Highly developed cultures, including those of the Olmecs, Mayas, Toltecs, and Aztecs existed long before the Spanish conquest. Hernando Cortes conquered Mexico during the period 1519-21 and founded a Spanish colony that lasted nearly 300 years. Independence from Spain was proclaimed by Father Miguel Hidalgo on September 16, 1810; this launched a war for independence. An 1821 treaty recognized Mexican independence from Spain and called for a constitutional monarchy. The planned monarchy failed; a republic was proclaimed in December 1822 and established in 1824.

Prominent figures in Mexico's war for independence were Father Jose Maria Morelos; Gen. Augustin de Iturbide, who defeated the Spaniards and ruled as Mexican emperor from 1822-23; and Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Ana, who went on to control Mexican politics from 1833 to 1855. Santa Ana was Mexico's leader during the conflict with Texas, which declared itself independent from Mexico in 1836, and during Mexico's war with the United States (1846-48). The presidential terms of Benito Juarez (1858-71) were interrupted by the Hapsburg monarchy's rule of Mexico (1864-67). Archduke Maximilian of Austria, whom Napoleon III of France established as Emperor of Mexico, was deposed by Juarez and executed in 1867. Gen. Porfirio Diaz was president during most of the period between 1877 and 1911.

Mexico's severe social and economic problems erupted in a revolution that lasted from 1910-20 and gave rise to the 1917 constitution. Prominent leaders in this period--some of whom were rivals for power--were Francisco I. Madero, Venustiano Carranza, Pancho Villa, Alvaro Obregon, Victoriano Huerta, and Emiliano Zapata. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), formed in 1929 under a different name, emerged as a coalition of interests after the chaos of the revolution as a vehicle for keeping political competition in peaceful channels. For 71 years, Mexico's national government had been controlled by the PRI, which had won every presidential race and most gubernatorial races until the July 2000 presidential election of Vicente Fox Quesada of the National Action Party (PAN).

On July 2, 2000, Vicente Fox Quesada of the opposition "Alliance for Change" coalition, headed by the National Action Party (PAN), was elected president, in what are considered to have been the freest and fairest elections in Mexico's history. Fox began his 6-year term on December 1, 2000. His victory ended the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (PRI) 71-year hold on the presidency.

An unresolved sociopolitical conflict exists in the southernmost state of Chiapas. In January 1994, insurgents in the state of Chiapas briefly took arms against the government, protesting alleged oppression and governmental indifference to poverty. After 12 days of fighting, a cease-fire was negotiated that remains in effect. Since 1994 sporadic clashes have continued to occur between armed civilian groups, usually over disputed land claims.

As a presidential candidate, Fox promised to renew dialogue with the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) and address unresolved problems in the state. Following his inauguration, he ordered many troops out of Chiapas, dismantled roadblocks, closed military bases, and submitted revised peace accords to Congress. In August 2001, the peace accords became law, after having been passed by Congress and ratified by more than half of the state legislatures.

Since August, 2001, numerous legal challenges to the accords have been filed, and the Fox Administration has on more than one occasion suggested that modifications may be necessary. The peace process in Chiapas between the EZLN and the Government remained stalled, despite positive developments early in the year. Sporadic outbursts of politically motivated violence continued to occur in the southern states of Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca.

Criminal activity, much of it engendered by narcotics trafficking and production, has, since the 1970s, constituted the most serious problem facing military and police agencies concerned with internal security. Mexico's leaders are increasingly conscious of the threat that drug cartels, with enormous funds and weapons at their disposal, pose to the nation's political and social stability. The illicit movement of drugs generates huge amounts of money that can be employed to corrupt public officials at both the state and federal levels. Traffickers also can assemble large weapons arsenals, which contribute to the atmosphere of lawlessness in society.

Until the uprising in Chiapas in 1994, revolutionary activity amounting to insurrection against the state had not been a major source of concern for several decades. Groups that sprang up to exploit the plight of the downtrodden and the disparities between the rich and poor have failed to coalesce into a single movement powerful enough to threaten the stability of the central government. The fragmentation of the forces of protest has been ascribed to several factors, including the territorial expanse and geographic diversity of the country, the preoccupation with local injustices suffered at the hands of those holding economic power, and the government's determination to deal harshly with any threat to public order.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, several guerrilla organizations operated in the countryside. The three principal groups were the National Revolutionary Civic Association, the Mexican Proletarian Party, and the Party of the Poor. Each was directed by a charismatic leader, who eventually was tracked down and killed in confrontations with the military or police. None of the groups was able to carry on organized operations after its leader's death.

The police claimed in 1981 that they had destroyed the last cell of the Twenty-Third of September Communist League, the largest and longest-lived of Mexico's urban guerrilla groups. The league reportedly had incorporated members from several other urban guerrilla fronts. Many terrorist acts were committed in the name of the league before its eradication, including the kidnapping of two United States consular officers in 1973 and 1974 (one officer was freed after a ransom was paid, and the other was murdered).

Mexico's rural indigenous peoples periodically have risen in protest against poverty and encroachment by large farmers, ranchers, and commercial interests on contested land. The most recent and serious such uprising occurred on January 1, 1994, when the Zapatista National Liberation Army (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional--EZLN) rebelled, capturing four municipalities in Chiapas state. Some of the group, believed to number about 1,600, were armed with semiautomatic and assault rifles, whereas others were armed only with sticks and wooden bayonets. Although the group's attacks seemed well planned, army units, supported by air force strikes, were able to regain control after the initial surprise. At least 12,000 troops were transported to the scene. Officials announced that 120 deaths had resulted, although church officials said 400 lives had been lost. Five rebels apparently were executed while bound, and other deaths may have been the result of extrajudicial executions. Many disappearances of peasants were reported, and there was indiscriminate strafing of hamlets. The government declared a unilateral cease-fire after twelve days and announced several goodwill gestures as a prelude to reconciliation talks with the rebels, who were represented by their masked leader, Subcommander Marcos.

According to government sources, the EZLN, commonly known as the Zapatistas, is not a purely indigenous movement, but is instead an alliance of middle-class intellectuals and radicalized indigenous groups dating from the early 1980s. The EZLN began as an offshoot of the National Liberation Forces (Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional--FLN), a Maoist guerrilla group that had been largely dormant since the 1970s. At the start of the Zapatista rebellion, command of the Zapatista army was jointly held by FLN veterans from Mexico City and a "clandestine committee" of Chiapas Indians representing the various ethnic groups residing in the area.

In February 1995, on the eve of a new offensive against rebel strongholds, the government identified Subcommander Marcos as Rafael Sebastián Guillén, a white, middle-class graduate in graphics design from the National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México--UNAM). In the initial January 1994 Zapatista raids, the charismatic guerrilla leader had become an international media star, quickly assuming the status of a folk hero among many Mexicans. Capitalizing on his newfound fame and his proximity to the rebel army, Marcos is believed to have wrested control of the EZLN from its Mexico City leadership.

Despite a formidable government offensive involving approximately 20,000 army troops venturing into Zapatista-held territory, Subcommander Marcos and his rebel force eluded capture. By late February 1995, a second cease-fire had been declared. Soon thereafter, the government and the rebels embarked on a second major round of peace talks. In early 1996, the Zapatistas declared their willingness in principle to lay down their arms and become a legal political party pending major reforms of the political system. Despite their ability to grab headlines and attract international support, the Zapatistas remain a marginal political force and are not considered a serious military threat outside of Chiapas.

Since the EZLN uprising in Chiapas began in 1994, the Mexican armed forces have assumed a much higher profile. The reluctance of the armed forces and Zapatistas to engage in full-scale hostilities, the relatively low number of casualties in the uprising, and the idiosyncrasies of Mexico's "revolutionary" political culture suggest, however, that the Chiapas conflict will not necessarily replicate the violent pattern of the Central American guerrilla wars of the 1970s and 1980s.

Analysts predict that the Mexican armed forces will continue a prominent role in narcotics interdiction efforts, as the Mexican drug cartels, bolstered by their links to international organized crime, attempt to consolidate their territorial power and undermine state authority. Observers also expect that the Mexican navy will assume a more prominent role in protecting Mexico's EEZ and combatting illegal immigration and smuggling. For the foreseeable future, Mexico will continue to rely on the United States hemispheric defense umbrella for its external security needs.

As of year 2001, the country's population was approximately 98 million. The Government continued to deregulate and open the market-based, mixed economy. The gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000 was $596 billion, and the inflation rate was 8.9 percent. Per capita GDP in 2000 was approximately $5,970. In the first half of the year, real wages equaled or surpassed levels reached before the country's 1994 financial crisis, effectively closing an important economic period. However, wage growth stalled in the second half, reflecting a contraction in exports and the worldwide economic slowdown. Leading exports include petroleum, automobiles, and manufactured and assembled products, including electronics and consumer goods. An estimated 26 percent of the population resides in rural areas where subsistence agriculture is common. Income distribution remained skewed; the top 20 percent of the population received approximately 58 percent of total income, while the bottom 20 percent earned an estimated 3.6 percent.

The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a notable shift in religious affiliation and in church-state relations in Mexico. Although Mexico remains predominantly Roman Catholic, evangelical churches have dramatically expanded their membership. Motivated in part by the evangelical challenge, the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church has sought greater visibility, speaking out on sensitive public issues and ignoring constitutional bans on clerical involvement in politics. These actions ultimately led in 1992 to dramatic constitutional changes and a resumption of diplomatic relations with the Vatican.

The Roman Catholic share of the population declined steadily during the period from 1970 to 1990. In 1970, 96.2 percent of the population five years of age and older identified itself as Roman Catholic. That dropped to 92.6 percent of the population in the 1980 census and to 89.7 percent in 1990. The 1990 census revealed significant regional variations in numbers of Roman Catholics. Roman Catholics represented more than 95 percent of all Mexicans in a band of central-western states extending from Zacatecas to Michoacán. In contrast, the least Roman Catholic presence was found in the southeastern states of Chiapas, Campeche, Tabasco, and Quintana Roo.

