Myanmar (Burma) was unified by Burman dynasties three times during the past millennium. The first such unification came with the foundation of the Pagan Dynasty in 1044 AD, which is considered the "Golden Age" in Burmese history. It is during this period that Theravada Buddhism first made its appearance in Burma, and the Pagan kings built a massive city with thousands of pagodas and monasteries along the Irrawaddy River. The Pagan Dynasty lasted until 1287 when a Mongol invasion destroyed the city. Ethnic Shan rulers, who established a political center at Ava, filled the ensuing political vacuum for a short time.

In the 15th century, the Toungoo Dynasty succeeded again in unifying under Burman rule a large, multi-ethnic kingdom. This dynasty, which lasted from 1486 until 1752, left little cultural legacy, but expanded the kingdom through conquest of the Shans. Internal power struggles, and the cost of protracted warfare, led to the eventual decline of the Toungoo.

The final Burman royal dynasty, the Konbaung, was established in 1752 under the rule of King Alaungpaya. Like the Toungoo Kings, the Konbaung rulers focused on warfare and conquest. Wars were fought with the ethnic Mons and Arakanese, and with the Siamese. The Burmese sacked the Siamese capital of Ayuthaya in 1767. This period also saw four invasions by the Chinese and three devastating wars with the British.

The British began their conquest of Burma in 1824, expanding their holdings after each of the three wars. At the end of the third war in 1885 the British gained complete control of Burma, annexing it to India. Under British control, which lasted until 1948, Burma underwent enormous change. The British established strong administrative institutions and reorganized the economy from subsistence farming to a large-scale export economy. By 1939 Burma had become the world's leading exporter of rice.

Burmese nationalists, led by General Aung San and 29 other "Comrades," joined the Japanese forces in driving out the British at the outbreak of World War II. However, the Burmese Army switched sides in mid-1945 and aided U.S. and British forces in their drive to Rangoon. After the war, the Burmese, with General Aung San at the helm, demanded complete political and economic independence from Britain. The British Government acceded to these demands. A constitution was completed in 1947 and independence granted in January 1948. General Aung San was assassinated with most of his cabinet before the constitution was put into effect.

During the weak constitutional period from 1948 to 1962 Burma suffered widespread conflict and internal struggle. Constitutional disputes and persistent division among political and social groups contributed to the democratic government's weak hold on power. In 1958, the military was invited in temporarily by Prime Minister U Nu to restore political order. The military stepped down after 18 months; however, in 1962 General Ne Win led a coup abolishing the constitution and establishing a xenophobic military government with socialist economic priorities. These policies had devastating effects on the country's economy and business climate.

In March 1988 student disturbances broke out in Rangoon in response to the worsening economic situation which evolved into a call for regime change. Despite repeated violent crackdowns by the military and police, the demonstrations increased in size as the general public joined the students. During mass demonstrations on August 8, 1988, military forces killed more than 1,000 demonstrators. It was at a rally following this massacre that Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of General Aung San, made her first political speech and assumed the role of leader of the opposition.

On September 18, 1988, the military deposed Ne Win's Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP), abolished the constitution, and established a new ruling junta called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). In an effort to "restore order," the SLORC sent the army into the streets to suppress the ongoing public demonstrations. An estimated additional 3,000 were killed, and more than 10,000 students fled into the hills and border areas.

The SLORC ruled by martial law until national parliamentary elections were held on May 27, 1990. The results were an overwhelming victory for Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) party, which won 392 of the 485 seats, even though she was under house arrest. However, the SLORC refused to call the Parliament into session and imprisoned many political activists.

The ruling junta changed its name to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997, but did not change its policy of autocratic control and repression of the democratic opposition. In 2000, the SPDC announced it would begin talks with the political opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi, who had been released once from house arrest in 1995, only to be detained once more. These talks were followed by the release of many political prisoners and some increase in political freedoms for Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. On May 6, 2002, she was allowed to leave her home and subsequently traveled widely throughout the country. On May 30, 2003, Aung San Suu Kyi and a convoy of her supporters were attacked by a group of government-affiliated thugs. Many members of the convoy were killed or injured and others remain unaccounted for. Aung San Suu Kyi and other members of her party were detained, and the military government forcibly closed the offices of the NLD. Although NLD headquarters is open, all the party’s other offices remain closed and Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD Vice Chairman U Tin Oo remain under house arrest.

On October 19, 2004, hard-line members of the senior leadership consolidated their power by ousting Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and removing him and his allies from control of the military intelligence apparatus. In late November 2004, the junta announced it would release approximately 9,000 prisoners it claimed had been improperly jailed by Khin Nyunt’s National Intelligence Bureau. As of early December 2004, it was unclear how many of the 9,000 had actually been released. However, of those who have been released, fewer than 50 appear to have been prisoners held for their political beliefs. One of those released was Min Ko Naing, a key figure in the 1988 demonstrations.

The central government has had a contentious relationship with ethnic groups calling for autonomy or secession for their regions since the country's independence. In 1948, only the capital city itself was firmly in control of the Rangoon authorities. Subsequent military campaigns brought more and more of the nation under central government control. Since 1990, the regime has signed a series of cease-fire agreements with insurgent groups, leaving only a handful still in active opposition.

Since independence in 1948, large numbers of ethnic insurgent groups have battled government troops for autonomy or independence from the Burman-dominated state. Since 1989, 17 groups have concluded cease-fire agreements with the Government. Under the agreements, the groups have retained their own armed forces and performed some administrative and economic functions within specified territories inhabited chiefly by members of their own ethnic groups.

However, a few groups maintained active resistance, including the Chin National Front, the Naga National Council, the Arakan-Rohingya Solidarity Organization, the SSA-South, the KNPP, and the KNU through its armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army. The largest of these, the KNU, began peace talks with the Government in December 2003 leading to a temporary ceasefire. However, there were credible reports of renewed attacks on villages in Karen State in September after the rainy season ended.

Beginning in mid-November there were credible reports that the army attacked Karen villages in Shwegyin Township, Nyaunglebin District, of western Karen State, burning houses and rice stores. An estimated 20,000 baskets of paddy rice were destroyed. As many as 4,781 civilians were displaced and were prevented from returning. The attacks ceased by the end of the year, but construction of three new military camps and the dislocation of civilians continued.

In November and December, there were credible reports of army attacks on civilians in Taungoo District, northern Karen State, which displaced more than 3,000 residents. Reportedly they were used as forced labor to construct roads into former KNU-held territory. These projects were ongoing at year's end.

There were credible reports from Mon Township of northern Nyaunglebin District, Karen State that local villagers were forced to tear down their homes and were then used as forced labor to construct a new army camp at Mawdalaw. Construction continued at year's end.

There were credible reports that attacks continued against civilian populations in Kayah State throughout the year. Army troops reportedly continued to pursue Karenni displaced persons who had fled to Taungoo and Papun Districts of northern Karen State.

An SSA-South source reported that in early August, Burmese Army troops harassed villagers in Lechar and Limkhay Townships, accusing them of being spies for the SSA-South.

In 2003, diplomatic representatives received credible first-hand accounts that in 2002, government troops tortured and detained seven Karen clergymen in Pa-an, Karen State, and in Mawlamyine, Mon State. The soldiers also confiscated 13 cows, 5 bullock carts, and household goods, and extorted money before burning down 2 churches and 11 houses. Two clergymen were held for 2 months before release and were forced to sign a statement saying they were not mistreated. The Government ordered the National Investigation Bureau, a division of the National Police Force, to investigate the incident; however, there was no information that the Government prosecuted any of the soldiers for the abuses.

Incidents of rape in conflict areas and other ethnic minority areas continued. In January, the Thai-based Human Rights Foundation of Monland issued a report documenting five cases of rape by elements of the Burmese Army during an offensive against ethnic rebels in southern Mon State that began in December 2003. The report also asserted that rape of local women was standard practice by Burmese Army troops, especially by the 299^th Light Infantry Brigade, which took three local Mon women per day to military bases to work, after which soldiers raped the women. The Government did not investigate any of the cases, despite their being documented, and failed to respond officially to the report.

In April, a report, "Shattering Silences," by the Thai-based Karen Women's Organization documented 125 instances of Burmese Army soldiers raping local women since 1988--including 3 cases in January and February. Reportedly half of the rapes were by high-ranking military officers. Of the cases documented, reportedly only one resulted in punishment. The Government refused to investigate these cases, and instead issued a statement that the report was an attempt to discredit and derail the Government's "Road Map to Democracy." Christian Solidarity Worldwide reported that on April 16, a Shan woman was gang-raped by Burmese Army soldiers near the Thai border.

NGOs reported that Burmese Army soldiers raped numerous women in Shan State and other ethnic regions in 2002 and 2003. In April 2003, a captain raped a 20-year-old woman in Shan State, while another soldier restrained her husband. The woman and her husband later reported the rape to SPDC authorities in the area; however, after no action was taken they began to fear for their safety and fled across the border to Thailand. In August 2003, a captain and 20 other soldiers gang-raped a woman in Shan State. The captain then threatened to punish the village headman and the villagers if anyone reported the rape. There was no information that the Government investigated these abuses.

During the year there were no Government investigations into the SHRF and Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN) 2002 report alleging that the Burmese Army used rape as a systematic weapon of war against the ethnic populations in Shan State.

The Government denied the SHRF/SWAN allegations of systematic rape and ordered three internal reviews. The Government stated it provided copies of its report on the investigations to the international community and to the UNSRHR. However, according to the UNSRHR, military and other government personnel with no special skills or experience in investigating human rights allegations undertook the investigations. Despite continued international pressure for independent assessments, these investigations reportedly consisted of prearranged, large, collective, and public meetings with local officials, organized by military personnel. The Government did not allow the UNSRHR to visit areas of conflict in Shan State to corroborate the information from his own interviews with refugees in Thailand. There were no new developments in the reported August 2002 rape of a 4-year-old child by an army captain in Yusomoso.

There is no information that the Government investigated or prosecuted anyone for the following rape cases in 2002: The case of two soldiers who beat and raped a woman doing laundry near Keng Tung Township and threw her unconscious into the river, the case of six or seven soldiers who reportedly raped two women in Mong Khak Township, or the hundreds of other cases reported by NGOs.

In central and southern Shan State, security forces continued to engage the SSA-South. The military maintained a program of forced relocation of villagers in that region that reportedly was accompanied by killings, rapes, and other abuses of civilians. AI reported in 2002 that 90 percent of the civilians from Shan State interviewed in Thailand said they had been subjected to unpaid forced labor by the military within the previous 18 months.

