The Korean Peninsula was first populated by peoples of a Tungusic branch of the Ural-Altaic language family who migrated from the northwestern regions of Asia. Some of these peoples also populated parts of northeast China (Manchuria); Koreans and Manchurians still show physical similarities.

Koreans are racially and linguistically homogeneous. Although there are no indigenous minorities in North Korea, there is a small Chinese community (about 50,000) and some 1,800 Japanese wives who accompanied the roughly 93,000 Koreans returning to the North from Japan during 1959-62.

Korean is a Ural-Altaic language and is related to Japanese and remotely related to Hungarian, Finnish, Estonian, and Mongolian. Although dialects exist, the Korean spoken throughout the peninsula is mutually comprehensible. In North Korea, the Korean alphabet (hangul) is used exclusively, unlike in South Korea, where a combination of hangul and Chinese characters is used as the written language.

Korea's traditional religions are Buddhism and Shamanism. Christian missionaries arrived as early as the 16th century, but it was not until the 19th century that they founded schools, hospitals, and other modern institutions throughout Korea. Major centers of 19th-century missionary activity included Seoul and Pyongyang, and there was a relatively large Christian population in the north before 1945. Although religious groups exist in North Korea, most available evidence suggests that the government severely restricts religious activity.

According to legend, the god-king Tangun founded the Korean nation in 2333 BC. By the first century AD, the Korean Peninsula was divided into the kingdoms of Shilla, Koguryo, and Paekche. In 668 AD, the Shilla kingdom unified the peninsula. The Koryo dynasty--from which Portuguese missionaries in the 16th century derived the Western name "Korea"--succeeded the Shilla kingdom in 935. The Choson dynasty, ruled by members of the Yi clan, supplanted Koryo in 1392 and lasted until the Japanese annexed Korea in 1910.

Throughout most of its history, Korea has been invaded, influenced, and fought over by its larger neighbors. Korea was under Mongolian occupation from 1231 until the early 14th century and was plundered by Japanese pirates in 1359 and 1361. The unifier of Japan, Hideyoshi, launched major invasions of Korea in 1592 and 1597. When Western powers focused "gunboat" diplomacy on Korea in the mid-19th century, Korea's rulers adopted a closed-door policy, earning Korea the title of "Hermit Kingdom."

Though the Choson dynasty paid tribute to the Chinese court and recognized China's hegemony in East Asia, Korea was independent until the late 19th century. At that time, China sought to block growing Japanese influence on the Korean Peninsula and Russian pressure for commercial gains there. This competition produced the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Japan emerged victorious from both wars and in 1910 annexed Korea as part of the growing Japanese empire.

Japanese colonial administration was characterized by tight control from Tokyo and ruthless efforts to supplant Korean language and culture. Organized Korean resistance during the colonial era--such as the March 1, 1919, Independence Movement--was unsuccessful, and Japan remained firmly in control until the end of World War II in 1945.

Japan surrendered in August 1945, and Korea was liberated. However, the unexpectedly early surrender of Japan led to the immediate division of Korea into two occupation zones, with the U.S. administering the southern half of the peninsula and the U.S.S.R taking over the area to the north of the 38th parallel. This division was meant to be temporary and to facilitate the Japanese surrender until the U.S., U.K., Soviet Union, and China could arrange a trusteeship administration.

At a meeting in Cairo, it was agreed that Korea would be free "in due course;" at a later meeting in Yalta, it was agreed to establish a four-power trusteeship over Korea. In December 1945, a conference convened in Moscow to discuss the future of Korea. A 5-year trusteeship was discussed, and a joint Soviet-American commission was established. The commission met intermittently in Seoul but deadlocked over the issue of establishing a national government. In September 1947, with no solution in sight, the United States submitted the Korean question to the UN General Assembly.

Initial hopes for a unified, independent Korea quickly evaporated as the politics of the Cold War and domestic opposition to the trusteeship plan resulted in the 1948 establishment of two separate nations with diametrically opposed political, economic, and social systems and the outbreak of war in 1950.

Today, The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a dictatorship under the absolute rule of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP). Kim Il Sung led the DPRK from its inception until his death in 1994. Since then his son Kim Jong Il has exercised unchallenged authority. Kim Jong Il was named General Secretary of the KWP in October 1997. In September 1998, the Supreme People's Assembly reconfirmed Kim Jong Il as Chairman of the National Defense Commission and declared that position the "highest office of state." The presidency was abolished leaving the late Kim Il Sung as the DPRK's only president. The titular head of state is Kim Yong Nam, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly. Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il continue to be the objects of intense personality cults. The regime emphasizes "juche," a national ideology of self-reliance. The judiciary is not independent.

The State directs all significant economic activity, and only government-controlled labor unions are permitted in this country of 22 million persons. Industry continued to operate at significantly reduced capacity, reflecting antiquated plant and equipment and severe shortages of inputs. This decline is due in part to the collapse of the former Soviet Union and East European communist governments and the subsequent sharp decline in trade and aid. Efforts at recovery have been hampered by heavy military spending--which amounted to perhaps one-quarter of gross domestic product before the economy went into decline and is probably now larger as a share of national output. The economy also has been held back by a lack of access to commercial lending stemming from the DPRK's default on its foreign debt, and its inability to obtain loans from international financial institutions. Never food self-sufficient, the country relies on international aid and trade to supplement domestic production, which has been hobbled by disastrous agricultural policies. This is true even when crop production is relatively good, as it was during the year 2001. Since 1995, nearly annual droughts and floods have destroyed crops and ruined agricultural land, and hunger and malnutrition have been widespread. Famine has caused internal dislocation and widespread malnutrition, and an estimated several hundreds of thousands to two million persons died from starvation and related diseases. Economic and political conditions have caused thousands of persons to flee their homes. The Government continued to seek international food aid, produce "alternative foods," and take other steps to boost production. It has permitted the spread of farmers' markets to make up for the contraction of food supplied through the public distribution system. Food, clothing, and energy are rationed throughout the country. The U.N.'s World Food Program provides assistance to children and mothers, the elderly, and persons employed in flood damage recovery efforts. The gross national product (GNP) may have grown slightly in 2000 due largely to international aid and limited South Korean investment, but this followed nearly a decade of steady decline in which GNP is estimated to have shrunk by half since 1993. Most foreign observers note improved food and other economic conditions over the last year.

