Oman adopted Islam in the seventh century A.D., during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad. Ibadhism, a form of Islam distinct from Shiaism and the "Orthodox" schools of Sunnism, became the dominant religious sect in Oman by the eighth century A.D. Oman is the only country in the Islamic world with a majority Ibadhi population. Ibadhism is known for its "moderate conservatism." One distinguishing feature of Ibadhism is the choice of ruler by communal consensus and consent.

Contact with Europe was established in 1508, when the Portuguese conquered parts of Oman's coastal region. Portugal's influence predominated for more than a century, with only a short interruption by the Turks. Fortifications built during the Portuguese occupation can still be seen at Muscat.

Except for a period when Iran conquered Oman, Oman has basically been an independent nation. After the Portuguese were expelled in 1650 and while resisting Persian attempts to establish hegemony, the Sultan of Oman extended his conquests to Zanzibar, other parts of the eastern coast of Africa, and portions of the southern Arabian Peninsula. During this period, political leadership shifted from the Ibadhi imams, who were elected religious leaders, to hereditary sultans who established their capital in Muscat. The Muscat rulers established trading posts on the Persian coast and also exercised a measure of control over the Makran coast (now Pakistan). By the early 19th century, Oman was the most powerful state in Arabia and on the East African coast.

Oman was the object of Franco-British rivalry throughout the 18th century. During the 19th century, Oman and the United Kingdom concluded several treaties of friendship and commerce. In 1908, the British entered into an agreement of friendship. Their traditional association was confirmed in 1951 through a new treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation by which the United Kingdom recognized the Sultanate of Oman as a fully independent state.

When Sultan Sa'id bin Sultan Al-Busaid died in 1856, his sons quarreled over his succession. As a result of this struggle, the empire--through the mediation of the British Government under the "Canning Award"--was divided in 1861 into two separate principalities--Zanzibar, with its East African dependencies, and Muscat and Oman. Zanzibar paid an annual subsidy to Muscat and Oman until its independence in early 1964.

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the sultan in Muscat faced rebellion by members of the Ibadhi sect residing in the interior of Oman, centered around the town of Nizwa, who wanted to be ruled exclusively by their religious leader, the Imam of Oman. This conflict was resolved temporarily by the Treaty of Seeb, which granted the imam autonomous rule in the interior, while recognizing the nominal sovereignty of the sultan elsewhere.

The conflict flared up again in 1954, when the new imam led a sporadic 5-year rebellion against the sultan's efforts to extend government control into the interior. The insurgents were defeated in 1959 with British help. The sultan then terminated the Treaty of Seeb and eliminated the office of the imam. In the early 1960s, the imam, exiled to Saudi Arabia, obtained support from his hosts and other Arab governments, but this support ended in the 1980s.

In 1964, a separatist revolt began in Dhofar Province. Aided by communist and leftist governments such as the former South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen), the rebels formed the Dhofar Liberation Front, which later merged with the Marxist-dominated Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). The PFLOAG's declared intention was to overthrow all traditional Arab Gulf regimes. In mid-1974, PFLOAG shortened its name to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) and embarked on a political rather than a military approach to gain power in the other Gulf states, while continuing the guerrilla war in Dhofar.

Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id assumed power on July 23, 1970, in a palace coup directed against his father, Sa'id bin Taymur, who later died in exile in London. The new sultan was confronted with insurgency in a country plagued by endemic disease, illiteracy, and poverty. One of the new sultan's first measures was to abolish many of his father's harsh restrictions, which had caused thousands of Omanis to leave the country, and to offer amnesty to opponents of the previous regime, many of whom returned to Oman. He also established a modern government structure and launched a major development program to upgrade educational and health facilities, build a modern infrastructure, and develop the country's natural resources.

In an effort to curb the Dhofar insurgency, Sultan Qaboos expanded and re-equipped the armed forces and granted amnesty to all surrendered rebels while vigorously prosecuting the war in Dhofar. He obtained direct military support from the U.K., Iran, and Jordan. By early 1975, the guerrillas were confined to a 50 square kilometer (20-sq. mi.) area near the Yemen border and shortly thereafter were defeated. As the war drew to a close, civil action programs were given priority throughout Dhofar and helped win the allegiance of the people. The PFLO threat diminished further with the establishment of diplomatic relations in October 1983 between South Yemen and Oman, and South Yemen subsequently lessened propaganda and subversive activities against Oman. In late-1987, Oman opened an embassy in Aden, South Yemen, and appointed its first resident ambassador to the country.