Despite ongoing abuses, Karen NGO sources indicated that human rights abuses in Karen State had declined significantly since the peace talks between the SPDC and the KNU began in December 2003.

There were no developments in the following cases from 2003: In June 2003, combined troops of the Burmese Army and a DKBA unit arrested and tortured a villager in Noeaw-lar village, Pa-an Township. When he later escaped, the troops extorted $450 (450,000 kyat) and a cow from his mother. In July 2003, soldiers extorted $200 (200,000 kyat) worth of food from the villagers in Sha-zi-bo village and abducted a woman from Zi-pyu-gon village. At year's end, it was not known if she had been released. Also in July 2003, in Nyaunglaybin district, government troops shot and killed a man from Thaw-nge-doe village, Kyauk-kyi Township, and took $50 (50,000 kyat) from his body.

From August until mid-October 2003, government soldiers reportedly forced villagers from Na Bue Township to porter ammunition and supplies and to act as mine sweepers for the troops. Many villagers and prisoners have been killed or injured from resulting landmine explosions.

According to a 2002 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, government troops conscripted children as young as the age of 11.

The Government did not allege any serious abuses by insurgent groups during the year, though it did blame Thai-based exile groups for several small bombs that exploded near the Rangoon central train station on June 26. Some members of the insurgent groups committed serious abuses in 2003. For example, according to a government report, the KNU blew up a cinema hall in May 2003 in Phyu Township, Bago Division, injuring 50 persons. The KNU denied responsibility. UNICEF, AI, and HRW reported that insurgent groups as well as government forces recruited child soldiers.

Burma is a resource-rich country with a strong agricultural base. It also has vast timber and fishery reserves and is a leading source of gems and jade. Tourist potential is great but remains undeveloped because of weak infrastructure and Burma's international image, which has been damaged by the junta's human rights abuses and oppression of the democratic opposition. The economy has been affected by U.S. sanctions, including 2003 bans on the importation of Burmese products into the U.S. and the export of financial services from the U.S. to Burma.

Long-term economic mismanagement under military rule has prevented the economy from developing in line with its potential. Burma experienced 26 years of socialist rule under the dictator, General Ne Win, from 1962-1987. In 1988 the economy collapsed, and pro-democracy demonstrators took to the streets. The military government violently put an end to the civil unrest and pledged to move toward a market-based economy. Although some aspects of economic policy have changed, the state remains heavily involved and additional, much needed reforms have not been forthcoming.

The regime's mismanagement of the economy has created a downward economic spiral. The vast majority of Burmese citizens now subsist on an average income that equates to about $225 per capita. Inflation, caused primarily by public sector deficit spending, stagnant wages, and the eroding value of the local currency (the kyat) have undermined living standards. The limited moves to a market economy have been accompanied by a significant rise in crony capitalism. A handful of companies loyal to the regime has benefited from policies that promote monopoly and privilege.

Agriculture, light industry, and transport dominate the private sector of Burma’s economy. State-controlled activity predominates in energy, heavy industry, and the rice trade. The military, through its commercial arms, also plays a major role in the economy.

Burma remains a primarily agricultural economy with 54% of GDP derived from agriculture, livestock and fisheries, and forestry. Manufacturing constitutes only 9% of recorded economic activity, and state industries continue to play a large role in that sector. Services constitute only 8% of GDP.

Foreign investment increased markedly in the early to mid-1990s, but has declined precipitously since 1999 due to the increasingly unfriendly business environment and mounting political pressure from Western consumers and shareholders. The government has tried hard to conserve foreign exchange by limiting imports and promoting exports. Published estimates of Burma's foreign trade (particularly on the import side) are greatly understated because of the volume of off-book, black-market, illicit, and unrecorded border trade.

In the near term, growth will continue to be constrained by poor government planning and minimal foreign investment. A number of other countries, including member states of the European Union, Canada, Australia, Japan, and Korea, have joined the United States in applying some form of sanctions against the regime.

Government economic statistics are unavailable or very unreliable. According to official figures, GDP growth has been over 10% annually since FY 1999-2000. However, the real numbers are likely much smaller. Burma's top export markets include Thailand, India, China, and Singapore. Burma's top export commodities include clothing, natural gas, wood and wood products, and fish and fish products.

Burma was the world's second-largest producer of illicit opium in 2003. Burma also has been the primary source of amphetamine-type stimulants in Asia, producing hundreds of millions of tablets annually. The Burmese Government has committed itself in recent years to expanded counternarcotics measures.

The Government has governed without a constitution since 1988. Constitutional support for religious freedom does not exist. Most religious adherents registered with the authorities generally were free to worship as they chose; however, the Government imposed restrictions on certain religious activities and promoted Buddhism over other religions in some ethnic minority areas. In practice, the Government also restricted efforts by Buddhist clergy to promote human rights and political freedom.

There were no reported incidents of religious violence during the year. However, in October and November 2003, there were several incidents of Buddhist-Muslim violence near Mandalay and in Rangoon. Muslim groups in Rangoon claimed that 11 persons were killed and 2 mosques were destroyed near Mandalay. It was unclear what sparked these clashes. Although it was slow to react to the incidents in Mandalay, the Government reacted quickly in Rangoon, sending troops into Muslim neighborhoods and imposing a strict curfew on Buddhist monasteries. This latter action caused resentment among many Buddhist monks, and the authorities arrested several monks for not observing the curfew. Overall, the Government arrested approximately 70 Buddhists, including 44 monks, and 70 Muslims for their participation in the violence. The fate of the monks and Buddhists is not known, but a Muslim group reported that in December 2003 a court sentenced 30 Muslims from near Mandalay to prison and sentenced 1 person to death for their role in the violence and the death of a senior Buddhist monk.

The Government's pervasive internal security apparatus sought to infiltrate or monitor meetings and activities of virtually all organizations, including religious ones. Religious activities and organizations also were subject to restrictions on freedom of expression and association.

Virtually all organizations, religious or otherwise, must be registered with the Government. Although an official directive exempted "genuine" religious organizations from registration, in practice only registered organizations were allowed to buy or sell property or open bank accounts. Thus, most religious organizations registered with the Government. In addition, the Government provided some utilities at preferential rates to recognized religious groups. There was no official state religion; however, the Government continued to show preference for Theravada Buddhism, the majority religion. For example, the Government continued to fund two state-run Buddhist universities in Rangoon and Mandalay. The Government also hosted the World Buddhist Summit from December 9-11.

The Government continued its efforts to control the Buddhist clergy (Sangha). It tried members of the Sangha for "activities inconsistent with and detrimental to Buddhism" and imposed on the Sangha a code of conduct that was enforced by criminal penalties. In a November report, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners in Burma estimated that there are approximately 300 monks and novices in Burma's prisons. In December 2003, 26 monks from Mahagandayon Monastery in Rangoon were defrocked and then sentenced by the Government to 7 to 18 years in prison for refusing to accept offerings from a senior military official. The Government also subjected the Sangha to special restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of association. The military Government prohibited any organization of the Sangha other than the nine state-recognized monastic orders under the authority of the State Clergy Coordination Committee (Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee). The Government prohibited all religious clergy from being members of any political party.

The Government continued to restrict the building of religious structures by minority religious groups and limited the educational and proselytizing activities of these groups.

In most regions of the country, Christian and Muslim groups that sought to build small churches or mosques on side streets or other inconspicuous locations occasionally were able to proceed, but only based on informal approval from local authorities. These groups reported that formal requests encountered long delays, generally were denied, and could be reversed by a more senior authority. In June, a Chin human rights group reported that a more senior military official reversed a local commander's decision to allow construction of a new Baptist church in southern Chin State.

The Government appeared to discriminate against non-Buddhists at the upper levels of the public sector. There are no non-Buddhist members in the SPDC, in the Cabinet, or among active flag rank officers of the armed forces. The Government actively discouraged Muslims from entering military service, and Christian or Muslim military officers who aspired to promotion beyond the rank of major were encouraged to convert to Buddhism. In some ethnic minority areas, such as Chin State, there were reports that the SPDC offered troops financial and career incentives to marry Christian Chin women, teach them Burmese, and convert them to Buddhism.

The Government discourages proselytizing by all clergy. Evangelizing religions, like some Christian denominations and Islam, were most affected by these restrictions. In general, the Government has not allowed permanent foreign religious missions to operate in the country since the mid-1960s, when it expelled nearly all foreign missionaries and nationalized almost all private schools and hospitals.

There continued to be evidence that Christian Chins were pressured to attend Buddhist seminaries and monasteries and were encouraged to convert to Buddhism. In April, an exile Chin human rights group reported that local authorities forced 15 Chin pastors to participate in Buddhist New Year events to demonstrate "unity" with Burman Buddhists. The same human rights group claimed that local government officials lodged the children of Chin Christians in Buddhist monasteries in which they were given religious instruction and converted to Buddhism without their parents' knowledge or consent. Reports suggested that the Government sought to induce members of the Naga ethnic group in Sagaing Division to convert to Buddhism by similar means.

Religious publications remained subject to control and censorship. Translations of the Bible and Koran into indigenous languages could not be imported legally; however, with the Government's permission, Bibles in indigenous languages could be printed locally.

Citizens and permanent residents of the country were required to carry Government-issued national registration cards that often indicated religious affiliation and ethnicity. There appeared to be no consistent criteria governing whether a person's religion was indicated on his or her identification card. Citizens also were required to indicate their religion on some official application forms, such as for passports.

U.S. citizens have been detained, arrested, tried, and deported for, among other activities, distributing pro-democracy literature, photographing sites and activities, and visiting the homes and offices of Burmese pro-democracy leaders. Burmese authorities have warned U.S. Embassy officials that those who engage in similar activities in the future will be jailed rather than deported. Should an emergency arise involving the detention of a U.S. citizen, especially outside of Rangoon, it may be difficult for U.S. Embassy personnel to assist quickly, because travel inside Burma can be slow and difficult.

Burma previously experienced major political unrest in 1988 when the military regime jailed as well as killed thousands of Burmese democracy activists. In 1990, the military government refused to recognize the results of an election that the opposition won overwhelmingly. Burma experienced major demonstrations in 1996 and 1998. In May 2003, individuals affiliated with the Burmese government attacked a convoy carrying opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in Sagaing Division. Dozens were killed or injured.

