Located in the heart of Central Asia between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers, Uzbekistan has a long and interesting heritage. The leading cities of the famous Silk Road--Samarkand, Bukhara, and Khiva--are located in Uzbekistan, and many famous conquerors passed through the land. Alexander the Great stopped near Samarkand on his way to India in 327 B.C. and married Roxanna, daughter of a local chieftain. Conquered by Muslim Arabs in the eight century A.D., the indigenous Samanid dynasty established an empire in the 9th century. Its territory was overrun by Genghis Khan and his Mongols in 1220. In the 1300s, Timur, known in the west as Tamerlane, built an empire with its capital at Samarkand. Uzbekistan's most noted tourist sights date from the Timurid dynasty. Later, separate Muslim city-states emerged with strong ties to Persia. In 1865, Russia occupied Tashkent and by the end of the 19th century, Russia had conquered all of Central Asia. In 1876, the Russians dissolved the Khanate of Kokand, while allowing the Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara to remain as direct protectorates. Russia placed the rest of Central Asia under colonial administration, and invested in the development of Central Asia's infrastructure, promoting cotton growing, and encouraging settlement by Russian colonists.

In 1924, following the establishment of Soviet power, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan was founded from the territories of the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva and portions of the Fergana Valley that had constituted the Khanate of Kokand. During the Soviet era, Moscow used Uzbekistan for its tremendous cotton-growing and natural resource potential. The inefficient irrigation used to support the former has been the main cause of shrinkage of the Aral Sea to half its former volume, making this one of the world's worst environmental disasters. Uzbekistan declared independence on September 1, 1991. Islam Karimov, former First Secretary of the Communist Party, was elected President in December 1991 with 88% of the vote; however, the election was not viewed as free or fair by foreign observers. Most government leaders are former Soviet officials.

Today, Uzbekistan is an authoritarian state with limited civil rights. The Constitution provides for a presidential system with separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; however, in practice President Islam Karimov and the centralized executive branch that serves him dominate political life. First chosen president in a 1991 election that most observers considered neither free nor fair, Karimov's term was extended to 2000 by a 1995 plebiscite. Parliament subsequently voted to make the extension part of Karimov's first term, making him eligible to run for office again in 2000. He was elected to a second term in January 2000 against token opposition with 92.5 percent of the vote under conditions that were neither free nor fair. In December the Parliament voted to schedule a January 2002 plebiscite, which would, as part of a constitutional reform, extend Karimov's term in office for an additional 2 years. The Oliy Majlis (Parliament) consists almost entirely of officials appointed by the President and members of parties that support the President. Despite constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary, the executive branch heavily influences the courts in both civil and criminal cases.

The country has a population of approximately 24,756,000. The Government has stated that it is committed to a gradual transition to a free market economy. However, despite some steps during the year 2001 toward currency convertibility, continuing restrictions on convertibility and other government measures to control economic activity have constrained economic growth and led international lending organizations to suspend or scale back credits. The economy is based primarily on agriculture and agricultural processing; the country is a major producer and exporter of cotton. It also is a major producer of gold and has substantial deposits of copper, strategic minerals, gas, and oil. The Government continued to make progress in reducing inflation and the budget deficit, but government statistics understate both, while overstating economic growth. There are no reliable statistics on unemployment, which is believed to be high and growing. The Government took some modest steps to reduce the formal and informal barriers that constrain the nascent private sector, including the unification of exchange rates and easier licensing processes for businesses.

Islam is by far the dominant religious faith in Uzbekistan. In the early 1990s, many of the Russians remaining in the republic (about 8 percent of the population) were Orthodox Christians. An estimated 93,000 Jews also were present. Despite its predominance, Islam is far from monolithic, however. Many versions of the faith have been practiced in Uzbekistan. The conflict of Islamic tradition with various agendas of reform or secularization throughout the twentieth century has left the outside world with a confused notion of Islamic practices in Central Asia. In Uzbekistan the end of Soviet power did not bring an upsurge of a fundamentalist version of Islam, as many had predicted, but rather a gradual reacquaintance with the precepts of the faith.

For the most part, however, in the first years of independence Uzbekistan is seeing a resurgence of a more secular Islam, and even that movement is in its very early stages. According to a public opinion survey conducted in 1994, interest in Islam is growing rapidly, but personal understanding of Islam by Uzbeks remains limited or distorted. For example, about half of ethnic Uzbek respondents professed belief in Islam when asked to identify their religious faith. Among that number, however, knowledge or practice of the main precepts of Islam was weak. Despite a reported spread of Islam among Uzbekistan's younger population, the survey suggested that Islamic belief is still weakest among the younger generations. Few respondents showed interest in a form of Islam that would participate actively in political issues. Thus, the first years of post-Soviet religious freedom seem to have fostered a form of Islam related to the Uzbek population more in traditional and cultural terms than in religious ones, weakening Karimov's claims that a growing widespread fundamentalism poses a threat to Uzbekistan's survival. Available information suggests that Islam itself would probably not be the root cause of a conflict as much as it would be a vehicle for expressing other grievances that are far more immediate causes of dissension and despair. Experts do not minimize the importance of Islam, however. The practice of the Islamic faith is growing in Uzbekistan, and the politicization of Islam could become a real threat in the future.

