When the Spanish landed in 1531, Peru's territory was the nucleus of the highly developed Inca civilization. Centered at Cuzco, the Inca Empire extended over a vast region from northern Ecuador to central Chile. In search of Inca wealth, the Spanish explorer Francisco Pizarro, who arrived in the territory after the Incas had fought a debilitating civil war, conquered the weakened people. The Spanish had captured the Incan capital at Cuzco by 1533 and consolidated their control by 1542. Gold and silver from the Andes enriched the conquerors, and Peru became the principal source of Spanish wealth and power in South America.

Pizarro founded Lima in 1535. The viceroyalty established at Lima in 1542 initially had jurisdiction over all of South America except Portuguese Brazil. By the time of the wars of independence (1820-24), Lima had become the most distinguished and aristocratic colonial capital and the chief Spanish stronghold in America.

Peru's independence movement was led by Jose de San Martin of Argentina and Simon Bolivar of Venezuela. San Martin proclaimed Peruvian independence from Spain on July 28, 1821. Emancipation was completed in December 1824, when Gen. Antonio Jose de Sucre defeated the Spanish troops at Ayacucho, ending Spanish rule in South America. Spain made futile attempts to regain its former colonies, but in 1879 it finally recognized Peru's independence.

After independence, Peru and its neighbors engaged in intermittent territorial disputes. Chile's victory over Peru and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific (1879-83) resulted in a territorial settlement. Following a clash between Peru and Ecuador in 1941, the Rio Protocol--of which the United States is one of four guarantors--sought to establish the boundary between the two countries. Continuing boundary disagreement led to brief armed conflicts in early 1981 and early 1995, but in 1998 the Governments of Peru and Ecuador signed a historic peace treaty and demarcated the border. In late 1999, the Governments of Peru and Chile likewise finally implemented the last outstanding article of their 1929 border agreement.

The military has been prominent in Peruvian history. Coups have repeatedly interrupted civilian constitutional government. The most recent period of military rule (1968-80) began when Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado overthrew elected President Fernando Belaunde Terry of the Popular Action Party (AP). As part of what has been called the "first phase" of the military government's nationalist program, Velasco undertook an extensive agrarian reform program and nationalized the fish meal industry, some petroleum companies, and several banks and mining firms.

Because of Velasco's economic mismanagement and deteriorating health, he was replaced by Gen. Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerruti in 1975. Morales Bermudez moved the revolution into a more pragmatic "second phase," tempering the authoritarian abuses of the first phase and beginning the task of restoring the country's economy. Morales Bermudez presided over the return to civilian government in accordance with a new constitution drawn up in 1979. In the May 1980 elections, President Belaunde Terry was returned to office by an impressive plurality.

Nagging economic problems left over from the military government persisted, worsened by an occurrence of the "El Niño " weather phenomenon in 1982-83, which caused widespread flooding in some parts of the country, severe droughts in others, and decimated the schools of ocean fish that are one of the country's major resources. After a promising beginning, Belaunde's popularity eroded under the stress of inflation, economic hardship, and terrorism.

During the 1980s, cultivation of illicit coca was established in large areas on the eastern Andean slope. Rural terrorism by Sendero Luminoso (SL) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) increased during this time and derived significant financial support from alliances with the narcotraffickers. In 1985, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) won the presidential election, bringing Alan Garcia Perez to office. The transfer of the presidency from Belaunde to Garcia on July 28, 1985, was Peru's first exchange of power from one democratically elected leader to another in 40 years.

Economic mismanagement by the Garcia administration led to hyperinflation from 1988 to 1990. Concerned about the economy, the increasing terrorist threat from Sendero Luminoso, and allegations of official corruption, voters chose a relatively unknown mathematician-turned-politician, Alberto Fujimori, as president in 1990. Fujimori implemented drastic orthodox measures that caused inflation to drop from 7,650% in 1990 to 139% in 1991. Faced with opposition to his reform efforts, Fujimori dissolved Congress in the "auto-coup" of April 4, 1992. He then revised the constitution; called new congressional elections; and implemented substantial economic reform, including privatization of numerous state-owned companies, creation of an investment-friendly climate, and sound management of the economy.

Fujimori’s constitutionally questionable decision to seek a third term and subsequent tainted victory in June 2000 brought political and economic turmoil. A bribery scandal that broke just weeks after he took office in July forced Fujimori to call new elections in which he would not run. Fujimori fled the country and resigned from office in November 2000. He currently resides in his parents’ native Japan, amid controversy regarding his involvement in corruption scandals and human rights violations during his tenure as President. A caretaker government presided over new presidential and congressional elections, held in April 2001, which observers considered to be free and fair. The new elected government, led by President Alejandro Toledo, took office July 28, 2001.

Today, Peru is a multiparty republic that recently emerged from a decade of authoritarian government and is undergoing a process of democratic transformation. In November 2000, President Valentin Paniagua took power and led a transition government after then-President Alberto Fujimori resigned and was dismissed from office. Under President Paniagua, the Government held elections in April and June, which observers considered to be generally free and fair. Alejandro Toledo of the Peru Posible party won the presidential runoff election with approximately 53 percent of the vote and was inaugurated in July. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary has been subject to interference from the executive and is corrupt and inefficient. The Government took steps to implement important judicial reform during the year 2001.

Both the Paniagua and Toledo administrations took steps to implement important democratic reforms to improve the exercise of civil and political rights and to address allegations of corruption in the judiciary, the executive, and the intelligence service. The Paniagua administration created a National Initiative Against Corruption, a Truth Commission, and a Commission on Constitutional Reform. In June former de facto SIN Chief Vladimiro Montesinos was captured in Venezuela and the Peruvian National Police (PNP) brought him back to the country to face a range of charges, including murder, corruption, money laundering, and drug trafficking. President Toledo continued these efforts, appointed an anticorruption czar, and initiated other reforms to restructure the police and judiciary. In February Congress voted to return the country to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Adhering to Court rulings, the Government moved to prosecute perpetrators of human rights abuses from previous years. In an effort to address impunity, the Government, Congress, and the judiciary undertook dozens of investigations during the year 2001 into political abuses and corruption of the Fujimori period (1990-2000). However, some of these investigations appeared to have politically partisan overtones. On August 27, Congress voted unanimously to remove former President Fujimori's immunity from prosecution as a former head of state, and in September he was indicted on charges of murder, causing grave injuries, and responsibility for forced disappearances. In November the Truth and Reconciliation Commission began to investigate past human rights abuses.

Sendero Luminoso terrorists were responsible for killings, torture, and numerous other abuses.

The Peruvian armed forces have had to face several internal threats to national security since the 1930s. APRA, Peru's first mass-based political party, mounted at least seven attempts to take power by force between 1931 and 1948, after being frustrated in its efforts to gain access through elections. Its reformist agenda was perceived as revolutionary and totally unacceptable to the senior military command, although the party did have some success in gaining support among junior officers, NCOs, and even an occasional senior official. The most serious of the APRA coup attempts were the revolt of February 1939, led by army General Antonio Rodríguez, second vice president and minister of government in the administration of General Oscar Raimundo Benavides (president, 1914-15, 1933-39), and the October 1948 naval revolt in Callao by APRA cells among junior officers. Both were put down violently by loyal army forces, but had the effect of further inflaming military opposition to APRA because of the party's attempts to subvert the integrity of the military institution itself. This military opposition lingered well into the 1960s even though the 1948 revolt was APRA's last attempt to gain power by force.

The organization of farmers in the La Convención Valley of Cusco, beginning locally in 1951 and with the aid of Trotskyite Hugo Blanco starting in 1960, was the most visible of various efforts in rural Peru in the 1950s and 1960s pushing for land reform. The farmers' movement in La Convención whose principal tactic was to occupy land was successful only after a period of violent confrontation with landowners, police, and military and the capture of Blanco and most of his partisans in May 1963. It was the first example of substantial, locally organized pressure for agrarian reform. The Revolutionary Military Government (July 1962 to July 1963) officially ratified this de facto local reform as part of its newly progressive approach to dealing with Peru's problems. This initiative gave an early indication of how the armed forces preferred to deal with issues of development that became related to internal security.

The peasants' success in La Convención inspired many others around the Peruvian highlands to carry out their own land occupations, a large number of them coordinated with the return to elected government on July 28, 1963, as President Belaúnde took office. More radical groups, Cuban inspired, also saw the growing rural ferment as an opportunity to begin armed revolution in the countryside. One was the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria--MIR), created in 1962 and led by Luis de la Puente Uceda with other disaffected former APRA militants. Operating in Cusco, the MIR was tracked down and destroyed by the military in October 1965, and De la Puente was killed in action. Another radical group was Guillermo Lobatón's Túpac Amaru (not to be confused with the MRTA), which suffered the same fate in Junín in January 1966 after six months of skirmishes. A third group, from the National Liberation Army (Ejército de la Liberación Nacional--ELN), a Castroite force founded in 1962 and led by Héctor Béjar Rivera, was also defeated in early 1966 in Ayacucho. Béjar was captured and jailed in late 1965. Freed in the military government's Christmas 1970 amnesty, he became an important official in the regime's organization to foster the labor movement. These guerrilla activities and military responses helped convince the armed forces that centralgovernment reforms, rather than continued protection of the status quo, were the preferred route to defend Peru's domestic security needs.

Although the military junta's reforms were ultimately unsuccessful, the regime did attempt to resolve the problems it created by turning the political process back to the civilians. It did not try to overcome its own legitimacy crisis by force. The military regime also opened up the system to the left--political parties and unions especially--for the first time on a sustained basis in Peru's history. Both the constitution of 1979 and the elections of 1980 were to a significant degree the results of the military's decisions. In this context of the restoration of civilian rule and all the enthusiasm that accompanied it, what was totally unexpected was the simultaneous preparation for the inauguration of guerrilla war by an obscure provincial Maoist university group known to outsiders as the Shining Path, and to militants as the Peruvian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Peruano--PCP).

The SL launched its peoples' war with the burning of ballot boxes in the provincial Ayacucho market town of Chuschi on May 17, 1980, the eve of national elections. Unlike the short-lived guerrilla movements of the mid-1960s, the SL extended its range of activities and actions over the course of the 1980s and contributed to the expansion of violence by other guerrilla organizations, as well as by common criminals. By mid-1992 political violence accounted for over 25,000 casualties. The SL insurgency also caused some US$22-billion worth of property damages from direct destruction and indirect loss of production and employment.

The SL's success in comparison with earlier insurgencies' failures had at least seven explanations. First, the movement organized and developed over a fifteen- to seventeen-year period before it launched its "armed struggle." Second, the SL began and grew in a provincial university (San Cristóbal de Huamanga) beyond the regular purview of central government authorities and in an isolated highland department (Ayacucho). In 1990 Ayacucho Department was still one of the most sparsely populated (with less than 3 percent of the country's population, mostly Quechua- speaking native Americans) and economically deprived departments (generating a meager 1 percent of Peru's GNP). Third, the SL was organized from the outset and directed by a single individual, professor Abimáel Guzmán Reynoso, who had the capacity to impose an iron discipline, attract many of the university's most able students and faculty, and build a strategy of revolutionary war in Peru drawn from Mao Zedong and other leading Marxist thinkers and practitioners. Fourth, the government response was delayed for years because it refused to take the SL seriously. When the government did act, it was often on the basis of strong and sometimes indiscriminate military action rather than through a combination of military and economic activities to respond more effectively to the real problems of the provinces that the SL was trying to exploit. Fifth, continuing and often increasing economic difficulties during the 1980s made it harder for the political center at Lima to respond effectively to the growing needs of the periphery and gave the guerrillas more opportunities. For example, the SL moved into the Upper Huallaga Valley and became involved in the coca production and cocaine- paste trafficking business, which generated resources estimated to be as much as US$30 million per year that were used to pay SL salaries and strengthen the SL's domestic infrastructure. And sixth, the SL's insistence on autarkic autonomy took it out of the mainstream international communist movement, with all of its uncertainties, and gave it a greater sense of its own significance.

As of mid-1992, the SL was believed to have between 3,000 and 4,000 armed cadre and some 50,000 supporters in various civilian support groups. Although the SL began in Ayacucho, the movement consciously expanded to other departments, so that by 1992 most of its actions took place in other areas--particularly Lima, Ancash, Junín, and the Upper Huallaga Valley. The movement was organized into a Central Committee and Politburo and six regional commands, all of which had a certain degree of autonomy to be able to adjust to special local circumstances. A strict hierarchy of commitment obtained: from sympathizers to activists to militants to commanders to the Central Committee and Politburo. The militants formed the armed cadres and the assassination squads; the sympathizers and activists operated in the SL's Popular Aid (Socorro Popular) organization to help the SL prisoners or families of fallen comrades, to assist in legal defense or recruitment, to march in demonstrations, and to undertake other activities. There were believed to have been nineteen Central Committee members and five Politburo leaders who made the decisions for the organization and who were replaced as needed by the most qualified of the militants and so on down. Assassination squads had backups to increase the chances of successful operations.

The SL recruitment took place primarily among the young and the marginalized; the organization included large numbers of fourteen- to eighteen-year-olds and women. Sympathizers gradually proved themselves by their actions and advanced to the status of militants. Visits by journalists to prisons where captured SL militants were housed suggested that indoctrination was intensive and total, with songs, marches, plays, and skits manifesting a training both ideological and personal. Members appeared to be transformed by their experience, adopting a new, more aesthetic life-style, total subordination to the cause of the revolution, and an apparent utter conviction, inviting comparisons with religious fundamentalist converts. For the individual, it could be an uplifting, liberating experience; at the same time, the person put himself or herself in a situation of complete subservience to the organization and its leadership.