For the last decade, sporadic anti-government insurgent activity has occurred in various locations, such as an attack on a natural gas pipeline in the Tenasserim Division and bomb attacks against family members of senior military officials in Rangoon. Two small bombs exploded in downtown Rangoon in the spring of 2004. A similar event occurred in

Rangoon a year earlier.

Ethnic insurgencies still smolder in regions along the Thai-Burma border and anti-personnel landmines pose a danger. Occasional fighting between government forces and various insurgent groups has occurred in Chin and Rakhine states and along the Thai-Burma border area in Burma's southern Shan, Mon, and Karen states. From time to time, the Thai government has closed the border with Burma due to increases in insurgent activity. In January 2005, a major regional law enforcement initiative aimed at dismantling the operations of Southeast Asia's largest narcotics trafficking organization, the United Wa State Army, was announced. At that time, the Burmese government stated that it could not guarantee the safety of foreign officials or personnel from non-governmental organizations traveling or working in Was Special Region 2 (eastern Shan State).

Crime rates in Burma, especially toward foreigners, appear to be lower than those of many other countries in the region. Nevertheless, because of the difficult economic situation in Burma, the potential exists for an increase in street crime. Violent crime against foreigners is rare.

The Government reinforced its rule with a pervasive security apparatus. Until its dismantling in October, the Office of Chief Military Intelligence (OCMI) exercised control through surveillance, harassment of political activists, intimidation, arrest, detention, physical abuse, and restrictions on citizens' contacts with foreigners. After October, the Government's new Military Affairs Security (MAS) assumed a similar role, though apparently with less sweeping powers. The Government justified its security measures as necessary to maintain order and national unity. Members of the security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses

Unlike in previous years, there were no known instances of government-affiliated agents killing pro-democracy activists. In March, the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) reported a commander from Light Infantry Battalion 514 beat a civilian to death in front of a military checkpoint in Mong Kung Township, Shan State for refusing to provide his vehicle for forced labor.

In July, there was an unverified, but credible report that Maung Aye, a theft suspect, died after being beaten while in police custody.

The Government refused to investigate, or to take any responsibility for, the May 2003 attack by government-affiliated forces on an NLD convoy led by party leader Aung San Suu Kyi near the village of Depeyin. During the attack, the assailants used bamboo staves and metal pipes to kill or injure at least six pro-democracy supporters including four NLD members: San Myint, Tin Maung Oo, Thein Toe Aye, and Khin Maung Kyaw. Also killed were Min Zaw Oo, a student; and U Panna Thiri, a Buddhist monk. There were credible reports of two more victims who later died of their injuries. Villagers and survivors of the attack reported that the attackers might have killed as many as 70 pro-democracy supporters accompanying the NLD convoy, but there was no official verification of this number. By year's end, the fate of other injured persons, including 47 pro-democracy supporters from the convoy, remained unknown. Of the 10 missing NLD members injured in the attack, 8 fled to Thailand, 1 (Tun Aung Kyaw) died, and 1 remained in hiding.

According to credible reports, throughout the night following the attack, security forces clashed with and may have killed scores of villagers, students, and Buddhist monks in the villages surrounding the attack site. The Government did not acknowledge the alleged killings in the surrounding villages. Diplomatic observers received credible reports that 16 injured attackers were hospitalized at a military base in Monywa, Sagaing Division, and subsequently released on July 2. The Government did not credibly investigate any of the attacks.

Officials reportedly involved in the assault were not held accountable and in fact continued to be promoted. On October 19, Lieutenant General Soe Win, reportedly involved in planning the attack, was promoted to Prime Minister, the third highest-ranking position in the SPDC. Regional commander Major General Soe Naing, reliably reported to be responsible for executing the attack, was made commander of the Irrawaddy Division. Deputy Regional Commander, Brigadier General Ohn Myint, was promoted to commander of the military's Coastal Command.Reliable sources reported that Lieutenant Colonel Than Han, Chairman of Shwebo District, Sagaing Division Peace and Development Council, the senior regional political figure responsible for the attacks, was promoted to brigadier general and appointed director of Police Operations.

Similarly, there were no reports that the Government took action to investigate or prosecute soldiers involved in any of the 2003 killings reported by the SHRF and the KNU: two farmers accused of being or helping Shan soldiers in Namhsan Township, Shan State; a displaced farmer in Lai-Kha Town in Shan State; a farmer at a remote farm in Shan State; and two Karen village chiefs.

There also were no reports that the Government took action to investigate or prosecute soldiers involved in the following acts reported in 2002: the killing of 10 persons, including 6 children, and the injuring of 9 in Karen State; the robbery and killing of 6 civilians near the Thailand border in Shan State; and the killing of 10 villagers in Kholam, Shan State.

In August 2002, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) reported that army troops killed an official of the Free Trade Union of Burma (the Kawthoolei Education Workers Union).

There were several unverified reports of deaths due to security forces using civilians to clear landmines; however, reported incidents declined from previous years due to a temporary cease-fire between the Government and the KNU.

Some armed ethnic groups also reportedly committed killings during the year. According to the government newspaper, The New Light of Myanmar, on August 1, the Shan United Revolutionary Army killed five farmers in Namhsan Township.

Private citizens and political activists continued to "disappear" for periods ranging from several hours to several weeks or more, and many persons never reappeared. Such disappearances generally were attributed to authorities detaining individuals for questioning without informing family members and the army's practice of seizing private citizens for porterage or related duties, often without notifying family members. Diplomatic observers reported an improved response by police authorities to requests for information on missing or incarcerated individuals. No improvement was reported regarding requests for information directed to the military or military intelligence services. In many cases, individuals who were detained for questioning were released soon afterward and returned to their families.

In late January, Nyan Gyi, an NLD youth member from South Dagon Township, disappeared. Family members initially were unable to trace him, but eventually learned through the relative of another prisoner that he was in Insein prison and on trial. At year's end, he still was being denied access to family members and lawyers.

There was no further information on the 17 cases mentioned in a 2003 Amnesty International (AI) report of persons who disappeared while in Government detention in 2002.

The whereabouts of persons seized by military units to serve as porters, as well as prisoners transferred for labor or porterage duties, often remained unknown. Family members generally learned of their relatives' fates only if fellow prisoners survived and later reported information to the families.

There were no developments in the August 2003 case of a 15-year-old student and three or four other youths who disappeared from a Rangoon teashop and were believed to have been forcibly taken by the Government for military portering.

The abrogated 1974 Constitution did not provide for rights to privacy, and authorities infringed routinely on citizens' privacy rights. Through its pervasive intelligence network and administrative procedures, the Government systematically monitored the travel of all citizens and closely monitored the activities of many citizens, particularly those known to be active politically.

Forced entry without a court order is legal. The law requires that any person who spends the night at a place other than his registered domicile inform the police in advance. Any household that hosts a person not domiciled there must, according to the law, maintain and submit a guest list to the police. However, the law is selectively enforced. Security forces significantly increased surveillance of civilians following the May 2003 Depeyin attack and also after bombings that occurred in Rangoon during the year and in 2003. Ward-level SPDC officials stepped up unannounced nighttime checks of residences for unregistered visitors. During the year, the Government sentenced NLD party members Than Than Suu Win and Ye Myint to 7-days hard labor for failing to register as overnight guests while in Rangoon.

The judiciary is not independent of the Government. The SPDC appoints justices to the Supreme Court who, in turn, appoint lower court judges with the approval of the SPDC. These courts then adjudicate cases under decrees promulgated by the SPDC that effectively have the force of law. The court system includes courts at the township, district, state, and national levels.

During the year, the Government continued to rule by decree and was not bound by any constitutional provisions providing for fair public trials or any other rights. Although remnants of the British-era legal system formally were in place, the court system and its operation remained seriously flawed, particularly in regard to the handling of political cases. The misuse of blanket laws--including the Emergency Provisions Act, the Unlawful Associations Act, the Habitual Offenders Act, and the Law on Safeguarding the State from the Danger of Subversive Elements--and the manipulation of the courts for political ends continued to deprive citizens of the right to a fair trial. Pervasive corruption further served to undermine the impartiality of the justice system.

There is a fundamental difference between criminal and political trial procedures. Some basic due process rights, including the right to be represented by a defense attorney, generally were respected in criminal cases, but not in political cases that the Government deemed especially sensitive. In criminal cases, defense attorneys generally are permitted 15 days to prepare for trial, are permitted to call and cross-examine witnesses, and can be granted a 15-day delay for case preparation; however, their primary purpose is to bargain with the judge to obtain the shortest possible sentence for their clients. Reliable reports indicate that senior junta authorities dictate verdicts in political cases, regardless of the evidence or the law. Political trials are not open to the public.

None of the NLD members or the hundreds of pro-democracy supporters arrested in association with the May 2003 Depeyin attack were given public trials. In December 2003, police arrested Thet Lwin, a driver for a Canadian mining company, for driving his expatriate supervisor in the vicinity of the Rangoon residence of Aung San Suu Kyi. He was held incommunicado, and his family had to seek ICRC assistance to learn of his whereabouts. In February, a closed court sentenced Thet Lwin to 7 years in prison under a criminal charge (abuse of narcotics).

During the year, there was one new arrest of a lawyer with NLD connections (see Section 2.a). NLD members generally appeared to be able to retain the counsel of lawyers without fear of the lawyers being imprisoned; however, lawyers were not always told when trials would begin. Approximately 14 lawyers remained imprisoned at year's end. Most had been sentenced prior to 1998, when the Government made it easier for political prisoners to retain legal counsel.

During the year, the majority of political prisoners released had completed or nearly completed their sentences, or were in poor health. Senior military authorities dictated the release of political prisoners, and the Government required most political prisoners to sign a release form agreeing to serve the remainder of their terms if rearrested for any reason. For example, following the May 2003 attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members, the Government detained M.P.-elect Hla Min for 1 month, released him, and immediately re-imprisoned him to serve the remainder of a previous prison term. The Government released him again in late 2003.

At year's end, international officials with regular access to prisons reported that they have files on 3,600 individual prisoners whom they consider potentially vulnerable to abuse: security detainees, minors, foreign citizens and others in need of protection. Among these, there were some 1,500 "security detainees": political prisoners (approximately 1,300), arms merchants, violators of state security laws, and those accused of fostering religious disturbances. The last group had the largest increase during the year.