Dozens of evangelical denominations have engaged in strong recruitment efforts since 1970. Protestant or "evangelical" affiliation--the terminology used by Mexican census officials--surged from 1.8 percent in 1970 to 3.3 percent in 1980 and to 4.9 percent in 1990. Traditional Protestant denominations, including Lutherans, Methodists, and Presbyterians, have had a small urban presence dating from the late 1800s. However, the Protestant membership explosion during the 1970-90 period was led by congregations affiliated with churches such as the Assemblies of God, the Seventh Day Adventists, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mor mons), and Jehovah's Witnesses. For example, the Mormons reported that membership surged from 248,000 in 1980 to 617,000 in 1990 and increased further to 688,000 by 1993.

Protestant or evangelical growth was especially strong in southeastern Mexico. In 1990 Protestants or evangelicals composed 16 percent of the population in Chiapas, 15 percent in Tabasco, 14 percent in Campeche, and 12 percent in Quintana Roo. Yet a significant evangelical presence also has appeared in several other areas, including the states of Veracruz and México, where more than 20 percent of all Protestants or evangelicals live.

The Roman Catholic Church's role in Mexican history goes back to 1519. When Hernán Cortés, the Spanish conqueror of New Spain, landed on the coast of Mexico, he was accompanied by Roman Catholic clergy. All new Spanish territories were to be conquered in the name of the cross as well as the crown. Since those early days, the Roman Catholic Church has always been present, playing different roles, some of which have led to violent confrontations.

The history of the relationship between church and state following independence involves a series of efforts on the part of the government to curtail the church's influence. Nineteenth-century liberals, trained in the law and influenced by the French Revolution, were anticlerical. Liberals, who also were federalist and favored free competition, were highly concerned that the Roman Catholic Church, by owning between one-quarter and one-half of the land and by controlling most schools, hospitals, and charitable institutions, was practically a state within the Mexican state.

Between 1833 and the early 1840s, the Mexican government produced various pieces of legislation to limit the power of the church. In 1833 the government adopted several anticlerical measures, including one providing for the secularization of education and another declaring that the payment of the ecclesiastical tithe was not a civil obligation.

The first major confrontation between the church and the state occurred during the presidency of Benito Juárez (1855-72). The 1855 Juárez Law drastically reduced traditional ecclesiastical privileges. On March 11, 1857, a new constitution was adopted that denied all ecclesiastical entities the right to own real estate and abolished most remaining ecclesiastical privileges. On July 12, 1857, Juárez confiscated all church properties, suppressed all religious orders, and empowered the state governors to designate what buildings could be used for religious services. Mexico's first religious civil war was fought between 1857 and 1860 in reaction to the legislation.

The constitution of 1917 highlighted and institutionalized many of the nineteenth-century secular reforms. The new constitution included at least five articles that affected all religious groups, regardless of denomination. These articles, which remained in effect until 1992, appeared to preclude any national role for the Roman Catholic Church. Article 3 forbade churches from participating in primary and secondary education. Article 5 prohibited the establishment of religious orders. Article 24 mandated that all religious ceremonies occur within church buildings. Article 27 gave the state ownership of all church buildings.

Article 130 contained the most extensive restrictions on the Roman Catholic Church. The article stated that the Roman Catholic Church lacks legal status; ecclesiastical marriages have no legal standing; state legislatures can determine the maximum number of clergy operating within their boundaries; and operation of church buildings requires explicit government authorization. Among the most contentious provisions of Article 130 was Section 9: "Neither in public nor private assembly, nor in acts of worship or religious propaganda shall the ministers of the religions ever have the right to criticize the basic laws of the country, of the authorities in particular or of the government in general; they shall have neither an active nor passive vote, nor the right to associate for political purposes."

Beginning in 1926 and continuing until the late 1930s, various federal and state administrations strenuously enforced these constitutional edicts and related laws. Their actions paved the way for the second Mexican religious war, the bloody Cristero Rebellion of 1926-29 in western Mexico. During this period, the governor of Sonora ordered all churches closed, officials in the state of Tabasco required priests to marry if they were to officiate at mass, and the Chihuahua government allowed only one priest to minister to the entire statewide Roman Catholic population.

Church-state conflict officially ended with the administration of Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-46). With the notable exception of Article 130, Section 9, the government tacitly offered nonenforcement of key constitutional provisions in exchange for the Roman Catholic Church's cooperation in achieving social peace. Over the next four decades, enforcement of Article 130, Section 9, served the interests of both the government and the Roman Catholic Church. The constitutional restriction on ecclesiastical political participation enabled the state to limit the activities of a powerful competitor. It also permitted the Roman Catholic Church to sidestep controversial political issues and to concentrate on rebuilding its ecclesiastical structure and presence throughout the country.

By the early 1980s, however, this unspoken consensus supporting the legal status quo had eroded. The Roman Catholic Church regarded the constitution's anticlerical provisions, especially those governing ecclesiastical political activity, as anachronistic. It demanded the right to play a much more visible role in national affairs. At the same time, the church became increasingly outspoken in its criticism of government corruption. The Mexican bishops' Global Pastoral Plan for 1980-1982, for example, contained a highly critical assessment of the Mexican political system. According to the Roman Catholic hierarchy, democracy existed only in theory in Mexico. The ruling PRI monopolized power, producing apathy and frustration among citizens and judicial corruption. The principal worker and peasant unions were subject to political control. Peasants and Indians constituted an exploited, marginalized mass barely living at a subsistence level and subject to continual repression. During the mid-1980s, the bishops of Chihuahua and Ciudad Juárez assumed prominent roles in denouncing electoral fraud in northern Mexico. In the south, the bishops of San Cristóbal de las Casas and Tehuantepec frequently accused the government of human rights violations.

The Roman Catholic Church hierarchy has emphasized that its renewed interest in political affairs does not equate with church involvement in party activities. According to the Mexican episcopate, priests should be above all political parties and may not become political leaders. However, the church hierarchy also argues that priests have a moral responsibility to denounce actions that violate Christian morality.

The Salinas administration's 1991 proposal to remove all constitutional restrictions on the Roman Catholic Church, recommendations approved by the legislature the following year, allowed for a more realistic church-state relationship. At the same time, however, tensions remained in the relationship, particularly in southern Mexico in general and in Chiapas in particular. Local government and PRI officials and ranchers accused the Bishop of San Cristóbal de las Casas of having supported the rebellion that began in Chiapas in 1994, a charge that the bishop denied. Federal soldiers repeatedly searched diocesan churches in their pursuit of the rebels. The government also expelled foreign clergy who were accused of inciting violence and land seizures. In addition, the Vatican accused the San Cristóbal prelate of theological and pastoral distortions and named a coadjutor (successor) bishop for the diocese in the mid-1990s. For their part, the rebels insisted that the bishop continue to serve as mediator in their negotiations with the federal government.

Mexican Catholicism is extremely varied in practice. It ranges from those who support traditional folk religious practices, usually in isolated rural communities, to those who adhere to the highly intellectualized theology of liberation, and from charismatic renewal prayer groups to the conservative Opus Dei movement. Lay groups with different goals, purposes, and political orientations are well known and common in contemporary Mexico. The largest and best known include Mexican Catholic Action, Knights of Columbus, Christian Study Courses, Christian Family Movement, and a wide range of university students' and workers' organizations.

The Virgin of Guadalupe has long been a symbol enshrining the major aspirations of Mexican society. According to Roman Catholic belief, in December 1531, the Virgin Mary appeared on three occasions to a Christian Indian woodcutter named Juan Diego on the hill of Tepeyac, six kilometers north of Mexico City's main plaza. She spoke to him in the Náhuatl language and identified herself by the name of Guadalupe. The Virgin commanded Juan Diego to seek out Bishop Juan de Zumárraga and to inform him of her desire to have a church built in her honor on that spot. After two unsuccessful visits to the bishop's house, Juan Diego returned to Tepeyac and was ordered by the Virgin to pick up some roses, carry them on his cloak, and attempt to make a third visit to the skeptical bishop. Once in the bishop's office, Juan Diego unfolded his cloak to present the roses, and an image of a mestizo Virgin had been miraculously imprinted upon it. Bishop Zumárraga acknowledged the miracle, and a shrine was built on the site of the appearances.

Today, two neighboring basilicas of Our Lady of Guadalupe are at the foot of Tepeyac hill. The first basilica, which was dedicated in 1709 but now is closed to services, accommodated 2,000 worshipers; the new ultramodern basilica, inaugurated in October 1976, accommodates up to 20,000 people. Juan Diego's original cloak with the mestizo Virgin image imprinted on it hangs above the altar of the new basilica.

According to anthropologist Eric R. Wolf, the Guadalupe symbol links family, politics, and religion; the colonial past and the independent present; and the Indian and the Mexican. It reflects the salient social relationships of Mexican life and embodies the emotions they generate. It is, ultimately, a way of talking about Mexico. Wolf's views are shared by Harvey L. Johnson of the University of Houston. For him, worship of the brown-skinned Virgin has resulted in the reconciliation of two opposing worlds, in the fusion of two religions, two traditions, and cultures. Devotion to Our Lady of Guadalupe remains strong even as other aspects of Mexican society have changed. The UNAM national opinion poll found, for example, that nine out of ten Mexicans continued to ask intercessions from the Virgin or a saint.

The penal code stipulates a range of sentences for each offense. Sentences tend to be short, in most cases not longer than seven years. The actual time of incarceration is usually three-fifths of the sentence, assuming good behavior. Those sentenced for less than five years may avoid further time in jail by payment of a bond.