The crime rate in Uzbekistan is extremely low compared to more industrialized countries. An analysis was done using INTERPOL data for Uzbekistan. For purpose of comparison, data were drawn for the seven offenses used to compute the United States FBI's index of crime. Index offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The combined total of these offenses constitutes the Index used for trend calculation purposes. Uzbekistan will be compared with Japan (country with a low crime rate) and USA (country with a high crime rate). According to the INTERPOL data, for murder, the rate in 1999 was 3.16 per 100,000 population for Uzbekistan, 1.00 for Japan, and 4.55 for USA. For rape, the rate in 1999 was 2.03 for Uzbekistan, compared with 1.47 for Japan and 32.05 for USA. For robbery, the rate in 1999 was 10.02 for Uzbekistan, 3.34 for Japan, and 147.36 for USA. For aggravated assault, the rate in 1999 was 3.01 for Uzbekistan, 15.97 for Japan, and 329.63 for USA. For burglary, the rate in 1999 was 33.24 for Uzbekistan, 206.01 for Japan, and 755.29 for USA. The rate of larceny for 1999 was 13.79 for Uzbekistan, 1267.95 for Japan, and 2502.66 for USA. The rate for motor vehicle theft in 1999 was 2.29 for Uzbekistan, compared with 34.01 for Japan and 412.70 for USA. The rate for all index offenses combined was 67.54 for Uzbekistan, compared with 1529.75 for Japan and 4184.24 for USA. (Note: data were not reported to INTERPOL by the USA for 1999, but were derived from data reported to the United Nations for 1999)

Between 1996 and 1999, according to INTERPOL data, the rate of murder decreased from 3.72 to 3.16 per 100,000 population, a decrease of 15.1%. The rate for rape decreased from 2.57 to 2.03, a decrease of 21.0%. The rate of robbery increased from 9.25 to 10.02, an increase of 8.3%. The rate for aggravated assault decreased from 4.11 to 3.01, a decrease of 26.8%. The rate for burglary increased from 29.87 to 33.24, an increase of 11.3%. The rate of larceny increased from 10.27 to 13.79, an increase of 34.3%. The rate of motor vehicle theft decreased from 3.63 to 2.29, a decrease of 36.9%. The rate of total index offenses increased from 63.42 to 67.54, an increase of 6.5%.

Uzbekistan defines its most important security concerns not only in terms of the potential for military conflict, but also in terms of domestic threats. Primary among those threats are the destabilizing effects of trafficking in narcotics and weapons into and across Uzbekistani territory. Although the government has recognized the dangers of such activities to society, enforcement often is stymied by corruption in law enforcement agencies.

Narcotics

With an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 hectares of domestic opium poppy grown annually, Uzbekistan's society long has been exposed to the availability of domestic narcotics as well as to the influx of drugs across the border from Afghanistan (often by way of Tajikistan). Since independence, border security with Afghanistan and among the former Soviet Central Asian republics has become more lax, intensifying the external source problem. Uzbekistan is centrally located in its region, and the transportation systems through Tashkent make that city an attractive hub for narcotics movement from the Central Asian fields to destinations in Western Europe and elsewhere in the CIS.

In 1992 and 1993, shipments of thirteen and fourteen tons of hashish were intercepted in Uzbekistan on their way to the Netherlands. Increasingly in the 1990s, drug sales have been linked to arms sales and the funding of armed groups in neighboring Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Drug-related crime has risen significantly in Uzbekistan during this period. Uzbekistani authorities have identified syndicates from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and other countries active in the Tashkent drug trade.

Domestic drug use has risen sharply in the 1990s as well. In 1994 the Ministry of Health listed 12,000 registered addicts, estimating that the actual number of addicts was likely about 44,000. Opium poppy cultivation is concentrated in Samarqand and along the border with Tajikistan, mainly confined to small plots and raised for domestic consumption. Cannabis, which grows wild, is also increasingly in use. In 1995 government authorities recognized domestic narcotics processing as a problem for the first time when they seized several kilograms of locally made heroin.

To deal with this threat, three agencies--the National Security Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the State Customs Committee--share jurisdiction, although in practice their respective roles often are ill-defined. The international community has sought to provide technical and other assistance to Uzbekistan in this matter. In 1995 Uzbekistan established a National Commission on Drug Control to improve coordination and public awareness. A new criminal code includes tougher penalties for drug-related crimes, including a possible death penalty for drug dealers. The government's eradication program, which targeted only small areas of cultivation in the early 1990s, expanded significantly in 1995, and drug-related arrests more than doubled over 1994. In 1992 the United States government, recognizing Central Asia as a potential route for large-scale narcotics transport, began urging all five Central Asian nations to make drug control a priority of national policy. The United States has channeled most of its narcotics aid to Central Asia through the UN Drug Control Program, whose programs for drug-control intelligence centers and canine narcotics detection squads were being adopted in Uzbekistan in 1996. In 1995 Uzbekistan signed a bilateral counternarcotics cooperation agreement with Turkey and acceded to the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

Law Enforcement and Crime

The Uzbekistani police force is estimated to number about 25,000 individuals trained according to Soviet standards. The United States Department of Justice has begun a program to train the force in Western techniques. Interaction also has been expanded with the National Security Service, the chief intelligence agency, which still is mainly staffed by former KGB personnel. About 8,000 paramilitary troops are believed available to the National Security Service.

But these efforts are expected to have little impact on the widespread and deeply entrenched organized crime and corruption throughout Uzbekistan, especially in the law enforcement community itself. According to experts, the government corruption scandals that attracted international attention in the 1980s were symptomatic of a high degree of corruption endemic in the system. In a society of tremendous economic shortage and tight political control from the top down, the government and criminal world become intertwined. Citizens routinely have been required to pay bribes for all common services. More than two-thirds of respondents in a recent survey of Uzbekistan's citizens stated that bribes are absolutely necessary to receive services that nominally are available to all. These bribes often involve enormous sums of money: in 1993 admission to a prestigious institution of higher learning, while technically free, commonly cost nearly 1 million Russian rubles, or more than twice the average annual salary in Uzbekistan in 1993.