Since his accession in 1970, Sultan Qaboos has balanced tribal, regional, and ethnic interests in composing the national administration. The Council of Ministers, which functions as a cabinet, consists of 26 ministers, all directly appointed by Qaboos. The Majlis Al-Shura's (Consultative Council) mandate is to review legislation pertaining to economic development and social services prior to its becoming law. The Majlis Al-Shura may request ministers to appear before it. In September 2000, about 100,000 Omani men and women elected 83 candidates, including two women, for seats in the Majlis Al-Shura. Further, in December 2000, Sultan Qaboos appointed the 48-member Majlis Al Dowla, or State Council, including five women, which acts as the upper chamber in Oman's bicameral representative body.

In November 1996, Sultan Qaboos presented his people with the "Basic Statutes of the State," Oman's first written "constitution." It guarantees various rights within the framework of Quranic and customary law. It partially resuscitated long dormant conflict-of-interest measures by banning cabinet ministers from being officers of public shareholding firms. Perhaps most importantly, the Basic Statutes provide rules for setting Sultan Qaboos' succession.

Oman is strategically located on the Strait of Hormuz, the entrance to the Gulf, 35 miles directly opposite Iran. Oman is concerned with regional stability and security, given tensions in the region, the proximity of Iran and Iraq, and the potential threat of political Islam. Oman maintained its diplomatic relations with Iraq throughout the Gulf War while supporting the UN allies by sending a contingent of troops to join coalition forces and by opening up to prepositioning of weapons and supplies. In addition, since 1980 Oman and the U.S. have been parties to a military cooperation agreement, which was revised and renewed in 2000. Oman also has long been an active participant in efforts to achieve Middle East peace.

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, the Omani Government at all levels pledged and provided impressive support to the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism. Oman is a signatory of most UN-sponsored anti-terrorism treaties.

Today, the Sultanate of Oman is a monarchy that has been ruled by the Al Bu Sa'id family since the middle of the 18th century. It has no political parties, but does have one representative institution, whose members are elected directly by voters selected by the Government. The Sultan, Qaboos Bin Sa'id Al Sa'id, acceded to the throne in 1970. Although the Sultan retains firm control over all important policy issues, he has brought tribal leaders and other notable persons into the Government. In accordance with tradition and cultural norms, much decisionmaking is by consensus among these leaders. In 1991 the Sultan established a Consultative Council, or Majlis Al-Shura, which replaced an older advisory body. The Consultative Council was expanded to 83 seats for the September 2000 elections, and members were chosen directly by the vote of 175,000 government-selected electors. The Council has no formal legislative powers but may question government ministers and recommend changes to new laws regarding economic and social policy, which on occasion leads to amendments to proposed decrees. In January the Sultan appointed 53 members, including 5 women, as members of a new Council of State (Majlis Al-Dawla), which, with the Consultative Council, forms the bicameral body known as the Majlis Oman (Council of Oman). In late 1996, the Sultan promulgated by decree the country's "Basic Charter" (also known as the Basic Law), which provides for citizens' basic rights in writing. The judiciary is not independent, and courts are subject to the Sultan's influence.

The country has a population of approximately 2.3 million, including approximately 600,000 foreigners. Since 1970 the country has used its modest oil revenue to make impressive economic progress and improve public access to health care, education, and social services for its citizens. The average per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was approximately $8,000. The economy is mixed, with significant government participation in industry, transportation, and communications. The Government seeks to diversify the economy, whose GDP is $21.1 billion, and stimulate private investment.

A foreign work force was the key to the development of Oman's physical and administrative infrastructure. However, in 1993 indigenization was among the government's principal priorities. Only 23 percent of the private-sector work force is Omani, whereas the public-sector work force is dominated by Omani nationals. In 1990 Omanis made up 80 percent of public corporation employees, 52 percent of diwan employees, and 65 percent of the civil service. In certain organizations and ministries--such as the Oman News Agency and the ministries of foreign affairs; interior; justice, awqaf [religious endowments], and Islamic affairs; national heritage and culture; and social affairs and labor--Omanis exceed 90 percent of the work force.