With the important exceptions of violent crimes murder, robbery, and aggravated assault, the crime rate in Mexico is low compared to more industrialized countries. For purpose of comparison, data were drawn for the seven offenses used to compute the United States FBI's index of crime. Index offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. In the UN reports, murder is referred to as "intentional homicides." Aggravated assault is referred to as "major assaults," and larceny is referred to as "thefts." According to the United Nations Seventh Annual Survey on Crime, crime recorded in police statistics shows the crime rate for the combined total of all Index crimes in Mexico to be 836.71, per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000. This compares with 1951.92 for Japan (country with a low crime rate) and 4123.97 for USA (country with high crime rate). For intentional homicides, the rate in 2000 was 14.11 for Mexico, 0,.50 for Japan, and 5.51 for USA. For major assaults, the rate in 2000 was 185.01 for Mexico, compared with 34.04 for Japan, and 323.62 for USA. (Note these data for Japan are for total recorded assaults, since Japan did not report a figure for major assaults.) For rapes, the rate in 2000 was 13.33 for Mexico, 1.78 for Japan, and 32.05 for USA. For robberies, the rate in 2000 was 219.51 for Mexico, 4.07 for Japan, and 144.92 for USA. For automobile theft, the rate in 2000 was 162.04 for Mexico, 243.81 for Japan, and 414.17 for USA. The rate of burglaries for 2000 was 142.53 for Mexico, 233.45 for Japan, and 414.17 for USA. The rate for thefts in 2000 was 100.18 for Mexico, compared with 1434.27 for Japan and 2475.27 for USA. (Note that USA data were those reported to INTERPOL for year 2000, since USA has not yet reported this data to UN.)

Mexico began providing data to the United Nations Survey in 1998. Between 1998 and 2000 the rate for all recorded Index offenses decreased from 968.98 to 836.71 per 100,000 in Mexico, a decrease of 13.7%. The rate of intentional homicide decreased from 14.93 to 14.11, a decrease of 5.5%. However, the rate for major assaults increased from 171.06 to 185.01, an increase of 8.2%. The rate of rape increased from 11.89 to 13.33, an increase of 12.1%. The rate for robberies decreased from 316.71 to 219.51 per 100,000, a decrease of 30.7%. The rate for automobile theft increased from 161.24 to 162.04, an increase of 0.5%. The rate of burglaries decreased from 145.8 to 142.53, a decrease of 2.2%. Thefts decreased from 148.35 to 100.18, a decrease of 32.5%.

The Mexican legal system is based on Spanish civil law with some influence of the common law tradition. Unlike the United States version of the common law system, under which the judiciary enjoys broad powers of jurisprudence, Spanish civil law is based upon strict adherence to legal codes and minimal jurisprudence. The most powerful juridical instrument is the writ of amparo , which can be invoked against acts by any government official, including the president. Unlike the United States system, where courts may rule on basic constitutional matters, the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice is prohibited by the constitution from applying its rulings beyond any individual case. Within this restricted sphere, the Supreme Court of Justice generally displays greater independence in relation to the president than does the legislature, often deciding against the executive in amparo cases. Nevertheless, the judiciary seldom attempts to thwart the will of the president on major issues.

A number of federal, state, and local police and law enforcement organizations exist to provide for internal security. Their responsibilities and jurisdictions frequently overlap, a factor acknowledged in 1984 when the government created a national consulting board designed to "coordinate and advise police forces" throughout the country. The senior law enforcement organization in Mexico is the Federal Judicial Police, which is controlled by the attorney general. The plainclothes force acts as an investigative agency with arrest power for the Office of the Attorney General. The foremost activity of the Federal Judicial Police is carrying out investigations and making apprehensions related to drug trafficking. Espionage, arms trafficking, and bank robberies also fall under its purview. The Federal Judicial Police serves as the government's liaison with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). Its role can be compared to a combination of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

The jurisdiction of the Federal Judicial Police encompasses the entire nation. For control purposes, its jurisdiction is divided into thirteen zones with fifty-two smaller detachment headquarters. Under the coordination of the local federal prosecutor, each zone is headed by a second commandant of the Federal Judicial Police, who in turn directs the group chiefs in the outlying detachments. Individuals arrested by the Federal Judicial Police are placed at the disposition of the local federal prosecutor, who appoints subordinate attorneys to assess each case.

Although it remains one of the smaller law enforcement agencies, the Federal Judicial Police tripled in size between 1982 and 1984, from 500 personnel to an estimated 1,500. In 1988 an assistant attorney general's office for investigating and combating drug trafficking was formed with an additional 1,500 Federal Judicial Police agents. In 1990 the office was expanded and given interagency coordinating functions in the battle against narcotics.

The principal Mexico City police force, the Protection and Transit Directorate, also known as the Traffic Police, consists of some 29,000 officers organized into thirty-three precincts. It is the largest law enforcement organization in Mexico. More than 100 serious crimes are reported each day in Mexico City, and on average in the Federal District in the first quarter of 1997 one police officer was killed and one injured weekly. A sense of insecurity prevails among many citizens because of the lack of confidence in the police and the fear of police misbehavior and crime.

The Federal District police are poorly paid; in 1992 they earned between US$285 and US$400 a month. Double shifts are common, although no extra pay for overtime is provided. Incomes can be supplemented in various ways, including from petty bribes (mordidas ) from motorists seeking to park in restricted zones. Police are said to be obliged to pay for more desirable assignments where the possibilities of extorting payments from drivers in lieu of fines is greater. However, junior officers are forced to pass along a daily quota of bribes to more senior officers. In one case, a tow truck driver admitted that he had paid more than US$1,000 for his lucrative job and said that he had to contribute US$32 daily to his superior. In 1992 after a number of officers expressed their objections to the system, the mayor of Mexico City set up offices to receive and investigate citizen complaints.

A number of smaller law enforcement bodies exist at the state and local level. Each of the country's thirty-one states and the Federal District has its own judicial police--the State Judicial Police and the Federal District Judicial Police. State police are under the direction of the state's governor; the Federal District Judicial Police fall under the control of the Federal District attorney general. The distinction between crimes investigated by State and Federal Judicial Police is not always clear. Most offenses come under the state authorities. Drug dealing, crimes against the government, and offenses involving several jurisdictions are the responsibility of the federal police.

Cities and municipalities have their own preventive and municipal police forces, which are responsible for handling minor civil disturbances and traffic infractions. The Federal Highway Police patrols federally designated highways and investigates traffic accidents. Highway police are assisted by military personnel on national holidays.

Both state and municipal forces operate from precinct stations, called delegaciones . Each delegación has an average of 200 police officers attached to it. The ranking officer is known as a comandante , equivalent to a first captain in the military. Most of the remaining personnel hold the ranks of first sergeant, second sergeant, and corporal.

Immigration officers, directed by the Mexican Immigration Service under the Secretariat of Government (Secretaría de Gobernación), have the right to detain suspected undocumented aliens and, under certain conditions, to deport them without formal deportation proceedings. Customs officers, controlled by the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público), Crédito are deployed at borders and at international airports to interdict contraband entering Mexico. The Bank of Mexico also operates its own security division, which is charged with enforcing banking and monetary laws, including cases of counterfeiting, fraud, and money laundering.

A number of unofficial paramilitary groups incorporating various police officials have existed in the past to deal with rural and urban guerrillas and illegal groups. The most notorious paramilitary group was the White Brigade (Brigada Blanca) whose existence was officially denied, although it was known to be active from 1977 until 1980, when the government dismantled it. The White Brigade consisted of a group of officers from the army and the police forces that used illegal tactics to destroy guerrilla movements. Published reports held that the White Brigade was responsible for the "disappearance" of several hundred leftists, most of whom the government claimed were killed in fights between rival leftist groups. Politically motivated "disappearances" tapered off sharply during the 1980s, but were once again being reported in the mid-1990s in connection with the unrest in Chiapas.

The government has repeatedly denounced abuses and corruption by the Federal Judicial Police and other police forces. Numerous reforms have been announced, personnel shifted, and codes of procedures adopted. Allegations of police brutality have declined, but torture, wrongful arrests, and involvement in drug trafficking have not been eliminated because abuses are so deeply rooted in the police agencies, and violators for the most part have been able to act with impunity.

In 1991 Attorney General Enrique Álvarez del Castillo, who was reported to have impeded several human rights investigations against the police, was abruptly removed from office and replaced by Ignacio Morales Lechuga. Morales quickly announced a crackdown on corruption, including a reorganization of the Federal Judicial Police, the creation of special anticorruption and internal affairs units, as well as a unit to protect citizens against crimes committed by the police. In addition, all federal police units were placed under the control of a civilian deputy attorney general. New high-level officials supervised police activities in sensitive border areas. These reform measures were announced soon after a jailed drug lord took over a prison in Matamoros, claiming that agents of the Federal Judicial Police aligned with another drug lord were threatening his life.

Despite Morales's reputation as an upright official prepared to dismiss police agents and government prosecutors suspected of ties with drug traffickers, he was replaced in early 1993. Later reports accused some of Morales's subordinates of drug-related corruption. The new attorney general, Jorge Carpizo MacGregor, was a respected human rights activist. Carpizo acknowledged in a detailed report the close relations between criminals and law enforcement agencies and produced his own program to eliminate deficiencies and corruption among the police. His reforms brought some progress; some members of the security forces were charged and sentenced, and human rights violations declined, but the so-called "culture of impunity" still prevailed. Carpizo resigned as attorney general in early 1994 and was replaced by Diego Valádez.

The 1994 assassinations of PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio Murrieta and PRI Secretary General José Francisco Ruiz Massieu shook the highest levels of federal law enforcement. After failing to make significant progress in investigating the Colosio case, Attorney General Valádez was replaced in May 1994 by Humberto Benítez Trevino. Initially declaring that the Colosio assassination was the work of a lone gunman, the Attorney General's office later revised its theory based on videotape evidence that suggested a conspiracy of up to six individuals working in concert to allow the alleged gunman to approach the candidate during a crowded campaign rally. The post of attorney general underwent yet another change in early 1996 when incoming President Zedillo replaced Benítez with an opposition congressman, Fernando Antonio Lozano Gracia. Lozano's tenure was significant because it was the first time a non-PRI official held the post.

Late in 1994, the assassination of José Francisco Ruiz Massieu prompted a special investigation headed by Deputy Attorney General Mario Ruiz Massieu, brother of the slain politician. After calling dozens of PRI officials to testify, Ruiz resigned abruptly in November, accusing high-level PRI functionaries of complicity in the killing and of impeding further progress in the investigation. In early 1996, the investigation still had produced no results.