Guzmán and his colleagues were convinced that they had unlocked the secrets of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism and were pursuing the correct revolutionary course even as communist movements and governments collapsed around the world. To Guzmán, or "Presidente Gonzalo," as he was called in the SL, the failure of world communism resulted from its unwillingness to apply the purifying orthodoxy of China's Cultural Revolution to return regularly to the movements' essential proletarian foundations. The PCP was to Guzmán the new beacon of hope for world revolution; the SL's advance worldwide depended first on its slow, methodical, and above all "correct" movement forward in Peru. It was a movement that took the long view, building and progressing slowly on its own terms. Organization and cadre were more important than territory at this point, particularly among the urban proletariat; hence, the greater focus after 1988 on building the movement in the cities, particularly Lima.

Terrorism and intimidation were part of the strategy to neutralize those key individuals whom the SL could not co-opt, but almost always on a very selective basis, not indiscriminately, and usually for political, not military, reasons. Key targets were local officials, especially candidates and elected officers of communities, towns, organizations, and unions. Targets also included selected government employees and key foreign technicians in rural development projects. Occasionally, a national figure--such as a general, an admiral, or a deputy to Congress--was assassinated to drive the message home that no one was safe, that central government and the military were unable to protect their own.

The 1989 municipal and 1990 national elections went ahead as scheduled despite SL threats, but over 400 local districts (out of some 2,016) remained bereft of elected officials. Most foreign development projects, including those of France, the Netherlands, and Japan, with between 500 and 1,000 specialists in the field, pulled their people out of rural areas or quietly withdrew from Peru entirely after one to three of each group's members were killed in 1989-91, and the Peruvian government could not guarantee the safety of those remaining.

Attacks on Peru's infrastructure sent a similar message--electrical pylons were toppled, bridges and railroad tracks blown up, roads catered, factories bombed. Through such actions, the SL was unable to paralyze the country, but did impair its function. Living in Lima became more difficult with electric-power cutoffs and rationing, water-use limits, and spot shortages of key foodstuffs. About 150,000 Peruvians migrated each year in 1988 and 1989, according to official statistics; in 1990 the figure was 328,000.

The expansion of violence by the SL also took its toll on the armed forces. Thirty-one military and forty-five police members were killed in political violence in 1985; in 1990 there were 135 military fatalities and 163 police deaths. The expansion in the number of provinces under a state of emergency owing to the insurgency forced the deployment of an estimated 15 percent to 20 percent of the armed forces, predominantly the army, to these areas. Because most of the military's equipment was originally purchased for more traditional border defense purposes rather than for combating insurgency, there were continuing shortages of matériel. In addition, the economic crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s reduced the defense budget substantially, making such fundamental activities as provisioning and maintaining troops in the field quite difficult at times. Helicopter maintenance was a particular problem. Under those conditions, human rights violations by the armed forces and police increased substantially in the late 1980s after marked improvement in 1985 and 1986.

In spite of the multiple challenges posed by the insurgency, the armed forces also experienced a number of important successes. These included the June 1988 capture of several important SL leaders, including Osmán Morote Barrionuevo, believed to have been the organization's number-two figure and chief military strategist. There were also major raids on SL safehouses in Lima in 1990-91 that yielded key documents and computer files of the organization; one raid reportedly came within minutes of capturing Guzmán himself. Significant military operations in the Upper Huallaga Valley in 1989 under the command of General Alberto Arciniega Huby, the political-military chief of the region, restored government control to most of the area, at least temporarily, with many SL casualties. Guerrilla fatalities nationwide increased markedly, from 630 in 1985 to 1,879 in 1990. These military successes were attributed to a number of factors, including improved intelligence gathering and coordination with the military units in the field, as well as the overextension of the SL organization in some parts of the country and the SL's use of larger military units in the field. In addition, the SL met with greater civilian resistance as peasant communities organized armed peasant patrols (rondas campesinas) that served as volunteer defense forces.

The most dramatic government success was the September 1992 capture in Lima of Guzmán himself along with other important SL figures, including at least three members of the Central Committee. This police Dincote operation resulted from painstaking intelligence work. Guzmán's capture helped restore the tattered prestige of Peru's police forces and gave the Fujimori government a significant psychological boost at a critical juncture. Guzmán was tried in a military court that October and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. He began his imprisonment in solitary confinement in a military prison on San Lorenzo Island. Documents seized in the September safehouse raid led to the subsequent capture of other important SL militants at the regional and local levels. Many, although far from all, analysts believed that this was the beginning of the end for the SL, especially if the government could take advantage of the movement to begin implementing local development projects.

The military and police forces also experienced considerable success against a much smaller and more conventional guerrilla organization, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru--MRTA. Organized in 1985 by disaffected members of the youth wings of several of Peru's legal Marxist parties, the MRTA began to compete with the SL for support, primarily in Lima, parts of the Upper Huallaga Valley, and the adjacent jungle. Some of its members were killed by SL forces and by the military. A number were captured, including, in 1988, the MRTA's head, Víctor Polay Campos. By early 1990, much of the organization had been disbanded and its jailed leadership was trying to work out a negotiated settlement with the government for the ending of hostilities. But the MRTA got a new lease on life in July 1990 when some forty-seven jailed members, including Polay, tunneled their way to a mass escape from Lima's Canto Grande Prison. The crowning indignity for the outgoing APRA administration was that the escapees videotaped the entire operation.

In the months to follow, the MRTA resumed operations with expanded military activities in the Upper Huallaga Valley and adjacent jungle, and elsewhere. The MRTA appeared to be more willing to consider conversations with government authorities than the SL, which adamantly refused any contact. However, because they were responsible for only between 10 and 20 percent of the incidents of political violence, it was not likely that any settlement that could be reached would significantly diminish Peru's insurgency problem. In any event, with Polay's recapture in 1992, along with a substantial number of his lieutenants, the MRTA appeared to be close to elimination as a significant guerrilla threat. The same careful police intelligence work that brought in Guzmán enabled Peru's government to advance against the MRTA.

As the world's largest producer of coca and cocaine paste, Peru had a major drug-trafficking problem during the 1980s, concentrated in and around the Upper Huallaga Valley, where most of the coca used in the manufacture of cocaine for export was grown. Weekly flights from the area's more than 100 clandestine airstrips by small aircraft laden with cocaine paste were believed to have peaked in 1988 and 1989 at about fifty. Concentrated efforts in late 1989 and 1990 to restrict the trafficking in Colombia, the destination of most flights, and in Peru itself were partially successful, as indicated by a sharp overall decline in price for the coca leaf. Counting Peruvian coca growers (estimated to number between 70,000 and 320,000), cocaine-paste processors (estimated at between 23,000 and 107,000), and cocaine-paste transporters (some 2,400 to 11,000), from 95,400 and 438,000 individuals were employed in the illicit production and preliminary refining of the drug in Peru. Considering the average peasant family size of five, between 477,000 and 2.64 million Peruvians depended directly on coca and cocaine-paste production for their livelihoods, or between about 4 percent and 20 percent of the country's economically active population (about 10 percent of Peru's coca production is legal, mostly for traditional uses of coca by the indigenous population). Joint Peruvian-United States efforts to reduce the supply of cocaine reaching North America initially focused on coca crop eradication but shifted to interdiction and crop substitution in the late 1980s, in part owing to tensions with peasant growers.

Cocaine and cocaine base use among Peruvians was also perceived as a problem. A 1990 national epidemiology study of drug use among 12- to 50-year-olds put one-time use of cocaine paste at 4.6 percent and more frequent cocaine use at 1.5 percent, slightly higher than a similar study conducted in 1986. It was believed that drug use in and around centers of drug production was growing much more rapidly. Arrests for drug consumption were about 1,900 in 1985, peaked at 2,200 in 1986, and then declined to about 1,400 in 1987, 900 in 1988, and 500 in 1989. Cocaine seized by Peruvian authorities showed a similar pattern--15.4 tons in 1985, 48.4 in 1986, 36.6 in 1987, 30.9 in 1988, and 8.4 in 1989, with a substantial increase to 14.9 tons during the first half of 1990. Peruvian authorities recognized the seriousness of the drug production and trafficking problem but were more worried about the economic crisis and the insurgency.

The country's population is approximately 27 million. Over the last decade, the Government transformed a heavily regulated economy into a market-oriented one. Gross domestic product (GDP) showed no growth during the year 2001, compared with 3.1 percent growth in 2000. Inflation, which was 3.7 percent in 2000, fell to less than 1 percent for the year. Per capita GDP is estimated at $2,085. Major exports include copper, gold and other minerals, fishmeal, textiles, and agricultural products. More than half of the economically active population works in the informal sector. The urban unemployment rate is officially 9.5 percent of the workforce, with underemployment of over 40 percent. The poor constitute approximately 54 percent of the population, earning less than $1.25 per day; about 15 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty, unable to meet the most basic food, shelter, and clothing requirements.

A large part of Peru's complicated modern social system started with the hierarchical principles set down in colonial times that remain as powerful guidelines for intergroup and interpersonal behavior. Peru's ethnic composition, however, is mixed. In the early 1990s, Europeans of various background made up 15 percent of the population, Asians from Japan and China and Africans formed 3 percent, the mestizo population constituted 37 percent, and the native Americans made up 45 percent, according to various United States and British reference sources. However, it is difficult to judge the composition of the native population because census data have generally undercounted or frequently failed to identify ethnic groups successfully. Even using language as the primary criterion does not take bilingualism adequately into account and omits other aspects of cultural behavior altogether. Thus, although Cajamarca Department is 98- percent Spanish-speaking, the bulk of the rural population lives in a manner identical to those classified as native people because they speak Quechua. The question as to who is a native has been an oft-debated issue. But how the individual chooses to classify his or her cultural identity is determined by the forces of society that give ethnic terms their social meaning. Because of Peruvian society's longstanding negative attitudes and practices toward native peoples, persons who have become socially mobile seek to change their public identity and hence learning Spanish becomes critical. Denial of the ability to speak Quechua, Aymara, or other native languages often accompanies the switch.

Another separate dimension of the "Indian problem" so widely discussed by Peruvian essayists has to do with the natives living in the Selva and high Selva, or Montaña, regions of the country. The tribal peoples have a tenuous and generally unhappy relationship with Peruvians and the state, evolved from long experience along the tropical frontier. The Incas and their predecessors ventured only into the fringes of the region called Antisuyu, and the Spanish followed their pattern. The inhabitants were known collectively as savages (chunchos). In documents they are politely referred to as jungle people (selvícolas or selváticos). Thought to be savage, wild, and dangerous but usually described as "simple" and innocent, they are also widely considered to possess uncanny powers of witchcraft and healing. Here, the sixteenth-century concept of the "noble savage" vies with equally old notions that these are lazy, useless people who need to get out of the way of progress. Indeed, modern currents of developmental change, the expanding drug trade, oil exploration, the clearing of the forest, and the search for gold in Madre de Dios Department have placed native peoples under great pressures for which they are little prepared. The Selva tribes, like native highlanders, Afro-Peruvians, and other people "of color," are those who feel the discriminatory power of the colonial legacy as well as modern stresses, especially if they are poor. In demographic terms, the impact of poverty and oppression has been, and remains, considerable. Thus, the mortality rates of native peoples and especially their children are much higher than those of the general population. Tribal peoples are still widely susceptible to numerous uncontrolled infectious diseases and outside the religious missions have little or no access to scientific medical care.

The tribal peoples of the lower Selva along the major rivers have endured the stress and danger of contact with outside forces longer than those groups located at the upper reaches of the streams. It is in these "refuge areas" that most of the present tribal populations survive. More than any other sector of the population, the rural peoples of the Selva, and especially the tribal groups, live at the fringe of the state both literally and figuratively, being uncounted, unserved, and vulnerable to those who would use the area as their own. According to anthropologist Stéfano Varese, there are about 50 tribes numbering an estimated 250,000 persons and maintaining active communities, scattered principally throughout the departments of Loreto, Amazonas, Ucayali, Huánuco, and Madre de Dios. The national census, however, has lowered its estimates from 100,830 in 1961 to 30,000 in 1981 for the tribal peoples, even though field studies have not supported such conclusions.

In the Selva, tribal lands in the early 1990s were in even more jeopardy than the Quechua and Aymara farmland in the Sierra. Although community rights were acknowledged, if not respected, in the Andes, outsiders have virtually never accepted this fact in the case of the Amazonian peoples. Nevertheless, apparently many tribal societies, such as the Shipibo, have held their traditional hunting, fishing, and swidden lands in continuous usufruct for as long as 2,000 years. As a result of the land reforms under the Velasco government, however, laws established the land rights of Amazonian native communities. Consequently, some groups, such as the Cocama-Cocamilla, have been able to secure their agroecological base.

The Afro-Peruvians who came as slaves with the first wave of conquest remained in that position until released from it by Marshal Ramón Castilla (1845-51, 1855-62) in 1854. During their long colonial experience, many Afro-Peruvians, especially the mulattos and others of mixed racial parentage, were freed to assume working-class roles in the coastal valleys. Even fewer blacks than Europeans settled in the highland towns and for virtually all the colonial epoch remained concentrated in the central coastal valleys. Lima's colonial population was 50 percent African during much of the era. Indeed, the term "criollo" was originally identified with native-born blacks and acquired much of its special meaning in association with urban, streetwise behavior. The social status of blacks in many ways paralleled that of the native Americans in rank and role in society.

Completing the human resource mix in Peru were the immigrants from Europe and Asia. The former arrived with the advantages of conquest; the latter arrived first as indentured laborers and later as Japanese and Taiwanese immigrants who pursued careers in truck farming, commerce, and business. The Chinese who were brought to Peru from Macao and other ports between 1849 and 1874 numbered about 90,000. The Chinese influx occurred in the same period as the United States' importation of Chinese coolies, and many of the latter were eventually shipped from San Francisco to Lima. Most Chinese eventually survived their indentures and took up residence in the coastal towns where they established themselves as active storekeepers and businesspeople. The growth of the Japanese presence in Peru began early in the twentieth century and quietly increased over the 1970-90 period. In 1990 Japanese immigrants constituted the largest foreign group in Peru and were rapidly integrating into Peruvian culture, gaining positions from president (Fujimori) to popular folk singer (the "Little Princess from Yungay"). In the middle range of Peruvian class structure, the Chinese and especially the Japanese have achieved status and mobility in ways the native peoples have not.