In the banking sector, 70.8 percent of the work force was Omani in 1990; in the oil sector, it was 61.0 percent, with a large disparity between producing and nonproducing companies. Of PDO's work force, 61.0 percent was Omani, compared with 53.4 percent of Elf Aquitaine Oman, 20 percent of Occidental Oman, and 21.0 percent of Japex Oman. In non-oil-producing companies, Omanis averaged 31.6 percent of the work force. In 1990 only 24.0 percent of insurance-sector workers and 19.0 percent of hotel-sector workers were Omanis.

The government hopes that an increasing number of Omanis will enter trade and industry, increasing the number of Omanis in the private sector to 45.2 percent by 1995. RO40 million (US$104 million) was allocated to training in 1990, with the intent of training 100,000 individuals and creating 160,000 job opportunities. In March 1991, the Higher Committee for Vocational Training and Labor was established to generate employment for Omanis and to establish other policies for the indigenous and foreign work force.

Institution building has been largely a foreign initiative. The professional core of the civil administration has consisted mainly of British and United States citizens, influencing the development of ministries, the judiciary, development planning, and resource management. The dependency on foreign advisers in the 1990s is likely to grow, given increasing Western, notably United States, involvement in the gulf after Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, particularly in defense and security areas. Also, the emphasis of the Joint United StatesOman Commission on institution building and privatization has resulted in sustained foreign influence in the sultanate.

The government not only faces a skills barrier to its indigenization program but also a psychological obstacle. As a result of the initiation of a civil administrative structure, a sense of entitlement has arisen in the public psyche. By ensuring positions in the public sector for Omani nationals, the government inadvertently created the notion that it was the universal provider for its citizens. This notion may be difficult to reverse and perhaps will become a source of political instability if the government proves unable to fulfill its obligations should an economic downturn and consequent financial difficulties occur.

The majority of Omanis are Ibadi Muslims, followers of Abd Allah ibn Ibad. Approximately 25 percent are Sunni Muslims and live primarily in Sur and the surrounding area and in Dhofar. They form the largest nonIbadi minority. The Shia minority live along the Al Batinah coast in the Muscat-Matrah region. This minority includes the Khojas, the Baharina of Iraqi or Iranian descent, and the Ajam, of vague origin but generally considered to originate in Iran.

Ibadism is an outgrowth of the Kharijite movement, a variant form of Islam practiced by descendants of a sect that seceded from the principal Muslim body after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in A.D. 632. Kharijites reject primogeniture succession of the Quraysh, the tribe of Muhammad, and assert that leadership of Islam, the caliphate, should be designated by an imam elected by the community from candidates who possess spiritual and personal qualities. Ibadi leadership is vested in an imam, who is regarded as the sole legitimate leader and combines religious and political authority. The imam is elected by a council of prominent laymen or shaykhs. Adherence to Ibadism accounts in part for Oman's historical isolation. Considered a heretical form of Islam by the majority Sunni Muslims, Ibadis were not inclined to integrate with their neighbors.

The crime rate in Oman is very low compared to industrialized countries. An analysis was done using INTERPOL data for Oman. For purpose of comparison, data were drawn for the seven offenses used to compute the United States FBI's index of crime. Index offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The combined total of these offenses constitutes the Index used for trend calculation purposes. Oman will be compared with Japan (country with a low crime rate) and USA (country with a high crime rate). According to the INTERPOL data, for murder, the rate in 2000 was 0.91 per 100,000 population for Oman, 1.10 for Japan, and 5.51 for USA. For rape, the rate in 2000 was 3.73 for Oman, compared with 1.78 for Japan and 32.05 for USA. For robbery, the rate in 2000 was 2.58 for Oman, 4.08 for Japan, and 144.92 for USA. For aggravated assault, the rate in 2000 was 1.87 for Oman, 23.78 for Japan, and 323.62 for USA. For burglary, the rate in 2000 was 43.47 for Oman, 233.60 for Japan, and 728.42 for USA. The rate of larceny for 2000 was 12.2 for Oman, 1401.26 for Japan, and 2475.27 for USA. The rate for motor vehicle theft in 2000 was 21.45 for Oman, compared with 44.28 for Japan and 414.17 for USA. The rate for all index offenses combined was 86.21 for Oman, compared with 1709.88 for Japan and 4123.97 for USA. (Note that in the above data, Oman did not provide data to INTERPOL in year 2000, so data for the nearest year in which data were provided -1997 - was substituted.)