Although socialism promises a society of equals in which class oppression is eliminated, most evidence shows that great social and political inequality continues to exist in North Korea in the early 1990s. The state is the sole allocator of resources, and inequalities are justified in terms of the state's political and economic imperatives. Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are described by unsympathetic foreign observers as living like kings. (The South Korean film director Sin Sangok and his actress wife, Ch'oe Unhui, who were apparently kidnapped and taken to North Korea on Kim Jong Il's orders, described him as a fanatic film buff with a library of 15,000 films; they claimed that he alone could view these films, which were collected for his benefit by North Korean diplomats abroad.) Equally important from the standpoint of social stratification, however, is a small and clearly defined elite within the ruling KWP, who, like the privileged communists listed in the former Soviet Union's nomenklatura, a listing of positions and personnel, have emerged as a "new class" with a relatively high standard of living and access to consumer goods not available to ordinary people.

According to North Korean sources cited by Eberstadt and Banister, total membership in the KWP in 1987 was "over 3 million," or almost 15 percent of the estimated population of 20.3 million that year. Membership in the party requires a politically "clean" background. Given the KWP's status as a revolutionary "vanguard party," these individuals clearly constitute an elite; it is unclear, however, how the standards of living of lower echelon party members differ from those of nonparty members. Nonetheless, party membership is clearly the smoothest path for upward social mobility. It opens opportunities such as university attendance to members and their children. The statecontrolled media repeatedly exhorts party members to eschew "bureaucratism" and arrogance in dealing with nonparty people. But it is unclear how successful the regime is in uprooting the centuries-old tradition of kwanjon minbi (honor officials, despise the people), which often make the traditional aristocratic yangban elite insufferably arrogant.

Although Japan had promoted some industrialization in the northern part of their Korean colony during the occupation, most of the Korean Peninsula's population before 1945 were farmers. North Korea's industrialization after the Korean War, however, transformed the nature of work and occupational categories. In the late 1980s, the government divided the labor force into four categories: "workers," who were employed at state-owned enterprises; "farmers," who worked on agricultural collectives; "officials," who performed nonmanual labor and probably included teachers, technicians, and health-care workers as well as civil servants and KWP cadres; and workers employed in "cooperative industrial units," which Eberstadt and Banister suggest constitute a minuscule private sector. North Korean government statistics showed that the state "worker" category constituted the largest category in 1987, or 57 percent of the labor force. Farmers comprised the second largest category at 25.3 percent; and officials and industrial cooperative workers, 16.8 percent and 0.9 percent, respectively. Within the "worker" category, skilled workers in the fisheries and in the heavy, mining, and defense industries tend to be favored in terms of economic incentives over their counterparts in light and consumer industries; the labor force in urban areas tend to be favored over farmers. Despite the small size of the "cooperative industrial sector," that is, the industrial counterpart of the cooperative (collective) farms enterprise, a black market apparently exists, with prices as much as ten times higher than those in the official distribution system. Farmers' markets also exist. The black market is not likely to be large enough to foster the emergence of a sizable, shadowy class of smugglers and entrepreneurs.

Food and other necessities of life are strictly rationed, and different occupational groups are reported to receive different qualities and kinds of goods. Sin Sangok and Ch'oe Unhui wrote in the South Korean media in the late 1980s that consumption of beef and pork is largely restricted to "middle-class" and "upper-class people"; "ordinary people" can obtain no meat except dog meat, which is not rationed. An exception is made for the New Year's holidays, Kim Il Sung's birthday, and other holidays, when pork is made available to all. They also report that the regime is actively encouraging sons to assume the occupations of their fathers and that "job succession is regarded as a cardinal virtue in North Korea."

Housing is another area of social inequality. According to a South Korean source, North Korea has five types of standardized housing allotted according to rank; the highest ranks--the party and state elite--live in one- or two-story detached houses. Sixty percent of the population, consisting of ordinary workers and farmers, live in multi-unit dwellings of no more than one or two rooms, including the kitchen.

Family background, in terms of political and ideological criteria, is extremely relevant to one's social status and standard of living. Sons and daughters of revolutionaries and those who died in the Korean War are favored for educational opportunities and advancement. For these children, a special elite school, the Mangyngdae Revolutionary Institute, was established near P'yongyang at the birthsite of Kim Il Sung. South Korean scholar Lee Mun Woong wrote that illegitimate children are also favored because they are raised entirely in state-run nurseries and schools and are not subject to the corruption of traditionally minded parents.

Conversely, the children and descendants of "exploiting class" parents--those who collaborated with the Japanese during the colonial era, opposed agricultural collectivization in the 1950s, or were associated with those who had fled to South Korea- -are discriminated against. They are considered "contaminated" by the bad influences of their parents and have to work harder to acquire reputable positions. Relatives of those who had fled to South Korea are especially looked down on and considered "bad elements." Persons with unfavorable political backgrounds are often denied admission to institutions of higher education, despite their intellectual qualifications.

With the exception of disabled Korean War veterans, physically handicapped people appear to be subject to special discrimination, according to international human rights organizations. For example, they are not allowed to enter P'yongyang, and those who manage to live in the capital are periodically sought out by the police and expelled. These sources also allege that persons of below-normal height (dwarfs) have been forced to live in a special settlement in a remote rural area. South Korean sources also cite examples of single women over forty years of age who are considered social misfits and are thus harassed.

The penal code is draconian in nature and apparently does not accept the principles of modern criminal law that state that there is no crime unless so specified by law, that law may not be applied retroactively, and that the law cannot be extended by analogy. Article 10 of the North Korean Criminal Code states that "in the case of an offense that does not fall under any expressed clause of the criminal law, the basis, scope, and punishment for it shall be determined according to the clause on acts that resemble it most in terms of its type and danger to society."