The key to understanding Peruvian society is to view aspects of its dynamic ethnoracial character as a set of variables that constantly interplays with socioeconomic factors associated with social class configurations. Thus, a native American might acquire the Spanish language, a university education, a large amount of capital, and a cosmopolitan demeanor, but still continue to be considered an indio (Indian) in many circles and thus be an unacceptable associate or marital companion. Yet, there is opportunity for socioeconomic mobility that permits ambitious individuals and families to ascend the hierarchy ranks in limited ways and via certain pathways. Such mobility is easier if one starts on the ladder as a mestizo or a foreigner, but especially if one is white.

The word indio, as applied to native highland people of Quechua and Aymara origin, carries strong negative meanings and stereotypes among non-native Peruvians. For that reason, the ardently populist Velasco regime attempted with some success to substitute the term peasant (campesino) to accompany the many far-reaching changes his government directed at improving the socioeconomic conditions in the highlands. Nevertheless, traditional usage has prevailed in many areas in reference to those who speak native languages, dress in native styles, and engage in activities defined as native. Peruvian society ascribes to them a caste status to which no one else aspires.

The ingrained attitudes and stereotypes held by the mistikuna (the Quechua term for mestizo people) toward the runakuna (native people--the Quechua term for themselves) in most highland towns have led to a variety of discriminatory behaviors, from mocking references to "brute" or "savage" to obliging native Americans to step aside, sit in the back of vehicles, and in general humble themselves in the presence of persons of higher status. The pattern of ethnoracist denigration has continued despite all of the protests and reports, official policies, and compelling accounts of discrimination described in Peruvian novels published since the beginning of the twentieth century.

The regions and departments with the largest populations of native peoples are construed to be the most backward, being the poorest, least educated, and less developed. They are also the ones with the highest percentages of Quechua and Aymara speakers. The reasons for the perpetuation of colonial values with respect to autochthonous peoples is complex, being more than a simple perseverance of custom. The social condition of the population owes its form to the kinds of expectations embedded in the premises and workings of the nation's institutions. These are not easily altered. Spanish institutions of conquest were implanted into colonial life as part of the strategy for ruling conquered peoples: the indigenous people were defeated and captured and thus, as spoils of war, were as exploitable as mineral wealth or land. In the minds of many highland mestizos as well as betteroff urbanites, they still are.

Although the Spanish crown attempted to take stern control over civic affairs, including the treatment, role, and conditions of native Americans who were officially protected, the well-intended regulations were neither effective nor accepted by creole and immigrant interests. Power and status derived from wealth and position, considered not only to be in the form of money and property, but also coming from the authority to exercise control over others. Functionaries of the colonial regime paid for their positions so that they could exact the price of rule from their constituent populations. Encomenderos, corregidores, and the numerous bureaucrats all held dominion over segments of the native population and other castes, which were obliged to pay various forms of tribute. With the decline of the colonial administration and the failure of the many attempts at reform to control the abuses of the native peoples, Peru's political independence saw a transfer of power into the hands of Creoles and mestizos, the latter of whom comprised the majority of Peru's citizens in the early 1990s.

The growth of large estates with resident serf populations was an important feature of this transition period. The process benefited from the new constitutional policies decreeing the termination of the Indian community (Comunidad Indio)--the corporate units formerly protected by the crown. The subsequent breakup of hundreds of communities into individually owned properties led directly to these lands being purchased, stolen, or usurped by eager opportunists in the new society. The most critical native American franchise was thus lost as entire communities passed from a relatively free corporate status to one of high vulnerability, subject to the whims of absentee landlords. Although the development of haciendas occurred rapidly after the demise of the colonial regime, the system had long been in place, established through the assignment of property and people to benefit particular individuals for their service to the crown, to institutions such as the church, and to public welfare societies intended to offer succor to the poor by maintaining hospitals and orphanages. Debt peonage constituted the basic labor arrangement by which landlords of all types operated their properties nationwide. The system endured until it was abolished by the land reform of 1969.

Although a thing of the past, the numbing effects of four centuries of peonage on Peruvian society should not be underestimated. One archetypical Andean estate operated at Vicos, Ancash Department, from 1594 to 1952, before it became part of Peru's first land-reform experiment. The 17,000-hectare estate and the landlord's interests were managed by a local administrator, who employed a group of straw bosses, each commanding a sector of the property and directing the work and lives of the 1,700 peons (colonos) attached to the estate by debt. Dressed in unique homespun woolen clothing that identified them as vicosinos (residents of Vicos), each colono family lived in a house it built but did not own. Rather, it owed the estate three days of labor per week, and more if demanded, in exchange for a small subsistence plot and limited rights to graze animals on the puna. Grazing privileges were paid for by dividing the newborn animals each year equally between colono and landlord. For the work, a symbolic wage (temple) of twenty centavos (about two cents in United States currency of the time) and a portion of coca and alcohol were given to each peon. In addition, peons were obliged to provide other services on demand to the administrator and landlord, such as pasturing their animals, serving as maids and servants in their homes, running errands of all types, and providing all manner of labor from house construction to the repair of roads. The landlord might also rent his peons to others and pay no wage.

To enforce order on the estate, the administrator utilized "the fist and the whip." Vicos had its own jail to which colonos were sent without recourse to any legal process; fines, whippings, and other punishments could be meted out arbitrarily. As individuals, the colonos were subject to severe restrictions, not being allowed to venture outside of the district without permission, or to organize any independent activities except religious festivals, weddings, and funerals that took place in the hacienda's chapel and cemetery, only occasionally with clerical presence. The only community-initiated activities allowed were those under the supervision of the parish church.

Outside the protection of the estate, peons correctly felt themselves to be vulnerable to exploitation and feared direct contact with those mistikuna whom they regarded as dangerous, even to the extent of characterizing whites and powerful mestizos as pishtakos, mythical bogeymen who kill or rape natives. In protecting themselves from the threats of this environment, vicosinos, like tens of thousands of other colonos across the Andes, chose to employ the "weapons of the weak," by striking a low profile, playing dumb, obeying, taking few initiatives, and in general staying out of the way of mestizos and strangers they did not know, reserving their own pleasures and personalities for the company of family and friends.

Peonage under the hacienda functioned in a relatively standard fashion throughout Peru, with variations between the coastal plantations, on the one hand, and the highland estates and ranches, on the other. On some highland estates, conditions were worse than those described; in others they were not as restrictive or arbitrary. Although called haciendas, the coastal plantations were far more commercialized, being given to the production of goods for export or the large urban markets. Under these more fluid socioeconomic circumstances, the plantation workers, called yanaconas (after the Incan class of serfs called yanas), who permanently resided on the estates, also had access to subsistence plots. Moreover, they usually had "company" housing, schools, and access to other facilities specified under a signed labor contract often negotiated through worker unions.

Nevertheless, there were lingering connections to the highland manorial system. Because plantation crops, such as sugarcane and cotton, require a large labor force for harvests and planting, workers are seasonally recruited from the highland peasantry for these tasks. In some instances, owners of coastal plantations also possessed highland estates from which they might "borrow" the needed seasonal workers from among the colonos they already controlled in peonage and pay them virtually nothing. In most cases, however, the coastal plantations simply hired gangs of peasant farmers for the short term, using professional labor contractors to do the job. For thousands of young men, this became an important first experience away from their family and village, serving as a rite of passage into adulthood. It also constituted an important step for many in developing the labor and life skills needed to migrate permanently to the coast. Employment on the coastal plantations offered many opportunities to the highland farmer to use mechanized equipment and different tools, observe agricultural procedures guided by scientific principles and experts, and work for wages that greatly surpassed what they might earn in the villages. For most farm workers, it was the only chance to actually accumulate money.

Concentrated in the provincial, departmental, and national capitals, Peru's upper class was the other side of the coin of peonage. Whereas the Quechua or Aymara native population was powerless, submissive, and poor, the regional and national elites were Hispanic, dominant, and wealthy. The inheritors of colonial power quickly reaffirmed their political, social, and economic hegemony over the nation even though the Peruvian state itself was a most unstable entity until the presidency of Ramón Castilla. They continued to strike the posture of conquerors toward the native peoples, justifying themselves as civilized, culto (cultured), and urbane, as well as gente decente (decent people), in the customary phrase of the provincial town. Such presumption of status is a powerful but unwritten code of entitlement. It permits one to expect to have obedient servants, to be deferred to by those of lesser station, and to be the first to enjoy opportunity, services of the state, and whatever resources might be available.

The modern national upper classes of Peru are today a more diverse population than was the case even at the end of the nineteenth century. They have remained essentially identified with the Costa, even though they have controlled extensive property in the highlands and Selva. Nevertheless, these elites are highly conscious of class integrity as social life unfolds in the context of private clubs and specialized economic circles. The predilection of the upper-class families to show the strength of their lineages is revealed not only in the use of full names, which always contain both one's father's and mother's last names in that order, but also the apellidos (last names) of important grandparental generations. Thus, magazine society pages report names like José Carlos Prado Fernandini Beltrán de Espantoso y Ugarteche, in which only Prado is the last name in the American sense. Use of the family pedigree to demonstrate rank is common among the elite when the names are clearly associated with wealth and power.

As Peruvians have become more cosmopolitan, foreign names from Britain, Italy, Austria, and Germany have appeared with increasing frequency among those claiming upper-class credentials, leading to the conclusion that it is easier to reach elite status from outside Peru than to ascend from within the society. There are, of course a number of families who can trace their lineages to the colonial period. However, families of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century immigrants constitute about 40 percent of Peru's most elite sector, indicating a surprising openness to cosmopolitan mobility. In a 1980s list of Peru's national elite containing over 250 family names, for example, only one of clearly Quechua origins could be identified.

The racial composition of the upper class is predominantly white, although a few mestizos are represented, especially at regional levels. The social structure of the country follows a Lima-based model. The national upper class is located almost exclusively in the province of Lima, the second strata of elites is provincial, residing in the old principal regional cities, such as Arequipa, Trujillo, and Cusco, but not in Huancayo, Chimbote, or Juliaca, whose populations are predominantly of highland mestizo and cholo origins. Upper-class status in provincial life generally does not equate with the same levels in Lima, but rather to a middle level in the national social hierarchy.

Traditionally, the upper classes based their power and wealth on rural land ownership and secondarily on urban industrial forms of investment. This situation has changed in part through the rise of business, industry, banking, and political opportunities, and also because of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1969, which forced dramatic changes in land tenure patterns. It was, however, a change as difficult to make as any that could be imagined: the fabled landed oligarchy greatly feared any alterations in its property rights, which included the colonos and yanaconas attached to both highland and coastal estates. Their control over Peru's power, purse, and peasantry bordered on the absolute until the second half of the twentieth century, when the great highland migrations took hold of coastal cities and industrial growth exploded. Ensuing social and political demands could no longer be managed from behind the traditional scenes of power.

Vested interests of the landed upper class were ensconced in the National Agrarian Association (Sociedad Nacional Agraria-- SNA). Until the first government of Fernando Belaúnde, it had been impossible to discover just what the property and investment interests of this group were because government files on these subjects were closed and, indeed, had never been publicly scrutinized. All of this changed abruptly after the peasant land invasions of estates in 1963, when the need for solutions overcame the secrecy. In 1966 economic historian Carlos Malpica Silva Santisteban identified the landed oligarchy as a relatively small group, with 190 families owning 54 percent of the irrigated coast and 36 families or persons holding 63 percent of titled land in the Selva, for a total of over 3 million hectares. In the highlands, the data were similar in content but hard to verify.

Although upper-class wealth was founded on rural properties, it is evident that elite urban, mining, and industrial interests were also extensive. An indefatigable compiler of data on Peru's elites, Malpica annotated an extensive catalog of modern business and banking concerns showing the concentration of economic control in the hands of a tiny group of elite families, many being familiar traditional members of the oligarchy, now deprived of their land base by the agrarian reform. Of the seventy-nine families holding significant blocks of shares in the twelve principal insurance and banking operations in 1989, almost 50 percent were descended from the aforementioned European immigrant groups. Despite this Eurocentric trend, descendants of Japanese and Chinese immigrants have also entered the economic elites, if not with the equivalent social status. At least one Chinese-Peruvian family, which holds substantial banking, commercial, and industrial investments, descends from immigrants who arrived as indentured laborers in the nineteenth century.

Ninety percent of Peruvians are Catholic in religious preference. The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respected this right in practice; however, the Catholic Church received preferential treatment from the State. The Constitution establishes the separation of church and state, but it also acknowledges the Catholic Church's role as "an important element in the historical, cultural, and moral development of the nation." The Catholic Church and Catholic clergy received preferential treatment and tangible benefits from the State in the areas of education, taxation of personal income, remuneration and taxation of institutional property. Teaching about Roman Catholicism in primary and secondary schools was mandatory. By law, the military could hire only Catholic clergy as chaplains, and Catholicism is the only recognized religion of military personnel.

All faiths were free to establish places of worship, train clergy, and proselytize. Religious denominations or churches were not required to register with the Government or apply for a license. Conversion from one religion to another was allowed, and missionaries could enter the country and proselytize.