In late 2003 and early 2004, the Government released 24 NLD M.P.s-elect who had been arrested on and around May 2003, including: Dr. Zaw Myint Maung, Yaw Si, Khun Myint Htun, U Do Daung and Chit Htwe. Among the verifiable releases of long-term political prisoners by year's end were: on January 30, NLD M.P.-elect Myint Naing (incarcerated in 1991 for unlawful association); on June 4, two M.P.s-elect of the Mon National Democratic Front (MNDF) Dr. Min Soe Lin and Dr. Min Kyi and MNDF Executive Nai Ngwe Thein; on July 12, the Vice Chairman of the Arakan League for Democracy and journalist U Thar Ban; on July 15, former student leader Dr. Maung Maung Kyaw; on October 15 and November 1, respectively, student activists Htay Kywe and Dr. Ne Win; on November 19, student leader Min Ko Naing, NLD M.P.s-elect U Kyaw San, U Ohn Maung, U Toe Po, and Dr. May Win Myint. Other political prisoners were also released on November 19, November 26, and December 12. A total of 76 known political prisoners were freed in the three separate releases.

Three long-term political prisoners died shortly after their release from prison during the year. Dr. Than Nyein, an M.P.-elect from the NLD and the brother-in-law of former-Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt, had his 7-year prison term extended in September despite being terminally ill with liver cancer.

The Government granted Aung San Suu Kyi's brother authority to file a second suit against her seeking half ownership of the family compound. In 2002, the judge presiding over the case ruled that he had the right to inherit the property under Buddhist customary law. At year's end, the suit was ongoing. A final decision was postponed because the Government prohibited lawyers from having access to Aung San Suu Kyi.

There are laws that prohibit torture; however, members of the security forces reportedly tortured, beat, and otherwise abused prisoners, detainees, and other citizens. They routinely subjected detainees to harsh interrogation techniques designed to intimidate and disorient. In June, four members of the NLD were taken into custody, interrogated, and forced to stand on stools for 3 days. The four were forced to sign false written confessions that led to prison sentences of up to 15 years for violating the Emergency Provision Act of 1950, the Unlawful Association Act of 1908, and the Immigration Act of 1947 (amended in 1950 and 1962). The court ruled the three sentences would not have to be served consecutively, but rather the defendants would serve the longest of the three counts (7 years). The son of the most prominent member of this group also was taken into custody and beaten by OCMI agents before being released.

Prison and labor camp conditions generally remained harsh and life threatening; however, during the year, the ICRC reported the Government did a better job meeting standards set by existing regulations. The Department of Prisons operated approximately 35 prisons and approximately 70 labor camps throughout the country. In prisons, food, clothing, and medical supplies reportedly were in very short supply. Bedding consisted of a single mat on the floor. Prisoners were forced to rely on their families, who were allowed to visit once every 2 weeks for 15 minutes per visit, for basic necessities. Prisoners were held without being charged for weeks or months, and until a prisoner was officially charged with a crime, families could not visit or send critical supplementary food. HIV/AIDS infection rates in prison reportedly were high due to communal use of single syringes for injections and sexual abuse by other prisoners. In March, unverified reports indicated that the Government revoked access by prisoners to periodicals and television granted following a visit from the UNSRHR in 2003.

The Government continued to deny prisoners adequate medical care; however, the ICRC reported that a joint working group consisting of the ICRC, the Department of Prisons, and the Ministry of Health created a central medical service for all prisons. Ministry of Health professionals staffed the service with key personnel trained by the ICRC.

During the year, the health of several political prisoners deteriorated. On February 24, imprisoned student leader Htay Kywe suffered a life threatening deterioration in his health following a routine operation. He was released on October 26. Other prominent political prisoners who suffered deteriorating health included: student leader Ko Ko Gyi; NLD Members of Parliament-elect (M.P.s-elect) Dr. Than Nyein and U Naing Naing; and journalists Htwe Myint (released on December 11) and U Win Tin.

On December 8, Dr. Than Nyein, who suffers from liver disease, was not permitted to keep a previously scheduled doctor's appointment. Instead, he was transferred to Paungte Prison, where medical care is not available.

During the year, three prisoners died in custody.On January 28, Shwe Tin, an executive of a defunct political party, died at Taungoo Prison. Min Thu, a former student leader and a lawyer, died on June 12 at Insein Prison. The Prison Department authority did not inform family members of these deaths. On October 19, Zaw Myo Htet died from severe liver disease while in custody. In 2003, at least three political prisoners died in custody.

During the year, three political prisoners died of untreated medical conditions shortly after being released. On July 20, NLD member and artist Wa-ne Soe died of liver cancer within a month of his release. Shortly thereafter, Than Win died of liver cirrhosis. On July 25, well-known poet and NLD member Kyi Tin Oo died after an early release on March 26 due to liver complications contracted while in prison.

The health of Soe Win, an M.P.-elect for the pro-democracy Party for National Democracy, improved during the year, though he remains blind in one eye due to injuries received during detention in June 2003. In July 2003, the Government claimed he had attempted suicide, but did not provide any information or proof of an investigation into this case. In September 2003, 74-year-old Tin Aye, former Chairman of the University Student Union, died 1 month after the Government released him from a lengthy prison sentence. Aung Zaya, chairman of the Democratic Party for New Society, who was released in 2003 after 11 years in detention, became paralyzed from abuse and inadequate medical attention during his imprisonment; his ill health and disability continued during the year.

According to the Government, political detainees were separated from common criminals, juveniles from adults, and men from women. According to the ICRC, the Government's stated position was that political prisoners should not be subjected to hard labor.

During the year, the ICRC conducted periodic visits to all prisons in the country, with the goal of visiting each at least once a year. The ICRC reports that as a result of a constructive dialogue with the Government on prison problems it has the right to talk in private with prisoners; to make repeated visits as desired; and to have full access to prisoners. ICRC visits to labor camps began in March 2000 and continued during the year. There reportedly were approximately 70 camps, but many were temporary, existing only long enough to complete a specific work project. The Government allowed the ICRC to perform its traditional services, such as providing medications, delivering letters to and from prisoners, and providing support for family visits to prisoners.

During the year, the Government continued to rule by decree and was not bound by any constitutional provisions providing for fair public trials or any other rights.There is no provision in the law for judicial determination of the legality of detention, and the Government routinely used arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention. The Penal Code allows authorities to extend sentences after prisoners have completed their original sentence, and the Government makes regular use of this provision.

The police are auxiliary forces of the military and are under direct command of military officers. They primarily deal with common crimes and do not handle political crimes. The Myanmar Police Force is administratively under the Ministry of Home Affairs. Corruption and impunity were serious problems due to a government-imposed system whereby police were required to collect funds for their operations. Police typically required victims to pay substantial sums for crime investigations, and police often extorted money from the civilian population.

MAS (formerly OCMI) officers are responsible for arresting persons suspected of "political crimes" that are perceived to threaten or undermine the Government. Upon arrest, MAS/OCMI officers, or in some cases police officers, take prisoners to MAS/OCMI regional interrogation centers where MAS/OCMI officers interrogate the arrested person for a period ranging from hours to months and can charge the person with a crime at any time during the interrogation. A hood frequently was placed on those accused or suspected of political crimes upon arrest.

On December 3, Thet Naung Soe attempted to go on hunger strike in prison to demand the release of all political prisoners. His family tried to visit him, but the jailors showed them a note written in his own handwriting that he did not wish to meet his family at the time. A prison official indicated that Thet Naung Soe had refused food and was in the prison hospital.

The Government continued to arrest and detain citizens for extended periods without charging them, often under the Emergency Act of 1950, which allows for indefinite detention. In 2002, OCMI officers arrested Shwe Maung for making a symbolic golden hat for Aung San Suu Kyi and placed him in a dark cell for 4 months before charging him with "keeping stolen goods," and sentencing him in February 2003 to 3 years imprisonment.

On April 9, the Government sentenced 11 members of the Mandalay Division NLD to between 7 and 22 years in prison for "illegal association" with an exile group in Thailand. In early June, OCMI detained NLD Township Executive members from Magwe and Rangoon Divisions Than Than Htay and Tin Myint on similar charges. They were interrogated for several weeks before being transferred to Insein Prison. Later in June, authorities arrested Ye Ye Win, San Ya, and Ye Htet, members of NLD in Theinzayat Township in Mon State, accused them of contacting exile groups in Thailand, and held them incommunicado. In September, a court sentenced them to 7-years imprisonment. On September 24, Than Than Htay and Tin Myint, along with one other NLD member, were found guilty of violating three counts of Burmese law and sentenced to 7 years in prison. The Government had no credible evidence against them.

In-mid February, the OCMI transferred NLD Vice-Chairman U Tin Oo (arrested following the May 2003 Depeyin attack) from Kalay Prison, Sagaing Division, to his residence in Rangoon where he remains under house arrest. In mid-April, the Government released NLD Chairman U Aung Shwe and Secretary and Party Spokesman U Lwin from house arrest where they had been since the 2003 attack. Only Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo remain under house arrest. During the year, authorities further restricted the conditions of Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest by removing her personal security detail and limiting visits by her personal physician.

At year's end, the Government had released 151 of 153 arrested during and immediately following the Depeyin attack; however, in the months following the attack, the Government detained at least 270 additional NLD members, political supporters, and affiliated monks across the country. Some of them were charged with political crimes, and some were simply detained arbitrarily. At year's end, all but approximately 90 had been released.

On December 2, NLD representative Dr. Mying Naing was arrested for "reckless driving" and causing injury to a pedestrian in Shwebo, Sagaing Division. Although the victim admitted it was her fault, Dr. Mying Naing was sentenced to 3 months imprisonment. On December 2, NLD member U Kyaw Swe was arrested in Chaung Oo, Sagaing Division on charges of possessing an unregistered motorcycle and obstructing authorities in the line of duty. He was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment in Monywa Prison on December 8. On December 6, 11 NLD members from Bogalay Township, Irrawaddy Division were arrested for refusing to sign a statement that they would not hold an NLD celebration on National Day. On December 19, five NLD members were arrested for allegedly possessing and distributing a leaflet titled "An Appeal to the Masses," which was published by a dissident group in Mae Sot, Thailand.