From the 1940s until it was disbanded in 1985, the Federal Directorate of Security, which was under the control of the Secretariat of Government, was the primary agency assigned to preserve internal stability against subversion and terrorist threats. The directorate was responsible for investigating national security matters and performed other special duties as directed by the president. It acted as the equivalent of the United States DEA in the Mexican government. A plainclothes force, the directorate had no legal arrest powers nor formal authority to gather evidence, although it could call upon the assistance of other government agencies and could use other surveillance techniques.

By the final years of its existence, the directorate had more than doubled in size to some 2,000 personnel. The agency's demise came after it became evident that many of its personnel were in league with major drug traffickers. Its successor was the Center for Investigation and National Security (Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional--CISN). Although formally under the Secretariat of Government, CISN is said to operate under direct presidential control. Still primarily concerned with gathering intelligence, CISN also has expanded activities to include opinion polling and analysis of domestic political and social conditions. In 1992 illegal wiretaps were found in a meeting room to be used by the central committee of the opposition National Action Party (Partido de Acción Nacional--PAN). Although the government denied any official involvement, the local representative of CISN was forced to resign.

As of year 2001 in Mexico, the police forces, which include federal and state judicial police, the Federal Preventive Police (PFP), municipal police, and various police auxiliary forces, have primary responsibility for law enforcement and maintenance of order within the country. However, the military plays a large role in some law enforcement functions, primarily counternarcotics. Elected civilian officials maintain effective control over the police and the military; however, corruption is widespread within police ranks and also is a problem in the military. The military maintains a strong presence in the state of Chiapas and a lesser, but still significant, deployment in Guerrero. Military personnel and police officers committed serious human rights abuses.

In 2001, federal and state law enforcement officials and members of the military were accused of committing extrajudicial killings. There were reports of vigilante killings. There continued to be credible reports of disappearances. The police often torture persons in order to obtain information, prosecutors use this evidence in courts, and the courts continue to admit as evidence confessions extracted under torture. The military has been accused of using torture in the past. Impunity remains a problem among the security forces, although the Government continues to sanction public officials, police officers, and members of the military. Widespread police corruption and alleged police involvement in narcotics-related crime continued, and police abuse and inefficiency hampered investigations.

In 2001, the police continued to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. Lengthy pretrial detention, lack of due process, and judicial inefficiency and corruption persisted. The authorities violated citizens' privacy. Indigenous people's access to the justice system continued to be inadequate. There were reports of forced sterilizations in marginalized communities, especially indigenous areas. Human rights groups and representatives of a special unit of the Procuraduria General De La Republica (PGR) reported that armed civilian groups in the state of Chiapas continued to commit human rights abuses and some observers alleged that the Government used excessive force during incidents of conflict with likely sympathizers of rebel groups in Chiapas and Guerrero. Sporadic guerrilla attacks against government property and personnel continued; however, there were fewer such attacks than in previous years. Violence and threats against journalists primarily by narcotraffickers and on occasion by authorities hindered press freedom, and there have been reports in the past of self-censorship. Corrupt members of the police sometimes violated the rights of illegal immigrants; however, the Government opened an office to receive such complaints. Human rights workers were subjected to attacks and harassment. For example, on October 19, 2001, the prominent human rights lawyer Digna Ochoa was killed by unknown persons. Violence and discrimination against women, indigenous people, religious minorities, homosexuals, and individuals with HIV/AIDs persisted.

There were numerous reports of executions carried out by rival drug gangs, whose members included both active and former federal, state, and municipal security personnel. Throughout the country, but particularly in the northern border states, violence related to narcotics trafficking continued.

The police and military were accused of committing serious human rights violations as they carried out the Government's efforts to combat drug cartels. In the first 80 days of the Fox administration, there were nearly 2,000 arrests nationwide connected to drug trafficking. Although narcotics-trafficking organizations committed many killings, human rights groups allege that security forces were responsible for some of the killings generally attributed to narcotics traffickers or other criminals, including some the bodies discovered in Chihuahua in December 1999. The Association of Families of Disappeared Persons alleged that the security forces were behind many disappearances in the past and has argued that cases were not investigated properly due to the presumed complicity of personnel from the security forces.

The Constitution and the law prohibit torture; however, it continues to be a serious problem. The Constitution excludes as evidence confessions obtained in the absence of the accused person's defense attorney, and the law excludes coerced confessions, including those extracted under torture. However, the police regularly obtain information through torture, prosecutors use this evidence in courts, and the courts continue to admit as evidence confessions extracted under torture. The military also has been accused of using torture. According to a July Amnesty International report, victims and human rights workers who report or criticize the practice of torture often were the targets of intimidation. Many victims were afraid to report or follow through on complaints against the police, thereby hampering prosecution of the perpetrators.

In her fourth annual report delivered in February, Guadalupe Morfin Otero, president of the Jalisco Human Rights Commission (CEDHJ), stated that the use of torture by law enforcement officials continued to be a problem. The CEDHJ received 40 complaints of torture during the year 2001, only 5 of which were confirmed and documented; all 5 cases occurred in 1999 and were committed by state and local police. At a July U.N. seminar, then-Special Ambassador for Human Rights Acosta stated that torture is present within all public security and law enforcement agencies, including the armed forces. There were persistent reports by NGO's of the widespread use of torture by the police. In its July, 2001, report, Amnesty International claimed to have received numerous complaints that indicate that torture is a habitual practice in many areas of the country, especially to extract confessions and information in place of police investigations. Amnesty International called for strict enforcement of the laws governing detentions to help prevent torture, and for constitutional reforms that include an unalterable provision expressly forbidding torture and ill treatment. On September 16, the CNDH said in a press release that there had been advances in the prevention and punishment of torture, since there was broad awareness of the issue and public debate on how to combat it, but the practice has not been eradicated.

The authorities rarely punish officials for torture, which continues to occur in large part because confessions are the primary evidence in many criminal convictions. Many human rights groups link torture to the prevalence of arbitrary detention, and claim that torture often follows an arbitrary arrest, sometimes without a warrant, as police or prosecutors attempt to justify the detention by securing a confession to a crime. Poorly trained and inadequately equipped to investigate crimes, police officers often attempted to solve crimes by rounding up likely suspects and then extracting confessions from them by force. Amnesty International alleged in its July report that as a result those responsible for 95 percent of recorded crimes never are apprehended and brought to justice.

A 1998 report by the IACHR described a definite pattern of rape and sexual assault against women committed by members of the security forces. The Commission stated that some women had been assaulted sexually by law enforcement officials, particularly those in detention, or had been assaulted by others with the officials' consent. Two Ciudad Juarez municipal police officers were arrested in 2000 for rape, one was charged with committing the crime against a family member and the other against a former fellow officer. Both officers were convicted in December 2000; further information was unavailable.

Many citizens distrust the justice system, including law enforcement officials, and are reluctant to register official complaints.

Police corruption is a problem. Some law enforcement and military personnel have been known to have drug trafficking connections. According to news reports, one officer was fired each day during the year 2001 in Mexico City for misconduct ranging from armed robbery to beating suspects and accepting bribes.

Police extorted money from street children, at times abused homosexuals, and violated the rights of illegal immigrants.

The Constitution provides for the protection of privacy, family, home, and correspondence, and the law requires search warrants; however, in the past there were credible reports that unlawful searches without warrants were common, and there were reports of such searches during the year 2001.

The law allows for electronic surveillance with a judicial order. The law prohibits electronic surveillance for electoral, civil, commercial, labor, or administrative purposes. However, there were reports of illegal surveillance during the year 2001.

There were numerous allegations of the use of excessive force and the violation of international humanitarian law. During much of the year, the Government maintained approximately 20,000 troops in selected areas of Chiapas, and approximately half that number in Guerrero to handle the two relatively small rebel groups, the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) and the Revolutionary Army of the People's Insurgency (ERPI). Incidents of conflict in Chiapas between security forces and EZLN sympathizers, and in Guerrero between the army and the EPR and the ERPI, led to accusations of the use of excessive force; however, the confused circumstances of these clashes made those allegations difficult to substantiate.

The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the police continued to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. Arbitrary arrest and detention were among the most common human rights abuses. Legally, a prosecutor may hold a detainee no more than 48 hours before he must present the accused to a judge, except when the accused is caught in the act or within 72 hours of committing a crime. On June 1, the federal legislature criminalized forced disappearance, including illegal detentions; the law also prohibits sponsoring or covering up an illegal detention.

NGO sources report that a great number of disappearances eventually are found to be cases of arbitrary detention by security forces. In June, 2001, the Government amended the penal code to add forced disappearances of persons (defined to include illegal detention) to the list of punishable abuses of authority by public officials. If the victim is freed within 3 days of the detention, the sentence ranges from 8 months to 4 years; if the victim is freed within 10 days, the sentence ranges from 2 to 8 years. Many human rights groups link torture to the prevalence of arbitrary detention, and claim that torture often follows an arbitrary arrest, sometimes without a warrant, as police or prosecutors attempt to justify the detention by securing a confession to a crime. According to PRODH, incommunicado detention is a frequent practice.

The Constitution provides that the authorities must sentence an accused person within 4 months of detention if the alleged crime carries a sentence of less than 2 years, or within 1 year if the crime carries a longer sentence. In practice, judicial and police authorities frequently ignored these time limits. Criminal defendants often were held with convicted prisoners. There were reports that police demanded bribes to release suspects. Many detainees reported that judicial officials often solicited bribes in exchange for not pressing charges. Those able to pay were released from custody. Corruption is rampant throughout the criminal justice system.