The Freedom of Conscience Institute (PROLIBCO), an NGO that favored strict separation between church and state and opposed the preferential treatment accorded to the Catholic Church, claimed that the Government discriminated against non-Catholic groups by requiring payment of import duties and a sales tax on Bibles brought into the country. In May 2001, the Jehovah's Witnesses claimed that the Government denied them tax exemption for imported Bibles and other religious educational material. In April they filed two legal actions to uphold their right as a nonprofit educational entity to be exonerated from payment of duties. In May a Superior court ordered the temporary suspension of the surety fees, but according to PROBLICO, by year's end the court had not made a final ruling in this case.

The Ministry of Education required all primary schools, both public and private, to follow a set Catholic religion course. Parents who did not wish their children to participate in the mandatory religion classes had to request an exemption in writing to the school principal. According to PROBLICO, there were some complaints that requests for exemptions were denied during the year. Non-Catholics who wished their children to receive a religious education in their own faith were free to organize such classes, at their own expense, during the weekly hour allotted by the school for religious education, but had to supply their own teacher.

PROLIBCO objected to the requirement to teach the Catholic religion in the school curriculum. It claimed that the alternatives available to non-Catholic parents violated the constitutional protection of privacy and confidentiality of one's convictions and beliefs. PROLIBCO supported an initiative by two nonsectarian (and antireligious) organizations, the Lima-based Movimiento Arreligioso Peruano and Masa Peru, to eliminate from the Constitution any reference to the Catholic Church. In addition, PROLIBCO was seeking to collect enough signatures to ask the Constitutional Court to rule on the 1980 Concordat signed with the Vatican that granted special status to the Catholic Church.

Peru's penal code in force in 1991 was the much amended 1924 code and addressed itself primarily to common crime as opposed to political violence. It was expected to be replaced in 1992 by new statutes that were announced in initial form in April 1991. The amended 1924 code's four volumes dealt with general provisions, descriptions of felonies, descriptions of misdemeanors, and application of punishment. Felonies were divided into categories: crimes against the person, the family, or property; crimes against the state, public security, and public order; and crimes of moral turpitude. Punishments included jail, loss of rights, loss or suspension of employment, fines, probation, and warnings.

The proposed new penal code was intended to bring Peruvian law up to date and to make it internally consistent. The legal inconsistencies resulting from the many amendments over the years, under both civilian and military rule, had produced a very unwieldy legal framework. Major changes included specifying white collar crimes; expanding punishment to include community service; considering society's responsibility in the commission of crimes by less advantaged individuals; emphasizing the possibilities for rehabilitation; specifying economic crimes by monopolies, misuse of public funds, and tax evasion; incorporating much more severe penalties for drug trafficking, terrorism, and human rights violations; and considering as crimes damage to the environment, natural resources, and the ecology. The new code was to be subject to a national debate by interested parties, as well as a review by Congress before going into effect in 1992. The Fujimori autogolpe of April 5, 1992, changed this timetable. In the following month, it produced a plethora of decree-laws, which responded to a number of these issues, particularly those related to criminal activity and terrorism. The Democratic Constituent Congress (Congreso Constituyente Democrático) elected in November was to incorporate or adjust these decrees. The fate of the proposed code was unclear, but probably was postponed until after the full return to constitutional rule scheduled for April 1993.

The constitution of 1979 abolished the death penalty administered by firing squad, even though it had seldom been invoked (only twelve times between 1871 and 1971). The exception was Article 235, which allowed for the death penalty for the crime of treason during a war with an external enemy. In the 1970s, the military government (1968-80) had gradually expanded the list of crimes subject to the death penalty, including killing a member of the police, killing during a robbery, and mass killing. At least seven individuals were put to death on conviction under these statutes. The issue of the use of military and police rather than civilian courts to try citizens, with no right to appeal to civilian judicial authority, also came up frequently during the military regime. Article 282 of the constitution of 1979 dealt with this difficulty by prohibiting application of the Code of Military Justice to civilians except for treason.

Other provisions of the constitution of 1979 also emphasized civilian institutions and individual rights. Those provisions included the right to habeas corpus; presumption of innocence until proven guilty in judicial proceedings; arrest only by judicial warrant or in the commission of an offense; the right to go before a judge within twenty-four hours of arrest (except for terrorism, treason, and drug trafficking); immediate advice in writing as to reasons for arrest; access to a lawyer from the time of arrest; authorities' obligation to report location of person arrested; the inadmissibility of forced statements; no detention without communication; no transfer to a jurisdiction not provided for by law; trial only under legal procedures; and no torture or inhumane treatment.

However, Article 231 of the constitution of 1979 allowed for the suspension of some civil and political rights under exceptional circumstances by a presidential decree of a state of emergency or a state of siege for all or any portion of the country. It also allowed the president to order the armed forces to assume responsibilities for public order from civilian authorities, and could be renewed by the president every ninety days for an indeterminate period. As a result of the insurgency, this article has been invoked repeatedly; the military has been put in charge of every region that has been in a declared state of emergency since December 1982, except Lima. The effect of the president's use of Article 231 was to substantially erode constitutional guarantees in large sections of the country. Civilian courts were denied access to detention areas, making it impossible for them to pursue writs of habeas corpus. Military courts assumed responsibility for dealing with abuses committed by soldiers, and were upheld by the Supreme Court. Occasionally, police were tried for their alleged abuses, as in the successful prosecution of twelve members of the Sinchi Battalion for a 1983 massacre in the Ayacucho community of Socos and their sentencing to ten to twenty-five years in prison. But these cases were exceptional, and most reported abuses went unpunished. With the failure of the court system to respond effectively, the Office of the Public Ministry (an autonomous monitoring institution empowered to press charges), a short-lived special prosecutor for the investigation of disappearances, and the Congress through a special commission all tried, with very limited success, to fill the gap.

The civilian court limitations were manifest in the emergency zones, but also were very evident in the rest of the country. Only a small percentage of reported crimes were brought to trial in any given year (1 to 3 percent). Through June 1984, only 15 of 1,080 persons held for terrorist acts had been sentenced. As of 1989, less than 5 percent of those arrested for terrorist acts had been convicted. Of the 643 women inmates of Chorrillos Prison in December 1990, just 117 had received sentences. A smaller number of cases reached the Supreme Court in 1989 and 1990 than in 1985, in part owing to a six-month strike by the judicial branch in 1989. The Ministry of Justice reported in July 1988 that there was a backlog of almost 45,000 criminal cases and that two-thirds of all prison inmates were still awaiting trial. The weaknesses of the judiciary and the strains to which it was subjected by the recurring fiscal crisis of the government, the increase in common crime during the decade, the insurgency, and the government's response to it made the legal principles of the penal code and the constitution of 1979 virtually impossible to apply in practice. Frustration with the judicial system was a major factor in President Fujimori's April 5, 1992, decision to suspend the constitution, including the judiciary. Decree-laws tightened anticriminal and antiterrorist procedures and practices, including internal subversion redefined as treason and hence subject to trial in military courts. After Guzmán's capture in September 1992, his rapid trial, conviction, and life imprisonment along with several fellow SL leaders would have been legally impossible under the pre-April 1992 status of the laws and the judiciary.

Just as Peru's armed forces and police were buffeted by a number of challenges during the 1980s, so too were the country's judicial and penal systems. Despite the return to civilian government in 1980 under the constitution of 1979 and the widespread expectation at the time that this would also normalize the application and administration of justice, such was not to be the case. The recurring economic crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s prevented providing the judicial branch with the constitutionally mandated 2 percent of the government budget. In 1989 the sum appropriated was 1.4 percent; in 1990 it was 0.9 percent, or about US$15 million. The economic difficulties also contributed to increases in crime rates as more of the population struggled to cope with rising unemployment and underemployment. Recorded crimes of all types increased from 210,357 in 1980 to 248,670 in 1986, or by 18 percent; these data of the General Police (PG) and the Technical Police (PT) were believed to underrepresent actual figures.

Incomplete data resulted in part from the growing number of provinces during the 1980s under states of emergency because of insurgent activity (almost half of Peru's 183 provinces by mid1991 ). The states of emergency suspended constitutional guarantees of due process and freedom of movement and assembly, and placed all executive branch authority in local military commands. Many actions by military and insurgents alike were often not reported as crimes.

The guerrillas also threatened judicial branch officials at all levels and killed some, so that at times large numbers of openings, particularly at the lower levels, were much delayed in being filled. (In 1989, for example, over one-third of Peru's 4,583 justice of the peace positions were vacant.) The combination of vacancies and intimidation then further delayed judicial resolution of pending cases; a mere 3.1 percent of crimes committed in 1980 resulted in sentences, only 2.6 percent in 1986. Of the approximately 40,000 inmates in Peru's 111 to 114 prisons in 1990, 80 percent were waiting to be tried and nearly 10 percent had completed their sentences but remained in jail, according to the head of the Minister of Interior's National Institute of Prisons (Instituto Nacional Penitenciario--Inpe). Concern was also expressed that many of the justices and judicial branch employees replaced during the 1985-90 APRA government were selected more by political rather than judicial criteria. In short, a situation that had always been far from satisfactory became even less so by 1990.

One result of President Fujimori's autogolpe of April 5, 1992, was the suspension and reorganization of Peru's judiciary. As of October, over half of the twenty-five Supreme Court judges had been replaced, along with scores of judicial officials at other levels. Among other post-April 5 changes were decrees defining terrorism as treason, thereby placing trials for alleged actions in military courts as well as extending sentences from a twenty-year maximum to life imprisonment without parole.

The economic crises, the insurgency, and the drug trafficking were major contributors to rising crime rates in the 1980s. Illegal drug-trafficking crimes recorded by the PG between 1980 and 1986 increased by 67 percent, almost four times the rate of growth of crime overall. Drug-trafficking arrests between 1985 and 1988 totaled about 4,500, but were a small fraction of all arrests for alleged crimes for the period (574,393 total arrests, almost 3 percent of Peru's population). Guerrilla attacks during the Belaúnde government (1980-85) totaled 5,880, with deaths attributed to the subversion coming to 8,103. These levels increased during the García government (1985-90) to 11,937 insurgent actions associated with over 9,660 deaths. Extrajudicial disappearances during the 1980s, most often linked to the army and police in the emergency zones, approached 5,000. From July 28, 1990, to June 30, 1992, the first two years of the Fujimori administration, 2,990 incidents and 6,240 deaths were recorded.

Today, the crime rate in Peru is low compared to industrialized countries. An analysis was done using INTERPOL data for Peru. For purpose of comparison, data were drawn for the seven offenses used to compute the United States FBI's index of crime. Index offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The combined total of these offenses constitutes the Index used for trend calculation purposes. Peru will be compared with Japan (country with a low crime rate) and USA (country with a high crime rate). According to the INTERPOL data, for murder, the rate in 1998 was 3.23 per 100,000 population for Peru, 1.10 for Japan, and 6.3 for USA. For rape, the rate in 1998 was 4.97 for Peru, compared with 1.48 for Japan and 34.4 for USA. For robbery, the rate in 1998 was 9.55 for Peru, 2.71 for Japan, and 165.2 for USA. For aggravated assault, the rate in 1998 was 24.08 for Peru, 15.40 for Japan, and 360.5 for USA. For burglary, the rate in 1998 was 7.78 for Peru, 187.93 for Japan, and 862.0 for USA. The rate of larceny for 1998 was 41.85 for Peru, 1198.13 for Japan, and 2728.1 for USA. The rate for motor vehicle theft in 1998 was 3.64 for Peru, compared with 28.37 for Japan and 459.0 for USA. The rate for all index offenses combined was 95.1 for Peru, compared with 1709.88 for Japan and 4615.5 for USA. (Note: data were not reported to INTERPOL by the USA for 1998, but were derived from the Uniform Crime Report for 1998)

Between 1997 and 1998, according to INTERPOL data, the rate of murder decreased from 4.58 to 3.23 per 100,000 population, a decrease of 29.5%. The rate for rape increased from 4.26 to 4.97, an increase of 16.7%. The rate of robbery decreased from 11.28 to 9.55, a decrease of 15.3%. The rate for aggravated assault decreased from 25.26 to 24.08, a decrease of 4.7%. The rate for burglary increased from 6.73 to 7.78, an increase of 15.6%. The rate of larceny decreased from 43.62 to 41.85, an increase of 4.1%. The rate of motor vehicle theft decreased from 3.74 to 3.64, a decrease of 2.7%. The rate of total index offenses decreased from 99.47 to 95.1, a decrease of 4.4%.

Peru's police forces (FF.PP.) date from the days of Simón Bolívar in 1825 but were formally organized as a responsibility of the central government in 1852, with the establishment of the Gendarmerie. From this force, a Republican Guard (Guardia Republicana--GR) was created in 1919, with specified duties related to border patrol, prison security, and the protection of establishments of national importance. A reorganization was carried out in 1924 under the aegis of a Spanish police mission; the new plan created the Civil Guard (Guardia Civil--GC) as the main national police force (the Republican Guard retained its specialized responsibilities) and a plainclothes investigating and forensic group known as the Investigative Police of Peru (Policía Investigativa de Perú--PIP). The constitution of 1979 designated the president of Peru as the head of the police forces and armed forces, but with administrative responsibility for all of the police continuing to be vested in the Ministry of Interior.

After a number of problems in the mid-1980s, which included allegations of corruption, a large spate of human rights violations, and a massacre of inmates (mostly SL members) in Lima prisons in June 1986 after they had surrendered following a riot, President García initiated a reorganization of the police forces that resulted in the creation of the new National Police (Policía Nacional--PN) on December 7, 1988. It encompassed the General Police (Policía General--PG, formerly the GC), the Security Police (Policía de Seguridad--PS, formerly the GR), and the Technical Police (Policía Técnica--PT, formerly the PIP), all of which remained under the authority of the Ministry of Interior.