Between 1995 and 2000, according to INTERPOL data, the rate of murder decreased from 0.94 to 0.91 per 100,000 population, a decrease of 3.2%. The rate for rape decreased from 4.46 to 3.73, a decrease of 16.4%. The rate of robbery increased from 1.24 to 2.58, an increase of 108.1%. The rate for aggravated assault increased from 1.69 to 1.87, an increase of 10.7%. The rate for burglary increased from 27.56 to 43.47, an increase of 57.7%. The rate of larceny increased from 2.92 to 12.2, an increase of 317.8%. The rate of motor vehicle theft increased from 10.11 to 21.45, and increase of 112.2%. The rate of total index offenses increased from 48.92 to 86.21, an increase of 76.2%.

Oman has not been exposed to a significant internal threat since the defeat of the Dhofari insurgents in 1975. Tribal dissension, a factor in the past, is considered unlikely to recur because most tribal chiefs and leading families share the advantages of rising oil income. The foreign labor force is large--estimated at 58 percent of the working population--and most foreign workers are Indians and Pakistanis who are not politically active. A few observers foresee an internal power struggle over the succession because Sultan Qabus ibn Said has no designated successor, but others believe that the country is stable enough to avoid strife over the selection of a new ruler.

The sultanate has not been the target of terrorist acts; it faces few problems from the narcotics trade and considers the level of general crime to be remarkably low. The security services are described as large and efficient but not overly intrusive.

The Royal Oman Police (ROP), commanded by the inspector general of police and customs, is under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. The size of the force was estimated in 1992 at 7,000, but this number is believed to include customs, immigration, civil defense, firefighters, coast guard, and prison service. The principal crime fighting unit is the Directorate General of Criminal Investigation. An oil installation division has responsibility for security of the oil industry, patrolling pipelines, oil rigs, and oil terminals. The mounted division patrols border areas on horseback and camel and also provides security control at airports and border points. The coast guard contingent numbers 400; it is equipped with fifteen AT-105 APCs and eighteen inshore patrol craft.

The home guard (firqat) units had been raised and trained for irregular counterinsurgency operations by troops of the British army's Special Air Services. Armed with small arms, firqat units serve as tribal police and defense forces for the mountain people engaged in herding cattle in areas infiltrated by the Dhofari insurgents during the rebellion. After the insurgency, they remained as paramilitary tribal police, numbering about 3,500 in 1992.

Oman's criminal court system provides for fair trials within the framework of Islamic judicial practice. The defendant in criminal trials is presumed innocent and cannot be detained for longer than twenty-four hours without review of the case by a magistrate, who may then allow the police to hold a suspect up to fourteen days--extended if necessary up to seventy days--to carry out further investigation. Some suits have been filed against police officers for illegal arrest.

The accused can be represented by an attorney, but the government does not pay for a public defender. There are no jury trials and no right to a public trial. The judge can release the accused on payment of bail. Only the judge questions witnesses at the trial. The verdict and sentencing are frequently pronounced within a day. Sentences of more than two months and more than US$1,300 in fines are subject to appeal. No executions have been carried out since 1975 and are, in any event, subject to the sultan's ratification. A rarely used security court system handles internal security cases. The government can search private residences and monitor telephones and private correspondence without warrant but generally confines such actions to investigations of potential security threats and individuals suspected of criminal activity.

According to the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991, torture, mistreatment, and cruel punishment are not systematically practiced, nor are they countenanced by Omani authorities. The traditional punishments authorized by Islamic law, such as amputation and stoning, are not imposed. The Department of State reported that some prisoners had complained of beatings by police in 1991, and other physical abuse had been reported in earlier years. Prison conditions are described as harsh, with extreme temperatures in cells without proper ventilation. However, a practice of punitive hard labor under grueling desert conditions was discontinued in 1991.

Today, the internal and external security apparatus falls under the authority of the Royal Office, which coordinates all intelligence and security policies. The Internal Security Service investigates all matters related to internal security. The Royal Oman Police (ROP), whose head also has cabinet status, perform regular police duties, provide security at airports, serve as the country's immigration agency, and maintain a small coast guard. The security forces reportedly committed some abuses during the year 2001.