In 2001, judges often failed to sentence indigenous detainees within legally mandated periods. In 1996 the CNDH reviewed 8,661 files of indigenous persons who were detained and recommended the immediate release of 1,727 persons. Of those states with the largest numbers of indigenous prisoners, the CNDH reviewed 2,222 cases in Oaxaca, and recommended 407 releases, of which 296 had been accomplished by the end of 1998; 1,219 cases in Veracruz, with 331 recommendations for release and 245 releases; and 639 cases in Puebla, with 157 releases recommended and 61 releases. In 1999 the CNDH signed an accord with Secretariat of Government, the PGR, the Federal Institute of the Public Defense office, and the National Indigenous Institute (INI) to develop a program for the early release of indigenous prisoners in federal prisons. CNDH intervention reportedly resulted in the early release of 802 indigenous prisoners in 1998, 1,197 in 1999, 596 in 2000, and 531 during the first 11 months of the year.

Federal prosecutors continued to adhere to the INI's recommendation that they drop charges against indigenous first-time offenders accused of drug cultivation, as drug traffickers often forced indigenous defendants, who were not aware of the legal significance of their actions, to grow the crops. The INI also supports programs to provide translators for indigenous defendants and to assist them in obtaining bail bonds.

Some human rights groups have claimed that activists arrested in connection with civil disobedience activities are in fact political detainees. The Government asserts that the system fairly prosecutes those charged in sometimes violent land invasions for common crimes, such as homicide and damage to property.

The law does not permit forced exile, and it is not practiced.

The judicial branch of the Mexican government is divided into federal and state systems. Mexico's highest court is the Supreme Court of Justice, located in Mexico City. It consists of twenty-one magistrates and five auxiliary judges, all appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate or the Permanent Committee.

Mexican supreme court justices must be Mexican citizens by birth, thirty-five to sixty-five years old, and must have resided in Mexico and held a law degree during the five years preceding their nomination. According to the constitution, supreme court justices are appointed for life but are subject to impeachment by the Chamber of Deputies. In practice, the justices, along with the entire federal judiciary, traditionally submit their resignations at the beginning of each sexenio .

The Supreme Court of Justice may meet in joint session or in separate chambers, depending on the type of case before it. The high court is divided into four chambers, each with five justices. These are the Penal Affairs Chamber, Administrative Affairs Chamber, Civil Affairs Chamber, and Labor Affairs Chamber. A fifth chamber, the Auxiliary Chamber, is responsible for the overload of the four regular chambers. Court rulings of both the whole, or plenary, court and the separate chambers are decided on the basis of majority opinion. Rulings by the separate chambers may be overturned by the full court.

There are three levels of federal courts under the Supreme Court of Justice: twelve Collegiate Circuit Courts, each with three magistrates; nine Unitary Circuit Courts, each with six magistrates; and sixty-eight District Courts, each with one judge. Federal judges for the lower courts are appointed by the Supreme Court of Justice. The Collegiate Circuit Courts are comparable to the United States Courts of Appeals. The Collegiate Circuit Courts deal with the protection of individual rights, most commonly hearing cases where an individual seeks a writ of amparo , a category of legal protection comparable to a broad form of habeas corpus that safeguards individual civil liberties and property rights. The Unitary Circuit Courts also handle appeals cases. The Collegiate Circuit Courts are located in Mexico City, Toluca, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Hermosillo, Puebla, Veracruz, Torreón, San Luis Potosí, Villahermosa, Morelia, and Mazatlán. The Unitary Circuit Courts are located in Mexico City, Toluca, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Hermosillo, Puebla, Mérida, Torreón, and Mazatlán.

The judiciary is divided into federal and state systems. Federal courts have jurisdiction over major felonies, including drug trafficking. In the federal system, judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice, circuit courts, and district courts. The first chamber of the Supreme Court, composed of a president and four other judges, deals with penal affairs. Twelve collegiate circuit courts, each with three magistrates, deal with the right of amparo (constitutional rights of an individual, similar to habeas corpus). Nine unitary circuit courts, of one magistrate each, deal with appeals. There are sixty-eight one-magistrate district courts. State judiciary systems following a similar pattern are composed of state supreme courts, courts of first instance, and justices of the peace or police judges.

In most instances, arrests can be made only on authority of a judicial warrant, with the exception of suspects caught in the act of committing crimes. Suspects often are arrested without warrants, but judges tend to overlook this irregularity. Those arrested are required to be brought before an officer of the court as soon as possible, generally within forty-eight hours (ninety-six hours when organized crime is alleged), whereupon their statements are taken and they are informed of the charges against them. Within seventy-two hours of arraignment, the judge must remand the arrested person to prison or release him or her.

Criminal trials in nearly all cases are tried by a judge without a jury. The judge acting alone bases his or her verdict on written statements, depositions, and expert opinion, although in some instances oral testimony is presented. Defendants have access to counsel, and those unable to afford legal fees can be assigned public defenders. The quality of pro bono counsel is often inferior. The accused and his or her lawyer do not always meet before trial, and the lawyer may not appear at the important sentencing stage. The right to a public trial is guaranteed, as is the right to confront one's accusers and to be provided with a translator if the accused's native language is not Spanish. Under the constitution, the court must hand down a sentence within four months of arrest for crimes carrying a maximum sentence of two years or less, and within one year for crimes with longer sentences.

The entire process--the time for a trial, sentencing, and appeals--often requires a year or more. According to Amnesty International, a large number of persons charged with crimes have been held far beyond the constitutional limits for their detention. The long trial process and the detention of those who cannot qualify for or make bail are major causes of crowded prison conditions.

As of year 2001, the judiciary was generally independent; however, on occasion, especially at the state level, it has been influenced by government authorities. Corruption, inefficiency, impunity, disregard of the law, and lack of training are major problems. For example, many detainees reported that judicial officials often solicited bribes in exchange for not pressing charges, and authorities frequently ignored limits on pretrial detention. Judicial reforms have begun to address some of these problems, but full resolution of these problems requires significant additional time and effort. In 1999 the Congress and the states passed constitutional reforms designed to streamline the administration of justice and repeal archaic laws. Human rights groups criticized these reforms, claiming that they effectively allow prosecutors to disregard defendants' allegations of violation of due process during criminal proceedings.

In May U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Dato Param Cumaraswamy, conducted a 10-day evaluation mission. In a strongly worded press conference, the Special Rapporteur, accompanied by Mariclaire Acosta, expressed dismay about the lack of public confidence in the justice system, and called for increased resources for state-level judiciaries and improved professionalism among judges and lawyers. He endorsed the notion of a national accounting for alleged past government misconduct and urged an end to the widespread de facto impunity enjoyed by corrupt officials. He urged the Administration to expedite its reform agenda if it hopes to regain public trust in judicial institutions. Based on his visits to the states of Chihuahua and Nayarit, Cumaraswamy also voiced his concern about the indigenous population's access to the justice system, and the inadequacy of investigations into violence against women in Ciudad Juarez during the 1990's.

During the year 2001, the Federal Judicial Council continued to strengthen administrative control over the judiciary, investigated cases of corruption, and removed some corrupt judges. In September 2000, the Institute for Professional Formation of the Mexico City Attorney General's office initiated workshops and courses directed at officials who deal with prosecutions; including the prosecutor's office, official secretaries, judicial police, and police group leaders. The course material encompassed case management, scientific investigation techniques, legal framework, and evidence collection. These workshops and courses continued through year's end. However, in a report released in December 2000, Human Rights Watch asserted that deficiencies in the administration of justice still were a major concern, and repeated its 1999 statement that judicial reforms have done little to improve the problems that plague the justice system. The December 2000 report stated that prosecutors not only ignored abuses by police but also fabricated evidence. Judicial oversight was seriously inadequate as the courts accepted evidence obtained through human rights violations, and judges cited legal precedents that weakened human rights protections.

Following the November killing of two federal judges, the governor of the state requested police protection for all federal judges in the state.

The federal court system consists of a Supreme Court, 91 circuit courts of appeal, 49 courts of appeal, and 185 district courts.

Based on the Napoleonic Code, the trial system consists of a series of fact-gathering hearings at which the court receives documentary evidence or testimony. However, Amnesty International alleged in its July, 2001, report that judges often are not present at hearings when defendants give testimony. Court officials may add notarized documents that are not authenticated into the case file. A judge in chambers reviews the case file and then issues a final, written ruling. The record of the proceeding is not available to the general public; only the parties have access to the official file, although by special motion the victim may have access to it.

The Constitution provides for the right of the accused to attend the hearings and challenge the evidence or testimony presented, and the Government generally respects these rights in practice. In general, court hearings are open to the public, and it is common to find not only the accused, but also relatives of the accused and journalists in the courtroom. However, human rights groups have complained that many hearings take place in busy judicial offices where the public generally must stand at a distance and often cannot hear the proceedings well. In some courtrooms glass or plastic panels have been placed between the tables where the proceedings take place and the public.

While there is a constitutional right to an attorney at all stages of criminal proceedings, in practice the authorities often do not assure adequate representation for many poor defendants. Moreover, the public defender system is not adequate to meet the demand, although improvements in salaries and benefits have ameliorated this situation. Attorneys are not always available during the questioning of defendants; in some instances a defense attorney may attempt to represent several clients simultaneously by entering different rooms to certify formally that he was present, although he did not actually attend the full proceedings. Prosecutor salaries and benefits vary by region and agency. Federal prosecutors usually are paid better than state prosecutors.

In the case of indigenous defendants, many of whom do not speak Spanish, the situation is often worse. The law calls for translation services to be available at all stages of the criminal process; however, the courts do not routinely furnish translators for indigenous defendants at all stages of criminal proceedings, and thus defendants may be unaware of the status of their cases. Provision of translators to non-Spanish speaking defendants, including indigenous ones, is provided for but poorly implemented, resulting in prisoners being convicted without fully understanding the documents they have been required to sign. The CNDH, through the Fourth Inspector General's office, has a program to assist incarcerated indigenous defendants. The INI also has judicial assistance programs for indigenous defendants and provides counsel on their behalf. The INI also distributes legal, educational, and informational material in indigenous languages.

A particularly serious abuse of due process is the prosecution's ability to base its case on evidence gathered by means of torture. While torture itself is a criminal act, judges allow statements coerced through torture to be used as evidence against the accused and confessions are the primary evidence in many criminal convictions. For example, in July, 2001, a court upheld the August 2000 convictions of two environmental activists in Guerrero although they alleged that they had been tortured into signing confessions. A number of NGO's have declared that judges give greater evidentiary value to the first declaration of a defendant, thus providing prosecutors an incentive to obtain an incriminating first confession and making it difficult for defendants to overturn such declarations.