The multiple challenges faced by the police forces during the 1980s included rising crime rates, work stoppages, attacks on public buildings and installations, drug trafficking, and a growing guerrilla insurgency. These challenges contributed to a number of crises for the police (detailed later) but also to their expansion in personnel from 46,755 in 1980 to 84,265 in 1986 and about 85,000 in 1991 for the entire PN. By 1992 PN strength was reduced to 84,000. All personnel were recruited by voluntary enlistment. These figures included a small but indeterminate number of policewomen. Among the special duties policewomen performed were the staffing of a special police center set up in Lima in 1988 to provide assistance to abused spouses and children. In addition to the PN, Peruvian cities employed municipal police for minor duties in the city hall and other city buildings and for overseeing the cities' public markets.

The General Police (PG), formerly the Civil Guard and by far the largest of Peru's police forces (42,537 in 1986), were organized into fifty-nine commands (comandancias) throughout the country across five police regions (whose boundaries and headquarters were the same as the country's five Military Regions), with overall headquarters in Lima. The general staff was similar to the military's, and included sections for operations, training, administration, personnel, legal affairs, public relations, and intelligence. As of 1989, commands were located in each of Peru's 24 department capitals and in the constitutional province of Callao, as well as in the largest of the 183 provincial capitals. Smaller police stations and posts operated in most of the other provincial capitals and in a significant portion, though by no means all, of the 2,016 district capitals. Detachments varied in size, depending primarily on population density, from a single police officer, to three or four commanded by a sergeant, to thirty or forty commanded by a lieutenant; a department-level command included up to several hundred police and was headed by a colonel or a general. Lima-appointed mayors and deputy mayors had some influence over local posts, but primarily chains of command went through police channels. Some commands had specialized duties, such as riot control, radio patrol, and traffic, and one guarded the presidential palace.

The PG instruction center, located at Chorrillos, included an officers school that provided a four-year curriculum to police cadets comparable to the service academy programs, a school for lieutenants preparing for the required examinations for promotion to captain, and training schools for enlisted officers--recruits, corporals, and sergeants. In the 1960s, the police received training support from the Public Safety Mission of the United States Agency for International Development (AID), and some officers attended the AID's International Police Academy in the United States during its years of operation (1963-74). AID support for the police was renewed in the 1980s in the Upper Huallaga Area Development Project and the Control and Reduction of Coca Cultivation in the Upper Huallaga Project; the AID assistance was part of the United States government's effort to control coca production and cocaine-paste trafficking. Both projects were created in 1981, but passed from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Interior in 1987. The United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) also worked closely with the police to impede drug production and trafficking; a new base, Santa Lucía, completed in the Upper Huallaga Valley in 1989, gave the police and the DEA significantly greater local capability to directly confront the drug problem in the area.

Because the reorganization of the police forces into the PN was not fully implemented by the Congress until 1987, the Ministry of Interior substantially reduced its training programs for new officers and enlisted personnel in the late 1980s by postponing the admission of an entire officer class and two enlisted classes. With normal retirements, losses to the insurgents, and the large number of forced retirements ordered by President García, a decline in police personnel occurred just as insurgency, crime, and drug trafficking were increasing. Only in 1988 did the first joint police officer class of 682 graduate, combining the PG, the PT, and the PS. Some 814 were scheduled to complete their studies in 1989, none in 1990, and about 600 in 1991.

To cover the growing shortage of trained enlisted personnel, the Ministry of Interior established a new National Police School (Escuela de Policía Nacional--EPN), with centers in Lima, Chiclayo, Arequipa, and Cusco--and planned to open programs in Chimbote and Pucallpa as well. The eight-month training prepared some 1,288 high school graduates who had already had some secondary school military orientation, with a somewhat longer program for 1,618 recruits without high-school diplomas. With its six locations fully operational, the EPN was capable of providing up to 5,500 graduates a year for the PN enlisted ranks beginning in 1989. As of mid-1991, however, police training remained inadequate, with courses ranging from three to nine months at most.

The insurgency of the 1980s frequently targeted police stations for attack as part of a strategy of acquiring arms and equipment and of forcing the abandonment of smaller and more exposed posts, particularly in rural areas. Individual police were often targeted also for the same reasons. From 1981 through 1990, at least 735 police of all ranks were killed at the hands of the insurgents, most by the SL; many analysts believed that seized police arms provided a large share of the guerrillas' stock.

As the incipient insurgency began to grow in Ayacucho, where the SL originated, the new civilian government's initial response in October 1981 was to send the specially trained police antiterrorist unit to the area to combat it. The Sinchi Battalion, named after pre-Incaic warriors by that name, had proven quite effective on previous missions, including riot control, squatter eviction, and replacements for the 1980 Cusco police unit work slowdown. However, in Ayacucho the Sinchis appeared to make a difficult situation worse by some acts of indiscriminate violence and abuse, and were withdrawn before the Belaúnde administration decided to put the area under military control in December 1982. It was believed that the Sinchis underwent a thorough vetting and retraining before being committed to other actions, where their performance was much improved.

Although the police had primary responsibility for dealing with drug-trafficking activities in Peru from the mid-1970s onward, that role expanded markedly during the 1980s. The Peruvian military consistently held that coca eradication and drug interdiction were designated by the constitution of 1979 as responsibilities of the police rather than of the armed forces. However, the army did indicate its willingness to assist with security against the insurgents, so that the police would be better able to carry out antidrug operations. Because Peru was the world's largest producer of coca used to make cocaine, the police concentrated on eradication and interdiction. The Upper Huallaga Valley produced most of the cocaine (between 60 and 65 percent of world supply), so the police concentrated there. The United States government helped with DEA personnel, an AID assistance program, and, in 1989, resources and assistance for the Santa Lucía base, including a 1,500-meter runway. Three United States mobile training teams (MTT) of Green Berets helped prepare National Police units in base defense and interdiction techniques with short-term training in 1989-91, and contracted United States specialists continued narcotics tasks subsequently.

Although United States financial support for the antidrug production and trafficking program in Peru was modest, it did increase from about US$2.4 million in 1985 to US$10 million in 1990. Even so, both the hectarage under cultivation and the production of coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley increased to 79,000 hectares by United States government estimates, which were quite conservative compared with those of Peru's Ministry of Agriculture (from 8,400 hectares cultivated in the Upper Huallaga Valley in 1978 to 150,000 in 1990). Estimates as of early 1992 were 100,000 hectares (United States figures based on aerial surveys) or 315,000 hectares (Peruvian figures based on ground site inspection).

Efforts to reduce drug production and trafficking in the Upper Huallaga Valley were hampered by a number of negative factors. One was the insurgency; both SL and MRTA forces began to operate in the valley in 1985 and 1986. Then attacks on police and government employees working on eradication and interdiction forced suspension of most antidrug operations in the Upper Huallaga Valley between February and September 1989. The guerrillas positioned themselves as the protectors of the coca- growing peasants, while collecting "taxes" and drug-flight protection payments estimated at between US$10 million and US$30 million per year. Only when the army was able to drive the insurgents out of much of the valley, as occurred for a time in late 1989 and early 1990, could antidrug-trafficking operations resume. When they did, the emphasis shifted to interdiction rather than eradication.

Other problems included the perception among much of the local population that many of the police stationed in the Upper Huallaga Valley were either abusive or corrupt, or both. This led to a substantial overhaul of the police forces (and of the army as well) by the García administration during its first year in office, when a reported 2,000 to 3,000 police members were removed, reshuffled, or retired. Shortly after President Fujimori took office on July 28, 1990, another reshuffling took place that forced the retirement of nearly 350 police officers and 51 police generals, some of whom, United States officials believed, were among the drug-trafficking initiative's most able and experienced personnel.

A number of incidents involving the police during the first year of the Fujimori government led Minister of Interior general Víctor Malca Villanueva to disclose that 23 officers and 631 police members had been dismissed and another 291 officers and 600 police members were facing administrative action. Among the events leading to this announcement were the shooting down of a Peruvian commercial plane in the jungle at Bellavista, San Martín Department, with the loss of all seventeen on board; the murder of a medical student and two minors in Callao; the disappearance of fifty-four kilograms of cocaine after a police seizure; the release of a Colombian drug trafficker's plane after large payments to police involved in its capture; and the hold-up of buses on the highways to rob their passengers. General Malca announced on July 12, 1991, that evidence of "enormous corruption" and serious excesses committed by some of the PN's members required "a total restructuring," and that the Peruvian government was in contact with the Spanish police to enlist their assistance in the task.

The underlying factors contributing to the problems of the PN included the following: the constant threat and frequent reality of guerrilla attacks; the low pay (only US$150 per month for top generals and between US$10 and US$15 for new enlisted police) resulting from inflation's impact on the capacity of government to keep up with previous levels (which were considered quite adequate by Peruvian standards through the mid-1980s); and continuing tensions with armed forces counterparts, particularly the army, over roles, responsibilities, coordination, and support. These difficulties eroded the capability of the police forces, particularly the PG, to operate efficiently and with a high degree of professionalism.

The problems with the armed forces had spilled over into a direct confrontation between striking police in Lima and the army in February 1975, a confrontation that was settled only after a shoot-out in the police command with considerable loss of life (thirty police members and seventy civilians were killed). Other, less dramatic incidents occurred as well. In March 1988, when the military failed to respond to urgent requests for assistance by a police force besieged by SL guerrillas at Uchiza, in the Upper Huallaga Valley, the police felt that they had been humiliated by another branch of their own government, as well as defeated in that encounter with the guerrillas. General Malca saw no alternative but to resign as minister of interior. The explanation that no helicopters were available and that no order had been given was unconvincing. Others blamed the failure to respond on interservice rivalries and a perception by some military personnel at the time that the police in the Upper Huallaga Valley were getting more than their share of the technical and material assistance available to fight drug production and trafficking.

Although renamed in the police reorganization begun in 1986, the Security Police (PS), formerly the Republican Guard, continued to have responsibility for border control, custody of the prisons, and guarding significant government buildings. The PS grew the most rapidly of all the police forces in the 1980s; from 6,450 in 1980 to 21,484 in 1986. Some 20 percent of the force was detailed to prison duty, with a large portion of the rest distributed among public buildings and 177 border stations. Another sixty-one border stations were to have been added or reactivated by 1990, thirty-two of them staffed jointly with the army, but budget difficulties may well have delayed these. There was also a small parachute squadron, formed in 1963. Until the early 1970s, this police subgroup recruited its personnel directly from the army and had no training establishment of its own. In 1973 the minister of interior opened an advanced training school for upper-level career officers, with a comprehensive training center for all ranks expected to follow at the end of the decade. In the early 1990s, it was still unclear how the integrated police services officer school, which began operating in the late 1980s, would ultimately affect the PS's own training establishments.

The growing drug-trafficking problem across Peru's borders, particularly with Colombia and Brazil, provided the PS with additional challenges. The additional border posts were envisioned as one way to respond, because most were proposed for areas where the drug trafficking was believed to be concentrated. However, the growing prison population during the 1980s posed more difficulties for the PS; many had to do with the prisoners accused and/or convicted of terrorism.

In December 1989, two police officers were found guilty of abuses in the prison massacre by a Court of Military Justice and were sentenced to prison terms. The other sixty-nine police members and six army officers accused were acquitted, but in June 1990 the not-guilty verdicts of eight of the police officers were overturned in a Military Appeals Court. One officer was sentenced to one month in jail, the other seven to six months.

The police reorganization of 1988 creating the Technical Police (PT) gave it the same functions as its predecessor, the Investigative Police of Peru. The PT served as Peru's intelligence service for state security, as well as an investigative unit in criminal and terrorist cases, much like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the United States. A special section, the National Counterterrorism Division (Dirección Nacional Contra el Terrorismo--Dincote, formerly known as Dircote) focused mainly on the SL and MRTA. Headquartered in Lima's Rímac district, the largely plainclothes PT also operated out of the same main regional offices as the military and the PG, or on special assignment from the Lima office. As of 1986, the PT had a total staff of 13,165, including a few women agents, and was fully autonomous from the former Civil Guard (GC).

The effects of the police reorganization on PT training were not clear by 1990, but the PT's distinctive responsibilities probably assured continuity rather than change. Despite suffering from the same restrictions and limitations imposed by the economic crisis and the insurgency, the PT showed fewer signs of trouble than its sister services. The PT's Instruction Center was based in the San Isidro district of Lima and offered both a full four-year course for prospective officers in its Cadet School, as well as specialized training in police technology and criminology in its Detective School. Successful completion of mid-career courses was a requirement for eligibility for continued advancement in the service.

In September 1992, Dincote succeeded in capturing SL head Guzmán. This gave the government and the police forces a badly needed major victory against the Shining Path at a critical juncture and greatly enhanced the standing of the country's beleaguered police forces.

Today, the police and military share responsibility for internal security. In November 2000, Congress dismantled the National Intelligence Service (SIN) and in June passed legislation to create a new intelligence system under civilian control, with congressional oversight. Members of the security forces committed some serious human rights abuses.

There were no reports of politically motivated killings. The police committed three killings and prison security forces committed four killings. Two military recruits died under suspicious circumstances.

The Human Rights Commission (COMISEDH) and Amnesty International report that abuse of individuals in police custody and inmates in prison by security forces continues to be a problem. When police officers were the perpetrators, the abuse usually took place at the police station just after the arrest, while the detainee was held incommunicado. When detainees die as a result of abuse or torture, COMISEDH reports that the security forces sometimes describe the incident as a suicide. In these cases, nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) such as COMISEDH file a complaint of torture and present evidence they may have to a prosecutor, who then proceeds with an investigation. Impunity is a problem, and the authorities who commit such abuses seldom are held responsible.

Sendero Luminoso terrorists killed 31 persons during the year 2001 in the course of 130 acts of violence.

The Constitution and the law prohibit torture and inhuman or humiliating treatment; however, in practice torture and brutal treatment by the security forces continued to occur. COMISEDH and Amnesty International report that abuse of individuals in police custody and inmates in prison by security forces continues to be a problem. In 2000 the Human Rights Ombudsman and NGO's had described such abuse as widespread.

