of corruption, subversion, and arms trafficking. The Defense Ministry controls the General Directorate for Military Intelligence (DIM), which is responsible for collecting intelligence related to national security and sovereignty. The National Guard, an active branch of the military, has arrest powers and is largely responsible for maintaining public order, guarding the exterior of key government installations and prisons, conducting counternarcotics operations, monitoring borders, and providing law enforcement in remote areas. It also supplies the top leadership for various state and municipal police forces, which fall under the authority of the respective state governors or municipal mayors. The Metropolitan Police is the main civilian police force in and around Caracas. In February President Chavez appointed the country's first-ever civilian Defense Minister, Jose Vicente Rangel. There continued to be concern during the year 2001 regarding the use of the armed forces in traditionally nonmilitary roles in government and society, including the appointment of active and retired military officers to high-ranking government positions. Three of the 14 members of the President's Cabinet are either active or retired career military officers, as are the presidents of the major state-owned corporations Petroleos de Venezuela, Corporacion Venezolana de Guyana, and CITGO. There are also a number of military officers in high- and mid-ranking positions in government agencies responsible for social development, public works, and finance. The military is involved heavily with public service projects. While civilian authorities generally maintain effective control over security forces, some members of the police and military committed serious human rights abuses.

There were no reports of targeted political killings; however, the security forces continued to commit extrajudicial killings, primarily of criminal suspects, at increased levels. The Venezuelan Program of Action and Education in Human Rights (PROVEA), a respected human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO), documented 241 extrajudicial killings from October 2000 through September, compared with 170 killings from October 1999 to September 2000. The killings included summary executions of criminal suspects and deaths resulting from mistreatment while in custody. The indiscriminate or excessive use of force also was documented. PROVEA attributes the following responsibility for extrajudicial killings: state police forces other than the Metropolitan Police (189); the Metropolitan Police (2); the PTJ (12); the National Guard (8); municipal police forces (20); the army (2); the DISIP (2); other security forces (2); and two or more security forces (4). These figures reflect a range of killings in different situations committed by organizations with varying levels of control and responsibilities. Police continued to fire on criminal suspects who disobey orders to halt.

The perpetrators of extrajudicial killings act with near impunity, since the Government rarely prosecutes such cases. The police often fail to investigate crimes allegedly committed by their colleagues and characterize incidents of extrajudicial killings as "confrontations," even when eyewitness testimony and evidence strongly indicate otherwise. In addition, the civilian judicial system still is struggling to implement the 1999 COPP and, in the meantime, remains highly inefficient and sometimes corrupt. In the small number of cases in which the courts convict perpetrators of extrajudicial killings and other abuses, the sentences issued frequently are light, or the convictions are overturned on appeal. Unlike common criminals, members of the security forces charged with or convicted of crimes rarely spend much time in prison.

Federal and state police are investigating the so-called "Grupo Exterminio," a vigilante "death squad" with apparent police ties that is accused of up to 100 killings between mid-2000 and September 2001 in the cities of Acarigua and Araure, Portuguesa state. After investigation began in May, two witnesses also were killed, and judges and public prosecutors received death threats. A total of 42 state police officers are suspected of having ties to the Grupo Exterminio, and the authorities have arrested 18 officers. In late December, the press reported another extermination group emerging in Portuguesa. Investigators believe that the group is made up of active and former police as well as private "hit men." An anonymous member of the group gave a newspaper interview on June 4 in which he acknowledged the group's existence and described it as being made up of "decent citizens doing what they have to do" to fight rising crime. He claimed that the group has targeted only "criminals with lengthy records" and claimed that it is responsible for only half the killings attributed to it. In May the group published a pamphlet that blamed the COPP for the rise in crime that led it to act and claimed that the group will not stop until the COPP is repealed. The National Guard took over police duties in Portuguesa state pending the outcome of investigations of the extermination group.

On January 10, army Lieutenant Alessandro Siccat sprayed and ignited paint thinner in the holding cell of three allegedly disobedient soldiers. Two men were burned seriously; a third, Jesus Alberto Febres, died as a result of burns 20 days later. A military court convicted Siccat; however, in a test of the constitutional provision that trials for military personnel charged with human rights abuses would be held in civilian courts, the Attorney General appealed, and in October the Supreme Court granted a civilian court jurisdiction.

The majority of extrajudicial killings by security forces were attributed to state and municipal police forces that report to local officials and often have little training or supervision. For example, on January 7, the Trujillo state police bound, shot, and killed 17-year-old Luis Fernando Briceno, according to the human rights NGO Red de Apoyo. Briceno was walking home from a friend's residence in Valera City when a police patrol stopped him. According to witnesses, police tied Briceno's hands with a cloth and walked him to a side street, where several shots were heard. There was no known investigation.

Red de Apoyo reported that on February 2, in Casigua el Cubo, Zulia state, security forces killed 44-year-old Angel Ardilla when they fired at his vehicle without provocation. Ardilla was seated in his truck with Alba Marina Bustamante, who was injured in the incident, when an army troop patrol approached the vehicle, which stood stationary with its engine off. Without warning, the patrol opened fire. Army members later attempted to force Bustamante to declare that Ardilla had tried to kidnap and rape her. There was no investigation.

On May 31, Caracas Metropolitan Police shot and killed 16-year-old Ericson Jose Parra in the Petare neighborhood. Parra was leaving the home of an acquaintance when a plainclothes policeman stopped him and shot him in the leg without justification. Parra ran to the home of a friend, where two police entered and forced the family residing there to leave. Police then took Parra away in a patrol car and later informed his family that he was dead. There was no investigation.

On June 22, in San Antonio, Tachira state, members of the PTJ shot and killed 19-year-old Juan Pablo Arroyave. Arroyave and three relatives were driving home when PTJ officials stopped their car and violently forced them to get out. When the car began to roll away, the police told Arroyave to engage its hand brake. When Arroyave reached for the brake, police shot him. There was no investigation.

There were no new developments in the official investigation into the June 2000 killings by the Caracas Metropolitan Police of Ronny Tovar, age 17, Francisco Mister, age 14, and Luis Hernandez, age 21. Police arrested the three in their homes, and witnesses heard shots and saw their bodies being taken from the scene in a police vehicle. The bodies were recovered later.