The Penal Code adopted in 1987 simplifies the 1974 code without making substantial changes in the definitions of crimes or penalties. The entire section entitled Military Crimes, contained in Part 5 of the previous code, has been deleted. It is likely that military crimes still are treated as a criminal category, and are covered by another, separate code.

The 1987 code generally covers fewer types of crimes. Crimes eliminated from the general heading of treason include armed incursions, hostile crimes against the socialist state, and antirevolutionary sabotage. Penalties also have been relaxed. The number of crimes for which the death penalty can be applied has been reduced from twenty civil crimes to five offenses in addition to those offenses covered under the Military Crimes section. Retained as capital offenses are plots against national sovereignty (Article 44), terrorism (Article 45), treason against the Motherland by citizens (Article 47), treason against the people (Article 52), and murder (Article 141). The death penalty no longer applies to propaganda and sedition against the government; espionage; armed intervention and instigating the severance of foreign relations; antirevolutionary disturbances; theft of government or public property; violation of railway, water, or air transportation regulations; mob violence; unauthorized disclosure of or loss of official secrets; rape; and robbery of personal property. The maximum sentence has been reduced from twenty to fifteen years.

In May 1992, the chairman of the criminal law department at Kim Il Sung University published an address on misinterpretations of the North Korean Criminal Code. He pointed out that the code banned death sentences for minors under seventeen years of age when the crime was committed and for pregnant women. The code has no penalty of confinement; all noncapital punishment is in the form of forced labor. The code also stipulates that revisions to it cannot be applied retroactively to define an act as criminal that was not so at the time of commission or to raise the maximum penalty. Reductions of penalties, however, apply retroactively. The code also redefines several of the provisions related to contact with South Korea in a manner apparently aimed at drawing attention to the strict limits of South Korea's National Security Law on unauthorized North/South contacts.

The definition of the most serious political crimes--reforms notwithstanding--is ambiguous and includes both counterrevolutionary crimes and more general political offenses. Punishment for counterrevolutionary crimes is severe, it involves capital punishment, loss of property, and even summary execution for almost any dissident activity. Furthermore, these cases are often decided without recourse to the appropriate legal procedures. Most political offenses do not go through the criminal justice system, but are handled by the State Security Department. Trials are closed, and there is no provision for appeal. Punishment is often broadened to include the offender's immediate and extended family.

North Korea has provided data neither for United Nations nor INTERPOL surveys of crime; however, an estimate of crime is given in the United States State Department's Consular Information Sheet according to which "The North Korean government does not release statistics on crime, but street crime appears to be uncommon. Petty thefts, however, have been reported, especially at the airport in Pyongyang."

The forty-five years since the founding of the DPRK have witnessed the construction of a system of totalitarian control unique even when compared to the communist systems in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The population of North Korea is rigidly controlled. Individual rights are subordinate to the rights of the state and party. The regime uses education, mass mobilization, persuasion, and coercion to guarantee political and social conformity. Massive propaganda and political indoctrination are reinforced by extensive police and public security forces.

The regime's control mechanisms are quite extensive. Security ratings are established for individuals and influence access to employment, schools, medical facilities, stores, admission to the KWP, and so on. The system in its most elaborate form consists of three general groupings and fifty-one subcategories. Over time, however, the use of subcategories has diminished.

The population is divided into a core class, the basic masses, and the "impure class." The core class, which includes those with revolutionary lineage, makes up approximately 20 to 25 percent of the population. The basic masses--primarily workers and peasants--account for around 50 percent. The impure class consists of descendants of pro-Japanese collaborators, landowners, or those with relatives who have defected. In the past, restraints on the impure class were strict, but as time has passed they have been relaxed, although the core class continues to receive preferential treatment. Nonetheless, by the 1980s even a member of the impure class could become a party member.

Since the late 1950s, all households have been organized into people's neighborhood units. The units, originally called the five-family system, consist of about 100 individuals living in close proximity. The ward people's committee selects the people's neighborhood unit chief, generally from pensioners in the unit. Meetings are held once a month or as necessary. The primary function of the ward people's committee is social control and propagation of the chuch'e ideology.

There are five categories of social control: residence, travel, employment, clothing and food, and family life. Change of residence is possible only with party approval. Those who move without a permit are not eligible for food rations or housing allotments and are subject to criminal prosecution. Travel is controlled by the Ministry of Public Security, and a travel pass is necessary. Travel on other than official business is limited strictly to attending family functions, and obtaining approval normally is a long and complicated process. The ration system does not recognize individuals while they are traveling, which further curtails movement. Employment is governed by the party, with assignments made on the basis of political reliability and family background. A change in employment is made at the party's convenience.

The Ministry of Public Security and the State Security Department are responsible for internal security. Although both are government organs, they are tightly controlled by the party apparatus through the Justice and Security Commission and the penetration of their structures by the party apparatus at all levels. The formal public security structure is augmented by a pervasive system of informers throughout the society. Surveillance of citizens, both physical and electronic, also is routine.

The Ministry of Public Security, responsible for internal security, social control, and basic police functions, is one of the most powerful organizations in North Korea and controls an estimated 144,000 public security personnel. It maintains law and order; investigates common criminal cases; manages the prison system and traffic control; monitors citizens' political attitudes; conducts background investigations, census, and civil registrations; controls individual travel; manages the government's classified documents; protects government and party officials; and patrols government buildings and some government and party construction activities.

The ministry has vice ministers for personnel, political affairs, legal counselling, security, surveillance, internal affairs, rear services, and engineering. There are approximately twenty-seven bureaus, but the functional responsibilities of only some of the bureaus are known. The Security Bureau is responsible for ordinary law enforcement and most police functions. The Investigation Bureau handles investigations of criminal and economic crimes. The Protection Bureau is responsible for fire protection, traffic control, public health, and customs. The Registration Bureau issues citizen identification cards and maintains public records on births, deaths, marriages, residence registration, and passports.

Below the ministry level, there are public security bureaus for each province and directly administered city. These bureaus are headed by either a senior colonel or a lieutenant colonel of police, depending on the size of the population. Public security departments at each city or county and smaller substations through the country are staffed by about 100 personnel. They are organized roughly parallel to the ministry itself and have several divisions responsible for carrying out various functions.