The police may obtain warrants prior to making arrests but are not required by law to do so. However, within 24 hours of arrest, the authorities must obtain court orders to hold suspects in pretrial detention, and the police are required to file charges or request a magistrate judge to order continued detention. However, in practice the police do not always follow these procedures. Judges may order detentions for 14 days to allow investigation and may grant extensions if necessary. There is a functioning system of bail. The 1996 Basic Charter provides for certain legal and procedural rights for detainees; however, these provisions have yet to be implemented.

Police handling of arrests and detentions constitutes incommunicado detention in some instances. The police do not always notify a detainee's family or, in the case of a foreign worker, the worker's sponsor of the detention. At times notification is made only just prior to the detainee's release. The authorities post the previous week's trial results (including the date of the trial, the name of the accused, the claim, and the sentence) near the magistrate court building in Muscat. The police do not always permit attorneys and family members to visit detainees. Judges occasionally intercede to ensure that security officials allow such visits.

The Government does not use forced exile. The 1996 Basic Charter prohibits exile; however, the provisions concerning exile have yet to be implemented.

The police are not required by law to obtain search warrants. There is a widely held view that the Government eavesdrops on both oral and written communications, and citizens are guarded in both areas. Citizens must obtain permission from the Ministry of Interior to marry foreigners, except nationals of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Such permission is not granted automatically. Delays or denial of permission have resulted in secret marriages within the country. Marriages in foreign countries may lead to denial of entry of the foreign spouse into the country and prevent a legitimate child from claiming citizenship rights.

The police may obtain warrants prior to making arrests but are not required by law to do so. However, within 24 hours of arrest, the authorities must obtain court orders to hold suspects in pretrial detention, and the police are required to file charges or request a magistrate judge to order continued detention. However, in practice the police do not always follow these procedures. Judges may order detentions for 14 days to allow investigation and may grant extensions if necessary. There is a functioning system of bail. The 1996 Basic Charter provides for certain legal and procedural rights for detainees; however, these provisions have yet to be implemented.

Police handling of arrests and detentions constitutes incommunicado detention in some instances. The police do not always notify a detainee's family or, in the case of a foreign worker, the worker's sponsor of the detention. At times notification is made only just prior to the detainee's release. The authorities post the previous week's trial results (including the date of the trial, the name of the accused, the claim, and the sentence) near the magistrate court building in Muscat. The police do not always permit attorneys and family members to visit detainees. Judges occasionally intercede to ensure that security officials allow such visits.

The Government does not use forced exile. The 1996 Basic Charter prohibits exile; however, the provisions concerning exile have yet to be implemented.

The legal system of Oman is based on English common law and Islamic law, with ultimate appeal to the monarch. Oman's legal system is based on the Ibadi interpretation of the sharia (Islamic law), which is similar to that of the four orthodox schools of Sunni Islam. Jurisprudence is administered regionally by the wali, in conjunction with the qadi, a judge who has attained that position either by graduating from an Islamic law college or by taking advanced study with local religious experts. Although primarily guided by the sharia, the system aims at arriving at a fair decision or compromise acceptable to all parties. Invariably, tribal law has become mixed with religious law. Modern commercial law, borrowed from other parts of the Middle East and Europe, also operates in the business sphere.

The 1996 Basic Charter affirms the independence of the judiciary; however, the various courts are subordinate to the Sultan and subject to his influence in practice. All judges are appointed by the Sultan and serve at his pleasure. The Sultan acts as a court of final appeal and intercedes in cases of particular interest, such as those concerning national security. However, there have been no reported instances in which the Sultan has overturned a decision of the magistrate courts or the commercial courts.

All courts are administered by the Ministry of Justice. The judiciary comprises the magistrate courts, which adjudicate misdemeanors and criminal matters; the Shari'a (Islamic law) courts, which adjudicate personal status cases such as divorce and inheritance; and the commercial courts. The Labor Welfare Board attempts to mediate disputes between employers and employees. If a settlement cannot be reached, the parties may seek recourse in the appropriate courts. The Rent Dispute Committee has been abolished; the courts of general jurisdiction may hear cases involving rent disputes.

The magistrate court system was established by royal decree in 1984 to take over all criminal cases from the Shari'a courts; it is not independent, and its president reports directly to the Sultan. Regional courts of first instance handle misdemeanor cases, which are heard by individual judges. All felonies are adjudicated at the Central Magistrate Court in Muscat by a panel made up of the President of the Magistrate Court and two judges. All rulings of the felony panel are final except for those in which the defendant is sentenced to death. The death penalty rarely is used, except in serious felonies such as murder, and the Sultan must approve death sentences. There is no provision for amputation.