Torture most often takes place immediately following arrest. Torture is common during police detention when families are prohibited from visiting suspects while they are held incommunicado, and attorneys have only limited access to them. In a number of cases during the year 2001, suspects died following torture and beatings by security officials; NGO's used charges of torture to bring cases in previous killings.

In some cases, the police and security forces threaten or harass victims, their relatives, and witnesses in an attempt to keep them from filing charges of human rights violations. According to Amnesty International, several victims have been too scared to follow through with judicial proceedings against their abusers, who subsequently were released without being charged.

In past years, such abuse was particularly common in police cells operated by the National Counterterrorism Directorate (DIRCOTE) and in detention facilities on military bases, where terrorism and treason suspects normally were held. Psychological torture and abuse, which result from the harsh conditions in which detainees are held, are more characteristic of the prisons.

COMISEDH reported 36 cases of aggravated torture by security forces, compared with 35 in 2000. The majority of cases involved incidents of police brutality and beatings during detention.

There continued to be reports of arbitrary arrest and detention. The Constitution, Criminal Code, and antiterrorist statutes delineate the arrest and detention process. The Constitution requires a written judicial warrant for an arrest unless the perpetrator of a crime is caught in the act. However, the Organic Law of the National Police permits the police to detain a person for any investigative purpose. Although the authorities must arraign arrested persons within 24 hours, they often violate this requirement. In cases of terrorism, drug trafficking, or espionage, arraignment must take place within 30 days. Military authorities must turn over persons they detain to the police within 24 hours; in remote areas, this must be accomplished as soon as practicable. However, the authorities often disregard this requirement. Police abuse of detainees is a problem, and the abuse usually took place at the police station just after the arrest, while the detainee was held incommunicado. A law passed in December 2000 allows the authorities to detain suspects in investigations for corruption for up to 15 days without arraignment. The law also permits authorities to prohibit suspects under investigation for corruption from traveling abroad.

Detainees have the right to a prompt judicial determination of the legality of their detention and adjudication of habeas corpus petitions; however, according to human rights attorneys, judges continued to deny most requests for such hearings. In Lima and Callao, detainee petitions for habeas corpus had been restricted severely, because under a 1998 executive branch decree issued as part of the war on crime, only 2 judges were able to hear such petitioners, instead of the 40 to 50 judges in previous years, thereby significantly delaying justice. In December 2000, the Government restored the number of judges able to hear habeas corpus petitions to its original level as part of the restructuring of the court system.

Police may detain terrorism and treason suspects for a maximum of 15 days and hold them incommunicado for the first 10 days. Treason suspects, who are handed over automatically to military jurisdiction, may be held incommunicado for an additional 30 days. When suspects are held incommunicado, attorneys have access to them only during the preparation and the giving of sworn statements to the prosecutor.

In 2000 the special terrorism chamber of the superior court dismissed 300 arrest warrants of the estimated 4,000 to 5,000 persons still subject to detention orders. The Ombudsman's office estimates that this number actually may be higher. These cases involved many persons who allegedly were forced to participate in terrorist activities during the internal conflict, or who were accused falsely of links with terrorist groups. In 1998 the Human Rights Ombudsman called on the Government to rescind all outstanding detention orders that were more than 5 years old and to cancel all orders that did not comply with legal specifications. The Government did not comply with the Ombudsman's request; however, Congress enacted a new law on May 18 that allows these individuals to have their detention orders changed to court summonses. As of October, only one detention order had been converted in this manner.

As of October, the Government had approved 90 pardons recommended by the ad hoc Pardons Commission and the Justice Ministry's Council on Human Rights, which evaluated and recommended pardons for persons convicted of terrorism. This brought the total to 726 pardons.

Approximately 43 percent of a total prison population of 26,769 had been sentenced, according to the INPE. About 50 percent of the prison population remained incarcerated in Lima; of these, 65 percent have been convicted but remained unsentenced. The IACHR and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights have expressed concern about the large number of unsentenced prisoners. In December 2000, President Paniagua committed the Ministry of Justice to assess procedures for reviewing cases with pending sentences. The problem of prisoners who have served their terms and still have not been released continued. The Justice Ministry had recommended better ways to track the status of prisoners in the penal system, but NGO's report that, as of year's end, no progress had been made due to a lack of resources and organization.

According to the INPE, the elapsed time between arrest and trial in civil, criminal, and terrorism cases averages between 26 and 36 months, during which time suspects remain in detention. Those tried by military courts on treason charges generally do not have to wait more than 40 days for their trial; however, as trial procedures in military courts lack full due process protections, the speed with which trials are conducted offers little benefit to the defendants. Once trials have concluded, prisoners often have to wait long periods before being sentenced.

Human rights organizations reported that police routinely detain persons of African descent on suspicion of having committed crimes, for no other reason than the color of their skin, but rarely act on complaints of crimes against blacks.

Many individuals associated with the Fujimori administration are the targets of criminal investigations. Anticorruption legislation enacted in 2000 gave judicial authorities expanded powers to detain witnesses and suspects. Many of those detained under these laws complain that the cases against them are politically motivated, and some of the investigations appeared to have politically partisan overtones.

The Constitution does not permit forced exile, and the Government does not use it in practice.

The Supreme Court of Justice was the highest judicial authority in the nation. The twelve Supreme Court justices were nominated by the president and served for life. The nominations had to be approved by the Senate. The Supreme Court of Justice was also responsible for drawing up the budget for the judiciary, which was then submitted to the executive. The budget could be no less than 2 percent of the government's expenditures. Under the Supreme Court of Justice were the Superior Courts, which were seated in the capitals of judicial districts; the Courts of First Instance, which sat in provincial capitals and were divided into civil, criminal, and special branches; and the justices of the peace in all local centers.

Several other judicial functions are worthy of note. The public prosecutor's office was appointed by the president and was responsible for overseeing the independence of judges and the administration of justice, representing the community at trials, and defending people before the public administration. Public attorneys, who are also appointed by the president, defend the interests of the state. The office of the Public Ministry was made up of the attorney general and attorneys before the Supreme Court of Justice, Superior Courts, and the Courts of First Instance. Public attorneys defended the rights of citizens in the public interest against encroachment by public officials.

The National Elections Board established voting laws, registered parties and their candidates, and supervised elections. It also had the power to void elections if the electoral procedures were invalid. The six-member board was composed of one person elected by the Supreme Court of Justice, one by the Bar of Lima, one by the law faculty deans of the national universities, and three Peru's regional boards.

Although in theory the judicial system was independent and guaranteed at least minimal operating financial support, in practice this was far from the case. The system had been hampered by scarce resources, a tradition of executive manipulation, and inadequate protection of officials in the face of threats from insurgents and drug traffickers. Even without the existence of guerrilla movements, the system was inadequately staffed to deal with the number of cases from criminal violations. It was not uncommon for detainees to spend several years in prison awaiting a hearing. In addition, in the emergency zones, where guerrillas were operating, security forces have had virtual carte blanche in the areas of interrogation and detention, and suspects often have been held incommunicado. Imprisoned suspects awaiting trial have subsisted in medieval conditions. In 1990 the Ministry of Justice recorded 60 deaths from starvation and a backlog over several years of 50,000 unheard cases.

The executive branch traditionally manipulated the judiciary for its own purposes, using its ability to appoint and remove certain judges for its own political ends. For example, when a Superior Court judge ruled that President García's nationalization of Peru's banks was unconstitutional, García merely replaced him with a judge from his party, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana--APRA), who then ruled in his favor.

It also was common for known terrorists or drug traffickers to be released for "insufficient evidence" by judges with no protection whatsoever but with responsibility for trying those suspected of terrorism. Largely because of corruption or inefficiency in the system, only 5 percent of those detained for terrorism had been sentenced by 1991. Those responsible for administering justice were under threat from all sides of the political spectrum: guerrilla movements, drug traffickers, and military-linked paramilitary squads. Notable cases included the murder of the defense attorney for the SL's number two man, Osmán Morote Barrionuevo, by an APRA-linked death squad, the Rodrigo Franco Command; the self-exile of a public attorney after repeated death threats during his investigation of the military's role in the massacre of at least twenty-nine peasants in Cayara, Ayacucho Department, on May 14, 1988; a bloody letter-bomb explosion at the headquarters of the Lima-based Pro-Human Rights Association (Asociación Pro-Derechos Humanos--Aprodeh); and the March 1991 resignation of an attorney general of the military court martial, after he received death threats for denouncing police aid and abetment of the rescue by the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru-- MRTA) of one of its leaders, María Lucero Cumpa Miranda. The judicial terrorism was hardly surprising, given the lack of protection for judges dealing with terrorism cases; many of them normally rode the bus daily to work, totally unprotected. Finally, owing to neglect of the judicial system by successive governments, the Supreme Court of Justice lacked a significant presence at the national level.

In the context of widespread terrorism, what was legal in theory and what happened in practice had little to do with each other. As the situation increasingly became one of unrestrained violence, the capability of the judicial system to monitor the course of events was reduced markedly. In addition, the judicial system was unable to escape the loss of confidence in state institutions in general that had occurred among the Peruvian public. The discrediting of the judicial system was a significant step toward the total erosion of constitutional order.

Today, the Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary has been subject to interference from the executive. It is also subject to corruption and is notably inefficient. Public confidence in the judiciary remains low.

There is a 3-tier court structure that consists of lower and superior courts and a Supreme Court of 33 judges. In November 2000, the Constitutional Tribunal resumed its mandate to rule on the constitutionality of congressional legislation and government actions. In late 2000, the Government restored the powers of the independent National Magistrates Council (CNM) to appoint, evaluate, and discipline judges and prosecutors. The Judicial Academy trains judges and prosecutors; it began to restructure its work after Congress abolished the mandatory 2-year training of all candidates for appointment. In May the Government appointed new members to the board of the Judicial Academy.

In 2000 President Paniagua began to reform the judicial branch. At the end of 2000, the Government abolished the executive committees responsible for provisionally appointing judges and prosecutors through which President Fujimori had exerted control over the judiciary. At the same time, the Government created transitory councils. At the end of their 90-day mandate, these councils had reassigned hundreds of provisional judges and prosecutors to positions more closely corresponding to their actual rank. The councils also removed judges associated with corrupt practices and reinstated others who had been unfairly separated. The CNM later suspended some and dismissed or prohibited others from holding office for up to 10 years. It returned others to lower courts where they belonged, in keeping with the Organic Law of Judicial Branch.

Beginning in January, the CNM exercised its constitutional authority to certify all judges and prosecutors who have served in their position for 7 years or more. By mid-November, of 364 judges and prosecutors the CNM evaluated, it had recertified 220, while 139 failed to be recertified. Failure to be certified disqualifies a judge or prosecutor from ever working in that capacity again. By year's end 2001, the CNM also had sanctioned numerous judges following investigations into corruption. The CNM sanctions include suspensions, dismissals, and prohibition from holding office for as long as 10 years.

In August the CNM began naming judges and prosecutors to approximately 2,000 vacancies and positions occupied by provisional judges and prosecutors (who were appointed temporarily from a lower court or who were attorneys serving temporarily as judges and prosecutors). These provisional appointees represent roughly 80 percent of the country's approximately 1,565 civilian judges at all levels, including 21 of the 33 judges on the Supreme Court. Former President Fujimori's reliance on provisional and temporary judges had enabled the executive branch to influence cases and to more easily control the judicial branch. In some cases, the judges were assigned independently and without proper training. Critics also charged that since these judges lacked tenure, they were more susceptible to pressures. In September a congressional investigative panel found that former intelligence advisor Montesinos had improperly influenced cases. The majority of implicated officials either resigned or were suspended; at year's end 2001, some were facing prosecution.

In May Congress enacted a law eliminating a 1996 requirement that mandated 2 years of training in the Judicial Academy prior to a person becoming a judge or prosecutor. This measure opened the ranks of the judicial system to a larger pool of candidates and allowed the CNM to fill vacancies. In August President Toledo nearly doubled the salaries of tenured judges and prosecutors to make work in the judiciary more attractive and to reduce corruption incentives.

In November 2000, Congress restored to the Constitutional Tribunal three judges who had been removed in 1997 after they had opposed the application of a law allowing President Fujimori to seek a third term. Their removal had deprived the court of a quorum to rule on constitutional issues and paralyzed the court. By year's end 2001, Congress had removed one of the seven Tribunal members on corruption charges and the Tribunal was at times unable to reach the required six-member quorum. The Government paid each of the three reinstated judges $25,000 to cover legal fees but has not compensated them further despite the Inter-American Court's ruling that it should do so.

During the year 2001, the Tribunal decided 13 constitutional cases, 6 of them brought by the Ombudsman's office. In one of them, the court ruled that an electoral law provision banning the dissemination of exit poll results before 10:00 p.m. on election day (6 hours after the polls closed) restricted the public's rights to information. In June the Tribunal declared unconstitutional a 1998 law that stripped 3,000 policewomen of their ranks as officers.

In May Congress passed another law that interprets the constitutional role of the president of the Supreme Court as head of the judicial branch and as such grants him more powers, including control of the judicial budget and the authority to make appointments in key administrative judicial positions.

In July a high-level anticorruption commission appointed by the Government underscored the need to strengthen the independence and transparency of the judiciary. It recommended a new mechanism to elect more transparently the president of the Supreme and superior courts and the subordination of the military justice system to the judicial branch. In October the Government appointed a national anticorruption coordinator, another of the commission's proposals. At year's end 2001, 500 disciplinary actions were in process against judges and prosecutors who were involved in corrupt judicial practices under the Fujimori administration.