In 1973 political security responsibilities were transferred from the Ministry of Public Security to the State Security Department, an autonomous agency reporting directly to Kim Il Sung. The State Security Department carries out a wide range of counterintelligence and internal security functions normally associated with "secret police." It is charged with searching out antistate criminals--a general category that includes those accused of antigovernment and dissident activities, economic crimes, and slander of the political leadership. Camps for political prisoners are under its jurisdiction. It has counterintelligence responsibilities at home and abroad, and runs overseas intelligence collection operations. It monitors political attitudes and maintains surveillance of returnees. Ministry personnel escort high-ranking officials. The ministry also guards national borders and monitors international entry points. The degree of control it exercises over the Political Security Bureaus of the KPA--which has representatives at all levels of command--is unclear.

The Border Guards are the paramilitary force of the Ministry of Public Security. They are primarily concerned with monitoring the border and with internal security. The latter activities include physical protection of government buildings and facilities. During a conflict, they would probably be used in border and rear area security missions.

Today, the Korean People's Army is the primary organization responsible for external security. It is assisted by a large military reserve force and several quasi-military organizations, including the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and the People's Security Force. These organizations assist the Ministry of Public Security and the KWP in maintaining internal security. Members of the security forces committed serious human rights abuses.

The Government reportedly is responsible for cases of disappearance. According to defector reports, individuals suspected of political crimes often are taken from their homes by state security officials late at night and sent directly, without trial, to camps for political prisoners. There also have been reports of past government involvement in the kidnaping abroad of South Koreans, Japanese, and other foreign nationals. As many as 20 Japanese may have been kidnapped and detained in North Korea. According to Japanese government officials, these abductions took place between 1977 and 1983. Following a December 1999 meeting between officials from the Red Cross societies of North Korea and Japan, the Government agreed to conduct an investigation into the fate of the missing Japanese nationals. However, on December 17, the Government announced it was suspending the investigation. In addition several suspected cases of kidnaping, hostage-taking, and other acts of violence apparently intended to intimidate ethnic Koreans living in China and Russia have been reported. There were unconfirmed reports that North Korean agents kidnaped a South Korean citizen, Reverend Dongshik Kim, in China and took him to North Korea in January 2000. There is credible evidence that North Korea may have been involved in the July 1995 abduction of a South Korean citizen working in China as a missionary. This missionary subsequently appeared publicly in North Korea and was portrayed as a defector. The DPRK denies that it has been involved in kidnapings.

The Constitution provides for the inviolability of person and residence and the privacy of correspondence; however, the Government does not respect these provisions in practice. The regime subjects its citizens to rigid controls. The state leadership perceives most international norms of human rights, and especially individual rights, as alien social concepts subversive to the goals of the State and party. The Government relies upon an extensive, multilevel system of informers to identify critics and potential troublemakers. Whole communities sometimes are subjected to massive security checks. The possession of "reactionary material" and listening to foreign broadcasts are both considered crimes that may subject the transgressor to harsh punishments. In some cases, entire families are punished for alleged political offenses committed by one member of the family. For example, defectors have reported families being punished because children had accidentally defaced photographs of one of the two Kims. Families must display pictures of the two Kims in their homes, and must keep them clean. Local party officials have conducted unannounced inspections once per month, and if the inspectors find a family has neglected its photos, the punishment is to write self-criticism throughout an entire year.

The Government monitors correspondence and telephones. Telephones essentially are restricted to domestic operation although some international service is available on a very restricted basis.

The Constitution provides for the right to petition. However, when an anonymous petition or complaint about state administration is submitted, the Ministries of State Security and Public Safety seek to identify the author through handwriting analysis. The suspected individual may be subjected to a thorough investigation and punishment.

The regime justifies its dictatorship with arguments derived from concepts of collective consciousness and the superiority of the collective over the individual, appeals to nationalism, and citations of "the juche idea." The authorities emphasize that the core concept of juche is "the ability to act independently without regard to outside interference." Originally described as "a creative application of Marxism-Leninism" in the national context, juche is a malleable philosophy reinterpreted from time to time by the regime as its ideological needs change and is used by the regime as a "spiritual" underpinning for its rule.

As defined by Kim Il Sung, juche is a quasi-mystical concept in which the collective will of the people is distilled into a supreme leader whose every act exemplifies the State and society's needs. Opposition to such a leader, or to the rules, regulations, and goals established by his regime is thus in itself opposition to the national interest. The regime, therefore, claims a social interest in identifying and isolating all opposition.

Since the late 1950's the regime has divided society into three main classes: "core," "wavering," and "hostile." These three classes are further subdivided into subcategories based on perceived loyalty to the Party and the leadership. Security ratings are assigned to each individual; according to some estimates, nearly half of the population is designated as either "wavering" or "hostile." These loyalty ratings determine access to employment, higher education, place of residence, medical facilities, and certain stores. They also affect the severity of punishment in the case of legal infractions. While there are signs that this rigid system has been relaxed somewhat in recent years--for example, children of religious practitioners are no longer automatically barred from higher education--it remains a basic characteristic of KWP political control.

Citizens with relatives who fled to South Korea at the time of the Korean War still appear to be classified as part of the "hostile class" in the Government's elaborate loyalty system. This subcategory alone encompasses a significant percentage of the population. One defector estimated that the class of those considered potentially hostile may comprise 25 to 30 percent of the population; others place the figure at closer to 20 percent. Members of this class still are subject to discrimination, although defectors report that their treatment has improved greatly in recent years.

The authorities subject citizens of all age groups and occupations to intensive political and ideological indoctrination. Even after Kim Il Sung's death, his cult of personality and the glorification of his family and the official juche ideology remained omnipresent. The cult approaches the level of a state religion.

The goal of indoctrination remains to ensure loyalty to the system and leadership, as well as conformity to the State's ideology and authority. The necessity for the intensification of such indoctrination repeatedly is stressed in the writings of Kim Jong Il, who attributes the collapse of the Soviet Union largely to insufficient ideological indoctrination, compounded by the entry of foreign influences.