An official investigation concluded during the year 2001 in the April 2000 shooting of Guillermina Colmenares by the Metropolitan Police; however, as of September, no charges had been filed. Colmenares was killed when police fired at a group of persons who had just seen them shoot and kill a suspected criminal. The police tortured witness Donis Ramirez and, in late December, threatened another witness, according to the human rights group Support Network.

There were no developments in the investigation into the January 2000 detention by Yaracuy state police of Jaime Hilarion and Richard Lucambio on a street in San Felipe city. Hilarion's and Lucambio's bodies were found 5 days later on a river bed and a highway, respectively.

An official investigation continued slowly during the year 2001 into the June 1999 death of Jhon Linares, who was detained by the Metropolitan Police and later was found dead at the hospital as a result of bullet wounds. There were no prosecutions, and none appear likely, in the February 1999 death of Oswaldo Blanco due to abuse by the National Guard.

There were no new developments, and none appear likely, in the on-going trial of a Sucre state police officer for the February 1999 death of Angel Castillo Munoz. Castillo died when state police broke up a peaceful student demonstration; he was hit in the head by a rubber bullet and fell unconscious into an area saturated by tear gas. Police reportedly continued to fire on the demonstrators, despite students' attempts to surrender, thus delaying medical care to injured students.

There were also no developments, and none appear likely, in the appeal by the prosecution of a 1999 court decision to exonerate a PTJ member implicated in the 1995 execution-style killing of 21-year-old Hector Rojas, despite evidence of the officer's guilt.

PROVEA reported a pattern of extrajudicial killings in the states of Barinas (32 such deaths between January 2000 and June 2001) and Zulia (where 43 persons died in "clashes" with police in the first 4 months of the year). On October 15, Human Rights Ombudsman German Mundarain called for "urgent intervention" by the federal government into the operations of state-level police in six states, in response to what he termed increasing numbers of extrajudicial killings that may have police connections. He expressed concern regarding reports of killings and forced disappearances in Portuguesa, Bolivar, Aragua, Yaracuy, Anzoategui, and Miranda states. According to the Public Ministry, there have been 239 cases of killings or forced disappearances in 18 of the country's 23 states since the beginning of 2000.

Security forces also killed some prisoners; however, the majority of the inmate deaths during the year 2001 resulted from gang confrontations, riots, fires, and generally unsanitary and unsafe conditions in prison facilities.

The authorities continued slowly to investigate allegations of human rights violations by the military and security forces sent to Vargas state in December 1999. The forces were sent to restore order after an outbreak of looting following flooding and landslides that killed an estimated 20,000 persons. Witnesses claim that military and security forces beat, detained, and killed alleged criminal suspects and other individuals between December 19 and December 25. Four disappearance cases from the same period in Vargas also are being investigated slowly.

In June the NGO Committee of Family Members of Victims of the Unrest (COFAVIC) called for the removal of the Government's representative in the cases relating to the civil unrest of February-March 1989, in which security forces allegedly committed some 300 extrajudicial killings. The COFAVIC had referred a total of 45 cases to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)) in 1995. In November 1999, before the IACHR, the Government accepted responsibility in 44 killings. The Government also agreed to compensate the families of the victims and to punish those responsible; however, there remained considerable disagreement regarding compensation. During the year 2001, human rights activists criticized the Government for moving slowly and questioned whether it was negotiating in good faith. In 1991 a police officer was found guilty of one killing, but the courts released the officer from prison 1 year later. In 1997 the IACHR called on the Government to investigate this case, provide compensation to the victim's family, and bring to justice those responsible for the death. The Government investigated and made a payment in 2000, but at year's end 2001, it still had not punished any of those responsible.

Mob lynchings of supposed criminals increased due to the public's frustration with rising crime. The victims were almost always known criminals who preyed on residents of poor neighborhoods. Between October 2000 and September, PROVEA recorded 63 lynchings and 102 attempted lynchings, compared to 22 lynchings and 107 attempted lynchings between October 1999 and September 2000. Unlike the previous year, there were no reports during the year 2001 of lynchings by vigilante groups known as "brigadas."

The 1999 Constitution prohibits forced disappearance, and there were no reports of politically motivated disappearances during the year 2001. The Constitution also states that an individual must refuse to obey an order to commit such a crime, and provides for the prosecution of the intellectual author of the crime.

Government agents are suspected in the forced disappearances of alleged criminal suspects and other individuals in Vargas state during a crackdown on looters following flooding in December 1999. On September 14, the Attorney General announced that formal charges had been filed against two DISIP agents in a Vargas court. DISIP Commissioner Jose Yanez Casimiro and since-retired Commissioner General Justiniano Nartinez Carreno face charges in the December 1999 disappearances of Oscar Blanco Romero and Marco Monasterio, who were arrested separately by army paratroopers without explanation in their homes in Caraballeda, Vargas state. The army has stated that it immediately turned the two men over to the DISIP. The DISIP first claimed that it had no agents in the area at the time, and then reversed itself but stated that it did not have Blanco and Monasterio in detention. Casimiro is accused of being responsible for the disappearances and Carreno is accused of covering them up; neither man had been arrested by year's end.

Also on December 21, 1999, army paratroopers beat and arrested Jose Rivas Fernandez on a street in Caraballeda. The army stated that it did not detain Rivas. On December 23, 1999, DISIP agents seized Roberto Hernandez Paz in La Guaira, Vargas state. Hernandez's uncle heard him plead to the agents and heard a gunshot in the family's garden. Neighbors witnessed the injured victim being placed in a DISIP vehicle and driven away. The DISIP stated that it did not arrest Hernandez. Neither of these missing individuals has been located.

The Government's investigation of these cases has been extremely slow and disorganized. Charges have been filed in only one case, and the Government has been unable to compel the cooperation of the DISIP. The investigating team was changed three times in 2000, with each new team starting an inquiry afresh. During the year 2001, human rights groups continued to ask that obstruction of justice charges be brought against the DISIP to force it to cooperate. In July the Supreme Court granted a habeas corpus writ filed on behalf of Hernandez and ordered the prosecutor to renew investigations into his disappearance.

There are reports that Colombian guerrillas kidnap persons for extortion. According to the National Federation of Cattlemen, at year's end 2001, Colombian guerrillas still held 18 of the 24 landowners whom they kidnaped in 1999.