Narcotics and weapons trafficking are only an extension of this system, widely viewed as sustained and supported by law enforcement and government officials themselves. In the same survey, a majority of Uzbekistanis stated that bribery occurs routinely in the police department, in the courts, and in the office of the state procurator, the chief prosecutor in the national judicial system. About 25 percent of police surveyed agreed that other officers were involved in the sale of drugs or taking bribes.

The condition of the internal security system is an indicator that progress remains to be made in Uzbekistan's journey out of Soviet-style governance. In the first five years of independence, efforts to establish profitable relations with the rest of the world (and especially the West) have been hindered by a preoccupation with maintaining the political status quo. However, by the mid-1990s Uzbekistan began to take advantage of its considerable assets. Uzbekistan does not suffer from poor natural resources or hostile neighboring countries; its mineral resources are bountiful, and Russia continues to watch over its former provinces in Central Asia. According to government rhetoric, market reforms and expanding international trade will make the nation prosperous--beginning in 1995, an improved human rights record and more favorable investment conditions supplemented the country's political stability in attracting foreign trade and fostering at least the beginning of democratic institutions.

Today, the Ministry of Interior (MVD) controls the police. The police and other MVD forces are responsible for most routine police functions. The National Security Service (NSS)--the former KGB--deals with a broad range of national security questions, including corruption, organized crime, and narcotics. There is effective civilian control over the military. The police and the NSS committed numerous serious human rights abuses.

There were no confirmed reports of political killings; however, security forces committed a number of killings of prisoners in custody. Although there is specific information available on deaths due to mistreatment in custody, human rights observers and relatives of prisoners claim that the number of such cases throughout the country reached several dozen during the year 2001. Law enforcement officials warned families not to talk about their relatives' deaths. Government officials acknowledge that some inmates died, but attribute the deaths to illness or suicide.

According to human rights activists and other observers, many of those who died in custody were interned at a prison near Jaslik in Karakalpakstan, where conditions were thought to be extremely harsh in the past; however, conditions in Jaslik improved during the year 2001. Nearly all the inmates of this facility, which opened in 1999, were convicted for religious extremism.

The country's regulations require that every death in custody be investigated by a medical examiner. In most cases, deaths apparently due to torture or other mistreatment are ascribed to heart failure.

On February 21, police arrested Emin Usman, a prominent writer and an ethnic Uighur, on charges of possessing illegal religious literature and belonging to the banned Hizb ut-Tahrir Islamic political party. Police returned Usman's body to relatives on March 1. Authorities, who claimed that Usman had committed suicide, ordered the body buried immediately and would not allow family members to view it; however, one family member who did view the body reported that it bore clear signs of having been beaten.

On July 7, Shovruk Ruzimuradov, a human rights activist and former Member of Parliament died in custody allegedly after police tortured and beat him. Prior to his death, authorities had held Ruzimuradov in a pretrial detention facility for 3-weeks. While searching his house, police claimed to have found 9 leaflets by the outlawed Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, 28 bullets, and narcotics. Relatives reported that the police had planted the contraband. Ruzimuradov was not granted access to a lawyer and his family members were not informed of his whereabouts. An official investigation of his death concluded that Ruzimaradov committed suicide; nonetheless sanctions were ordered against four officers, including the dismissal of one officer, for mishandling Ruzimuradov's detention.

On October 16, in Tashkent, police arrested two brothers, Ravshon and Rasul Haitov, on suspicion of Hizb ut-Tahrir membership. On October 17, police returned the body of Ravshon Haitov to his family, which showed clear signs of torture; authorities informed the family that he had died of a heart attack. His brother Rasul was beaten so severely that he became an invalid. The authorities reported that within 24 hours four police officers (two majors, a captain, and a lieutenant) had been placed under indictment and the Tashkent city procurator had opened a criminal investigation into the matter.

There were no investigations into nor action taken in the following 2000 cases of deaths in custody allegedly as a result of torture or other mistreatment: Hazratkul Kudirov and Amanullah Nosirov in December, Shukhrat Parpiev in May, and Rulam Norbaev and Nagmut Karimov in March.

In 2000 in an open letter to the President, 33 Tashkent residents protested the military hazing death of Dmitriy Popov, a recruit who suffered from heart problems. Senior soldiers allegedly beat Popov in June 2000. The HRSU commented that such deaths were not uncommon in the military. Military prosecutors brought a criminal case against five soldiers who allegedly participated in the beating; in November 2000, the five were sentenced to several years each in prison.

During and after the armed incursions of August and September 2000, military forces laid mines on the border with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The Ministry of Defense asserted that all minefields were marked clearly and that it had informed the Tajik and Kyrgyz Governments of their locations. However, there were at least 20 civilian deaths during the year 2001 from landmine explosions.

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances during the year 2001.

Bakhodir Khasanov, an instructor of French at the Alliance Francaise whom security forces refused to acknowledge was in their custody in 2000, was sentenced to a long prison term.

There were reports during the year 2001 that Imam Abidkhon Nazarov, who widely was believed to be missing since March 1998, actually had fled the country to avoid arrest and had not been abducted by security forces.