The Criminal Appeals Panel also is presided over by the President of the Magistrate Court in Muscat and includes the court's vice president and two judges. This panel hears appeals of rulings made by all courts of first instance. In the past, specially trained prosecutors from the Royal Oman Police (ROP), all of whom are trained as policemen as well as prosecutors, carried out the role of public prosecutor in criminal cases; however, as a step toward implementing a November 1999 Royal decree designed to increase the independence of the judiciary, prosecutors were made independent of the ROP.

The Criminal Code does not specify the rights of the accused. There are no written rules of evidence, codified procedures for entering cases into the criminal system, or any legal provision for a public trial. Criminal procedures have developed by tradition and precedents in the magistrate courts. In criminal cases, the police provide defendants with the written charges against them; defendants are presumed innocent and have the right to present evidence and confront witnesses. The prosecution and the defense direct questions to witnesses through the judge, who is usually the only person to question witnesses in court. A detainee may hire an attorney, but has no explicit right to be represented by counsel.

The 1996 Basic Charter affirms both the right to counsel and government-funded legal representation for indigents; however, these provisions have yet to be implemented, and the Government does not pay for the legal representation of indigents. Judges often pronounce the verdict and sentence within 1 day of the completion of a trial. Those convicted may appeal jail sentences longer than 3 months and fines over the equivalent of $1,250 (480 rials) to a three-judge panel. Defendants accused of national security offenses and serious felonies do not have the right of appeal.

The State Security Court tries cases involving national security and criminal cases that the Government decides require expeditious or especially sensitive handling. Magistrate court judges have presided over trials in the State Security Court. Defendants tried by the Security Court are not permitted to have legal representation present. The timing and the location of the Court's proceedings are not disclosed publicly. The Court does not follow legal procedures as strictly as the magistrate courts, although prominent civilian jurists form the panel. The Sultan has exercised his powers of extending leniency, including in political cases.

The Shari'a courts are administered by the Ministry of Justice and apply Shari'a law as interpreted under the Ibadhi school of Islamic jurisprudence. Courts of first instance are located in each of the 59 wilayats, or governorates, and are presided over by a single judge, or qadi. Appeals of the rulings of the courts of first instance involving prison sentences of 2 weeks or more or fines greater than $260 (100 rials) must be brought within 1 month before the Shari'a Court of Appeals in Muscat. Panels of three judges hear appeals cases. Court of Appeals rulings themselves may be appealed, within a 1-month period, to the Supreme Committee for Complaints, which is composed of four members, including the Minister of Justice and the Grand Mufti of the Sultanate.

In 1997 the Government promulgated into law the provisions of the 1996 Basic Charter pertaining to family law, that is, law that falls under the purview of the Shari'a courts. The effect of the new law has been to regularize the nature of the cases and the range of corresponding judgments within the Shari'a court system that only deals with family law.

The Authority for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes (ASCD), better known as the commercial courts system, was established by royal decree in 1981 to decide all cases related to commercial matters. Subsequent decrees have empowered the commercial courts to decide labor disputes referred to it by government departments, commercial disputes to which the Government is a party, and arbitration cases involving private parties. After the June reform, the ASCD falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, rather than the Minister of Commerce and Industry. The ASCD is made up of the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, a number of judges appointed by royal decree, and members of the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Cases are heard in regional courts for suits involving not more than $26,000 (10,000 rials).

In November 1999, the Sultan issued several royal decrees to establish a law on judicial authority and to affirm the independence of the judiciary as called for in the 1996 Basic Charter. The decrees formally established the judiciary as an independent, hierarchical system composed of a Supreme Court, an appeals court, primary courts (one located in each region), and, within the primary courts, divisional courts. Within each of the courts there are to be divisions to consider commercial, civil, penal, labor, taxation, general, and personal status cases (the latter under Shari'a). The General Prosecutor's Office, which before the June reform was under the jurisdiction of the Royal Omani Police Chief Inspector, has become an independent legal entity within the Ministry of Justice.

There were no reports of political prisoners.

Prison conditions are Spartan, but appear to meet international standards. Access to some prisoners was restricted severely. There are separate facilities for men and women, as well as separate facilities for juveniles and adults. Security prisoners are held separately and in different conditions from regular prisoners. Pretrial detainees also are held separately.