The law does not require civil trials of soldiers involved in civil crimes, and the military continues to handle such cases. The Constitution provides for military jurisdiction for crimes or offenses involving any violation of military discipline. In cases in which a member of the military commits a crime and is arrested by civil authorities, the military has the right to request the immediate transfer of the case to military jurisdiction. Although the military still retains jurisdiction over its personnel in cases where its personnel have been accused of a crime against a civilian, in June it changed procedures to allow for limited civilian participation at the trials. The military cooperated with the PGR on investigations of counternarcotics cases involving soldiers and sailors. For example, on April 6, the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) announced that charges had been brought against Brigadier General Ricardo Martinez Perea as well as two junior officers for their alleged links with the drug trafficking group the Gulf Cartel. On July 1, a federal judge sentenced retired General Jorge Mariano Maldonado to 26 years and 3 months in prison after finding him guilty of drug trafficking, money laundering, and organized crime. Maldonado Vega, who also served previously as director of the Federal District Police Academy, was linked to the Juarez Cartel. In August 2000, the military police arrested Generals Humberto Quiros Hermosillo and Arturo Acosta Chaparro on charges of narcotics trafficking and assisting the Ciudad Juarez-based Amado Carrillo drug cartel. General Acosta also was accused of complicity in the disappearance and torture of several persons in Guerrero during the 1960's and 1970's. Both remained in custody as investigations continued at year's end 2001.

In December, 2001, Human Rights Watch issued a report that called on the Government to end military jurisdiction over all cases involving human rights violations. The report found that the military justice system lacks transparency because civilians are barred from monitoring the progress of investigations. In addition, investigations by the military are not accountable to civilian authorities.

According to the Foreign Ministry, on April 17, 2001, the CNDH concluded that allegations that the military had tortured or violated the human rights of Hildegardo Bacilio Gomez and the other incarcerated members of the military dissident group, the Patriotic Command for Raising People's Awareness (CPCP) were unfounded. All members of the CPCP were freed by January; however, there were no investigations into their allegations of torture, illegal arrest, and harassment of families.

There continued to be reports during the year 2001 of the harassment of human rights lawyers. Approximately 15 activists and lawyers were threatened and harassed during the year 2001. Five human rights activists, Sergio Aguayo, Edgar Cortez, Miguel Sarre, Juan Antonio Vega and Fernando Ruiz, received death threat via a letter sent to la Reforma on October 28. In August unknown armed assailants tried to stop Marina Patricia Jimenez Ramirez' car, but she was able to get away. In September and October, unknown persons, impersonating her work colleagues, inquired about her exact travel itineraries at the local travel agency she used.

During the year 2001, General Jose Francisco Gallardo was the only political prisoner. He maintains that he was sentenced to 28 years' imprisonment by a military court for publicly advocating the creation of a military human rights ombudsman. During the year 2001, he received visits from Amnesty International. At year's end 2001, Undersecretary Mariclaire Acosta and the Secretariat of Foreign Relations were studying a variety of legal mechanisms that would allow the Government and Gallardo's defense team to reach agreement on a means to comply with a 1996 IAHCR recommendation calling for Gallardo's release.

The penal system consists of both federal and state correctional institutions. The largest federal prison is the penitentiary for the Federal District. The Federal District also sends prisoners to four detention centers, sixteen smaller jails, and a women's jail. Each state has its own penitentiary. There are, in addition, more than 2,000 municipal jails. As of the end of 1993, nearly 95,000 inmates were in Mexican prisons; almost half were persons still awaiting trial or sentencing.

Overcrowding of prisons is chronic. Mistreatment of prisoners, the lack of trained guards, and inadequate sanitary facilities compound the problem. The United States Department of State's country reports on human rights practices for 1992 and 1993 state that an entrenched system of corruption undermines prison authority and contributes to abuses. Authority frequently is exercised by prisoners, displacing prison officials. Violent confrontations, often linked to drug trafficking, are common between rival prison groups.

Mexican prisons also exhibit some humane qualities. In 1971 conjugal visiting rights were established for male prisoners and later extended to females. Prisoners held at the penal colony on the Islas Tres Marías off the coast of Nayarit are permitted to bring their entire families to live temporarily. Women are permitted to keep children under five years of age with them.

Based on interviews at a smaller state prison, United States penologist William V. Wilkinson found in 1990 that serious overcrowding, lack of privacy, and poor prison diets were the most common complaints. Wilkinson found no deliberate mistreatment of inmates. The prison fare generally was supplemented by food supplied by prisoners' families or purchased from outside. Prisoners with money could buy items such as television sets and sports equipment. Through bribery, prisoners could be assigned to highly prized individual cells, where even air conditioners were permitted.

A major building program by the CNDH added 800 prison spaces in 1993 and 1994. In 1991 Mexico's only maximum security facility, Almoloya de Juárez, was completed. Major drug traffickers were transferred to it from other prisons. The prison's 408 individual cells are watched by closed-circuit television and the most modern technical and physical security equipment. Violence in prisons is a constant problem as a result of overcrowding, lack of security, and the mixing of male and female prisoners and of accused and sentenced criminals.

Imprisonment of peasants, often for growing marijuana, puts a heavy demand on the system. Through the efforts of CNDH, a program of early release and parole benefited 1,000 people incarcerated on charges of growing marijuana in 1993.

Under the terms of the 1977 Prisoner Transfer Treaty between the United States and Mexico, United States prisoners in Mexican jails and Mexican prisoners in United States jails may choose to serve their sentences in their home countries. An extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico took effect in January 1980. It requires the mutual recognition of a crime as defined by the laws of each nation. Because of the extensive processing required under extradition requests, however, informal cooperation has developed among police on both sides of the border. Suspected criminals who flee to the neighboring country to escape apprehension routinely are turned over without formal proceedings to police in the country where the crime was committed.

Noncompliance with the Prisoner Transfer Treaty has occasionally created friction between the United States and Mexico. The United States strongly criticized Mexico's decision in 1988 to release William Morales, a leader of the Puerto Rican Armed National Liberation Front, who was wanted for a series of bombings in New York in 1978. Mexico rejected a United States extradition request even though a Mexican court had found Morales extraditable. Washington objected particularly to the initial Mexican characterization of Morales as a "political fighter."

The death penalty has not been applied in Mexico since 1929, when the assassin of president-elect Obregón was executed. The federal death penalty was abolished under the Federal Penal Code of 1930, and by 1975 all state codes also had eliminated the death penalty. The military, however, still holds certain offenses as punishable by death, including insubordination with violence causing the death of a superior officer, certain kinds of looting, offenses against military honor, and treason.

As of year 2001, prison conditions are poor . In June the CNDH announced that it had issued 385 recommendations to prison administrators at both the state and federal level. Many prisons are staffed by undertrained and corrupt guards. Prisoners complain that they must purchase food, medicine, and other necessities from guards or bribe guards to allow the goods to be brought in from outside. In many prisons inmates exercise authority, displacing prison officials. Influence peddling, drug and arms trafficking, coercion, violence, sexual abuse, and protection payoffs are the chief methods of control used by prisoners against their fellow inmates.

The penal system consists of 446 facilities: 5 federal penitentiaries, 8 federal district prisons, 330 state prisons, and 103 municipal and regional jails. According to the CNDH, as of October 2000, there were 154,843 prisoners in the country; 65,090 were serving their sentence, and 89,753 were awaiting sentence. Although the Constitution calls for separation of convicted criminals from detainees held in custody, in practice these requirements were violated routinely as a result of overcrowding. Prison overcrowding continued to be a common problem, despite an early release program endorsed by the CNDH, legal reforms that reduced the number of crimes that carry mandatory prison sentences, and the construction of new prisons. According to the CNDH, the country's 446 penal facilities are overpopulated by approximately 29 percent; 154,793 prisoners are being held in facilities that have a capacity of 120,344 prisoners. In June the CNDH announced that in Baja California and Sonora, prisons are more than 181 percent overpopulated; in Nayarit the rate of overpopulation is 92 percent, in Chiapas 95 percent, in Sonora 82 percent, in Tamaulipas 69 percent, in Oaxaca 56 percent, in Puebla 55 percent, and in the Federal District 48 percent. The prisons with the largest overpopulation are: Reclusorio Norte, Reclusorio Oriente, and Reclusorio Sur in Mexico City, the state prison in Ciudad Juarez, and La Mesa in Tijuana. In August the newspaper Reforma reported that the total capacity of existing facilities in Mexico City is 14,000, but that there were slightly more than 22,000 inmates.

In Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, the state prison increased its inmate capacity from 700 to 1,940; however, the facility housed 3,036 inmates. In October 2000, construction began on a second penitentiary (1,500 beds) in Ciudad Juarez to ease overcrowding and on a new juvenile detention facility. Construction on both facilities, originally scheduled for completion during the year 2001, is not expected to be complete until the second half of 2002. The delay is attributed to budget problems and bureaucratic infighting over maintenance responsibilities. The city government assumes the costs associated with upkeep of the prison, although state or federal entities are normally responsible for most such facilities.

Health and sanitary conditions are poor. In May 2000, doctors at a prison in Nuevo Laredo resigned, citing unhealthy conditions such as inadequate food and water as the reason for their resignations. They stated that conditions such as mange, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis are known to the authorities, who fail to take any action to treat and segregate sick inmates. In March the CNDH reported that HIV/AIDS and associated illnesses were the leading cause of death among inmates in the Federal District. The deaths of 20 inmates from HIV/AIDS-related complications in 2000 underlined the need for awareness, prevention, and treatment programs. The CNDH also noted that HIV-positive prisoners are subject to mistreatment and discrimination in prisons. For example, the Multisectoral Group of Citizens with HIV/AIDS claimed that 30 HIV-infected inmates in the state prison in Merida, Yucatan, suffered discriminatory treatment and insufficient access to healthcare. There were no developments in the case of Eugenio Almaraz Garcia, who died in February 2000 from presumed neglect by the director of the Pochutla, Oaxaca prison.