Although the law prohibits these practices, both police and the NSS routinely tortured, beat, and otherwise mistreated detainees to obtain confessions, which they then used to incriminate the detainees. Police also used suffocation, electric shock, rape, and other sexual abuse. Neither the severity nor frequency of torture appeared to have decreased during the year 2001.

In December 2000, Human Rights Watch released a report on torture in the country that detailed dozens of allegations of torture based on interviews with victims and their families. The report claimed that the number of allegations and the brutality of torture were increasing. The most common torture techniques were beating, often with blunt weapons, and asphyxiation with a gas mask. There were numerous unverifiable reports of interrogators raping detainees with objects such as bottles, and of threatening to rape both detainees and their family members.

On June 30, Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU) member Elena Urlaeva walked out of a clinic where she had been subject to involuntary psychiatric detention and treatment. On November 6, a final appeals court overturned the order that Urlaeva undergo forced psychiatric treatment.

On July 7, human rights activist Shovruk Ruzimuradov died in police custody allegedly after police tortured him.

On October 18, police killed Ravshon Haitov, and beat his brother Rasul severely; Rasul is an invalid as a result of the beating.

On October 23, the National Security Service arrested poet and opposition political party member Yusup Jumaev. On December 29, Jumaev was released; there were rumors that high-level government officials were displeased that local officials detained him. Jumaev credibly denied reports from other sources that he had been beaten and tortured.

Although it is routine for police to beat confessions out of detainees, anecdotal evidence suggests that those suspected of Islamist political sympathies (sometimes only because of their piety) are treated more harshly than criminals. There also were reports that on at least two occasions police beat members of Jehovah's Witnesses.

Defendants in trials often claim that their confessions on which the prosecution based its cases were extracted by torture. For example Imam Abdulvakhid Yuldashev, convicted in April of organizing an underground Islamic movement stated in court that investigators had beaten him and burned his genitals in order to extract confessions during detention. Fifteen members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, who were convicted of anticonstitutional activity in September 2000, alleged during their trial that they had been tortured during pretrial detention. According to those attending the trial (international monitors were barred from the courtroom), the defendants alleged that guards and interrogators had used beatings and electric shocks, and had forced them to sign blank statements. Several defendants alleged that guards had raped them. In a March 2000 trial, 12 members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, including Haffezullah Nosirov, alleged that authorities tortured them to get confessions.

Police forcibly disrupted some protests by Muslim women, in at least one case injuring some of the protesters.

Police at times arrested and beat family members of suspects they were seeking.

Writer Mamadali Makhmudov, who reported being tortured in 2000, remained in prison and was reported to be in poor health. According to NGO reporting, he was transferred several times during the year 2001 between strict penal facilities and prison hospital facilities.

The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the person and provides that persons may be taken into custody only on lawful grounds. Article 27 also prohibits unlawful searches; however, authorities infringed on these rights. The law requires the issuance of a search warrant by the Procurator for Electronic Surveillance; however, there is no provision for a judicial review of such warrants. Security agencies routinely monitor telephone calls and employ surveillance and wiretaps in the cases of persons involved in opposition political activities. For example, family members of missing Andijon Imam Abdu Kori Mirzaev reported that they were harassed and kept under constant surveillance during the year 2001. Mirzaev's son, who lives in a remote location, had his telephone line cut during the year 2001.

The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations and other legislation prohibits the private teaching of religion and forbids the wearing of religious clothes. Students who in 1997 and 1998 were expelled from schools for wearing religious dress were not allowed to reenroll during the year 2001.

Police arrested, detained, and beat family members of suspects whom they were seeking. Authorities also frequently forced relatives of alleged religious extremists to undergo public humiliation at neighborhood assemblies organized for that purpose. For example, after his June 2000 conviction, Abduvahid Yuldashev's wife claimed that when she turned to her mahalla committee for help after her husband was arrested, she was subjected to a mock trial and subsequently ostracized.

In August 2000, the mother of IMU leader Juma Namangani was summoned to a school auditorium where an assembly of neighbors confronted her. Relatives of soldiers killed in the insurgency insulted her and smeared her face with black paint. Local leaders shamed her for bringing Namangani into the world until she tearfully apologized and cursed her son.

The Government interferes with correspondence. For example, Nosir Zakhir reported that on July 4, he received at his Namangan home an invitation from a foreign embassy to attend an event. The invitation, which had been mailed on May 28, was delivered opened. Zakhir, who is a Radio Liberty reporter and a member of both the Birlik opposition party and the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU), reported that this sort of interference is common. Customs officials opened and confiscated some mail based on its content during the year 2001.

Mytabar Atababaevoi, an HRSU member and a lawyer who had advocated on behalf of jailed activist and former Parliamentarian Meli Kobilov, reports that the prosecutor forced her to move nine times in a 10 month period. The local procurator's office also forbade her homeless daughter and two grandchildren to live with her, apparently on fabricated legal technicalities.

Following fighting with the IMU in 2000, the Government forcibly resettled five villages in the Surkhandarya region.

Security forces continued to arrest and detain individuals arbitrarily, without warrants or just cause. The law provides that police may hold a person suspected of committing a crime for up to 3 days. At the end of this period, the detained person must be declared officially a suspect, and charged with a crime, or be released. A person officially declared a suspect may be held for an additional 3 days before charges are filed. A prosecutor's order is required for arrests, but not for detentions, prior to the filing of charges. In practice these legal protections frequently are ignored. In some cases, police circumvent the rules by claiming that the detainee is being held as a potential witness and not as a suspect; there are no regulations concerning the length of time witnesses may be detained. A court date must be set within 15 days of arrest (or filing of charges) and the defendant may be detained during this period. A defendant has a right to counsel from the moment of arrest, but in practice access to counsel is very often denied. Once the trial date is set, detainees deemed not to be violent may be released on their own recognizance pending trial. No money need be posted as bond, but in such cases the accused usually must sign a pledge not to leave the city; however, in practice this procedure rarely is used. During the period between arrest and trial, defendants almost always are kept in pretrial detention, which has been known to last as long as 2 years.