Indoctrination is carried out systematically, not only through the mass media, but also in schools and through worker and neighborhood associations. Kim Jong Il has stated that ideological education must take precedence over academic education in the nation's schools, and he also has called for the intensification of mandatory ideological study and discussion sessions for adult workers.

Another aspect of the State's indoctrination system is the use of mass marches, rallies, and staged performances, sometimes involving hundreds of thousands of persons. In September 1998, celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK included hours of carefully choreographed demonstration of mass adulation of the leadership. In October 2000, similar celebrations of the 55th anniversary of the KWP reportedly involved upwards of 1 million persons. According to news reports, hundreds of thousands of citizens were mobilized to greet and perform for China's President, Jiang Zemin, when he visited North Korea in September.

There are no restrictions on the ability of the Government to detain and imprison persons at will and to hold them incommunicado.

Little information is available on criminal justice procedures and practices, and outside observation of the legal system has been limited to "show trials" for traffic violations and other minor offenses.

According to an NGO, family members and other concerned persons find it virtually impossible to obtain information on charges against or the length of sentences of detained persons. Judicial review of detentions does not exist in law or in practice.

Defectors claim that the Government detains between 150,000 to 200,000 persons for political reasons, sometimes along with their family members, in maximum security camps in remote areas. The Government denies the existence of such prison camps but admits that there are "education centers" for persons who "commit crimes by mistake."

A defector who had been a ranking official in the Ministry of Public Security stated that there were two types of detention areas. One consists of closed camps where conditions are extremely harsh and from which prisoners never emerge. In the other, prisoners can be "rehabilitated."

One credible report lists 1 dozen political prisoner camps and approximately 30 forced labor and labor education camps in the country. It is believed that some former high officials are imprisoned in the camps. Visitors formerly were allowed, but currently any form of communication with detainees is said to be prohibited.

In mid-1999, an ethnic Korean with foreign citizenship was arrested for unauthorized contact with North Koreans. This person was detained for 1 month before being released.

In May 1998, a foreigner of Korean descent was detained and held incommunicado for nearly 3 months before he finally was released. In September 1998, another foreigner of Korean descent was held incommunicado for more than 1 month for an unspecified "violation of law" before being released and expelled from the country.

In March 1999, North Korean officials in Thailand tried to detain a Bangkok-based North Korean diplomat, Hong Sun Gyong, and his family. Hong and his wife escaped from their abductors and then requested asylum. Their son was taken to Laos by North Korean officials but subsequently was allowed to rejoin his parents in Thailand.

South Korean newspapers reported in 1997 that family members of North Korean defector Hwang Chang Yop, former head of the Juche Research Institute, and a senior advisor to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, who defected to South Korea that year, were either under house arrest or incarcerated in political prisons. However, visiting foreigners have seen some members of his family.

The Government is not known to use forced exile. However, the Government routinely uses forced resettlement and has relocated many tens of thousands of persons from Pyongyang to the countryside. Although disabled veterans are treated extremely well, there also are reports that other persons with physical disabilities and those judged to be politically unreliable have been sent to internal exile. Often those relocated are selected on the basis of family background. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that class background is less important than in the past because of the regime's emphasis on the solidarity of the "popular masses," and united front efforts with overseas Koreans. According to unconfirmed September 1997 foreign press reports, some 500 senior officials were sent into internal exile.

The legal system of North Korea is based on German civil law system with Japanese influences and Communist legal theory.

In the North Korean judicial process, both adjudicative and prosecuting bodies function as powerful weapons for the proletarian dictatorship. The constitution states that justice is administered by the central court, provincial- or special-city level courts, the people's court, or special courts.

The Central Court, the highest court of appeal, stands at the apex of the court system. As of July 1992, it had two associate chief judges, or vice presidents--Choe Yong-song and Hyon Hongsam . Pang Hak Se, who died in July 1992, had been chief judge, or president, since 1972. In the case of special cities directly under central authority, provincial or municipal courts serve as the courts of first instance for civil and criminal cases at the intermediate level. At the lowest level are the people's courts, established in ordinary cities, counties, and urban districts. Special courts exist for the armed forces and for railroad workers. The military courts have jurisdiction over all crimes committed by members of the armed forces or security organs of the Ministry of Public Security. The railroad courts have jurisdiction over criminal cases involving rail and water transport workers. In addition, the Korean Maritime Arbitration Committee adjudicates maritime legal affairs.

Judges and people's assessors, or lay judges, are elected by the organs of state power at their corresponding levels, those of the Central Court by the SPA's Standing Committee, and those of the lower courts by the provincial- and county-level people's assemblies. Neither legal education nor practical legal experience is required for judgeship. In addition to administering justice based on criminal and civil codes, the courts are in charge of political indoctrination through "reeducation." The issue of punishment is not expressly stated in the constitution or the criminal code.

The collective interests of the workers, peasants, soldiers, and working intellectuals are protected by a parallel hierarchy of organs controlled at the top by the Central Procurator's Office. This office acts as the state's prosecutor and checks on the activities of all public organs and citizens to ensure their compliance with the laws and their "active struggle against all lawbreakers." Its authority extends to the courts, the decisions of which (including those of the Central Court) are subject to routine scrutiny. A judgment of the Central Court may be appealed to the plenary session of the Central Court, of which the state's chief prosecutor is a statutory member.

The chief prosecutor, known as the procurator general, is appointed by and accountable in theory, though not in fact, to the SPA. As of mid-1993, the procurator general was Yi Yong-sp. There are three deputy procurators general.

Foreign laws have repeatedly influenced Korea. Korea assimilated the codes of various Chinese dynasties through the close of the Chosn Dynasty and Western law (Continental Law) during the Japanese occupation (1910-45). Although Confucian legal culture exerts strong influence on North Korea's legal attitudes, the modern legal system initially was patterned after the Soviet model imposed during the period of Soviet occupation (1945-48).