The Constitution prohibits torture and the holding of detainees incommunicado, provides for the prosecution of officials who instigate or tolerate torture, and grants victims the right to medical rehabilitation. Under the 1999 COPP, detainees have the right to a judicial determination of the legality of their detention within 3 days--a reduction from the previous 8-day period that human rights groups argued was the principal time during which detainees were tortured. However, security forces continued to torture and abuse detainees physically and psychologically. This abuse most commonly consisted of beatings during arrest or interrogation, but there also were incidents in which the security forces used near-suffocation and other forms of torture that left no telltale signs. Most victims came from the poorest and least influential parts of society.

PROVEA documented 340 cases of torture, beatings, and other abuse from October 2000 through September (affecting 577 victims), compared with 429 cases from October 1999 through September 2000 (affecting 527 victims). PROVEA attributes responsibility for the reported incidents as follows: state police forces, 277; the armed forces, including the National Guard, 115; Caracas Metropolitan Police, 50; other municipal police forces, 98; the Technical Juridical Police, 26; and the DISIP intelligence service, 11. In 1999 human rights NGO's presented a report to the U.N. Committee Against Torture in which they documented 120 torture cases since 1987 that they have reported to the Government but that still have not been investigated fully; there is no indication of Government follow-up to this report.

Torture, like extrajudicial killings, continues because the Government does not ensure independent investigation of complaints, a needed step to bring those responsible to justice. In addition to the judiciary's lack of vigor, the Institute of Forensic Medicine is part of the PTJ. This contributes to a climate of impunity, since its doctors are unlikely to be impartial in their examinations of cases that involve torture by members of the PTJ. Very few cases of torture have resulted in convictions.

Cases of torture occur under a variety of circumstances. For example, on February 17, Carabobo state police beat and extorted money from 22-year-old Elio Centeno and three friends, according to Red de Apoyo. The group was seated in a parked car when police demanded to see their identification documents and obliged them to board a patrol car. When the group asked why they were being detained, police beat them, took them to a police station, and demanded $7 (5,000 bolivars) each for their release. When Centeno and his friends refused to pay, police beat them again. The four were released the next day after each paid $11 (8,000 bolivars) to the police. There was no known investigation.

On May 18, National Guard members in San Cristobal, Tachira state, beat William Ferrer and Arturo Teran. The two were seated in a liquor store when a National Guard patrol stopped and demanded their identification. Before Ferrer could stand up to provide his identification card, a Guard member beat him. When Teran protested Ferrer's treatment, another Guard member dragged him out of the store by the neck and beat him as well. There was no known investigation.

An official investigation in the case of Donis Ramirez, who was tortured in April 2000 by the Caracas Metropolitan Police and threatened with death if she spoke to other authorities, concluded during the year 2001; however, no charges were filed by year's end. Ramirez had seen the police fire at a group of individuals who had just witnessed them shoot and kill a suspected criminal. Another witness, Guillermina Colmenares, was killed in the incident. In late December, the police reportedly threatened a third witness.

An official investigation continued during the year 2001 into the case of Jose Matheus, who was arrested in his home in March 2000, by Zulia state police and accused by police of involvement in a kidnaping. The police held Matheus incommunicado for 11 days, beat him severely, and tortured him psychologically.

There were no new developments, and none appear likely, in the August 1999 case of torture of Juan de la Cruz Bravo by the PTJ in Guasdualito, Apure state, or in the June 1999 beating of Andres Flores by the Metropolitan Police.

An official investigation concluded, and charges against members of the military were dismissed during the year 2001 for lack of evidence, in the 1995 case in Cararabo, Apure state, in which the military killed or tortured 23 rural workers in response to an attack by Colombian guerrillas. Three members of the military spent 5 years in jail or under house arrest until they were released at the conclusion of the investigation. There were no new developments in the 1995 case in La Victoria, Apure state, in which 19 peasant farmers were tortured or killed by military members reacting to a guerrilla attack.

According to indigenous activists in Amazonas state, on April 17, a member of the Bare indigenous people was left paralyzed when a member of the National Guard shot him without provocation. Julian Rivas was traveling by boat along the Orinoco River with his brother Juan when he was shot repeatedly in the back. The National Guard later claimed that the shooting was accidental. There was no known investigation.

In October two landowners and several squatters were badly injured, and a teenage boy was left in a coma as police and the National Guard tried to evict invaders from a private property in Machiques, Zulia.

Metropolitan Police used tear gas against protesters at the National Assembly on November 22 and against marchers on December 7. There were no reports of excessive use of force in these incidents.

Constitutional provisions prohibit arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, and correspondence; however, the security forces continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights by conducting searches of homes without warrants, especially during anticrime sweeps in impoverished neighborhoods. There were no complaints during the year 2001 by human rights NGO's of illegal wiretapping by the security forces.

DETENTION

The Constitution and the law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the security forces continued to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily.

The National Guard, a branch of the military, has arrest powers and is largely responsible for maintaining public order, guarding the exterior of key government installations and prisons, conducting counter narcotics operations, monitoring borders, and providing law enforcement in remote areas. The Ministry of Interior and Justice controls the CICPC, which conducts most criminal investigations, and the DISIP, which collects intelligence and is responsible for investigating cases of corruption, subversion, and arms trafficking. Mayors and governors oversee local and state police forces. Often, mayors and governors recruited retired National Guard officers for the top leadership of their police. Corruption was a major problem among all police forces, whose members were poorly paid and trained. Impunity for corruption, brutality, and other acts of violence were major problems. Some local police forces offered human rights training for their personnel.

The COPP states that a person accused of a crime cannot be incarcerated during criminal proceedings unless that person was apprehended in the act of committing a crime or a judge determines that there is a danger that the accused may flee or impede the investigation. All detainees must be taken before a prosecutor within 12 hours and before a judge within 48 hours to determine the legality of the detention. To keep a suspect in pretrial detention, a judge must rule that: A crime meriting a prison sentence of more than 2 years has been committed; there is solid evidence that the suspect is guilty of the crime; and there is a danger of flight or that the detainee might try to obstruct the investigation. A person accused of a crime may not be detained for longer than the possible minimum sentence for that crime, nor for longer than 2 years, except in certain circumstances, as when the defendant is responsible for the delay in the proceedings. Although COPP procedures generally were followed once suspects entered the justice system, confusion over its implementation remained, and arbitrary detention continued to be common.