In ordinary criminal cases, the police generally identify and then arrest those reasonably suspected of the crime; however, both the police and the NSS are far less discriminating in cases involving perceived risks to national security. There were continued reports that authorities arrested and detained Muslims associated with nongovernment-approved Islamic groups, who were perceived as a threat by the Government, on charges of belonging to radical Islamic organizations.

It is common government practice to arrest, detain, and mistreat both immediate and extended family members of those the Government has targeted. For example, on March 17, police detained Rahima Akhmadalieva while searching for her husband, independent Imam Ruhiddin Fahruddinov. Akhmadalieva was held for 2 months without charges, before being charged with possessing unapproved Islamist literature. She allegedly was denied medication for a heart problem and was denied sleep in an effort to force her to reveal her husband's whereabouts. Her 19-year-old daughter Odina Makhsudova, who visited her mother on March 20, also was detained briefly. Makhsudova alleged later that police were verbally abusive to her and her mother and forced them to remove their headscarves. She quoted police officials as saying that her mother would be freed as soon as her father turned himself in. On September 21, Akhmadalieva was convicted of anticonstitutional activities and sentenced to 7 years in prison.

Police routinely planted narcotics, weapons, ammunition, or Islamic literature on citizens either to justify arrest or to extort bribes. The most frequent victims of this practice were suspected members of Islamist organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, who usually were ultimately sentenced to between 15 and 20 years in prison. For example, on June 15, Interior Ministry police searched the home of human rights activist Shovruk Ruzimuradov and planted bullets and Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets in the house; he later died while in custody.

The authorities continued to arbitrarily arrest and detain human rights activists. For example, the authorities have attempted to silence human rights activists who criticize government repression of religious Muslims and others. On April 26, militia detained human rights activist Mahbuba Kasimova for 3 hours and questioned her about her attendance at trials of "religious persons" and her contacts with relatives of defendants. The officers warned her to cease her human rights monitoring activities. Human rights activist Ismail Adilov was released from jail on July 3; he had been arrested in July 1999, after police allegedly planted 100 Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets among his effects to justify the arrest. Adilov was not known to be religious. On September 5, police detained and questioned Tulkin Karayev, the HRSU regional representative for Kashkadarya, after he attended a protest by mothers and wives of jailed Muslims. According to Karayev, police accused him of organizing the protest and of having ties to Osama bin Laden. Karayev reported other instances of police surveillance throughout the year, as well as one visit to his home on August 31. Karayev stated that the police officer who had visited his home apologized later.

Police continued to arbitrarily arrest and detain members of political opposition groups. For example, on October 23, the National Security Service (SNB) detained Yusup Jumaev, a notable Uzbek poet and Birlik activist, on charges of committing crimes against the Constitution. Jumaev had written articles involving the beating of prisoners, closed court hearings, and other human rights abuses earlier in the year. Jumaev's wife and lawyer were permitted to visit him, and on December 29, Jumaev was released in compliance with a court order.

Following fighting with the IMU in 2000, the Government forcibly resettled five villages in the Surkhandarya and detained most of the men in those villages in an effort to find those who may have collaborated with the IMU. Most of the men were released later, although 73 were tried and convicted for crimes against the Constitution and aiding terrorists.

Police arrested and detained some peaceful protestors during the year 2001.

On April 6, police detained Elena Urlaeva and kept her against her will at a Tashkent psychiatric clinic to prevent her participation in a public protest. On April 10, the Mirabad district court ordered her to undergo a month of involuntary psychiatric treatment. Reportedly doctors made her sign a statement saying that she was undergoing treatment of her own free will. On October 19, an appeals court overturned the lower court ruling that had ordered Urlaeva to undergo involuntary psychiatric treatment.

Uzbek Imam Khadji Khudjaev, who was arrested by Russian police in August 2000 and extradited to Uzbekistan in November 2000, remained in jail at year's end 2001. Imam Khudjaev was accused of involvement in the February 1999 Tashkent bombings.

Bakhodir Khasanov, an instructor of French at the Alliance Francaise, whose brother was an Islamist, was detained and held incommunicado in July 2000, and was sentenced to a long prison term.

In general the Government does not hold political detainees indefinitely, but brings them to trial eventually. Because there is no free press or public record of arrests, it is not possible to determine the number of political or other detainees awaiting trial. Estimates by human rights activists usually are in the range of several thousand; political detainees reportedly do not represent a large share of that number. The Government and the ICRC have not yet agreed on visits to pretrial detainees and in May the ICRC suspended all other prison visits.

In September the Parliament passed several amendments to the Criminal and Civil Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law on the Procuracy, in order to lessen the abuses suffered by those arrested and to ensure that sentences are more equitable. The Parliament also approved a law on the Procurator's Office and a law on the enforcement of court rulings, both of which were implemented by year's end 2001. The Parliament established a commission composed of members of the Parliament and prominent lawyers to review and possibly amend the bills passed by the Parliament and publish them as law. The Parliament passed several judicial reform measures in 2000, which were implemented during the year 2001, aimed at making the criminal justice system more adversarial and to reduce the power of the procuracy, among other items; those reforms have had some limited success, according to legal professionals.