Neo-Confucian thought does not distinguish among politics, morality, and law. Law in traditional Korea was concerned with the control and punishment of deviance by the centralized bureaucratic political system rather than by private relationships or contracts. The elite viewed law as a last resort against a morally intractable person. The rule of law was little understood by the general population, which often saw it manifested only as an autocratic decree or as a tool of rigid political regimentation. These notions persist as part of the legal culture of North Korea.

No concepts in the Chosn Dynasty corresponded to the Western concept of right. Although in principle all classes were guaranteed property rights and the rights to act and initiate legal proceedings, the class nature of society meant that those rights were virtually meaningless for all but the elite. Social stratification was paralleled by de facto legal stratification. Noblemen, or yangban, had full exercise of their "rights." The theoretical rights of the middle class and lesser bureaucrats had practical limits, and the commoners and the lowest classes basically had no legal rights.

Morality and politics were reflected in the administration of justice; and structural differentiation among adjudicative, legislative, and administrative functions was contrary to Confucian substantive justice. The magistrate, a generalist scholar-official, was charged with both governing and adjudicating. Legal specialists, who were not from the yangban class, never developed into a professional group.

Korea's traditional legal system outwardly disappeared with the incorporation of modern Western law beginning with the Kabo Reforms of 1894 and ending with the imposition of Japanese legal concepts during the Japanese colonial period. Traditional legal thought, however, continued to influence North Korean attitudes toward the purpose and function of legal institutions.

With the end of the Chosn Dynasty in 1910, decisive changes occurred in Korean law. Traditional Korean institutions suddenly were replaced. The imposition of institutions by the Japanese and their post-1910 use for repressive colonial control constituted a sharp break with the past. Because of the nature of Japanese colonial rule, there was no constitutional law, guarantee of rights, or judicial review of the exercise of political power. The legal system of Korea under Japanese rule was composed essentially of rules, duties, and obligations. However, there was no institutional or procedural separation of powers. The Japanese governor-general had unrestrained executive and legislative power, the latter exercised by decree.

With the end of World War II came Soviet occupation. During this period, Soviet legal concepts and codes, as well as the court and procurator structure, were embraced. Soviet legal concepts were the basis for the Court Organization Law of March 1, 1950, and the Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, both issued on March 3, 1950. In December 1974, a new Criminal Code (five parts, 215 articles) was issued, but few details were revealed to the general public, and its promulgation was not known to outside sources until the late 1980s. The Penal Code (eight chapters, 161 articles) was adopted by the Supreme People's Assembly on February 5, 1987.

Under the guidance of the Justice and Security Commission of the Central People's Committee, the two main components of the post- 1945 judicial system are the Central Court and Central Procurator systems. These organizations perform their functions as "powerful weapons of the proletariat dictatorship, which execute the judicial policies of the Korean Workers' Party."

North Korea has a three-tiered court system with a Central Court, Provincial Courts (or Court of the Province), and People's Courts at the county level. The appeal process is based on the principle of a single appeal to the next highest court.

The Central Court is the final court of appeal for criminal and civil cases and has initial jurisdiction for grievous crimes against the state. According to the 1992 constitution, the Supreme People's Assembly has the power to elect and recall the president of the Central Court and to appoint or remove the president of the Central Procurator's Office (Article 91, items 12-13). The Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly interprets the laws and ordinances in force and elects and recalls judges and people's assessors of the Central Court (Article 101, items 3, 9). The Central Court supervises all lower courts and the training of judges. It does not exercise the power of judicial review over the constitutionality of executive or legislative actions nor does it have an activist role in protecting the constitutionally guaranteed rights of individuals against state actions. The Central Court is staffed by a chief judge or president, two associate chief judges or vice presidents, and an unknown number of regular judges.

The Central Court also arbitrates matters involving the nonfulfillment of contracts between state enterprises and cases involving injuries and compensation demands. These administrative decisions always reflect party policies.

Below the Central Court are the courts of the provinces and cities under central authority--courts that serve as the courts of first and only appeal for decisions made by the People's Courts. They are staffed in the same manner as the Central Court. Like the Central Court, provincial courts have initial jurisdiction for certain serious crimes. In addition, provincial courts supervise the People's Courts.

The People's Courts are at the lowest level of the judicial system. They are organized at the county (gun, or kun) level even though they may have jurisdiction over more than one county or smaller city. They have initial jurisdiction for most criminal and civil cases. Unlike the high courts, they are staffed with a single judge, who is assisted by two "people's assessors," laymen who are temporarily selected for the judiciary. An initial trial typically is presided over by one judge and two people's assessors. If the case is appealed, three judges preside, and a decision is made by consultation.

The constitution does not require legal education as a qualification for being elected as a judge or people's assessor. Over time, however, legal training has received more emphasis, although political reliability remains the prime criterion for holding office.

The Central Procurator's Office parallels the court system. In accordance with Article 162 of the 1992 constitution, "Investigation and prosecution are conducted by the Central Procurator's Office, the procurator's offices of the province (or municipality directly under central authority), city (or district) and county and special procurator's office." The office supervises or conducts investigations, arrests, preparation of indictments, criminal prosecutions, and criminal trial proceedings. It has the right to initiate court appeals. This supervisory function over the judiciary includes ensuring that the court system interprets the law in accordance with the KWP's wishes. As of July 1992, the procurator general of the Central Procurator's Office was Han Sang-kyu; there are three deputy procurators general.

Socialist law-abiding life guidance committees were established in 1977 in the Central People's Committee and in the people's committees at the provincial-, city-, and county-levels. These ad hoc committees meet once a month and are chaired by the president of the people's committee. The committees are a control measure for ensuring respect for public authority and conformity to the dictates of socialist society. The committees are empowered to implement state power, monitor the observance of law by state and economic institutions, and prevent the abuse of power by the leading cadre of these institutions. To this end, they have oversight of state inspection agencies, the procuracy, and the police; they also have supervision and control of all organizations, workplaces, social groups, and citizens in their jurisdiction. The committees can apply strict legal sanctions to all violations short of crimes.

Little reliable information is available on specific criminal justice procedures and practices as of mid-1993. Although North Korea refuses outside observation of its legal system, it is clear that the limited guarantees legally in place often are not followed in practice. There is reliable information of summary executions in the case of political crimes.