There was a bail system, but it was common to hold prisoners without according them access to bail. According to the OVP, there were approximately 18,781 prisoners in December, of whom 8,915 had not been convicted of a crime and were held without bail, and the Ministry of the Interior and Justice reported that 48 percent of all prisoners were in pretrial detention. Trials were delayed due to many factors, including the limited power of judges to compel authorities to transport prisoners to court.

Prisoners often had to bribe police to transport them to court for hearings. Judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers also were responsible for delays, due to excessive workload, corruption, and attempts to avoid controversial cases. Prisoners had reasonably good access to counsel and family members.

The Human Rights Ombudsman's office reported that, during the disturbances from February 27 to March 5, authorities arrested 513 persons and held 53 persons in pretrial detention for their actions. Arbitrary detentions by the Caracas Metropolitan Police, the DISIP, municipal police forces, the National Guard, and the CICPC continued; however, PROVEA estimated that the number of persons detained in anti-drug sweeps had declined.

The Government used the justice system selectively against the political opposition, including investigations against, and arrests of, opposition leaders on charges of conspiracy and treason.

On May 4, a judge ordered Baruta mayor Henrique Capriles Radonski detained on charges relating to a violent demonstration in front of the Cuban Embassy in 2002, despite the lack of evidence and the fact that Capriles was a public official. On September 6, a judge ordered him released on bail. Human rights groups, the political opposition, and media called Capriles a political prisoner. On October 18, an appeals court dismissed the Capriles case, a decision that the prosecution appealed.

On May 22, a military court ordered the detention of retired Army General Francisco Uson for "defaming" the army, despite the fact that Uson was retired and therefore not subject to military jurisdiction. When asked about the Fuerte Mara case in an interview program, Uson had explained how a flamethrower functions. On October 4, the military court found Uson guilty of insulting the army and sentenced him to 5½ years in prison. The defense appealed the decision.

On August 9, in the 2002 case against National Guard General Carlos Alfonzo Martinez, a judge ruled that the general was not guilty of instigating rebellion and abandoning his command but found him guilty of violating a security zone. General Martinez was sentenced to 5 years' probation and was forbidden to contact the media. Prosecutors and defense lawyers appealed the decision, and prosecutors also opened a new investigation against General Martinez for his actions in support of the Plaza Francia military dissidents in 2002. In October, an appeals court overturned General Martinez' conviction and set him free, a decision that the prosecutors appealed.

Prior to the August 15 presidential recall referendum, Carlos Melo, an opposition leader, was detained on charges of weapons possession, and was held until an appeals court ordered him released a few weeks later. Images captured by a video monitor at the time of Melo's detention supported his contention that the charges were fabricated.

In March, three judges were fired without cause, immediately after releasing protesters arrested in the February-March disturbances. In May, one of the tenured judges who ruled to free Carlos Melo was suspended indefinitely, while the tenured judge who wrote the decisions to release Capriles and General Alfonzo Martinez was suspended in December; in both cases, the alleged reasons for the suspensions were minor infractions of judicial rules.

COURTS

Venezuela has no dual organization of national and state courts. Since 1945, all courts have been part of the federal system, even though at one point a parallel organization of state courts existed. Regardless of their form of organization, the courts have never exercised as much influence as the executive or even the legislative branch in Venezuela.

As is the case with the legislature, the judicial branch in Venezuela does not share equal status with the executive. Although the law provides for the process of judicial review and for coequal status among the three branches of government, the reality is quite different. The Venezuelan brand of federalism does not provide for state courts. The law is perceived as the same, unitary, throughout the national territory. Thus, all courts and virtually all legal officers, from those who arrest to those who prosecute, are federal (i.e., central government) officials.

Broader implications stem from the fact that the Venezuelan legal system is essentially a code law system, and thus the legal system is relatively rigid and leaves little room for judicial discretion. In a system of code law, the jurist is seen as a confirmer of the written code rather than the finder or maker of the law, as is the case in common law systems.

The highest body in the judicial system is the fifteen-member Supreme Court of Justice, which is divided into three chambers that handle respectively, politico-administrative, civil, and penal matters. Its members are elected by joint session of the Congress for nine-year terms. One-third of the membership is renewed every three years. Each justice is restricted to a single term of nine years; this short tenure effectively limits how much a Supreme Court justice can accomplish.

Below the Supreme Court are seventeen judicial districts, each district having its own superior court. Lower courts within a judicial district include courts of instruction, district courts, municipal courts, and courts of first instance. The superior courts are composed of either one or three judges, a bailiff, and a secretary. They serve as appellate courts for matters originating in courts of first instance in the areas of civil and criminal law. Some deal exclusively with civil matters, others with criminal matters, and others with all categories of appeals. The courts of first instance are composed of one judge, a bailiff, and a secretary. They have both appellate and original jurisdiction and are divided into civil, mercantile, penal, finance, transit, labor, and juvenile courts. District courts are composed of one judge, one bailiff, and a secretary; they also operate nationwide. They have original jurisdiction in small bankruptcy and boundary suits, and appellate jurisdiction over all cases from the municipal courts. Municipal courts, consisting of a judge, a bailiff, and a secretary, hear small claims cases and also try those accused of minor crimes and misdemeanors. They also perform marriages. Although they do not constitute courts as such, instruction judges issue indictments, oversee investigations to determine whether a case merits the attention of the courts and, if so, issue an arrest warrant. Thus, these judges perform a crucial task in the initial stages of all cases that come before the courts.

In addition to the courts of ordinary jurisdiction, several courts of special jurisdiction operate under the Ministry of Justice. Military tribunals, fiscal tribunals, and juvenile courts all fall into this category. Although they operate independently of the ordinary courts, the Supreme Court also acts as the highest court of appeal for the special courts. Juvenile courts throughout the country try those under eighteen years of age.