In January 2003, the OCMI arrested two Buddhist nuns for shouting pro-democracy slogans and handing out pamphlets in front of the Rangoon City Hall and a third nun for opposing the arrest of her colleagues. Denied legal representation, the nuns were subsequently sentenced to 13 years in prison. In June 2003, OCMI officers arrested Myo Khin, Myat Gyi, Maung Maung Lay, and Ne Win of the Rangoon Division NLD for demanding that authorities reopen the NLD office in Bahan Township, Rangoon. Family members were denied access to them for months, and they reportedly were sentenced to 7 years in Insein Prison. Only after the convictions did the Government allow family members and lawyers to visit the prisoners. In September 2003, OCMI officers and local police arrested Phone Aung for demonstrating outside Rangoon City Hall calling for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. A court sentenced him in mid-December 2003 to 14 years at Insein Prison. He did not have legal representation during the judicial process, and was denied access to his family.

In 2002, the Government arrested at least 30 political activists in Rangoon including educator Hla Htut Soe, Buddhist monk U Veda (lay name, Maung Maung Aye), and 2 lawyers, U Aye and U Myint Yi. Also among those arrested was Hla Tun, an NLD M.P.-elect from the 1990 election who was not known to have been active in the NLD since he was released from prison in 1999. According to international press reports the Government sentenced approximately a dozen of the activists to prison terms of 3 to 22 years.

Elected M.P.s were harassed and pressured to resign. In northern Shan State, local authorities pressured Sai Tun Aung of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy to resign. Than Htay, an elected member (NLD) from Lashio, resisted pressure from the Government to leave his post. Consequently, local authorities arrested him and charged him with four counts of violating the Customs Act, the Export-Import Act, and the Wireless and Telegraph Act. The police arrested Than Htay because his son, who owned a legally registered shop selling electronic equipment, had sold an "illegal" cordless telephone and electronic equipment to a customer. Than Htay was not connected to his son's business operationally, although he owned the building in which it was located.

The Government routinely extends prison sentences under the Law Safeguarding the State from the Dangers of Subversive Elements. The Minister of Home Affairs has the right to extend unilaterally a prison sentence on six separate occasions for 2 months, that is, for up to 1 year. The SPDC Chairman, Senior General Than Shwe, can add 5 years to a sentence. In March 2003, Kyaw Hsan, a 74-year-old M.P.-elect and retired army colonel, completed his politically motivated 10-year prison term and was being released; however, when in sight of his family at the prison gate he was forced to return to his cell. He finally was released on November 19. In 2003, in Mandalay, 10 political prisoners, including Ne Win, Tin Aye Yu, Tin Myint, Tin Aye, Zarni Aung, Thein Than Oo, Kyaw Sein Maung, Naing Myint, Htay Nyunt, and Soe Myint, completed their terms, but were not released. Naing Myint was released on November 26. At various times in 2003 and during the year, the Government released prisoners being held under this law. At year's end, the Government was holding approximately 27 students and political activists in prison beyond the expiration of their sentences, including Ko Ko Gyi, who was reportedly in poor health.

Following the October ouster of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, the SPDC initiated three prisoner releases. In November and December, the SPDC released 14,318 convicts, citing "improper deeds" of the disbanded OCMI. Only 76 of those released were considered political prisoners.

Credible reports indicate that most, if not all, of the 90 remaining political prisoners arrested formally in connection with the May 2003 Depeyin attack have been sentenced. However it is possible that the Government is holding some indefinitely, without formal sentencing, under the Law Safeguarding the State from the Danger of Subversive Elements. The ICRC restored family links for most of those detained in connection with the May 2003 attacks.

Authorities continued to detain private citizens and political activists, some of whom disappeared, at times temporarily

Domestic violence against women, including spousal abuse, is a problem; however, because the Government did not release statistics regarding spousal abuse or domestic violence, it is difficult to measure.

Rape is illegal; however, spousal rape is not a crime unless the wife is under 12 years of age. Married women often lived in households with extended families, where social pressure tended to protect the wife from abuse. The Government did not release statistics regarding rape; however, the Government stated that rape was not common in populous urban areas, but occurred more often in remote areas. Nonetheless, it was generally considered unsafe for women to travel during hours of darkness without a male escort and employers typically had to supply a bus or truck to return female workers to their homes at night. Use of taxis at night was considered particularly hazardous for women because of the risk of rape or robbery. Prostitutes traveling at night typically must pay substantial additional fees to taxi operators or risk being raped, robbed, or turned over to the police. There are credible reports from NGOs and diplomatic sources that prostitutes taken into police custody were sometimes raped or robbed by the police. Incidents of rape in conflict areas and other ethnic minority areas continued.

Prostitution is prohibited by law and punishable by 3 years in prison; however, it was growing in prevalence, particularly in some of Rangoon's "border towns" and "new towns," which were populated chiefly by poor families that were relocated forcibly from older areas of the capital. In 2003, there were credible reports that a large number of female prostitutes were imprisoned and subjected to abuse while incarcerated. The Government and at least one international NGO operated schools and other rehabilitation programs for former prostitutes.

There were no laws against sexual harassment.

Consistent with traditional culture, women kept their names after marriage and often controlled family finances. However, women remained underrepresented in most traditional male occupations, and women continued effectively to be barred from a few professions, including the military officer corps. Poverty affected women disproportionately. Women did not receive equal pay for equal work on a consistent basis. Women legally were entitled to receive up to 26 weeks of maternity benefits; however, in practice these benefits often were not accorded them.

There were no independent women's rights organizations, though there were several with some relationship to the Government. The Myanmar National Committee for Women's Affairs (and its subgroup the Myanmar National Working Committee for Women's Affairs), in the Ministry of Social Welfare, had branches in all 14 states and divisions and was the primary government organization responsible for safeguarding women's interests. The Myanmar Women's Affairs Federation, established in December 2003 and chaired by the wife of Prime Minister Lieutenant General Soe Win, was the primary "nongovernmental" women's rights organization. The Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association, a government-controlled agency, provided assistance to mothers. The Myanmar Women Entrepreneurs' Association, a professional society for businesswomen, provided loans to women for starting new businesses.

Children under the age of 18 constituted approximately 40 percent of the population. Children were at high risk as destitute parents take them out of school to beg or to work in factories and teashops. Some were placed in orphanages. With few or no skills, increasing numbers of children worked in the informal economy or in the streets where they were exposed to drugs, petty crime, risk of arrest, sexual abuse and exploitation, and HIV/AIDS.

There was no adequate child protection or juvenile justice system. Efforts in this regard are severely constrained by lack of resources. The Department of Social Welfare (DSW) was in charge of the provision of limited social welfare services, and there were only a few officially appointed social workers.

The Government cooperated with the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child. In June, the Committee's chairman visited the country. UNICEF reported close working relationships with the DSW and the Ministry of Education, where it worked to support primary education and instruction in minority languages. Faith-based organizations, Buddhist monks and nuns, and private community-based groups also provided educational and other support for children.

The Government continued to allocate minimal resources to public education. According to the latest available statistics, in fiscal year 2003-04 (April-March), official expenditures for all civilian education were equivalent to 1.3 percent of the Government budget. Public schooling was ostensibly provided free through the 10th standard (around age 16). However, on average, public school teachers' pay was equal only to approximately $7 (7,000 kyat) per month, far below subsistence wages, forcing many teachers to leave the profession, or demand payments from their students. Thus, many families had to pay to send their children to school, even at the primary level. In some areas where families were not able to afford unofficial payments, teachers generally ceased work. In response to official neglect, private institutions began to provide assistance in education, despite a legal ban on private schools.

Education is compulsory through the 4th standard. UNICEF reports that 50 percent of primary school students drop out of school before finishing the 4th standard. Rates of school attendance and educational attainment decreased during the year, largely due to rising formal and informal school fees as the Government diverted expenditures from health and education to the armed forces. There was no difference in the attendance rate of boys and girls.

The Government promoted Buddhist monastic schools in rural areas and subsidized Buddhist universities in Rangoon and Mandalay. In ethnic minority areas, the Government often banned teaching in local languages.

Children also suffered greatly from the Government's severe neglect of health care. Although the Government doubled its budget for the Ministry of Health in FY 2003-04, it still amounted to only 1.2 percent of total Government expenditures. There were no reports that the Government discriminated between boys and girls in the provision of health care. In 2001, the latest data available, official studies sponsored by U.N. agencies found that, on average, 109 of 1,000 children died before reaching the age of 5 years, and that only 1 out of 20 births in rural areas was attended by a doctor. A joint Ministry of Labor and U.N. Populations Fund (UNFPA) study in 2001 indicated that, among children under 5 years of age, 7.9 percent were severely malnourished. A joint Ministry of Health and UNICEF report in 2000 indicated that on a national level 35.3 percent of children under 5 are moderately to severely underweight, 33.9 percent are moderately to severely underdeveloped, and 9.4 percent are moderately to severely emaciated. The World Health Organization considered the country's health care system to be extremely poor.

The law prohibits child abuse. The Government stated that child abuse was not a significant problem; however, the Government did not release supporting statistics. On May 26, the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child met to consider the country's second periodic report. The Committee issued its concluding observations on June 4, noting that it remained "seriously concerned at the lack of appropriate measures, mechanisms, and resources to prevent and combat domestic violence, including physical and sexual abuse and neglect of children; the limited number of services for abused children; as well as the lack of data on the aforementioned."

Child prostitution and trafficking in girls for the purpose of prostitution--especially Shan girls who were sent or lured to Thailand--continued to be a major problem. In Rangoon and Mandalay, diplomatic representatives noted widespread employment of female prostitutes who appeared to be in their early teens and for whom there was reportedly a high demand. Additionally, some brothels offered young teenage "virgins" to their customers for a substantial additional fee. The June U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child report commented: "The Committee is concerned over the increasing number of child victims of sexual exploitation, including prostitution and pornography, especially among those engaged in child labor and street children. Concern is also expressed at the programs for the physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of child victims of such abuse and exploitation which remain insufficient and inadequate."

The official age of enlistment in the army is 18 years. In the past, army recruitment drives have targeted children to meet quotas for the ostensibly all volunteer army, but anecdotal evidence, at least in Rangoon, suggests this practice is now not as common. Nevertheless, there was evidence of forced recruitment of child soldiers by the army.

Ethnic minority cease-fire and insurgent groups also forcibly conscripted child soldiers, and there were numbers of child soldiers with these forces, particularly the United Wa State Army.