The 1992 constitution guarantees judicial independence and requires that court proceedings be carried out in accordance with laws containing elaborate procedural guarantees. Article 157 of the constitution states that "cases are heard in public, and the accused is guaranteed the right to a defense; hearings may be closed to the public as stipulated by law." According to the United States Department of State's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1990 and a 1988 report by Asia Watch and the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee, however, practice is another matter. Additionally, according to the Criminal Code, defense attorneys are not proxies for the defendant but are charged with ensuring that the accused take full responsibility for his or her actions.

North Korean law limits incarceration during investigation and interrogation to a period not to exceed two months. The period of incarceration, however, can be extended indefinitely with the approval of the Central Procurator's Office. The approval apparently is given quite freely. It is not uncommon for individuals to be detained for a year or longer without trial or charge. During interrogation, at least through the early 1980s, there was strong evidence that prisoners were routinely tortured or ill treated. Habeas corpus or its equivalent is not recognized in theory or practice. In addition, information about detainees is restricted, and it is often very difficult, if not impossible, for concerned family members to obtain any data about someone being detained.

Party influence is pervasive in both criminal and political cases. In criminal cases, the government assigns lawyers for the defense. Defense lawyers are not considered advocates for the defendant so much as independent parties to help persuade the accused to admit his guilt, although they apparently present facts to mitigate punishment. In political cases, trials often are dispensed with and the Ministry of Public Security refers the cases directly to the Ministry of State Security for the imposition of punishment.

Today, the Constitution states that courts are independent and that judicial proceedings are to be carried out in strict accordance with the law; however, an independent judiciary and individual rights do not exist. The Public Security Ministry dispenses with trials in political cases and refers prisoners to the Ministry of State Security for punishment.

The Constitution contains elaborate procedural protections, and it states that cases should be heard in public and that the accused has the right to a defense; under some circumstances hearings may be closed to the public as stipulated by law. When trials are held, the Government apparently assigns lawyers. Reports indicate that defense lawyers are not considered representatives of the accused; rather, they are expected to help the court by persuading the accused to confess guilt. Some reports note a distinction between those accused of political crimes and common criminals and state that the Government affords trials or lawyers only to the latter. The Government considers critics of the regime to be "political criminals."

Numerous reports suggest that political offenses have in the past included such behavior as sitting on newspapers bearing Kim Il Sung's picture, or (in the case of a professor reportedly sentenced to work as a laborer) noting in class that Kim Il Sung had received little formal education. The KWP has a special regulation protecting the images of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. All citizens are required by this regulation to protect from damage any likeness of the two Kims. Beginning in the 1970's, the 10 Great Principles of Unique Ideology directed that anyone who tore or otherwise defaced a newspaper photo of either of the two Kims was a political criminal and punished as such. Defectors have reported families being punished because children had accidentally defaced photographs of one of the two Kims. Families must display pictures of the two Kims in their homes, and if local party officials find the family has neglected its photos, the punishment is to write self-criticism throughout an entire year.

A foreigner hired to work on foreign broadcasts for the regime was imprisoned for 1 year without trial for criticizing the quality of the regime's foreign propaganda. He was then imprisoned for 6 more years (with trial) shortly after his release for claiming in a private conversation that his original imprisonment was unjust. While Amnesty International has listed 58 political prisoners by name, the total number of political prisoners being held is much larger. Several defectors and former inmates reported that the total figure is approximately 150,000, while South Korean authorities stated the total figure is about 200,000.

The South Korean Ministry of National Unification reported to its National Assembly in October 1997 that North Korea held more than 200,000 political prisoners in camps where many had frozen or starved to death, and that famine may have worsened conditions. The report went on to describe the camps as having no electricity or heating facilities. The report claimed that those who attempted to escape were executed immediately. Most camps are located in remote mountain or mining areas. Some reports indicated an increase in the number of political prisoners as more persons had begun to complain more openly about the failure of the Government's economic policies.

According to press reports, in late December the Government announced its intention, effective January 1, 2002, to amnesty a number of persons sentenced to labor or reeducation for committing crimes against the state. The amnesty, the country's first in more than 20 years, reportedly is to mark the birthday of Kim Il Sung. It was not specified how many persons were to be amnestied or what crimes were covered by the amnesty.

Punishment for criminal behavior is determined by both the type of crime--political or nonpolitical--and the status of the individual. The underlying philosophy of punishment reflects both Marxist influences and Confucian moral precepts. According to the 1950 penal code, the purpose of punishment is explicitly Marxist: to suppress class enemies, educate the population in the spirit of "socialist patriotism," and reeducate and punish individuals for crimes stemming from "capitalist" thinking. However, the code's ambiguity, the clear official preference for rehabilitating individuals through a combination of punishment and reeducation, and additional severity for crimes against the state or family reflect the lack of distinction among politics, morality, and law in neo-Confucian thought.

Penalties for various types of crimes range from imprisonment, forced labor, banishment to remote areas, forfeiture of property, fines, loss of privileges or work status, and reeducation, to death. With the exception of political criminals, the objective is to return a reformed individual to an active societal role.

There are indications that criminal law is applied differentially. An accused person's class and category can have a substantial effect on treatment meted out by the justice system. The severity of punishment for common crimes such as rape, robbery, and homicide apparently is influenced by such considerations. There also is considerable leeway in the classification of crime; a robbery can be classified as either a common crime with minor punishment or a political-economic crime with far harsher punishment. The classification of crimes also is open to political considerations.

There apparently are several types of detention camps for convicted prisoners. Political criminals are sent to separate concentration camps managed by the State Security Department. Twelve such camps were reported to exist in 1991, holding between 100,000 and 150,000 prisoners and covering some 1,200 square kilometers. They are located in remote, isolated areas at Tongsin and H ich'n in Chagang Province; Onsng, Hoeryng, and Kyngsng in North Hamgyng Province; Tksng, Chongpyng, and Yodk in South Hamgyng Province; Yngbyn and Yongch'n in North P'yngan Province, and Kaech'n and Pukch'ang in South P'yngan Province. Convicted prisoners and their families are sent to these camps, where they are prohibited from marrying, required to grow their own food, and cut off from external communication (which was apparently once allowed). Detainees are classified as antiparty factionalists, antirevolutionary elements, or those opposed to Kim Jong Il's succession. There is conflicting information concerning whether individuals sent to these camps ever reenter society.