One of the most interesting aspects of the Venezuelan judicial system is its carryover of medieval Castilian traditions, such as the fuero militar (military privilege). Under this centuries-old tradition, members of the military cannot be tried by criminal or civilian courts, although the military has at times intruded into the civilian judicial system. For example, the Armed Forces of Cooperation (Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación--FAC)--also known as the National Guard-- was charged with the function of protecting all national territory and highways. Under this broad mandate, it could and did prosecute contraband cases and in effect became involved in the criminal prosecution of many suspected civilian offenders. This power was likely to increase as drug contraband became a greater problem in Venezuela, especially along its borders with Colombia.

Generally speaking, the system for selecting judges tended to limit their independence. The Congress chooses the members of the Supreme Court, and the minister of justice names judges to the lower civilian courts. Neither category of judge enjoyed life tenure. Judges' salaries were submitted to Congress as line items in the Ministry of Justice's annual budget and were therefore not guaranteed. Thus, in a number of ways the judiciary was subordinate to and dependent upon the good will of the executive and the legislative branches. Although Venezuelan jurists occupied a highly regarded position in society, they did not hold nearly as much power as their counterparts in those systems where judicial review and common law are the basic determinants of procedures.

Today, the civilian judiciary is legally independent; however, it is highly inefficient and sometimes corrupt, and judges are subject to influence from a number of sources, including the executive branch.

The judicial sector consists of the Supreme Court, which is the court of final appeal; the Public Prosecutor, who provides opinions to the courts on prosecution of criminal cases and brings to the attention of the proper authorities cases of public employee misconduct and violations of the constitutional rights of prisoners or accused persons; the Ministry of Interior and Justice, which manages the national police force, files complaints in criminal courts, and oversees the prisons; and the Executive Directorate of the Magistrature (DEM), which oversees the lower courts as well as the selection and training of judges. The lower court system includes district and municipal courts as well as trial and appeal courts that deal with civil and criminal matters.

Both the 1999 COPP and the previous legal code provide for the right to a fair trial and consider the accused innocent until proven guilty in a court. However, under the previous secretive inquisitorial code, the presumption of innocence generally was not respected nor accepted. The system was corrupt, paper-intensive, costly, and time-consuming. Judges are underpaid, poorly disciplined, and susceptible to political influence. The COPP introduced for the first time open, public trials with oral proceedings and verdicts by juries or panels of judges. The adversarial system also establishes the right to plead guilty and make reparation agreements, a statute designed to clear the overburdened judicial system of simple cases and minor offenses. However, lengthy delays in trials remained common.

The Government continued to struggle to implement the COPP, which altered the fundamental concept of how justice is carried out, the legal procedures involved, and the respective roles of the police, judge, and lawyers. The police no longer may detain persons arbitrarily for up to 8 days and now must work under the supervision of a prosecutor; judges have ceased to be investigators and are now arbiters of law; and prosecutors and defense attorneys confront one another in court. Despite a shortage of trained personnel and resources, open, oral trials took place around the country for the third consecutive year.

Frustration among law enforcement entities over the difficulty of adapting to the COPP and public perceptions that the COPP's higher evidentiary standards and greater rights for the accused are responsible for rising crime levels led the National Assembly to form a mixed committee of jurists to propose reforms to the law. In November the National Assembly approved a series of reforms, including: Strengthening out-of-court settlements and increasing victims' rights to compensation; providing physical protection to crime victims during trials; bolstering the work of juries for some crimes and eliminating them for others; eliminating some sentence reduction benefits for jailed criminals; and expanding powers of detention. The reforms were in effect at year's end 2001.

The civilian judiciary is an independent branch of power according to the Constitution; however, it was subject to political influence, highly inefficient, and sometimes corrupt.

The judicial sector consists of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General's office, and the Ministry Interior and Justice. The Supreme Court is the country's highest court and directly administers the lower courts. It is divided into six chambers: Constitutional, criminal, social, administrative, electoral, and civil. The Supreme Court administers the lower courts through the Executive Directorate of the Magistracy (DEM). The competitive exams to select permanent judges remained suspended, and only provisional and temporary judges, who constituted 80 percent of all working judges, were hired. The Supreme Court's Judicial Committee may hire and fire temporary judges without cause and did so, without explanation. Provisional judges legally have the same rights as permanent judges; however, in March, the Judicial Committee fired without cause a temporary judge who had been working for 3 years and at least two provisional judges. Human Rights Watch (HRW) raised the problem that this situation represents for judicial independence, as did leaders of the judicial system.

On May 18, the National Assembly passed the Organic Law of the Supreme Court, which increased the number of Supreme Court judges from 20 to 32 and allowed them to be appointed with a simple, rather than a two-thirds, majority vote of the National Assembly. The law also permits the Moral Council (Attorney General, Human Rights Ombudsman, and Comptroller General) to suspend judges and allows the National Assembly to revoke the appointment of Supreme Court judges by a simple majority vote, even if they were appointed by a two-thirds majority. On June 15, using this authority, the legislature annulled the appointment of the Court's vice president. HRW noted that the law threatens the independence of the judiciary by subjecting it to political control.

Control judges oversee the protection of the rights of suspects and hear prosecution and defense motions prior to criminal cases going to trial judges. Executive judges oversee the application of sentences. Appeals courts, consisting of three-judge panels, review lower court decisions. The Attorney General oversees the prosecutors who investigate crimes and bring charges against criminal suspects.

Corruption was widespread, and judges also were susceptible to political pressure. Following the February/March protests, several provisional judges who freed protesters were fired. Human rights groups and judicial observers believed that they were fired for their refusal to detain protesters. In September, police detained provisional control judge Juan Ramon Leon Villanueva for soliciting a bribe from the head of the CICPC. Leon was the most recent judge to confirm the detention of Baruta mayor Capriles, prior to his release. Leon accused other judges of setting him up. Following the killing of prosecutor Danilo Anderson on November 18, prosecutors investigated allegations that Anderson may have been involved in extorting money from persons in return for not pursuing investigations against them. The investigation was ongoing at year's end.

The COPP provides for the right to a fair trial and considers the accused innocent until proven guilty. The COPP also provides for open, public trials with oral proceedings. Suspects have the right to plead guilty without trial and make reparation agreements. Trial delays were common. A professional judge and two lay judges try serious cases. A single judge may hear serious cases, if the defendant or victim so requests and the judge agrees, or if attempts to appoint lay judges have failed. Difficulty in finding persons willing or able to serve as lay judges frequently caused delays. Usually, single judges try minor cases. Defendants and complainants have the right of appeal.