In his report on January 5, the UNSRHR expressed "deep concern about reported cases of boys forcibly recruited by the military… they range in age from 14 to 16 years old and were sent to support military activities in some ethnic area." He further noted, "worrying indications that… this practice may be widespread among government troops as well as among insurgent armies." On that same day, the Government established the Committee for Preventing Recruitment of Child Soldiers, which met again on August 4 and purportedly issued new rules and regulations to punish those who recruit child soldiers. In March, diplomatic observers received a report that the authorities had arrested more than a dozen children in Rangoon and forced them into military service.

In March and April, the ILO notified the Government of nine allegations of forced recruitment of children into the military. Two of the cases involved boys who had been sentenced to prison, or who were facing court martial for desertion. The Government investigated and reported to the ILO on eight of these cases, but claimed no incidents of forced recruitment. In two cases, the military released the boys who returned home, but there was no further action. In five cases the Government insisted the boys were above 18 years old. The Government was unable to find one of the alleged child soldiers.

The June U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child report welcomed the establishment of the Government's child soldier committee, but noted the Committee remained "concerned by the impact of the armed conflicts on children, especially the use of children below the age of 15 years as soldiers by both government armed forces and armed ethnic groups."

According to a U.N. source, on November 12, a military conscription unit of three soldiers visited Se Ywa village of Thongwa Township, Rangoon Division. Four youths were required to accompany the soldiers to the military conscription center at Mingaladon, Thongwa Township. Residents say that the youths were subsequently sent to Military Training Center No. 6 in Pathein. The parents of the students filed complaints with the Government's Committee for Preventing Recruitment of Child Soldiers.

A 14-year-old boy was picked up by a trishaw driver while en route home from school in November 2002 and "enlisted" in the Army. The boy's parents wrote to the newly established Committee for Preventing Recruitment of Child Soldiers in April and were able to trace their son to an Army post in Lashio (Shan State). His Battalion Commander was subsequently ordered by the Directorate of Military Training to send the young soldier to a Military Language School in Shan State. The parents now know where their son is located, although he is not with them.

In 2002, an M.P.-elect from Karen State filed a police report that a 15-year-old boy was missing minutes after arriving in Rangoon railway station. The Rangoon police suggested looking for him at the Hmawby army recruit camp near Rangoon, where the M.P.-elect found three sets of parents also looking for their children. Six boys were brought forward and the M.P.-elect was able to identify and retrieve the boy.

Several international NGOs and agencies promoted the rights of children in the country, including ICRC, World Vision, Save the Children UK, CARE, UNICEF, the U.N. Development Program, and foreign governments. UNICEF expanded its operations in May to open a separate child protection section. On July 12-13, UNICEF, in conjunction with the Supreme Court of Burma, ran a "National Workshop on Juvenile Justice and Child Protection" that concluded an action plan aimed at strengthening the existing juvenile justice system.

The law sets a minimum age of 13 for the employment of children, but in practice the law was not enforced. Child labor has become increasingly prevalent and visible. Working children were highly visible in cities, mostly working for small or family enterprises. In the countryside, children worked in family agricultural activities. Children working in the urban informal sector in Rangoon and Mandalay often began work at young ages. In the urban informal sector, child workers were found mostly in food processing, street vending, refuse collecting, light manufacturing, and as tea shop attendants. According to 2002 official statistics, 6 percent of urban children worked, but only 4 percent of working children earned wages; many were employed in family enterprises.

The law does not prohibit trafficking in persons; however, there are laws that are used against traffickers, such as those that prohibit kidnapping; and, the Suppression of Prostitution Act and the Child Law, which include provisions against the sale, abuse, or exploitation of children.

There are laws specifically against child prostitution and child pornography; however, they were not effectively enforced. An NGO reported in May that the Government arrested, tried, and convicted a foreigner for sexual abuse of a child. This was reportedly the first such conviction. Reports from Thailand indicated that the rising incidence of HIV infection there increased the demand for supposedly "safer," younger prostitutes, many of whom came from Burma. Trafficking in children within the country also appeared to be a growing problem; however, there were no reliable statistics regarding its extent.

According to the Government, 335 traffickers received jail sentences ranging from under 5 years (78) to life imprisonment (2) from July 2002-July 2004. The largest number (177) received sentences of between 5 and 10 years. According to government figures, 412 cases were filed during the same period, resulting in 166 convictions. Government data show Thailand as the primary destination for trafficking victims (nearly 80 percent), with much smaller numbers going directly to China, Bangladesh, and India. The Ministry of Home Affairs also reported that it had distributed information about human trafficking to some 702,000 persons living in border areas during the period, 2001-2004.

Officials recognized the importance of preventing trafficking and prosecuting traffickers. Although the Government was active on these fronts, its effectiveness was unclear at year's end. The Government expanded cooperation with international and local NGOs. On April 28, the Government issued the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters law, which allows for international cooperation to pursue transnational crime (including trafficking). Over the course of the year, the Government hosted ministerial-level meetings, in coordination with the U.N., with countries in the region to discuss the problem of trafficking in persons.

The Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking met in Rangoon, October 27-29, to sign a Memorandum of Understanding pledging mutual cooperation on the problems involved and to develop a related action plan. Senior government and cabinet-level officials from Burma, Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam all participated.

During the year, U.N. agencies and NGOs credited the Government for demonstrating political will to combat trafficking and for improvement in cooperation with the international community. In March, the Government formed a new office of Transnational Organized Crime, headed by a police brigadier general to handle nonnarcotics related transnational crimes. This office includes a 40-person unit responsible for trafficking in persons.

The Government made limited progress on trafficking in persons during the year. The Government's pervasive security controls, restrictions on the free flow of information, and lack of transparency prevented a meaningful assessment of trafficking in persons activities in the country. While experts agreed that human trafficking from the country was substantial, no organization, including the Government, was able or willing to estimate the number of victims. The Government did not allow an independent assessment of its reported efforts to combat the problem.

Trafficking of women and girls to Thailand and other countries, including China, India, Bangladesh, Taiwan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Japan, and countries in the Middle East for sexual exploitation, factory labor, and as household servants, was a problem. Shan and other ethnic minority women and girls were trafficked across the border from the north; Karen and Mon women and girls were trafficked from the south. There was evidence that internal trafficking generally occurred from poor agricultural and urban groups to areas where prostitution flourished (trucking routes, mining areas, and military bases) as well as along the borders with Thailand, China, and India. Men and boys also reportedly were trafficked to other countries for sexual exploitation and labor. While most observers believed that the number of these victims was at least several thousand per year, there were no reliable estimates.

Human traffickers appeared to be primarily free-lance, small-scale operators using village contacts that fed into more established trafficking "brokers."

The Ministry of Home Affairs stated there is no complicity of Government officials in trafficking; however, corruption among local government officials was widespread and NGOs reported that Government officials were complicit in trafficking, although it appears limited to local or regional officials turning a blind eye to trafficking activities. NGOs also report that individual Burmese police officials were likely involved in extorting money from economic migrants and others leaving the country.

In recent years, the Government has made it difficult for single women to obtain passports or marry foreigners ostensibly to reduce the outflow of women as victims of trafficking. In addition, there are regulations forbidding females under the age of 25 from crossing the border unless accompanied by a guardian. However, most citizens who were forced or lured into prostitution crossed the border into Thailand without passports. According to the Department of Social Welfare, the Government has begun to help locate families of trafficking victims and to assist in their repatriation.

The Government has a repatriation center on the Thai-Burma border, which has processed an estimated 10,500 illegal migrants (not just trafficking victims) since 2001. In May, three female trafficking victims were repatriated from Malaysia and six from Thailand and reunited with their families. On August 10, 20 female victims were repatriated from Thailand.

The Myanmar Women's Affairs Federation and the Social Welfare Department provided some counseling and job training for trafficking victims before they were returned to their families. The Social Welfare Department also provided training to Government officials on the recognition and provision of assistance to victims of human trafficking. The Government provided medical attention and shelter to trafficking victims returning from Thailand. However, Government funding for these programs was very limited. There were no reports of victims being arrested after their return to Burma. There were no reports of trafficking victims filing suit against traffickers.

A number of NGOs offered poverty alleviation and education programs designed to counter trafficking. Reportedly these programs have been moderately successful. On May 18-19, UNICEF organized with several government entities, U.N. agencies, and NGOs, a workshop on "Monitoring and Combating Trafficking and Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children." The workshop was aimed at expanding awareness of trafficking among involved government agencies and developing strategies for intervention.

Burma is the world's second largest producer of illicit opium and the second largest cultivator of opium poppy. The gap between Burma and the number one producer of illicit opium and number one cultivator of poppy, Afghanistan, increased considerably in 2003. Burma remains the primary source of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) in Asia, producing hundreds of millions of tablets annually. Although still a major producer of illicit opium, Burma's overall production in 2003 declined substantially for the seventh straight year. According to the joint U.S./Burma opium yield survey, opium production in Burma totaled no more than 484 metric tons in 2003, down more than 23 percent from a year earlier, and a fraction of the 2,560 metric tons produced in Burma in 1996. Burma's opium is grown predominantly in Shan State, in areas controlled by former insurgent groups. Since the mid-1990s, however, the government has elicited "opium-free" pledges from each cease-fire group and, as these pledges have come due, has stepped up law enforcement activities in areas controlled by these groups. The ethnic Wa group in northeastern Shan State has pledged to end opium production and trafficking at the end of the 2005 poppy harvest, but the government has been unable to curb the Wa's current cultivation and production activities. Wa cultivators now account for approximately 52 percent of Burma's total poppy crop. Major Wa traffickers continue to operate with apparent impunity, and United Wa State Army (UWSA) involvement in methamphetamine production and trafficking remains a serious concern. During the 2003 drug certification process, the USG determined that Burma had "failed demonstrably" to meet its international counternarcotics obligations.