Neither the Constitution nor the law explicitly prohibit forced exile; however, the Government does not use it. Government harassment of members of the Birlik movement and the--Erk Party--both political opposition groups, drove the leaders of these organizations, including Mohammed Solikh of the Erk Party and Adburakhim Polat of the Birlik Movement into voluntary exile in the early 1990's. The chairman of the HRSU, Abdumannob Polat, also lives in voluntary exile.

The legal system of Uzbekistan is an evolution of Soviet civil law.

The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the judicial branch takes its direction from the executive branch and has little independence in practice. Under the Constitution, the President appoints all judges for 5-year terms. Power to remove judges rests with the President; removal of Supreme Court judges must also be confirmed by Parliament. Judges may be removed for crimes or failure to fulfill their obligations.

Courts of general jurisdiction are divided into three tiers: district courts, regional courts, and the Supreme Court. In addition a Constitutional Court is charged with reviewing laws, decrees, and judicial decisions to ensure their compliance with the Constitution. Military courts handle all civil and criminal matters that occur within the military. There is a system of economic courts at the regional level that handles economic cases between legal entities.

Decisions of district and regional courts of general jurisdiction may be appealed to the next level within 10 days of ruling. The Government reduced the list of crimes punishable by death to murder, espionage, and treason, eliminating the economic crimes that were punishable by death in the former criminal code. Officially most court cases are open to the public but may be closed in exceptional cases, such as those involving state secrets, rape, or young defendants. Many trials of alleged Islamist extremists have been closed. International trial monitors or foreign diplomats only rarely are permitted to observe court proceedings.

State prosecutors play a decisive role in the criminal justice system. They order arrests, direct investigations, prepare criminal cases, and recommend sentences. If a judge's sentence does not agree with the prosecutor's recommendation, the prosecutor has a right to appeal the sentence to a higher court. There is no protection against double jeopardy. Judges whose decisions have been overturned on more than one occasion may be removed from office; consequently, judges rarely defy the recommendations of prosecutors. As a result, defendants almost always are found guilty. Senior officials have acknowledged the overwhelming power of the prosecutors, and there have been some steps to encourage greater independence by both judges and defense lawyers; however, progress has been very limited. Reform legislation passed in August and implemented in the fall aims to reduce the power of prosecutors.

Trials generally are by a panel of three judges: one professional judge and two lay assessors who serve 5-year terms and are selected by either workers' collectives' committees or neighborhood (mahalla) committees. The judge presides and directs the proceedings; however, in practice, judges often defer to the Government and its prosecutors on legal and other matters. Defendants have the right to attend the proceedings, confront witnesses, and present evidence. The State provides legal counsel without charge, but by law the accused also has the right to hire an attorney. In practice the right to an attorney of choice often is violated and there are numerous examples of denial of this right. Although at a minimum the state does seem to provide counsel at least during the trial stage; however, there are numerous examples of denial of this right to counsel at other stages of the legal process.

The Government does not announce trial dates, although such information is available to families and the public at courthouses. International observers generally are allowed to attend trials, although at times it can be difficult to persuade individual judges to allow access. Defendants often claimed that the confessions on which the prosecution typically based its cases were extracted by torture. Judges ignored these claims and invariably convicted the accused, often handing down severe sentences--usually from 15 to 20 years' imprisonment. Lawyers may, and occasionally do, call on judges to reject such confessions and to investigate claims of torture. In October authorities, for the first time, opened an investigation into a case of torture by police officers. In September more than 70 persons were sentenced to prison for allegedly participating or abetting armed incursions by Islamic militants.

On September 19, nine alleged members of banned Islamic political party Hizb ut–Tahrir were convicted of anticonstitutional activities. The judge, in sentencing the nine, specifically accused them of having ties to Osama bin Laden, a charge for which no credible evidence had been produced. The charge mirrored accusations made against many other alleged Islamists following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. During the trial, the defendants claimed that the police used unlawful methods of investigation, including physical torture and psychological pressure.

Prosecutors in 1999 and 2000 brought charges against at least 140 persons in connection with 1999 terrorist bombings in Tashkent. All of those tried were convicted and 20 were executed. Several individuals were tried and convicted in absentia. During 1999 and 2000, many other individuals were convicted of terrorism. Authorities alleged that most had ties with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a terrorist organization.

In August a criminal court tried a group of prisoners within the confines of Tashkent's No. 1 prison. Neither family members nor observers were allowed to attend the proceedings. There have been no other reports of a trial being held under such conditions.

In practice most defense lawyers are unskilled at defending their clients and judges rarely give lawyers the opportunity to defend their clients. For example, in the October trial of four members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, defendants were convicted on the testimony of two witnesses: one witness misidentified the defendants and the other reportedly did not know the defendants. Only one defense witness--a character witness--was allowed. Although all four defendants admitted membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir, all denied having committed the specific anticonstitutional activities of which they were accused. The court produced no evidence of guilt, other than the witness testimony. The prosecutor was present only for one of the five sessions where he read the accusations; he was not present for the verdict. This is standard prosecutorial practice. In other cases, defendants accused police of having coerced confessions, and the confessions were permitted to stand.