The authorities investigated some prison officials for abusing prisoners; however, they more commonly dismissed those who commit abuses or charged them with only minor offenses. Drug and alcohol abuse was a problem in prisons. In July the Ciudad Juarez prison director cited a study that showed that as many as 80 percent of the prisoners in the facility used some type of drug--heroin was the most common. On July 18, officials confiscated more than 400 weapons including homemade knives, heroin, cocaine, drug lab paraphernalia, a cellular telephone, and elaborate peso counterfeiting materials during a sweep of the facility. The authorities fired 15 guards for operating or allowing such operations to exist inside the prison. Control is difficult with 60 guards available on each shift to monitor more than 3,000 prisoners and up to 1,500 visitors daily.

In 2000 a Baja California state official estimated that 80 percent of the state's prison population was addicted to drugs. Conflicts between rival prison groups involved in drug trafficking continued.

Female prisoners are held separately from men. Women make up approximately 4.4 percent of the prison population. Of the 444 prison facilities in the country, 230 of them house female prisoners. In August a Federal District Interior Ministry official announced that two gender-segregated prisons under construction in Mexico City are expected by completed by 2002. The new men's facility is expected to house 3,000 inmates and the women's facility is expected to hold 1,200 inmates.

Juveniles are held separately from adults. The press reported that on November 26-27, prisoners in the Villas Crisol youth detention center in Berriozabal, Chiapas threw stones and set off homemade bombs. Approximately 400 police were brought in to control the rioting. Many of the youths were high on paint thinner and liquid glue and said that they were protesting poor living conditions that included bad food, dirty water, and a lack of medications.

There is no specific law or regulation that prohibits human rights organizations or other NGO's from visiting prisons, and some do; however, in practice, the CNDH and state human rights commissions conduct the majority of prison visits focused on human rights issues. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is able to visit prisoners in Chiapas based on a July agreement with the Government. For permission to visit prisoners in Oaxaca and Guerrero, the ICRC must apply on a case-specific basis to the Ministry of Foreign Relations.

The most pervasive violations of women's rights involve domestic and sexual violence, which are both widespread and vastly underreported. A 1997 law criminalized intrafamily violence, established protective measures for victims, and provided public education on the domestic violence problem. The law provides for fines equal to 30 to 180 days' worth of pay and the detention of violators for up to 36 hours. On July 21, the press reported that in 6 months, the Federal District's Attorney General's Center for Attention to Intrafamily Violence had given 13,822 victims medical, psychological, and legal assistance; however, only 16 of the cases went on to be prosecuted. The Center for Attention to Intrafamily Violence reported in 2000 that it received between 50 to 60 complaints nationwide every day. According to a 1999 survey by the National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Computation, some form of domestic abuse occurs in one of every three homes. The victim seeks help in only one of every six homes suffering from domestic abuse. Women are reluctant to report abuse or file charges, and the police are reluctant to intervene in what society considers a private matter. Many police also are inexperienced in these areas and unfamiliar with appropriate investigative techniques, although some have received training on these issues.

According to the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights (CMDPDH), over 1 million women each year seek emergency medical treatment for injuries caused by domestic violence. Groups such as the NGO Center for Research and Care of Women are attempting to counter the widespread view of domestic violence as private, normal behavior and to deter future violence. In June 2000, then-Mexico City Mayor Rosario Robles publicized a handbook written by a coalition of feminist NGO's to reduce domestic violence and to help victims of gender discrimination. Within the CNDH's First Inspector General's office, the General Coordinating Office that devotes all of its time with issues relating to women, children, and the family.

A 1997 law also expanded the definition of rape to include spousal rape, applying to both married or common-law couples. Under certain circumstances limited to the statutory rape of a minor between the ages of 12 and 18, the Criminal Code allows a judge to dismiss charges if the persons involved voluntarily marry. In practice this provision is invoked rarely.

Trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation is a problem.

There were reports in 2001 that public health institutions performed forced sterilizations in marginalized indigenous areas.

The National Institute for the Development of the Family (DIF) received an average of approximately 35,000 complaints per year of physical and mental abuse against children, the majority in the Federal District, Mexico State, and Nuevo Leon. On April 16, the Federal Chamber of Deputies Committee for Vulnerable Groups estimated that some 300 children die every year due to domestic violence.

Child prostitution and pornography are felonies under the law; however, sexual exploitation is a problem. Under a January 2000 law, anyone convicted of corrupting a minor under 16 years of age by introducing the minor to pornography, prostitution, or any sexual exploitation can be sentenced to 5 to 10 years' imprisonment. If parents or guardians are convicted of a crime, they automatically lose custody of their children. If convicted, accomplices to sexual abuse or exploitation may be imprisoned for 6 to 10 years. When physical or psychological violence is used to abuse sexually or profit from children's exploitation, the minimum and maximum penalties for these crimes are increased by up to half. The DIF estimates that 16,000 children below the age of 17 are victims of some form of sexual exploitation. In April 2000, the Mexico City attorney general's office and the Mexico City Human Rights Commission reported that nearly 12,000 children in Mexico City were exploited sexually, including through prostitution.

Trafficking in children for the purpose of sexual exploitation was a problem. In November 2000, the PGR established the Special Prosecutor's Office for Attention to Crimes of Trafficking in Children.

Press reports cite a 1998-99 DIF study that estimated that some 130,000 minors in 101 cities were living in the streets. The NGO Mexican Association of Childhood and Youth reported that there is a large population, estimated at 42,000, of vulnerable street children in Mexico City. Street children often become involved with alcohol, drugs, prostitution, petty thievery, and increasingly, violent crimes. Corrupt police officials sometimes exploit these children by pressuring them to commit petty crimes and extorting money from them. In March the DIF began a program aimed at street children, focusing initially on 3,000 children in Mexico, Puebla, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Tijuana, and Juarez.

There are no specific laws that prohibit the trafficking of persons, although other laws may be used to prosecute traffickers of undocumented migrants, women, and children; however, trafficking is a serious problem, and there were credible reports that police, immigration, and customs officials were involved in the trafficking of such persons.

Mexico is a source country for trafficked persons to the U.S., Canada, and Japan, a transit country for persons from various countries, especially Central America and China, and a destination country for children trafficked from Central America, especially from Honduras to Tapachula, Chiapas. There are an increasing number of persons from Brazil and Eastern Europe transiting through the country, some of whom are trafficked. Salvadorans and Guatemalans, especially children, are trafficked into the country for prostitution, particularly on the southern border. Internal trafficking, including of children for sexual exploitation, also is a problem. Russian criminal organizations reportedly traffic women from Eastern Europe into the country to work in nightclubs.

A study that was jointly funded by UNICEF and DIF and released in June 2000 studied children in six cities, and concluded that the commercial sexual exploitation of children was present today throughout the country. Its author estimated that the number of children involved in sexual exploitation countrywide at 16,000. Most were citizens, although there were significant numbers from Central America, principally Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. The Central American children entered the country through Chiapas. In many cases, those who brought them in the country promised them employment in legitimate occupations. Thereafter they were sold to the owners of bars and other establishments and then forced into prostitution to "pay off their debts." This debt peonage often never ends because the children accrue more debt for their meals and housing. The owners sold or traded the children among themselves. Other children were transported to Mexico City for "training" and then were sent to centers of tourism. Some children are trafficked to the U.S. and Canada.

There are no specific laws that prohibit the trafficking of persons, although immigration laws, the federal organized crime law, and federal and state penal codes contain provisions that may be used to prosecute traffickers of undocumented migrants, women, and children. Laws pertaining to trafficking in persons are Article 138 of the Immigration Law, and the Federal Organized Crime Law of the Federal Penal Code. There also are laws prohibiting the sexual abuse or exploitation of children and forced labor by children. The PRG and the INM are the agencies responsible for enforcing anti-trafficking laws; however, there is no special program to combat trafficking. In November 2000, the PRG established the Special Prosecutor's Office for Attention to Crimes of Trafficking in Children. The Government prosecutes cases against traffickers, but no statistics were available.

Taking full advantage of the approximately 2,000-kilometer border between Mexico and the United States and the massive flow of legitimate trade and traffic, well-entrenched polydrug-trafficking organizations based in Mexico have built vast criminal empires that produce illicit drugs, smuggle hundreds of tons of South American cocaine, and operate drug distribution networks across the continental United States. Mexico is the primary transit route for South American cocaine, a major source of marijuana and heroin, as well as a major supplier of methamphetamine to the illicit drug market in the U.S. Given the absence of adequate controls, Mexico has become a major money laundering center and a significant international placement point for U.S. dollars. Drug cartels launder the proceeds of crime in legitimate businesses in both the U.S. and Mexico, favoring transportation and other industries which can be used to facilitate drug, cash and arms smuggling or to further money laundering activities.

Drug cartels led by Columbian drug lords are said to operate throughout Mexico. These include the Jaurez Cartel, operating in 15 states; the Tijuana Cartel, headed by the Arelano Felix brothers, in 11 states; the Colima Cartel, run by the Amezcua brothers, in eight states; the Valencia Mendoza Cartel, in four states; the Gulf Cartel, headed by Juan Garcia Abreyo (now serving a life sentence in Houston, Texas); and the Miguel Caro-Quintero Cartel operating in Sonoma. These cartels smuggle drugs that include marijuana, Columbian cocaine, Mexican-grown heroin, and methamphetamine.