Over the past several years, the Burmese government has extended significantly its counternarcotics cooperation with other countries. In 2001, it signed counternarcotics Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with both China and Thailand, and has joined with China in annual joint operations in the northern and eastern Shan State, which resulted in the destruction of several major drug trafficking rings, including a group that the Chinese called one of the largest "armed drug smuggling groups in the Golden Triangle area." Cooperation with Thailand increased considerably in 2003 as the Thai government pursued an aggressive domestic "drug-free" policy. The Thai Prime Minister and other cabinet-level officials visited Burma in 2003 to discuss counternarcotics cooperation with senior leaders of the Burmese military government. Burma is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Burma is the world's second largest producer of illicit opium. However, eradication efforts, enforcement of poppy-free zones, alternative development, and a sharp shift towards synthetic drugs in consumer countries have combined to depress cultivation levels for the past three years. 2003 was the first year that weather was not a major factor in the declining poppy cultivation trend. According to the joint U.S./Burma opium yield survey, the total land area under poppy cultivation in Burma was 47,130 hectares in 2003, a 39 percent decrease from the 77,700 hectares under cultivation in 2002. Estimated opium production in Burma totaled approximately 484 metric tons in 2003, a 23 percent decrease from 630 metric tons in 2002, and less than one fifth of the 2,560 metric tons produced in Burma in 1996 (an 81 percent decline in seven years). Although climate was not a factor in declining cultivation in 2003, improved weather conditions during critical growth periods did improve yields for the region's poppy farmers. In 2003, yields rose to 10.3 kilograms/hectare, a substantial increase from the previous year (estimated at 8.1 kilograms/hectare) and a return to the robust yields of the early and mid-1990s, though still below the peak level recorded in 1996.

Burma plays a leading role in the regional traffic in ATS. Drug gangs based in the Burma/China and Burma/Thailand border areas annually produce several hundred million methamphetamine tablets for markets in Thailand, China, and India on the basis of precursors imported from neighboring states. Burma itself does not have a chemical industry and does not produce any of the precursors for methamphetamine or other artificial drugs. In 2003 there were troubling signs that a nascent domestic market for ATS began to emerge in Burma, although deteriorating economic conditions will likely stifle significant growth in consumption. During the first ten months of 2003, ATS seizures totaled fewer than 4 million tablets, a decline from previous modest levels of approximately 10 million tablets seized per year. Aside from these seizures, the government did not take significant steps to stop ATS production and trafficking.

Opium, heroin, and ATS are produced predominantly in Shan State, in areas controlled by former insurgent groups. Starting in 1989, the Burmese government negotiated a series of individual cease-fire agreements, allowing each group limited autonomy and a measure of development assistance in return for peace. Initially, these agreements permitted the former insurgents to continue their narcotics production and trafficking activities in relative freedom, reflecting, in many cases, the Burmese government's lack any other option in the short run. Since the mid-1990s, however, the Burmese government has elicited "opium-free" pledges from each cease-fire group and, as these pledges have come due, has stepped up law-enforcement activities against opium/heroin in the respective cease-fire territories. Although virtually the entire opium crop is cultivated in the eastern Shan State, there is also minor and widely scattered cultivation in the States of Chin, Kachin, and Kayah and in Sagaing Division. This cease-fire process has not had an impact on Burma's status as the major regional producer of ATS tablets, the current drug of abuse of choice in most regional markets.

In 2003, the Burmese government continued its counternarcotics activities, primarily poppy crop eradication, in the Kokang region of northeastern Shan State controlled by Peng Jiasheng's Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). The MNDAA had pledged to be opium-free by 2000. The government applied only modest pressure on the Wa in 2003, claiming it cannot crack down faster because the Wa's opium-free pledge does not come due until the end of the 2005 poppy harvest. Premature action against the Wa, the government claims, would jeopardize Burma's national security, as the UWSA is a formidable military force. Under the terms of the cease-fire agreements, the Wa and other groups involved in the drug trade are largely immune from government action. Burmese troops cannot enter Wa territory without permission from the UWSA and the GOB is unwilling to risk confronting the Wa, a potent organization with a well-manned and well-trained military force. However, the government continued a more aggressive stance on the travel of officials in Wa territory, merely informing UWSA officials of such visits rather than seeking advance permission. Nevertheless, the government has yet to put significant pressure on the Wa to stop illicit drug production or trafficking, and the Wa are the major manufacturers and traffickers of ATS pills.

UNODC and joint USG/GOB 2003 opium poppy survey results demonstrated partially effective enforcement of poppy-free zones, but may also indicate a shift toward synthetic drugs. Substitute crops and alternative development projects that seek to provide farmers economically viable alternatives to poppy cultivation have not, on their own, truly "replaced" opium production and its profitability, as a source of income for growers.

A domestic market for the consumption of ATS also emerged in Burma, a disturbing trend that, although less significant than other societal woes, could prove to be a destabilizing factor in the long-term. The UNODC estimated that in 2003 there were at least 15,000 regular ATS users in Burma. No ATS labs were reported destroyed in 2003.

Burma has a small, but growing drug abuse problem. While the government maintains that there are only about 70,000 registered addicts in Burma, surveys conducted by UNODC, among others, suggest that the addict population could be as high as 300,000 (i.e., still less than 1 percent of the population), with opium the major source of addiction (135,000 regular users of heroin, including up to 30,000 intravenous drug users). Recreational use of illicit drugs, including ATS, is on the rise. There is also a growing HIV/AIDS epidemic, linked in part to intravenous drug use. According to surveys, 57 percent of all intravenous drug users in Burma have tested positive for the HIV/AIDS virus. Infection rates are highest in Burma's ethnic regions, and specifically among mining communities in those areas, where opium, heroin, and ATS are readily available.

Money laundering is also an area of concern. In November 2003 the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) called upon member countries to impose countermeasures against Burma for its failure to pass a mutual legal assistance law and its failure to issue regulations to accompany the "Control of Money Laundering Law" passed in 2002. Burma responded by releasing new money laundering regulations on December 5, 2003, but has yet to address the mutual legal assistance law issue.

Burma's official 15-year counternarcotics plan calls for the eradication of all narcotics production and trafficking by 2014, one year ahead of an ASEAN-wide plan of action that calls for the region to be drug-free by 2015. The plan is to proceed by stages, with eradication efforts coupled to alternative development programs in individual townships, predominantly in Shan State. Altogether, the GOB identified 54 townships for the programs and targeted 25 of them during the first five years of the program.

The government has received limited international assistance in support of these efforts. The most significant multilateral effort is the UNODC's Wa Alternative Development Project (WADP), which is financed by the United States, Japan, and Germany. A five-year, $12.1 million program, this supply-reduction project encourages alternative development in a small portion of the territory controlled by the United Wa State Army. UNODC extended the project from 2003 until 2005 and expanded the number of villages targeted for community development work from 4 to 16. Also in 2003, the UNODC and the Japanese government announced plans to establish an intervention in the Wa and Kokang areas (dubbed "KOWI"), aimed at supporting the humanitarian needs of farmers who have abandoned poppy cultivation. A joint humanitarian assessment team, consisting of UN agencies and NGOs, traveled to the Kokang and Wa areas earlier in the year and concluded that farmers who had abandoned poppy cultivation had lost up to 70 percent of their income and were increasingly susceptible to disease, internal displacement, and food insecurity. Several international NGOs have partnered with the UNODC to develop an assistance response to this problem; Japan and Italy were early donors.

Bilateral counternarcotics projects include a small, U.S.-financed project in northern Shan State (Project Old Soldier) and a substantial Japanese effort to establish buckwheat as a cash crop in the Kokang and Mong Ko regions of northeastern Shan State. No U.S. counternarcotics funding directly benefits or passes through the GOB. The Thai government has since 2001 extended its own alternative development projects across the border into the Wa-controlled Southern Military Region of Shan State. Burma, India, China, Laos, and Thailand agreed on cross-border cooperation targeted on the flow of narcotics precursor chemicals among the countries of the Mekong river sub-region.

The GOB supported a UNODC effort in 2001 to form a "Civil Society Initiative" (CSI) to conduct awareness activities and programs regarding the dangers of drug abuse and HIV/AIDS. The CSI, which partnered with NGOs and local celebrities, held a successful counternarcotics concert and marathon in 2002. However, to avoid large concentrations of young people at a single event the GOB failed to support a two-day counternarcotics music festival in 2003, which was subsequently canceled.

The Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC)—which is comprised of personnel from various security services, including the police, customs, military intelligence, and the army—leads drug-enforcement efforts in Burma. CCDAC now has 18 drug-enforcement task forces around the country, with most located in major cities and along key transit routes near Burma's borders with China, India, and Thailand. As is the case with most Burmese government entities, CCDAC suffers badly from a lack of adequate resources to support its law-enforcement mission.

Summary statistics provided by Burmese drug officials indicate that during the first ten months of 2003 Burmese police, army, and the Customs Service together seized approximately 1,247 kilograms of raw opium, 488 kilograms of heroin, 78 kilograms of marijuana, 102 kilograms of methamphetamine powder, 156 kilograms of morphine, and 4.5 million methamphetamine pills. Opiates seized during 2003 represent less than 2 percent of this year's opium harvest. This compares with seizures during all of 2002 of 1,631 kilograms of raw opium, 285 kilograms of heroin, and 8.8 million methamphetamine pills. Heroin seizures, almost double the previous year's seizures, were at the highest levels since 1997. Seizures of ATS in 2003 continued a downward trend and may be related to adjustments in trafficking patterns or to Thailand's aggressive 2003 "drug free" policy, which greatly reduced the market for Burma-produced ATS, at least in the short-term. The relatively tiny amount of ATS seized (less than 4 million tablets) had no effect on the scope of the growing problem.

The Ministry of Health identifies 25 substances as precursor chemicals and prohibits their import, sale, or use in Burma. Seizures of precursor chemicals declined substantially during the first ten months of 2003 and included 266 kilos of ephedrine, 2,540 liters of acetic anhydride, and 37,557 liters of other precursor chemicals. There has been a substantial decline in ephedrine seizures. In 2001, the first year the GOB issued a notification identifying illegal precursor chemicals, the totals were substantially higher: 1.723 metric tons, compared with .266 metric tons for 2003.

In 2003, Burma arrested 3,336 suspects on drug related charges, according to official statistics. In addition, the GOB arrested nine United Wa State Army (UWSA) officers in 2003.

The government dismantled 7 heroin labs through the first ten months of 2003, compared to 17 from the entire previous year, although slow reports from remote areas of the country might account for the magnitude of the change. To date, the GOB has not reported the destruction of any meth labs in 2003, although 6 were destroyed in 2002.

The government eradicated more than 21,000 hectares (51,892 acres) of opium poppy over the past three crop years. However, only 683 hectares were destroyed during the 2002/03 crop year, a mere fraction of the 10,466 hectares (25,862 acres) destroyed during the 2001/02 crop year and the 10,568 hectares (26,113 acres) destroyed during the 2000/01 crop year. Nonetheless, overall eradication accounts for almost one-third of the reduction in area under poppy cultivation since 2001. In addition, during the first ten months of 2003 the government burned 164,000 kilos of poppy seeds capable of seeding more than 40,570 hectares (100,250 acres). The destruction of those seeds, together with law enforcement actions, reduced the area under opium cultivation by more than one third in 2003.