A second set of prisons, or camps, is concerned with more traditional punishment and rehabilitation. Prisoners sent to these camps can reenter society after serving their sentences. Among such camps are prisons, prison labor centers, travel violation centers, and sanatoriums. The basic prison is located at the city or province level; some seventeen of these prisons were identified in 1991. They are managed by the Ministry of Public Security for the incarceration of "normal" criminals.

Other types of prisons also exist. Labor prisons are found at the city or province level. Adult and youth centers house those convicted of normal criminal violations. There apparently are separate facilities for the incarceration of those who have attempted to violate travel restrictions or leave the country illegally. It is unclear, however, if these are in fact separate centers, or if those convicted of travel violations are placed in normal prisons. Lastly, minor political or ideological offenders or persons with religious convictions may be sent to sanatoriums where the offenses are treated as symptoms of mental disease. North Korean officials deny the existence of these camps, although they do admit to the existence of "education centers" for people who "commit crimes by mistake."

Today, prison conditions are harsh. International NGO's and defector sources contend that whole families, including children, are imprisoned together. "Reeducation through labor" is common punishment, consisting of forced labor, such as logging and tending crops, under harsh conditions. A small number of persons who claimed to have escaped from detention camps reported that starvation and executions are common. In one prison, clothing reportedly was issued only once in 3 years. Amnesty International has reported the existence of "punishment cells," too low to allow standing upright and too small for lying down flat, where prisoners are kept for up to several weeks for breaking prison rules. Visitors to North Korea report observing prisoners being marched in leg irons, metal collars, or shackles. Amnesty International also has received reports that in some places of detention, prisoners are given little or no food and, when they contract illnesses, are denied medical care. Amnesty International believes that many die of starvation and disease.

A former prison camp inmate who later defected to South Korea told the South Korean press that conditions in prison camps became more difficult as the food crisis worsened in the mid-1990s. With the food ration reduced to 2.6 ounces daily in 1996, 20 percent of the inmates in one camp died. Inmates were forced to find shelter in nearby mountains when authorities destroyed the camp's housing area in 1996 in anticipation of a visit by an international human rights group. The majority of prisoners in the camps were those who had contacted South Koreans, attempted to go to South Korea after defecting to China, those who studied abroad, and members of antigovernment groups.

In 1999 credible witnesses reported that prisoners held on the basis of their religious beliefs repeatedly were treated worse than other inmates were. One witness, a former prison guard, reported that those believing in God were regarded as insane, and the authorities taught that "all religions are opiates." He recounted an instance in which a woman was kicked severely and left lying on the ground for days, because a guard overheard her praying for a child who was beaten.

The Government normally does not permit inspection of prisons by human rights monitors.

There is no information available on violence against women.

The Constitution states that "women hold equal social status and rights with men." However, although women are represented proportionally in the labor force, few women have reached high levels of the party or the Government. In many small factories, the work force is predominantly female. Like men, working-age women must work. They are thus required to leave their preschool children in the care of elderly relatives or in state nurseries. However, according to the Constitution, women with large families are to work shorter hours. There were reports of trafficking in women and young girls among North Koreans crossing the border into China.

Social norms reflect traditional, family-centered values in which children are cherished. The State provides compulsory education for all children until the age of 15. However, some children are denied educational opportunities and subjected to other punishments and disadvantages as a result of the loyalty classification system and the principle of "collective retribution" for the transgressions of their parents.

Like others in society, children are the objects of intense political indoctrination; even mathematics textbooks propound party dogma. In addition, foreign visitors and academic sources report that children from an early age are subjected to several hours a week of mandatory military training and indoctrination at their schools. School children sometimes are sent to work in factories or in the fields for short periods to assist in completing special projects or in meeting production goals.

According to the WFP, the international community is feeding nearly every child under the age of 7 years. In some remote provinces, many persons over the age of 6 years reportedly appear to be suffering from long-term malnutrition. A nutrition survey carried out by UNICEF and the WFP in the aftermath of flood disasters found that 16 percent of children under 7 years of age suffered from acute malnutrition and that 62 percent suffered from stunted growth. In 1997 a senior UNICEF official said that approximately 80,000 children in North Korea were in immediate danger of dying from hunger and disease; 800,000 more were suffering from malnutrition to a serious but lesser degree.

In practice children do not enjoy any more civil liberties than adults. In June 1998, the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) released its concluding observations on a February 1996 report submitted by the Government, detailing its adherence to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. The UNCRC found that the Government's strategy, policies, and programs for children do not fully reflect the rights-based approach enshrined in the convention. The UNCRC also expressed concern over de facto discrimination against children with disabilities and at the insufficient measures taken by the state party to ensure that these children have effective access to health, education, and social services, and to facilitate their full integration into society.

In the fall of 1998, the NGO's Doctors Without Borders (DWB) and Doctors of the World closed their offices in the country because the Government reportedly denied them access to a large population of sick and malnourished children. DWB officials stated that they had evidence that orphaned and homeless children had been gathered into so-called "9-27 camps." These camps reportedly were established under a September 27, 1995 order from Kim Jong Il to "normalize" the country. Refugees who have escaped from the 9-27 camps into China have reported inhuman conditions.

Information about societal or familial abuse of children is unavailable. There were reports of trafficking in young girls among persons crossing the border into China.

There are no known laws specifically addressing the problem of trafficking in persons. There have been reports of trafficking in women and young girls among citizens crossing the border into China. Some were sold by their families as wives to men in China. A network of smugglers reportedly facilitates this trafficking. Many such women, unable to speak Chinese, are held as virtual prisoners. Many end up working as prostitutes.

Internet research assisted by Christine Chiuminatta and Nikki Kaith