The law provides for public defenders for those unable to afford an attorney; however, there were not enough public defenders. According to the DEM, as of September 2003, there were 619 public defense attorneys for the entire country, of whom 188 handled juvenile cases exclusively.

Prison officials often illegally demanded payment from prisoners for transportation to judicial proceedings. Those who were unable to pay often were forced to forgo their hearings.

On July 19, the Supreme Court president swore in the members of the First and Second Courts for contentious administrative matters. The Committee of Judicial Restructuring disbanded the First Court in 2003 following a series of decisions unfavorable to the Government. Citing reasons of workload, the DEM then created two courts.

The military created executive courts, as part of the restructuring the military justice system, mirroring the civilian courts. The Constitution establishes that trials for military personnel charged with human rights abuses would be held in civilian rather than military courts. However, the provision does not apply to cases that predate the 1999 Constitution.

On April 2, army Lieutenant Alessandro Sicat was convicted of murder and attempted murder and sentenced to 21 years in prison.

Human rights NGOs continued to express concern that the Supreme Court's selection of military judges from a list of candidates provided by the Minister of Defense linked the careers of military judges to the high command, making them more responsive to the views of their military leaders and influencing them to act slowly in cases in which the military is implicated. In May, without due administrative process, five military judges were fired for incompetence, although they had between 15 and 19 years' experience. Four of the judges were handling politically sensitive cases at the time. There were no reports of political prisoners.

CORRECTIONS

The Venezuelan prison system, which consisted of twenty-five institutions, suffered from overcrowding and understaffing as well as from graft and corruption. In the mid-1980s, the annual average prison population was about 15,000, exceeding the intended capacity of the system. As a result, prison conditions generally were inadequate, and prisoners commonly endured hardship and sometimes were subjected to physical abuse. As the national crime rate rose during the 1980s, the problems of the prison system became more acute.

The twenty-five prisons were essentially of three kinds: seventeen judicial detainment centers, seven national jails and penitentiaries, and the National Institute of Female Orientation located in Los Teques. Ostensibly, the prisons were designed to house those awaiting trial, those convicted, and women, respectively. In fact, however, several of the prisons had separate wings for each kind of inmate, although Los Teques housed the majority of female inmates and contained no males. Minors were interned in separate institutions. Prisons were staffed by civilian employees of the Ministry of Justice, although exterior guard duty was entrusted to National Guard personnel.

By law the rehabilitation of convicted criminals was based on their having meaningful work, an opportunity to receive at least a minimal education, and adequate medical assistance and living conditions. In fact, however, the overcrowded conditions precluded rehabilitation efforts. The idleness of many inmates, it is theorized, led to corruption, drug abuse, and homosexuality, all of which were growing problems in the prisons. One large Caracas prison had an entire wing that housed homosexuals exclusively.

Conditional liberty was granted to prisoners who had served at least three-fourths of their sentence and had a favorable conduct record. Prisoners who reached seventy years of age and had completed half their sentence were eligible for conditional liberty. Several organizations existed to help prisoners who had been released to find jobs and readjust to society. Nevertheless, the ex-convict encountered a generally hostile society on the outside, and the high rate of criminal repeaters was attributed largely to the stigma attached to the ex-convict.

The criminal justice system represented a glaring example of an area that lagged behind the many other comparative advances in Venezuelan society during the latter half of the twentieth century. Given the government's emphasis on reforming the bureaucratic structure that underlay the nation's economic shortcomings, it did not appear that judicial reform would be accorded a high priority during the 1990s. As with most of Venezuela's problems, however, the resources existed with which to effect reforms. Only the political will and the legislative procedure remained to be hammered out.

In year 2001, general prison conditions continued to be harsh due to underfunding, poorly trained and corrupt prison staff, and violence by guards and inmates. Due to the implementation of the COPP, the prison population decreased to 84 percent of capacity in 2000, the last year for which statistics are available. Conditions in some prisons became more humane and manageable during the year 2001 as overcrowding lessened; however, overcrowding in other prisons was so severe as to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment. Because of the uneven distribution of inmates, approximately 40 percent of prisoners remain housed in seriously overcrowded facilities. In November the National Assembly reformed the COPP, and human rights groups are concerned that the reforms could lead to an increase in detentions.

The Government failed to provide adequate prison security. According to PROVEA, there were 110 deaths and 698 injuries from violence in jails from October 2000 through September--a decrease from a total of 338 deaths and 1,255 injuries from violence between October 1999 and September 2000. Security forces committed a small number of the killings in prisons, and many prisoners died as a consequence of poor sanitary conditions, poor diet, and inadequate medical care. However, most inmate deaths resulted from prisoner-on-prisoner violence (especially during fights between rival gangs), riots, fires, and from generally unsafe conditions.

For example, on May 1, rival gangs clashed in the Tocuyito Prison in Carabobo state. The confrontation involved firearms and grenades that had been smuggled into the prison with the help of corrupt prison authorities. Six prisoners were killed and eight were wounded in the violence, which lasted several hours before authorities managed to control the situation.

On May 9, at the Yare jail in Caracas, two heavily armed rival gangs fought for over 12 hours before authorities could control the violence. Nine inmates were killed and 30 were wounded. One gang member was decapitated, several were mutilated, and one committed suicide when he found himself surrounded by rival gang members during the fighting.

On April 15, prisoners belonging to a gang in the Tocuyito Prison took hostage relatives of members of a rival gang who were present in the prison during visiting hours. Before releasing the family members, the inmates held them for more than a day to leverage their demands that prison authorities not undertake their planned transfer to another facility.

In March a gun battle between rival gangs in the El Rodeo Prison in Miranda state left 2 prisoners dead and 41 wounded. At Yare I Prison in Miranda, at least 20 inmates died in separate incidents from April to August, as gangs competed to control the market in drugs and weapons.

Inmates often have to pay guards as well as each other to obtain necessities such as space in a cell, a bed, and food. Because of the prison food's low quality and insufficient quantity, only about 30 percent of inmates consume it. Most prisoners get their food from their families, by paying prison guards, or in barter with other prisoners. Many inmates also profit from exploiting and abusing others. This problem is exacerbated by the absence of a rational system of prisoner classification: convicted murders and rapists are housed with unsentenced first-time petty offenders. Gang-related violence and extortion is fueled by the substantial trafficking in arms and drugs that occurs in prisons.