In 2002, the government, having established a police and military intelligence presence in the ethnic Wa territories, demanded that the Wa, the Kokang Chinese, and other cease-fire groups issue new counternarcotics decrees. Those decrees outlawed participation in any aspect of the narcotics trade. The GOB also demanded and received cooperation from the UWSA in bringing to heel several major fugitives wanted by China. In addition, it has closed down the liaison offices of armed groups like the UWSA, and of companies associated with those groups in Tachileik, Myawaddy, and other towns on the Thai/Burmese border. In December 2003, the GOB announced an investigation of two private banks associated with the Wa (Asia Wealth and Myanmar Mayflower), identified by the United States as entities of "primary money laundering concern."

The GOB continued efforts to hold cease-fire groups to their pledges to end opium production in their territories. U Sai Lin's Special Region No. 4 around Mong La has been opium-free since 1997 and the Wa claim they are maintaining their pledge to eliminate opium by the end of the 2005 harvest. However, according to the 2003 joint U.S./Burma opium yield survey, poppy cultivation increased in the Wa Special Region by over 5,500 hectares and the area now accounts for 52 percent of Burma's total poppy crop. The Kokang Chinese missed their opium-free target (scheduled for the year 2000), and extended their deadline to 2003 resulting in increased attention from both the Burmese and the Chinese police. Several of the ethnic trafficking armies, especially the Wa, also control amphetamine production labs and extensive trafficking operations, raising questions whether their gradual departure from opium cultivation is not just a business decision to concentrate on ATS. These ATS operations remain largely intact and are a major factor in amphetamine trafficking in Southeast Asia and beyond.

The government continued its crackdown begun in 2001 on the array of militias (some government-sponsored village defense forces, and others the remnants of former insurgent bands) that the government had previously allowed to cultivate opium in the Kutkai-Lashio region of northern Shan State. According to military intelligence officials, with peace now prevailing in most of the countryside and the government no longer in need of the local security services these groups provided, steps are now being taken to slowly scale back their privileges, including the right to grow and traffic in opium.

There is no reliable evidence that senior officials in the Burmese Government are directly involved in the drug trade. However, lower level officials, particularly army and police personnel posted in outlying areas, are widely believed to be involved in facilitating the drug trade; and some officials have been prosecuted for drug abuse and/or narcotics-related corruption. According to the Burmese government, over 200 police officials and 48 Burmese Army personnel were punished for narcotics-related corruption or drug abuse between 1995 and 2003. Of the 200 police officers, 130 were imprisoned, 16 were dismissed from the service, 7 were forced to retire, and 47 were demoted. No Burma Army officer over the rank of full colonel has ever been prosecuted for drug offenses in Burma.

Burma is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In September 2003 the 1971 UN Protocol on Psychotropic Substances took effect in Burma. In addition, Burma is also one of six nations (Burma, Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam) that are parties to UNODC's sub-regional action plan for controlling precursor chemicals and reducing illicit narcotics production and trafficking in the highlands of Southeast Asia.

In 2003, the Chinese and Thai governments stepped up bilateral counternarcotics cooperation efforts with Burma and, with the GOB, established joint Border Liaison Offices (BLO) along their respective borders to facilitate the sharing of intelligence. Cooperation with Thailand in particular increased considerably in 2003 as the Thai government pursued an aggressive domestic "drug-free" policy. Thai cabinet-level officials visited Burma several times during the year to discuss counternarcotics cooperation with senior leaders of the Burmese military government. Burma's 2001 MOU with Thailand commits both countries to closer police cooperation in narcotics control and they subsequently established joint "narcotics suppression coordination stations" in the Chiang Rai/Tachileik, Mae Sot/Myawaddy, and Ranong/Kawthoung border areas. In addition, Thailand implemented a 20 million baht (about $440,000) new alternative development program in the Southern Military Region of Shan State, which is now occupied by the United Wa State Army. While not formally funding alternative development programs, the Chinese government has encouraged investment in many projects in the Wa area, particularly in commercial enterprises such as tea plantations and pig farms and has assisted in marketing those products in China through relaxation of duty taxes.

According to the 2003 U.S./Burma Joint Opium Yield Survey, opium production declined in Burma for the seventh straight year. The survey found that the maximum potential yield for opium in Burma in 2003 totaled 484 metric tons, down 146 metric tons (or approximately 23 percent) from 2002. Over the past seven years, opium production in Burma has declined by more than 81 percent, from an estimated 2,560 metric tons in the peak year of 1996 to 484 metric tons in 2003. The area under cultivation has dropped by almost two-thirds, from 163,100 hectares in 1996 to approximately 47,130 hectares in 2003. Yields have also declined from an estimated 17 kilograms per hectare in 1996 to about 10.3 kilograms per hectare in 2003. However, the 2003 opium/hectare yield rate increased by about 18 percent from the previous year, reflecting favorable weather and more intense cultivation in Wa areas.

Results from a UNODC-sponsored census survey throughout Shan State in 2003 largely corroborated the results of the U.S./Burma Joint Opium Yield Survey. According to UNODC, the area under poppy cultivation in 2003 declined by 23 percent from the previous year and by 62 percent since 1996.

Most ATS and heroin in Burma is produced in small, mobile labs located in the Burma/China and Burma/Thailand border areas, primarily in territories controlled by active or former insurgent groups. A growing amount of methamphetamine is reportedly produced in labs co-located with heroin refineries in areas controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kokang Chinese, and the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S). Heroin and methamphetamine produced by these groups are trafficked primarily through China, Thailand, India, and, to a lesser extent, Laos, Bangladesh, and Burma itself.

Precursors for refining these narcotic drugs are primarily produced in India, China, and Thailand. Burma does not have a chemical industry and does not produce ephedrine, acetic anhydride, or any of the other chemicals required for the narcotics trade. Similarly, the major markets for all of these narcotic drugs lie in neighboring states. However, there were signs in 2003 that Burma's small domestic market for drug consumption grew, especially the consumption of ATS.

The overall level of drug abuse is low in Burma compared with neighboring countries, in part because many Burmese are too poor to afford a drug habit. According to the GOB, there are only about 70,000 "officially registered" drug abusers in Burma. This is undoubtedly an underestimate, and even the UNODC estimates that there may be no more than 300,000 people who abuse drugs in Burma. Most, particularly among the older generation, use opium, but use of heroin and synthetic drugs is rising, particularly in urban and mining areas. NGOs and community leaders reported growing numbers of disaffected youth using heroin and ATS, particularly in ethnic minority areas.

Burmese demand reduction programs are in part coercive and in part voluntary. Addicts are required to register with the GOB and can be prosecuted if they fail to register and accept treatment. Altogether, more than 21,000 addicts were prosecuted for failing to register between 1994 and 2002. The GOB has not provided 2003 data. Demand reduction programs and facilities are strictly limited, however. There are six major drug treatment centers under the Ministry of Health, 49 other smaller detox centers, and eight rehabilitation centers which, together, have reportedly provided treatment to about 55,000 addicts over the past ten years. There are also a variety of narcotics awareness programs conducted through the public school system. According to UNODC, approximately 1,200 high school teachers participated in seminars, training programs, and workshops connected with these programs in 2001. In addition, the government has established demand reduction programs in cooperation with NGOs. These include programs with CARE Myanmar, World Concern, and Population Services International (PSI), all of which focus on injecting drug use as a factor in the spread of HIV/AIDS.

The USG suspended direct counternarcotics assistance to Burma in 1988, when the Burmese military began its suppression of the pro-democracy movement. The USG now engages the Burmese government in regard to narcotics control only on a very limited level. DEA, through the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon, shares drug-related intelligence with the GOB and conducts joint drug-enforcement investigations with Burmese counternarcotics authorities. The U.S. also conducted opium yield surveys in the mountainous regions of the Shan State in 1993 and 1995 and annually from 1997 through 2003 with essential assistance provided by Burmese counterparts. These surveys give both governments an accurate understanding of the scope, magnitude, and changing geographic distribution of Burma's opium crop.

The Burmese government has in recent years made significant gains in reducing opium poppy cultivation and opium production. The GOB has cooperated with major regional allies (particularly China and Thailand) in this fight, and has built up the capacity to take action against drug traffickers and major trafficking organizations, even within the context of very limited resources. Based on experience in dealing with significant narcotics-trafficking problems elsewhere in the world, the USG recognizes that large-scale and long-term international aid—including development assistance and law-enforcement aid—is necessary to help curb drug production and trafficking in Burma. However, ongoing political repression has limited international support of all kinds to Burma, including support for Burma's law enforcement efforts.

For regions to become truly drug free, the government must make a considerable commitment beyond simple crop replacement, assisted where possible by the international community. A true opium replacement strategy must undertake an extensive range of counternarcotics actions, including crop eradication, effective law enforcement, and alternative development. The government must either foster cooperation between itself and the ethnic groups involved in drug production and trafficking, especially the Wa, and/or forcefully enforce counternarcotics laws to eliminate poppy cultivation and opium production.

The USG believes that the Government of Burma should continue to reduce opium cultivation and production, combat corruption, enforce its narcotics and money-laundering legislation, and deal with drug abuse. Its efforts to date have produced measurable results. The USG strongly urges the GOB to sustain and intensify those efforts so that its counternarcotics efforts are commensurate with the scope of the problem. The GOB must also address the explosion of ATS that has flooded Thailand and is trafficked to other countries in the region. The GOB must make a firm commitment and a concerted effort to stop production of ATS by gaining support and cooperation from the ethnic groups, especially the Wa, involved in manufacturing and distributing ATS, as well as through closing production labs and preventing the diversion of precursor chemicals needed to produce synthetic drugs. The USG also urges the GOB to stem the growth of a domestic market for the consumption of ATS before this problem becomes more significant. Burma should expand its law-enforcement campaign to the most prominent trafficking groups and their leaders. In addition, the USG encourages the GOB to continue its expanded efforts to cooperate with other countries in the region. Continuing and intensifying these efforts could lead to a sustained reduction in all forms of narcotics production and trafficking from an area that has been one of the world's major drug trafficking centers.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Internet research assisted by Marni Bender and Bryan T. Glasrud