The Constitution provides a right of appeal to those convicted; however, in the past such proceedings have been formalistic exercises that confirm the original conviction. For example, the appeal of Imam Abdurakhim Abdurakhmanov on August 8, 2000 lasted only 20 minutes, the judge did not permit testimony, and Abdukhmanov was not allowed to be present at the appeal. However, in November human rights activist Elena Urlaeva won an appeal against a lower court ruling, which had ordered her to undergo psychiatric treatment.

The authorities arrested, mistreated, and tried unfairly relatives of suspects and members of opposition groups.

During the year 2001, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conducted training on international human rights standards. Three hundred procurators, investigators, judges, and lawyers from around the country participated as well as several human rights activists.

In October the Moscow based human rights group Memorial published a credible list of over 2,600 individuals arrested and convicted from January 1999 through August 2001 for political opposition, suspected Islamic extremism, or suspected terrorism. Most were convicted under Article 159--crimes against the Constitution. Human rights groups believe that another 4,400 - 4,900 such individuals were being held after conviction for other alleged crimes, such as narcotics possession and tax evasion. Of the total figure of 7,000 to 7,500, a very tiny minority may have been involved in terrorism-related activities, while only approximately 200 were arrested for political activities; the remainder were arrested on suspicion of Islamic extremism. At year's end 2001, more than 2,000 were released under a general amnesty. In many of these cases evidence was planted; in all cases of suspected Islamic extremism, this was a particularly prevalent practice.

In September 2000, the Chairman of the Supreme Court claimed that there were 2,000 persons in jail for crimes against the State. At the same news conference the Minister of Justice explicitly rejected the notion that these or any other prisoners could be classified as "political" on the grounds that all had been tried and convicted of crimes; however, nearly all of the convictions were based on forced confessions, which makes it impossible to determine what percentage of those convicted actually violated the law. In addition the alleged "crimes" include such political acts as criticism of the Government and holding beliefs that the Government defines as extremist.

In January the Government signed and implemented an agreement allowing the ICRC access to convicted prisoners; however, in May the ICRC suspended its visits, complaining that government officials were failing to provide access to pretrial detention facilities. At year's end 2001 the Government and ICRC still were negotiating the terms of the agreement.

Prison conditions were poor, and worse for male than for female prisoners. Prison overcrowding was a problem. Human rights activists reported that the incarceration of 10 to 15 persons in cells designed for 4 is common. Tuberculosis and hepatitis are epidemic in the prisons, making even short periods of incarceration potentially deadly. Reportedly there are severe shortages of food and medicines, and prisoners often rely on visits by relatives to obtain both. Pretrial detainees are held separately from those convicted of crimes. Males and females are housed in separate facilities. Juveniles are held separately from adults.

Brutal treatment by guards and an especially harsh and polluted desert environment reportedly made conditions at Jaslik prison the worst in the country; however, in 2000 human rights observers learned from witnesses that conditions in Jaslik had improved substantially. According to the family members of prisoners, authorities at Jaslik also made some improvements prior to the visit of the ICRC during the spring. According to the Committee for the Legal Assistance of Prisoners, there are between 500 and 800 inmates at Jaslik. Although the law allows all prisoners to have occasional family visitors, the remoteness of Jaslik makes such visits rare and difficult.

The Government also operates labor camps, where conditions of incarceration have been reported to be less severe than in prisons. There are six types of prison and camp facilities, including pretrial detention facilities for adults.

An amnesty signed by the President on the occasion of the country's September 1 Independence Day promised the release of 25,000 prisoners and the reduction in sentences of an additional 25,000 prisoners. In his speech announcing the amnesty, the President admitted that authorities regularly violated the rights of prisoners and that sentences were too harsh.

In a separate statement in August, the president for the first time said that the amnesty would include 1,000 individuals who had been convicted of crimes against the Constitution (almost all of whom were jailed on suspicion of Islamic extremism). By year's end 2001, the Government claimed that a total of 28,000 prisoners had been released, including 860 convicted of crimes against the Constitution. Human rights groups independently estimated the latter figure to be approximately 800 (out of 2,600 convicted of such charges in the past 3 years) and generally accepted the total figure of 28,000. Human rights groups estimated that the total included also at least one third of the other 4,400 to 4,900 individuals who had been arrested since early 1999 on suspicion of Islamic extremism but convicted of other crimes. Prisoners convicted of crimes against the Constitution and sentenced to terms greater than 6 years were not eligible for the amnesty. Those released were required to repent for their alleged crimes.

In January the Government signed and implemented an agreement allowing the ICRC access to convicted prisoners; however, in May the ICRC suspended its visits and complained that government officials were failing to provide access to pretrial detention facilities. At year's end 2001, the Government and the ICRC still were negotiating on the terms of the agreement.

Violence against women is a problem and spousal abuse is common, but no statistics on the problem are available. Wife beating is considered a personal family affair rather than a criminal act; such cases usually are handled by family members or elders within the community (mahalla) and rarely come to court. The law punishes physical assault; however, no legal provisions specifically prohibit domestic violence. Police often discourage women from making complaints against abusive husbands and abusers are rarely taken from home or jailed.

In December 2000, the NGO Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights released a major study on domestic violence in the country. While the lack of reporting prevented the authors from determining the number of cases annually, the study concluded that domestic violence was widespread and that the Government had failed to combat or even acknowledge the problem. Another NGO, Winrock International, which helps develop women's organizations in the country, agreed with the conclusions of the study but noted that public officials were willing to speak openly about the problem of domestic violence.

Trafficking in women to other countries for the purpose of prostitution was a problem. Prostitution within the country is a growing concern as a result of the worsening economic situation.