The justice system generally is based on the Napoleonic Code. In civilian courts criminal cases move through three distinct phases. First, in a lower court a prosecutor investigates cases and submits an opinion to the examining judge, who determines whether there is sufficient evidence to issue an indictment. If there is, the judge conducts all necessary investigations and prepares and delivers a case report to the superior court prosecutor. Second, the superior court prosecutor reviews the lower court decision to determine if formal charges should be brought and renders an advisory opinion to another superior court, where a three-judge panel holds an oral trial. Criminal case convictions in civilian courts may be appealed, in which case the Supreme Court hears appeals and confirms or rejects the previous decision. All defendants have the right to be present at their trial. Defendants also have the right to counsel; however, the public defender system often fails to provide indigent defendants with qualified attorneys.

There is a presumption of innocence, defendants may call witnesses, and there is a system of bail. Attorneys are supposed to have unimpeded access to their clients.

Under the military justice system, judges in the lower courts have the power to sentence and are required to pass judgment within 10 days of a trial's opening. Defendants may then appeal their convictions to the Superior Military Council, which has 10 days to make its decision. A final appeal may be made to the Supreme Council of Military Justice, which must issue its ruling within 5 days. At the Superior Military Council and Supreme Council levels, a significant number of judges are active-duty officers with little or no professional legal training.

The Government's Ministry of Justice Commission reviewed laws governing the military justice system and issued a report in July with recommendations on changes to the Constitution, a few of which incorporated changes to the military justice system. The report went to Congress, and according to IDL, it is expected to be the main input for constitutional reforms by Congress. In July the Government published a draft proposal for a new military justice code, and as of October, it was still open for comments. By year's end 2001, Congress had not acted on legislation to change the Code of Military Justice and the Military Justice Organic Law.

Military courts try cases of treason for civilians or military defendants; there have been no new trials for treason in military courts since November 2000. Military courts also used to try cases of civilians or military charged with "aggravated terrorism," but in November the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that all military tribunal trials for aggravated terrorism were unconstitutional and were, therefore, invalid. Under the Fujimori administration, aggravated terrorism charges were applied to crimes committed by armed gangs of delinquents as a means of deterring crime. At year's end 2001, civilian courts were processing the cases of 152 of the approximately 600 persons tried in military courts under the aggravated terrorism law.

Terrorism is defined as being a terrorist leader or participating in a terrorist group's attack or activities. Human rights groups and legal experts have charged that the vaguely worded definitions of certain crimes in the antiterrorism statutes often led military judges to issue sentences disproportionate to the crimes committed. In 1999 Congress abolished the classification of acts of extreme violence such as criminal gang activity, homicide, kidnaping, and the use of explosives as aggravated terrorism. Under the new law, such cases are designated as "special terrorism," and civilian courts have jurisdiction over such crimes. Civilians charged with simple--as opposed to aggravated--terrorism are tried in civilian courts.

During the Fujimori administration, human rights groups and legal experts criticized the powers of the military courts to try civilians in cases of aggravated terrorism and the inability of the civilian judicial system to review military court decisions. Military courts may hold treason trials in secret. Such secrecy is not required legally, but in some cases the courts deemed that circumstances required it. Defense attorneys in treason trials were not permitted adequate access to the files containing the State's evidence against their clients, nor were they allowed to question police or military witnesses either before or during the trial. Some military judges sentenced defendants without even having notified their lawyers that the trials had begun.

Following the August 2000 Military Supreme Court decision to nullify the terrorism conviction and life sentence of U.S. citizen Lori Berenson, a civilian court tried her case. In June the court found Berenson guilty of collaboration with the MRTA terrorist group, one of two terrorism charges, and sentenced her to 20 years in prison. Berenson's appeal was pending with the Supreme Court at year's end 2001. The IACHR was studying petitions filed on Berenson's behalf by her U.S. attorneys alleging both double jeopardy and due process violations in her civilian trial.

In June 1999, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled against the Government in the case of four Chileans convicted of treason by a military tribunal and sentenced to life in prison. The Court found that the military had denied the defendants' due process rights provided by the American Convention on Human Rights and ruled that a civilian court should have had jurisdiction. It also ruled that military authorities held the suspects too long in pretrial detention; and that defense attorneys lacked access to witnesses and evidence and did not have sufficient time to review the case. Subsequently, the Supreme Court delegated to the Supreme Military Council the final decision regarding enforcement of the Court's decision. The Council had ruled that it could not grant the Chileans new civilian trials because laws passed after signing the Convention required military trials in cases of treason and aggravated terrorism. However, in May the Supreme Council of the Military Court invalidated the military court's decision and provided for new, civilian trials for the four Chileans. At year's end 2001, the case was still at the instruction phase.

Prior to the June 1999 ruling, the Government had refused to accept the Inter-American Court's jurisdiction in cases involving terrorism because laws passed after signing the Convention establishing the Court required military trials in cases of treason and aggravated terrorism. In July 1999, the Fujimori Government decided to withdraw from the Court's contentious jurisdiction; in February Congress voted to return to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

In midyear the Inter-American Court provided the Ministry of Justice a clarification of its 1999 ruling that found incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights two 1995 amnesty laws exempting military officials from prosecution that were used to protect those officers accused of the 1991 Barrios Altos massacre. Based on the clarification, the Government plans to bring other members of the security forces to justice in other human rights abuse cases.

A specialized terrorism chamber of the superior court tries cases in the civilian jurisdiction. The chamber is based in Lima, but its judges travel to the provinces as needed. During the year 2001, judges from this court traveled around the country to hear several hundred cases of persons with old warrants outstanding for terrorism charges. Of these, judges found several hundred persons innocent and ordered the cancellation of their warrants. Human rights NGO's and the Human Rights Ombudsman noted that this addresses the concerns of those who considered themselves innocent, but who feared coming forward for an abbreviated and unfair trial. Despite the chamber's action on many cases, detention orders remain pending against between 4,000 and 5,000 persons allegedly forced to join terrorist groups; in May Congress passed a law whereby individuals facing these pending detention orders may have their legal status changed to that of being subject to summons to appear in court when requested to do so.

In late 2000, the Government established a new Pardons Commission. As of October, 90 persons had been released from prison. Along with 636 persons pardoned between 1996 and 2000, a total of 726 persons have been pardoned and released after being accused unjustly of terrorism. At year's end 2001, approximately 1,700 cases still were pending review. NGO's advocated that the new commission expand its review to include all convictions and sentences rendered by military courts, but by October, the Government had not made a decision on the matter. The original ad hoc Pardons Commission, with a mandate to consider applications of those who believed themselves to be accused unjustly of terrorism, ended its work on December 31, 1999. By the end of 1999, 3,225 of a total of 3,878 persons accused of these crimes had applied for clemency, and 502 had received the Commission's recommendation for pardon. A December 1999 law assigned the Commission's functions to the Justice Ministry's National Human Rights Council. In 2000 the Council recommended (and President Fujimori granted) 32 pardons.

There was no congressional action by year's end 2001 on the Human Rights Ombudsman's 1999 recommendation for legislation for monetary compensation of persons released through the Pardon Commission's program. The matter was added to the agenda of the Truth Commission.

The Extrajudicial Conciliation Law, which Congress passed in 1997, was to have made conciliation a mandatory first step in most civil cases by January 2000; however, due to administrative and other delays, partial implementation of the law began in November 2000 in Trujillo and Arequipa, and in March in Lima and Callao. As of December, there were 392 conciliation centers in 20 jurisdictions, and the Justice Ministry had accredited over 10,000 "conciliators," of whom 60 percent are lawyers.

There were no reports of political prisoners. Sendero Luminoso and MRTA members charged with or serving sentences for terrorism are not considered to be political prisoners.

In the second half of the 1980s, Peru's insurgency exacerbated the country's already intolerable prison conditions. One of the SL's early successes was its March 1982 raid on the Ayacucho Prison, freeing most of the prisoners, including several SL militants. Even though intelligence reports had alerted the GR that an attack was planned and Lima had sent reinforcements to Ayacucho, the local commanding officer chose to disregard the warning.

Another problem related to the prison policy of segregating the SL members from the other prisoners. The SL turned this policy to its own advantage by creating model minicamps of collective ideological reinforcement and community building within their separate cell blocks. Visitors reported an organization and an esprit de corps not found in any other part of the prisons. This separation probably facilitated coordinated SL prisoner riots at Lurigancho, El Frontón, and Santa Bárbara prisons in Lima in mid-June 1986, as well as the overreaction by GR jailors and the army reinforcements that were sent in, resulting in the killing of nearly 300 prisoners after they had surrendered. One justification offered at the time alluded to the GR's release of pent-up rage after having been continuously subjected to threats from the jailed militants that their comrades outside prison knew where the guards' families lived and would attack them if the inmates were not granted special treatment. Later, Minister of Interior Félix Mantilla accused PS prison officials at Canto Grande of aiding and abetting the July 1990 tunnel escape of forty-seven MRTA prisoners. After the April 1992 autogolpe, President Fujimori took steps to break up the blocks of SL militants in prisons, which provoked a riot in Canto Grande in May, resulting in the deaths of about twenty-five SL inmates and two police officials.

Peru's prisons, totaling 111 to 114 nationwide in 1990, were administered by 3,075 employees, with a guard staff made up of about 4,000 PS members (formerly Republican Guards). Article 234 of the constitution of 1979 emphasized the reeducation and rehabilitative functions of the penal system rather than simply punishment, with the goal of eventual reintegration of the prisoner back into society. However, that remained a distant goal in 1992 rather than a realized program.

Of a 1990 prison population estimated at 40,000, about half were in the twenty-five jails in Lima. Although the military government began an ambitious program of building new prisons and rehabilitating old ones, financial limitations left the project incomplete. In a survey of the prisons carried out in 1987 to assess their general physical state, only 13 percent (fourteen) were determined to be in good condition, 53 percent (fifty-nine) were average, and 32 percent (thirty-six) were poor (two Lima prisons were not surveyed). Among the most important prisons, all in Lima, were Lurigancho Prison, completed in 1968; Canto Grande Prison, built in the early 1980s; Miguel Castro Prison; and two womens' prisons--Santa Mónica Prison in Chorrillos District, dating from 1951, and Santa Bárbara Prison. The most dangerous criminals were sent to El Frontón, on a small island near the port of Callao, where the isolated blockhouse, known as La Lobera (Wolf's Lair), was one of the most dreaded in the country. Another important prison was the agricultural penal colony of El Sepa in the jungle of Loreto.

The twin challenges of a growing prison population and the government's continuing economic difficulties contributed to increasing deterioration of conditions in the prisons, a deterioration that reached crisis proportions by the end of the 1980s. The total prison population increased from about 15,000 in 1975 to about 40,000 by 1990. Peru's largest prison, Lurigancho, built for a maximum inmate population of 2,000, held nearly 7,000 in August 1990; others, such as Miguel Castro Prison, housed at that juncture over four times its installed capacity of 500. Some 168 children were jailed with their mothers in Chorrillos Prison.

At the time the Fujimori government began its term in July 1990, Inpe was spending less than US$0.10 daily per inmate on food--one meal a day or less. A thirteen-day hunger strike was conducted by some 9,000 prisoners in Lima in August 1990 to protest the situation. In response, the Fujimori government directed food donations to the prisons and increased food expenditures to US$0.55 per inmate in September 1990.

Of the many other problems, one of the most serious was the "custom in the judicial system to delay five years before handing down a verdict," as Inpe director Carlos Caparó said in September 1990. Another problem was the delay in releasing inmates who had completed their sentences, which was an estimated 10 percent of the prison population. In some cases, this was because prisoners could not pay the "fees" demanded for authorities to sign the five evaluations required to be released--medical, legal, social, educational, and psychological. With the deterioration in conditions, health problems in the prisons increased; forty inmates died of tuberculosis in Lurigancho alone between January and September 1990, and President Fujimori stated that about 5,000 of the country's prisoners had life-threatening diseases.

In September 1990, President Fujimori's office promulgated a decree setting up a special advisory group, the Special Technical Qualifying Commission, to review cases of prisoners held but not tried for less serious offenses (drug trafficking, terrorism, and murder were excluded) for possible presidential pardons. The first 97 received President Fujimori's official pardon in December 1990, with up to 2,000 more expected to be pardoned later. The new draft penal code was another major step toward resolving some penal system problems, but alleviation of many other issues would require infusion of new resources that were not yet available in 1992. Fujimori's April 1992 autogolpe further postponed any definitive resolution of this problem, other than immediately implementing a reorganization of Inpe.

Today, conditions are poor to extremely harsh in all prison facilities. About one-half of all prisoners are in facilities where the National Police have both internal and external control; the other half are in facilities under internal control of National Prison Institute guards and under external control by the police. Conditions are especially harsh in maximum-security facilities located at high altitudes. Low budgets, severe overcrowding, lack of sanitation, and poor nutrition and health care are serious problems. Prison guards and fellow inmates routinely victimized prisoners, and prison security forces committed four killings during the year 2001. Corruption is a serious problem among poorly paid prison guards, many of whom engage in sexual abuse, blackmail, extortion, narcotics trafficking, and the acceptance of bribes in exchange for favors that ranged from providing a mattress to arranging an escape. Since prison authorities do not supply adequate bedding and budget only about $0.79 (2.75 soles) per prisoner per day for food, the families of prisoners typically must provide for these basic needs.

Overcrowding and inadequate infrastructure hamper efforts to improve prison living conditions. The 81 prisons and detention facilities held 26,769 prisoners at year's end 2001. At Lima's San Juan de Lurigancho men's prison, the country's largest, more than 6,000 prisoners live in a facility built to accommodate 1,500. Inmates in all prisons have only intermittent access to running water; bathing facilities are inadequate; kitchen facilities remain generally unhygienic; and prisoners sleep in hallways and common areas due to lack of cell space. Illegal drugs are abundant in many prisons, and tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS are reportedly at near-epidemic levels. As of October, approximately 57 percent of all prisoners had not been sentenced. Pretrial detainees are held together with convicted prisoners in most cases. Detainees held temporarily while awaiting arraignment in Lima are not provided with food. This temporary detention period lasts from a few hours up to 3 days. The detainees are not allowed outside for fresh air and have restricted access to bathrooms.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reports a shortage of trained medical personnel, unreliable and insufficient legal representation for prisoners, an insufficient number of social workers and psychologists, and a general lack of organization in prison administration.