The law does not specifically address domestic violence against women, but, according to Shari'a, all forms of physical abuse are illegal. There is no evidence of a pattern of spousal abuse, although observers claim that allegations of such abuse in the Shari'a courts are not uncommon. Doctors do not have a legal responsibility to report either spouse or child abuse to the courts. Battered women may file a complaint with the police but more often seek family intervention to protect them from violent domestic situations. Likewise, families seek to intervene to keep such problems from public view. In the past, there have been reports that employers or male coworkers have sexually harassed foreign women employed in positions such as domestic servants and hospital nurses. There were reports of employers physically and sexually abusing domestic servants; employers are not always held accountable for such actions. There are no government programs for abused women.

The law prohibits rape. Shari'a provides no punishment for spousal rape.

Prostitution is illegal, and is not a widespread problem.

Female genital mutilation (FGM) is widely condemned by international health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health. A few communities in the interior and in the Dhofar region still practice FGM. Experts believe that the number of such cases is small and declining annually.

Many women live within the confines of their homes. While progress has been made in changing laws and attitudes, women continue to face many forms of discrimination. Illiteracy among older women hampers their ability to own property, participate in the modern sector of the economy, or inform themselves of their rights. Government officials frequently deny women land grants or housing loans and prefer to conduct business with a woman's husband or other male relative. Women may own property. Women require permission from a male relative to leave the country.

Some aspects of Islamic law and tradition as interpreted in the country also discriminate against women. Shari'a favors male heirs in adjudicating inheritance claims. Many women are reluctant to take an inheritance dispute to court for fear of alienating the family.

Since 1970 conditions for women have improved markedly in several areas. Whereas in 1970 no schools existed for girls, the most recent figures available from the Ministry of Education in 1999 report an enrollment rate of nearly 90 percent for all girls eligible for elementary school. In the 1997-98 school year, female students constituted approximately 50 percent of the total number of students attending public schools. Women constitute roughly half of the 5,000 students at Sultan Qaboos University. In November 731 women and 566 men received bachelor's degrees as members of the 11th graduating class, while 2 women and 40 men received master's degrees. The university has a quota system with the apparent goal of increasing the number of men studying certain specialties. For example, women reportedly are being limited to 50 percent of the seats in the medical department. The quota system is expected to allow women to constitute a majority in some other departments.

Women also have made gains in the work force. Some educated women have attained positions of authority in government, business, and the media. Approximately 30 percent of all civil servants are women; of these, 59 percent are citizens. In both the public and private sectors, women are entitled to maternity leave and equal pay for equal work. The government bureaucracy, the country's largest employer of women, observes such regulations, as do many private sector employers. However, many educated women still face job discrimination because prospective employers fear that they might resign to marry or raise families. Female employees in the Government have sought administrative redress for alleged denial of promotion in favor of less capable men. Government grants for study abroad generally are divided evenly between men and women. According to unconfirmed reports, the Government provided grants to 40 men and 20 women during the year 2001.

Within the Government, women's affairs are the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, and Vocational Training. The Ministry provides support for women's affairs through support for and funding of the Oman Women's Association (OWA) and local community development centers (LCDC's). The OWA consists of 25 chapters, with an active membership of more than 3,000 women. Typical OWA activities include sponsoring health or sociological lectures, kindergarten services, and handicraft-training programs. The OWA also provides an informal counseling and support role for women with divorce-related difficulties, girls forced to marry against their will, and women and girls suffering from domestic abuse. The main purpose of the 50 LCDC's located throughout the country is to encourage women to improve the quality of life for their families and to improve their contributions to the community. LCDC activities focus on health and sociology lectures, childcare issues, and agricultural and traditional handicraft training programs.

The Government has made the education, health, and general welfare of children a budgetary priority. Primary school education for children, including noncitizen children, is free and universal, but not compulsory. Most children attend school through secondary school, until age 18. The infant mortality rate continues to decline, and comprehensive immunization rates have risen. The Government provides free health care for children to age 6. There is no pattern of familial or other child abuse, but government officials have publicly called for greater awareness and prevention of child abuse.

Child prostitution is not known to occur.

FGM is performed mainly on young girls.

The law does not prohibit trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, or within the country.

Internet research assisted by Zahia Daher