In parts of the country, some women and girls resort to suicide by self-immolation. There are no reliable statistics on the extent of this problem because most cases go unreported. After marriage many women or girls move into the husband's home, where they occupy the lowest rung on the family social ladder. A conflict with the husband or mother-in-law, who by tradition exercises complete control over the young bride, usually is the stimulus for suicide.

The Constitution provides for children's rights, stating that parents are obliged to support and care for their children until they reach age 18. Traditional Uzbek values reinforce the cohesion of families; in most cases, several generations of a family live together. In theory the State provides free universal primary education and health care; however, in practice shortages and budget difficulties mean that some services must be paid for privately. Nine years of formal schooling are compulsory, and the average length of schooling is over 11 years. According to the Government, 98.1 percent of children complete secondary school. Anecdotal evidence indicates that more children continued to drop out of high school as economic circumstances continued to deteriorate. There also is evidence that earlier marriages among young rural women have contributed to a higher drop out rate for young women. The State grants monetary allowances to families based on their number of children. The country has a very high birth rate; over one-half of the population is under the age of 18.

There is no societal pattern of abuse of children; however, trafficking in girls for the purpose of prostitution is a problem. During the harvest, some school children, particularly in rural areas, are forced to work in the cotton fields.

There are no laws that specifically prohibit trafficking in persons, and trafficking in women and girls from Uzbekistan for the purpose of prostitution was a problem, particularly to the Persian Gulf, South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey. There are no reliable statistics on this problem; and it does not appear to be widespread, although anecdotal reports from NGO's indicate that the number of young women from Uzbekistan who are trafficked into prostitution abroad is growing. Many victims are unwilling to come forward due to both societal pressure and the fear of retaliation from their traffickers. Traffickers most often target young women between the ages of 18 and 30. Agents in nightclubs or prostitution rings solicit these women, many of whom previously engaged in prostitution. In large cities such as Tashkent and Samarkand, traffickers use newspaper advertisements to lure women by promising high-paying work or marriage abroad. Travel agencies promising tour packages and work in Turkey, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) also solicit prostitutes. Victims often are promised jobs as dancers or waitresses in nightclubs or restaurants in the destination country. In its 2000 annual report, Human Rights Watch claimed that, traffickers after bribing law enforcement officials, had arranged for women and girls as young as 13 to work as prostitutes in the UAE.

The Government has not acknowledged the problem of trafficking publicly, but has taken some measures to combat it. According to NGO representatives, the police force in Samarkand formed a special unit on trafficking in women in 1998, but the unit's effectiveness has been hampered by a lack of resources. Border guards at airports were directed to give more scrutiny to unaccompanied young women traveling to Turkey, the UAE, and South Korea; they are authorized to deny such women permission to leave the country. There was no information available on whether the Government had prosecuted any traffickers, by year's end 2001. There is no government program to educate or assist potential victims.

There are no NGO's that address trafficking specifically, although several have attempted to gain information on the subject.

While not a significant producer of narcotics or precursors, Uzbekistan is a transit country for Southwest Asian narcotics heading for Russia and Europe. Law enforcement agencies seized approximately 1.5 tons of illicit narcotics in 1998, despite severe resource constraints and the lack of centralized coordination of drug control efforts. It is estimated that there are over 20,000 addicts in Uzbekistan and the number appears to be growing. Uzbekistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and the government regards the fight against drugs as a high priority. Nonetheless, it passed no new laws and launched no new initiatives in 1998. The government has drafted a counternarcotics master plan, but cannot approve it until financing is available. In April, Uzbekistan signed a counternarcotics cooperation agreement with the United States.

Several transshipment routes for opium, heroin and hashish originate in southwest Asia and cross Uzbekistan on their way to Russia and Europe. Precursor chemicals travel the same routes in reverse on their way to laboratories in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The volume of trafficking crossing Uzbekistan is thought to be growing. Effective government eradication programs have eliminated nearly all illicit production of opium poppies in Uzbekistan.

There were no major narcotics-related corruption cases in 1998. Nonetheless, corruption and bribery among law enforcement officials is common and sometimes related to narcotics.

The 1998 version of the annual "operation black poppy" destroyed only 2.9 hectares of poppies, since the government eradication effort has all but eliminated illicit opium poppy cultivation in Uzbekistan.

The quantity of drugs transiting Uzbekistan continues to grow, thanks to the country's location and relatively good roads and air service. Officials estimate that the volume of this flow increased by 25-30 percent in 1998. Opium and cannabis products originating in southwest Asia and bound for Russia and Europe take several routes across Uzbek territory. Since the only Afghan-Uzbek border crossing is closed, most transit Tajikistan. One major route--via the Gorno-Badakshan region of Tajikistan, through Osh in Kyrgyzstan, and into Uzbekistan's Ferghana Valley--has seen diminished traffic in 1998. Instead, smugglers are crossing the Tajik-Uzbek border near Khojand into the Syrdarya Oblast, and further south into the Surkhandarya Oblast. In addition, Uzbek transport police and customs officials regularly apprehend drug smugglers on the Dushanbe-Moscow train. Chemical precursors originating in Russia and the Ukraine also transit Uzbekistan. In the last two years Uzbek authorities have seized 70 tons of precursors bound for laboratories in southwest Asia.

Most observers agree that there are around 20,000 addicts in Uzbekistan. In 1998 the government, with UNDCP assistance, commissioned a study to get a more precise picture of demand in the country. Despite awareness of the problem, however, the government has instituted no demand reduction programs. The 15,000 registered addicts are, however, subject to compulsory treatment.