According to human rights monitors, the Challapalca prison in Tarata, Tacna, seriously violates international norms and standards, particularly as a result of its isolation and high altitude. Located at 14,000 feet, Challapalca's freezing temperatures and oxygen-thin air have unavoidably detrimental effects on prisoner health. The prison can be reached only after an all-night bus ride from the nearest population center, limiting inmates' contact with family. To relieve some of the isolation, the ICRC funds periodic visits by families. Hospital care is 6 to 8 hours away, depending on road conditions, by overland transportation. Face-to-face consultations by inmates with their attorneys are rare. Isolation or punishment cells in this prison are extremely small and sometimes hold two prisoners at a time. Torture and abuse of inmates is common in Challapalca, and in February the authorities shot and killed two escaped prisoners. In 1998 the International Federation of Human Rights, as well as visiting members of the IACHR and the Ombudsman, called on the Government to close the prison, but it remains in operation.

There were numerous prison protests during the year 2001, including nine violent prison riots that occurred in Sarita Colonia prison in Callao, Castro Castro and Lurigancho prisons in Lima, San Antonio de Pocollay prison in Tacna, the Picsi prison, the Socabaya prison in Arequipa, and the Chachapayas prison.

Male and female prisoners are housed separately. In high-security prisons, female inmates are allowed to see their children once a week. In women's prisons, children 3 years of age and younger live with their jailed mothers. There are also separate juvenile facilities, in which conditions are not as harsh as those in adult prisons.

The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights monitors, including the ICRC. Members of the Ombudsman's office were allowed to visit the naval facility in Callao for the first time in December 2000. The Ombudsman's office continued to visit the Callao facility during the year 2001. The ICRC made 134 first-time visits to new inmates during the year and visited a total of 2,485 inmates in prisons, detention facilities, and juvenile detention facilities, including 7 visits to the maximum-security naval station in Callao. Unlike the previous year, neither the ICRC nor the Ombudsman's office were denied access to any prisons during the year 2001.

Violence against women, including rape, spousal abuse, and sexual, physical, and mental abuse of women and girls, is a chronic problem. Such abuses are aggravated by insensitivity on the part of law enforcement and judicial authorities toward the female victims. A National Institute of Statistics and Information (INEI) survey reported that during 2000 at least 41 percent of women were battered by their partner, and that 16 percent of those women were battered frequently. PROMUDEH and NGO's agree that many domestic abuse cases are never reported. Although official figures for the number of arrests and convictions in abuse cases are unavailable, NGO sources contend that the majority of reported cases do not result in formal charges due to fear of retaliation from the accused spouse, or because of the cost involved in pursuing a complaint. In addition, legal and physical protection is limited by delays in legal processes, ambiguities in the law, and lack of alternative shelter and income for victims.

The domestic violence law gives judges and prosecutors the authority to prevent the convicted spouse or parent from returning to the family's home; authorizes the victim's relatives and unrelated persons living in the home to file complaints of domestic violence; and allows any health professional to certify injuries. In March 2000, Human Rights Watch called on the Government to improve legislation on domestic violence by eliminating mandatory conciliation sessions between victims and abusers, and by providing law enforcement and social service providers with training to improve their sensitivity to victims' needs. In January Congress approved a law that states that conciliation sessions between the abuser and victim are not required in cases of domestic violence. In June 2000, the Government enacted legislation that expanded the definition of domestic violence to include sexual violence, and to include all intimate partners whether or not the victim and perpetrator have ever lived together.

The Ministry of Women's Advancement and Human Development (PROMUDEH) runs the Women's Emergency Program to call attention to the legal, psychological, and medical problems facing women and children who were victims of violence. PROMUDEH operates 34 centers, staffed entirely by women, which bring together representatives of all government institutions--police, prosecutors, counselors, and public welfare agents--to which abused women might have recourse. During the year 2001, the centers each saw about 300 victims of domestic violence and abuse each month. PROMUDEH continued its public education campaign to sensitize government employees and the public to domestic violence. With NGO assistance, PROMUDEH educates police about domestic violence and trains officers in all police stations in processing domestic violence cases. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office continued to complain that officers react indifferently to charges of domestic violence, even though the law requires all police stations to receive such complaints.

According to the Human Rights Ombudsman, many rape victims complain that court-appointed medical examiners inappropriately delved into their past sexual histories. The victims also have accused judges of looking more favorably on rape victims who were virgins prior to the rape and of believing that a woman who was raped must have enticed her attacker. Many victims are afraid of personally filing a complaint of sexual abuse, particularly in cases where the perpetrators were police officers.

Prostitution is legal, but the law prohibits and sanctions activities of those who would obtain benefits from prostitution, such as pimping.

Unlike in previous years, the Ombudsman's office received no complaints of abuses committed by family planning personnel during the year 2001; however, there were isolated reports that women were not given the full 72-hours to consider alternatives, as is required by law, before undergoing voluntary sterilization procedures. This is generally attributed to the fact that some women arrive at a clinic ready to give birth and request that the sterilization procedure be performed that day, rather than having to make arrangements to return to the clinic at another time.

An INEI survey conducted during 2000 estimates that nearly 70 percent of the country's 10 million children under 18 years of age live in poverty; of them, roughly 20 percent live in extreme poverty. The survey indicates that 48 percent of urban and 62 percent of rural school-aged children suffer from malnutrition, and almost 50 out of every 1,000 children die before age 5. The infant mortality rate is 39 per 1,000. According to INEI, approximately 75 percent of children not living in poverty attend school through the high-school level, whereas, only 43 percent of children living in poverty reach high school. Children living in poverty average only 4.5 years of education compared to 9.3 years for children living above the poverty line. Only 1.2 percent of children living in extreme poverty attain university-level education, compared with 25.6 percent of children who live above the poverty line.

PROMUDEH's Children's Bureau coordinates child and adolescent related government policies and programs. At the grassroots level, 1,010 Children's Rights and Welfare Protection Offices receive and resolve complaints ranging from physical and sexual abuse to child support, abandonment, and undetermined guardianship. Provincial or district governments operate approximately 55 percent of these offices, while schools, churches, and NGO's run the remaining 45 percent. Law students staff most of the units; only the offices in the wealthiest districts of the country have professionally trained lawyers, psychologists, and social workers. When these offices cannot resolve cases, officials typically refer them to the local prosecutors' offices of the Public Ministry. Settlements adjudicated by these offices are binding legally and have the same force as judgments entered by a court of law.

Violence against children and the sexual abuse of children are serious problems. The INEI survey showed that an estimated 41 percent of parents abuse their children. In rural areas, this figure increases to 55 percent. The Municipal Ombudsman's Office for Children and Adolescents for Lima and Callao documented 586 sexual assaults against children 5 years of age and under; 2,937 against children aged 6 to 12; and 5,935 against children aged from 13 to 17 that occurred during 2000. The report confirmed that 70 percent of the assaults occur in the home by a relative or someone known to the victim and the victim's family. According to NGO's, many abuse cases are never reported to the authorities, since many persons believe that such problems belong within the family and should be resolved privately. PROMUDEH's Women's Emergency Program works to address the legal, psychological, and medical problems facing women and children who are victims of violence.

Although laws exist that prohibit sexual abuse of minors and police enforce such laws, there continued to be reports of child prostitution.

Street crime committed by children and adolescents, including robbery, physical assault, and vandalism, is often gang-related. The Government rescinded laws that allow 16- to 18-year-old criminal gang members to be prosecuted in military courts and sentenced to a minimum of 25 years in adult prisons.

A 1999 law prohibits trafficking in persons and alien smuggling, which is defined as promoting, executing, or assisting in the illegal entry or exit of persons from the country. Laws prohibiting kidnaping, sexual abuse of minors, and illegal employment are enforced and could also be used to sanction traffickers in persons. There are no programs to educate vulnerable groups about the dangers of trafficking or to assist victims.

There were two reports during the year 2001 that persons were trafficked from the country. Early in the year, three women in their twenties were forced into prostitution in Korea after they were ostensibly hired as domestic workers. In May a Peruvian intermediary contracted three men to work as mechanics in Abu Dhabi. The men alleged that once they arrived in Abu Dhabi, their employer took away their passports and never paid them for work performed over several months. With assistance from a foreign consulate in Abu Dhabi and an NGO, the men were repatriated in October.

Coca cultivation in Peru declined by 26 percent in 1998, producing a total reduction of 56 percent since 1995. In terms of hectarage, an estimated 51,000 hectares of coca cultivation remains, down from an estimated 115,300 hectares in 1995. Eradication of illegal coca cultivation reached an all-time record of 7,825 hectares, nearly doubling the Government of Peru (GOP) target goal of 4,000. In the past two years, a strong law enforcement program focused on trafficking organizations and transportation infrastructure, combined with an efficient coca eradication program, led to a collapse in coca prices. The reduction in coca prices prompted greater numbers of farmers to accept the economic alternatives to coca offered by the USG-Peru alternative development project, which continued to expand in 1998. However, coca leaf prices began to rise throughout Peru in August. This trend may reflect multiple factors, including new transportation methods, new markets for Peruvian drugs, natural market forces, and possibly increased cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) production in Peru.

Although the Ecuador-Peru border tensions took much of the GOP's time and attention during 1998, the GOP remained strongly committed to the objectives of the USG-GOP counternarcotics bilateral agreement currently in force and to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, to which Peru is a party. Seizures of illicit drug-related assets dropped significantly throughout most of 1998 due to the reluctance on the part of newly appointed drug court officials to issue orders for investigation and seizure. The Peruvian National Police (PNP) drug directorate (DINANDRO) actively promoted a regional counternarcotics approach with surrounding countries. A highly successful donors consultative group for GOP narcotics-related alternative development was organized by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), in November 1998, in Brussels. It resulted in $277 million in pledges to support the GOP's National Plan of Action for Alternative Development and Demand Reduction from 1999-2003.

For the third year in a row, Peruvian coca cultivation declined dramatically, from an estimated 115,300 hectares (with the potential to produce 460 metric tons of cocaine) in 1995 to an estimated 51,000 hectares (a potential 240 metric tons of cocaine) in 1998. Cultivation has declined by 56 percent since 1995. A strong GOP commitment to manually eradicate illicit mature coca in national parks and other unpopulated areas resulted in 7,825 hectares destroyed in 1998, a 126 percent increase over 1997 and nearly twice the GOP's own target goal for 1998.

The two-part Peruvian Government counternarcotics strategy has been an outstanding success over the last few years in reducing coca production. The combined efforts of the Peruvian program to intercept aircraft carrying cocaine base and money between Peru and Colombia and the Peruvian National Police (PNP) effort against drug traffickers contributed to coca leaf price drops. These programs ensured that, until late 1998, coca leaf and base prices fell to levels below the coca farmers' costs of production (estimated to average $17 per 25 pounds of coca leaf). As a complementary program, the USG-Peruvian alternative development program offered economic incentives to large numbers of coca farmers and created the social and economic basis for them to permanently abandon coca production.

Peru produces most of the chemicals necessary for cocaine base production. The GOP's chemical regulatory system, assessed by DEA as one of Latin America's best, makes illicit diversion difficult and police make frequent seizures. Nevertheless, there is some indication that drug traffickers are refining more cocaine base into cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) within Peru. Several small-scale laboratories were found during 1998 and authorities at Lima's international airport regularly arrested smugglers carrying small amounts of cocaine HCl. Nevertheless, cocaine base continues to be Peru's major drug export. There is also evidence of small-scale opium production in northern Peru, and the USG and GOP cooperate closely to prevent its cultivation in large quantities.

Peruvian law criminalizes money laundering only when it is related to narcotics trafficking or narcoterrorism. Based on a 1996 law, implementing regulations took effect July 1, 1998. The regulations require banks and financial institutions to designate compliance officers, record all cash transactions over thirty thousand soles (about $10,000), and report all suspicious transactions to the attorney general's office. The recording requirement was suspended one month later by the Superintendency of Banking due to pressure from the banking community, which had always opposed it.

The GOP does not condone, encourage, or facilitate any aspect of drug trafficking. The GOP has energetically shaped public opinion in this area, soundly denouncing all forms of public corruption, with a particular focus on drug trafficking. There were no known cases of systemic institutional corruption within GOP entities in 1998, nor was there evidence that senior-level GOP officials were engaged in drug production, distribution, or money laundering. Nevertheless, there have been arrests of low or mid-level GOP officials such as prosecutors, police, and military personnel. In July, a public prosecutor and her husband were filmed accepting a bribe from the relative of a defendant being prosecuted in a narcotics trafficking case. The prosecutor was suspended pending adjudication of the case against her, although no charges had been brought by the end of the year. Dismally low public sector salaries, especially for military and police officials, relative to Peru's high cost of living, make it more difficult to ensure the integrity of lower-level officials.

The successful "airbridge denial" program has significantly shaped trafficking patterns in Peru and has caused the traffickers to develop alternative methods of transport to export drugs out of Peru. While traffickers continue to fly large quantities of coca products out of Peru, particularly through Brazil, river and overland routes are increasingly used as intermediate steps in the export process. Overland routes, particularly north into Ecuador and south into Chile and Bolivia, are complementing maritime conveyance of drugs through Peru's coastal ports. The GOP is responding to the change by developing riverine and other counternarcotics transit control strategies, using USG assistance and training.

Internet research assisted by Jennifer VonBima