Prison officials often illegally demand payment from prisoners for transportation to judicial proceedings.

Female inmates are held in separate prisons, where conditions generally are better than those in the men's facilities. Security forces and law enforcement authorities often imprison minors together with adults, even though separate facilities exist for juveniles. Because reform institutions are filled to capacity, hundreds of children accused of infractions are confined in juvenile detention centers where they are crowded into small, filthy cells, fed only once a day, and forced to sleep on bare concrete floors.

In August 2000, the Government ended the prison emergency that it had declared in September 1999, and disbanded the Interinstitutional Commission that had managed it. Funding for prisons remained extremely low during the year 2001, preventing significant improvement in most penitentiaries. The Government publicly discussed the privatization of some prisons on several occasions, but took no concrete action. Despite resistance from the Catholic Church and NGO's, the Government sporadically used the National Guard, normally charged with exterior prison security, to maintain internal control of prisons.

The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights monitors.

WOMEN

Violence against women continued to be a problem, and women faced substantial institutional and societal prejudice with respect to rape and domestic violence. Domestic violence and rape often were not reported to the police. According to the Center for Women's Studies at the Central University of Venezuela (CEM), there were 900 reported rape cases as of June, compared with 2,100 such cases throughout 2003. There were 8,000 cases of reported domestic violence from January 2003 to June 2004. Police generally were reluctant to intervene to prevent domestic violence, and the courts rarely prosecuted those accused of such abuse. The law requires police to report domestic violence and obligates hospital personnel to notify the authorities when they admit patients who are victims of domestic abuse cases. Women generally were unaware of legal remedies and had little access to them. Few police officers were trained to assist rape victims. Only 1,500 of the 11,000 women who reported rape or abuse in 2003 and the first half of the year filed formal charges. In August, Linda Loaiza, the victim of brutal mistreatment and torture, staged a 6-day hunger strike to protest that her alleged aggressor had not been brought to trial in 2 years and thus could be released.

Rape was difficult to prove largely because a medical examination was required within 48 hours of the crime. The Penal Code also provides that an adult man guilty of raping an adult woman with whom he is acquainted can avoid punishment if, before sentencing, he marries the victim. If the rape victim is a prostitute, the rapist must serve only one-fifth of the sentence if convicted, a rule that applies to any crime committed against a prostitute. Prostitution is not illegal.

Sexual harassment in the workplace was a common problem but is not a criminal offense.

Women accounted for approximately half the student body of most universities and worked in many professions, including medicine and law. They were underrepresented in leadership positions and, on average, earned 30 percent less than men. Women attended military academies and served as officers in the armed forces.

Women and men are legally equal in marriage. The Constitution provides for sexual equality in exercising the right to work. The Labor Code specifies that employers must not discriminate against women with regard to pay or working conditions, must not fire them during pregnancy or for 1 year after giving birth, must grant them unpaid leave and benefits for 6 weeks before the birth of a child and 12 weeks after, and must provide them with 10 weeks of unpaid leave if they legally adopt children under 3 years of age. According to the Ministry of Labor and the CTV, these regulations were enforced in the formal sector.

The National Institute for Women, a government agency, had two programs to assist women in need and enhance the economic independence of women. The Women's Bank provided approximately 40,000 women with business and empowerment training and small-scale financing for micro-enterprises managed by women. During the year, the Women's Shelters Program opened its first shelter to receive, care for, and rehabilitate women in distress.

There were at least 10 NGOs in Caracas concerned with domestic violence, sex education, and economic discrimination. However, the recommendations of these groups were not implemented widely by the police or other concerned government agencies. Political differences created division among women's organizations, decreasing their effectiveness in advancing women's rights.

CHILDREN

The Organic Procedural Law on Adolescents and Children establishes legal protection of children under the age of 18, regardless of nationality; however, the law was not fully implemented. The Constitution provides that the State is to provide free education up to the university-preparatory level, and the law provides for universal, compulsory, and free education; however, an estimated 57 percent of children left school before the ninth grade. The Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports provided a public school feeding program for some children to promote school access and attendance through the high school level. Primary and secondary education was chronically underfunded.

There were numerous government health care programs provided for boys and girls on the basis of equal access. UNICEF reported that the under-5 mortality rate was 21 per 1,000 and that the Government financed the expanded program of immunization.

Reports of child abuse were rare due to a fear of entanglement with the authorities and societal ingrained attitudes regarding family privacy. According to UNICEF and other NGOs working with children and women, child abuse often included incest. The judicial system, although slow, ensured that in most situations children were removed from abusive households once a case had been reported; however, public facilities for such children were inadequate and had poorly trained staff.

UNICEF and CECODAP estimated that approximately 15,000 children lived on the street. Authorities in Caracas and several other jurisdictions tried to cope with the phenomenon of street children by imposing curfews for unsupervised minors. Reform institutions were filled to capacity, so hundreds of children accused of infractions, such as curfew violations, were confined in inadequate juvenile detention centers.

TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

The Constitution prohibits trafficking in persons, although there is no implementing law specifically for prosecution of all forms of trafficking in persons; however, there were reports that the country was a source, destination, and transit country for trafficked men, women, and children.

Trafficking may be prosecuted under laws against forced disappearance and kidnapping (punishable by 2 to 6 years' imprisonment) and, in the case of children, under the Organic Law to Protect Children and Adolescents (which carries a fine of 1 to 10 months' income for trafficking in children). The Law of Migration and Immigration, published on May 24, makes human smuggling punishable by 4 to 8 years in prison.

In January, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs inaugurated an interdepartmental working group to develop plans to combat trafficking in persons. The working group designed but has yet to implement an informational campaign.

The Government did not arrest or prosecute any individuals for trafficking in persons during the year, and no figures on trafficking were available from either government or NGO sources. CICPC's Interpol Division worked on two human trafficking cases involving seven women trafficked to Mexico and Spain. The two women lured to Mexico for sexual exploitation with false offers of employment were repatriated, but, despite cooperation with Spanish law enforcement, the five women trafficked to Spain had not been repatriated by year's end.