The Government of Mexico (GOM) continued to implement a comprehensive anti-drug strategy, encompassing efforts to attack the drug trafficking organizations, combat money laundering and chemical diversion, eradicate drug crops, interdict drug shipments, and increase public awareness. The GOM intensified its investigations of major narcotrafficking organizations, particularly the Juarez Cartel, the Tijuana Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, and the Caro Quintero Organization. The GOM arrested two major methamphetamine traffickers and founders of the Amezcua Organization (Colima Cartel), Jesus and Luis Amezcua Contreras. Mexican charges were subsequently dropped but the Amezcuas are still being held on U.S. provisional arrest warrants. Drug-related arrests and seizures of heroin and marijuana paralleled 1997 figures, but cocaine seizures were down 35 percent. Although overall eradication results also matched figures from the previous year, total opium cultivation increased by approximately 25 percent due to an increase in illicit cultivation. Mexican Attorney General Jorge Madrazo Cuellar continued his efforts to attack corruption within the criminal justice system. Persistent corruption at all levels of the justice sector and frequent changes in personnel have combined to hinder Mexico's ability to meet the goals of its anti-drug strategy.

During 1998, the U.S. -- Mexico High-Level Contact Group (HLCG) on narcotics control explored joint solutions to the shared drug threat, discussed the full range of narcotics issues, promoted closer law enforcement cooperation, and drafted performance measures of effectiveness or gauging implementation of the U.S.-Mexico Bi-National Drug Strategy. The GOM extradited 12 fugitives to the U.S., including three Mexican nationals, one of whom was a narcotics trafficker sought for the murder of a U.S. Border Patrol agent.

Mexico, a key country for U.S. drug control policy, is a significant supplier of heroin and marijuana entering the U.S. market. The country also sits astride the main transshipment routes for cocaine being smuggled into the United States from source countries in South America. An extremely porous and lightly guarded 760-mile southern frontier with Belize and Guatemala, as well as 5,804 miles of coastline with innumerable clandestine landing spots, help make Mexico a primary trafficking route. Chronic problems of severe poverty, especially in rural areas, budget constraints and weak police and criminal justice institutions hamper Mexico's ability to combat drug trafficking effectively. The GOM still lacks the institutional capability to implement fully the strong anti-drug legislation passed by the Mexican congress in 1997.

Mexico is fully aware of the threat posed to its security and democratic institutions by drug traffickers operating throughout its national territory. President Zedillo has identified narcotics trafficking as Mexico's primary national security concern. Major transborder drug trafficking organizations based in Mexico generate violence, corruption, and other crimes in both countries. The GOM is responding by intensifying law enforcement actions against major drug cartels, strengthening its laws, and enhancing its cooperation with the U.S. and other countries to fight international narcotics trafficking.

Mexican criminal organizations have become the most significant distributors in the U.S. of methamphetamine and its precursor chemicals. The GOM moved to strengthen its controls on the diversion of precursor and essential chemicals. Mexico is also a significant producer of some "designer" drugs, illicit steroids, and pharmaceuticals, such as Valium and Rohypnol, which are smuggled into the United States and subject to abuse.

Drug abuse in Mexico is low compared with most countries in the Western Hemisphere, but the GOM is concerned about indications that it is increasing along its border with the U.S., in large metropolitan cities with a university population, and in heavily traveled narco-transit tourist areas. Abuse of inhalants among street children and other vulnerable population groups is prevalent in Mexico's large cities. Public and private sector programs aimed at increasing public awareness of drug and substance abuse are being established throughout the country. The GOM conducted a national drug use survey in 1998, which will provide a sharper picture of increases in drug consumption since the previous survey in 1993. Bilateral cooperation with the U.S. in demand reduction oriented matters, including epidemiological studies is excellent. Mexico also continues to participate actively in regional efforts in this area through the OAS.

Mexico is a major money-laundering center. Increasingly effective U.S. anti-money laundering measures are forcing money launderers to turn towards Mexico for initial placement of drug proceeds into the global financial system. Measures enacted by Mexico in 1996 and 1997 have provided the means for more effective control of money laundering. Court decisions, however, have made convictions difficult as judges have ruled that a prior conviction on illegal enrichment or other underlying offenses is necessary to convict on money laundering. The GOM has submitted legislation to the Mexican Congress to strengthen asset forfeiture regulations and allow Mexico to cooperate with other countries as well as participate more actively in international asset sharing.

Federal authorities have made combating corruption a top priority because of the threat it represents to Mexico's democratic institutions. The GOM investigated corruption cases and was active in multilateral fora against corruption. Mexico is a signatory to the anti-corruption agreements of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.

Despite public statements and efforts by President Zedillo and other key government officials, corruption continues to be serious a problem in Mexican institutions, including federal, state, and local police agencies. The GOM has generally responded to revelations of corruption with administrative reorganization of the corrupted agency and dismissal or reassignment of the compromised officials. This situation is beginning to change because of better screening and internal controls as well as moves to prosecute corrupt officials.

In 1998, the GOM uncovered evidence of corruption in the special vetted units that had been specially created to avoid corruption. This appears to have resulted in the compromise of several investigations in which the U.S. supplied investigative information. Revelations of corruption at the highest levels of the OCU undermined the confidence of U.S. law enforcement in its working relationship with the unit. Law enforcement officials from both countries are working to restore mutual confidence.

In the past, most of the law enforcement personnel dismissed by Attorney General Madrazo and former Attorney General Lozano for corruption sought relief under Mexico's strong labor laws and many were reinstated. An encouraging sign has been the recent change in Mexican labor laws permitting corrupt police officers to be fired for cause without the possibility of reinstatement. Also, Mexico has made initial efforts to establish a national police registry and a Confidence Control Center to screen all officers.

In the fight against corruption, the new national registry of public security personnel was used to match active-duty police against those persons who had judicial proceedings pending against them. The Mexico Federal Judicial Police (MFJP), executing outstanding arrest warrants, conducted simultaneous raids on police barracks in Mexico City as well as in the states of Mexico, Morelos, and Hidalgo in a concerted anti-corruption effort. Government Secretary Francisco Labastida declared these arrests the beginning of a fundamental and radical purge of the nation's police.

While there have been successful corruption investigations and prosecutions, more are needed - yet ensuring police integrity is only part of the solution. The Ministry of Government (SEGOB) plans to administer examinations to 47,000 auxiliary and judicial police nationwide in 1999. This will give SEGOB the opportunity to check whether the examinees have outstanding warrants against them and permit it to dismiss poor performers. Those who pass these exams will receive additional training, a pay raise, increased benefits, and will help bring about enhanced professionalism, performance, public image, and lifestyle.

The Mexican military, which traditionally has enjoyed a better reputation for integrity than the police, has not escaped the taint of narco-corruption. In August 1998, 14 enlisted personnel of the elite Airmobile Special Forces Groups (GAFES) assigned to the Mexico City airport were arrested on charges of drug trafficking and alien smuggling.

To date, successive reorganizations and announcements of new programs have only brushed the surface of corruption in Mexico. Combating corruption is a long-term challenge that requires sustained effort at all levels of government and society. The GOM has made progress through development of new personnel and information databases and institutional improvements to deter corruption. It is critical that Mexico continue to investigate all allegations of corruption and take strong action against personnel who have been compromised, both for the integrity of its institutions and the confidence of its international partners.

Mexico is a major producer of marijuana and a producer of heroin, most of which is destined for the U.S. Lands used for illicit cultivation are subject to seizure, but many drug crops are grown on public land to thwart tracing ownership. Mexico's eradication program is one of the largest, oldest and most sophisticated in the world. The aerial spray program conducted by the PGR now accounts for about 25 percent of eradication totals. The Army's considerable field presence in manual eradication operations, some 20,000 troops daily and more during peak seasons, combined with Mexican Navy eradication efforts in coastal areas and along navigable rivers, is responsible for about 75 percent of the eradication performed.

The GOM does not produce statistical estimates of illegal drug crop cultivation, but U.S. analysts estimate that in 1998 that Mexican growers cultivated approximately 15,000 hectares of opium poppy, up from 12,000 in 1997, and 14,100 hectares of cannabis, down from 15,300 in 1997. The increase in poppy cultivation is partially worrisome as it led to a net increase in heroin production despite a massive eradication effort.

The GOM reported that the PGR and military forces eradicated 17,449 hectares of opium poppy in 1998, down slightly from 17,732 in 1997, and 23,928 hectares of cannabis, also a minimal decrease from 23,578 in 1997. Incorporating this information, U.S. analysts estimate the GOM effectively eradicated (removed from production for a full growing season) 9,500 hectares of opium poppy, up from 8,000 in 1997, and 9,500 hectares of cannabis, down from 10,500 in 1997. This left approximately 5,500 hectares of opium poppy in production, up from 4,000 in 1997. This could have yielded 60 METRIC TONS of opium gum, up from 46 in 1997, or 6 METRIC TONS of heroin, up from 4.6 in 1997. For cannabis, it would have left approximately 4,600 hectares of harvestable cultivation, down from 4,800 in 1997, which could have yielded 2,300 METRIC TONS of usable marijuana, up from 2,500 in 1997.

Mexico is the principal transit route to the United States for cocaine produced in South American source countries. U.S. agencies estimate that almost 60 percent of the Colombian cocaine sold in the U.S., several hundred metric tons, passed through Mexico, most of it by land or sea, but also by small aircraft.

The detected use of general aviation aircraft to smuggle cocaine directly from Colombia has decreased dramatically in recent years due to the threat of interdiction by Mexican forces. However, cocaine now arrives in Mexico via every kind of commercial and non-commercial transportation means available. In 1998 this included: smuggling across the land border with Guatemala; entry in legitimate air or containerized maritime cargo; smuggling by fishing or other non-commercial vessels; non-commercial flights to clandestine landing points in Mexico; and air drops to go-fast boats off its coasts. Once inside Mexico, illegal drugs are moved to northern border areas for stockpiling and entry into the U.S. Cocaine is smuggled across the U.S. border in everything from containerized cargo, commercial trucks, rail cars, airplanes, automobiles, and off-road vehicles to willing and coerced human "mules," including undocumented migrants and children, who backpack or strap the drugs to their bodies.

The eastern Pacific is one of the principal transit corridors used by air and maritime drug traffickers because of vast ocean areas and a lack of natural choke points. Multiple maritime events are estimated to occur there monthly using go-fast boats, fishing vessels and commercial carriers.

Internet research assisted by Ivan Iniguez