PROVEA received complaints that women were trafficked to Europe for purposes of prostitution. Undocumented or fraudulently documented Ecuadorian and Chinese nationals transited the country and reportedly were forced to work off the cost of their transportation in conditions of servitude. Organized criminal groups, possibly including Colombian drug traffickers, Ecuadorian citizens, and Chinese mafia groups, reportedly were behind some of these trafficking activities. The Ombudsman's office continued to investigate whether some of the children separated from their parents in the 1999 flooding in Vargas State may have been trafficked.

An underdeveloped legal framework, corruption among immigration authorities, and the ease with which fraudulent passports, identity cards, and birth certificates could be obtained created favorable conditions for trafficking.

There were small specially trained CICPC sections devoted to prostitution and the protection of women.

Government efforts to prevent trafficking are the responsibility of the Public Prosecutor's Family Protection Directorate and the National Institutes for Women and Minors. NGOs such as CECODAP and the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women also were involved in activities to combat trafficking; however, no details on their work were available.

DRUG TRAFFICKING

Venezuela is a major transit country for cocaine processed in Colombia and other Andean source countries. Law enforcement agencies estimate that over 100 metric tons of cocaine transit Venezuela annually. There are some indications that the quantity of drugs transiting Venezuela is increasing and that smuggling of Colombian heroin is a growing problem.

In 1998, Venezuela sustained its efforts to combat narcotics trafficking and consumption. The National Anti-Drug Commission (CNA) played an important coordination role by pressing for better implementation of existing legislation and lobbying for new, tougher counternarcotics legislation. Actions by the Government of Venezuela (GOV) to enhance counternarcotics efforts included. programs to implement a major reform of the judicial system due to enter into force in mid-1999, establishment of a central Financial Intelligence Unit, adoption of a unified regulatory system for essential chemicals, and passage of a new customs law. Efforts to gain passage of a Comprehensive Anti-Organized Crime Bill were ultimately unsuccessful when the Senate failed to pass the bill before Congress adjourned for elections.

U.S.-Venezuela bilateral counternarcotics cooperation continued in the political and law enforcement arenas. On the political level, the 1997 joint declaration of "Strategic Alliance Against Drugs" remained the framework for bilateral counternarcotics cooperation and 1998 saw progress in negotiations for a comprehensive Maritime Cooperation Treaty. Stepped up joint operations against drug traffickers and money laundering activities reflected increased law enforcement cooperation.

Narcotics-related corruption remained a problem in legal and financial systems and within security forces. Moreover, the Venezuelan authorities need to do more to combat diversion of chemical precursors and money laundering and to address the problem of over-flights by drug trafficking aircraft.

Venezuela continued to be a major drug transit country in 1998. Most large scale drug shipments transiting Venezuela originate in Colombia and are smuggled out of major Venezuelan ports in commercial cargo to the U.S. and Europe. Drugs are transported on commercial aircraft (either by drug mules or hidden in air cargo) and small aircraft through Venezuelan airspace. In addition, boats carrying drug shipments from Colombia pass through Venezuela's territorial waters on their way to Caribbean transshipment points.

Venezuela is a transit country for essential chemicals, which are either exported legally to Colombia and other source countries, diverted for use in cocaine labs, or smuggled out of Venezuela for this purpose. For instance, gasoline and cement are exported legally from Venezuela to Colombia and then diverted for use in cocaine processing. In 1998, Venezuela established a new regulatory structure to control essential chemicals subject to diversion.

The Government has acknowledged that Venezuelan financial institutions and other sectors of the economy are vulnerable to laundering of drug profits. U.S. Customs Service's Operation "Casablanca" identified Venezuela as one of the routes by which Colombian narco-traffickers repatriate drug proceeds. In 1998, the Government began to enforce the 1997 currency transaction reporting regulations and began to investigate suspicious financial transactions. Some of these investigations were developed in conjunction with U.S. law enforcement agencies.

The U.S. Customs Service's Operation "Casablanca" included investigations targeting Colombian narco-traffickers laundering drug proceeds through Venezuelan banks. Following the arrests in May of Venezuelan bankers implicated in this case, the Venezuelan government expressed concern over the vulnerability of its financial sector and cooperated with the U.S. on follow-up investigations. The Venezuelan authorities froze several bank accounts identified by the USG and, in addition, froze other accounts as a result of their own investigations. However, some in the Venezuelan Congress and media protested the means by which this operation was conducted and delivered a formal diplomatic protest. This case remains a politically sensitive issue in Venezuela.

The Government of Venezuela does not as a matter of policy or practice encourage or facilitate drug trafficking or money laundering, nor do its senior officials engage in, encourage, or facilitate such activities. However, corruption continues to be a major problem in law enforcement and the judicial system. In 1998, Venezuelan authorities moved against corruption in the Customs Service and prosecuted several officials for narcotics-related corruption. The Judicial Reform Program is designed to reduce the opportunities for corruption in the judicial sector. CNA Minister Carlos Tablante spot-lighted this issue in 1998, when he publicly called for punishment of specific judges suspected of corruption in narcotics cases.

To reduce corruption, the names of Venezuelan officials suspected of involvement in narcotics-related and other criminal activity will be included in a new centralized database. Because of the prevalence of corruption in the lower levels of law enforcement and the judiciary, this database should improve the ability to screen carefully all participants in counternarcotics operations.

The CNA continued to make demand reduction a priority in 1998. Programs included a nationwide school awareness program, TV spots and youth oriented events. In addition to a nationwide program of regional alliances led by the Governors of each of Venezuela's states, the CNA established alliances with NGOs, the private sector, and unions to promote demand reduction programs. The CNA worked with NGOs on drug treatment, education and rehabilitation programs. In November, the CNA announced that it had signed an agreement with the European community to establish a demand reduction information center in its headquarters in Caracas. The CNA organized a nationwide study of drug abuse trends by a leading demand reduction NGO.

Several influential non-governmental organizations function in Venezuela including the highly successful, private sector initiative "Alliance for a Drug-Free Venezuela." These organizations work independently and in conjunction with the CNA to raise public awareness on the dangers of drug consumption.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Internet research assisted by Claudia Betancourt and Maria Olivas