Lebanon is the historic home of the Phoenicians, Semitic traders whose maritime culture flourished there for more than 2,000 years (c.2700-450 B.C.). In later centuries, Lebanon's mountains were a refuge for Christians, and Crusaders established several strongholds there. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the League of Nations mandated the five provinces that had comprised present-day Lebanon to France. Modern Lebanon's constitution, drawn up in 1926, specified a balance of political power between the various religious groups. The country gained independence in 1943, and French troops withdrew in 1946. Lebanon's history from independence has been marked by periods of political turmoil interspersed with prosperity built on Beirut's position as a regional center for finance and trade. In 1958, during the last months of President Camille Chamoun's term, an insurrection broke out, and U.S. forces were briefly dispatched to Lebanon in response to an appeal by the government. During the 1960s, Lebanon enjoyed a period of relative calm and Beirut-focused tourism and banking sector-driven prosperity. Other areas of the country, however, notably the South, North, and Biqa' Valley, experienced increasing impoverishment.

In the early 1970s, difficulties arose over the presence of Palestinian refugees, many of whom arrived after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and "Black September" 1970 hostilities in Jordan. Among the latter were Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Coupled with the Palestinian problem, Muslim and Christian differences grew more intense. Fullscale civil war broke out in April 1975. After shots were fired at a church, gunmen in Christian East Beirut ambushed a busload of Palestinians. Palestinian forces joined predominantly leftist-Muslim factions as the fighting persisted, eventually spreading to most parts of the country and precipitating the President's call for support from Syrian troops in June 1976. In fall of 1976, Arab summits in Riyadh and Cairo set out a plan to end the war. The resulting Arab Deterrent Force, which included Syrian troops already present, moved in to help separate combatants. As an uneasy quiet settled over Beirut, security conditions in the south began to deteriorate. After a PLO attack on a bus in northern Israel and the Israeli retaliation caused heavy casualties, Israel invaded Lebanon in March 1978, occupying most of the area south of the Litani River. In response, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces and creating the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), charged with maintaining peace. Israeli forces withdrew later in 1978, turning over positions inside Lebanon along the border to a Lebanese ally, the South Lebanon Army (SLA) under the leadership of Maj. Saad Haddad, thus informally setting up a 12-mile wide "security zone" to protect Israeli territory from crossborder attack.

An interim cease-fire brokered by the U.S. in 1981 between Syria, the PLO, and Israel was respected for almost a year. Several incidents, including PLO rocket attacks on northern Israel, led to the June 6, 1982, Israeli ground attack into Lebanon to remove PLO forces. Operation "Peace for Galilee" aimed at establishing a deeper security zone and pushing Syrian troops out of Lebanon, with a view toward paving the way for an Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement. With these aims in mind, Israeli forces drove 25 miles into Lebanon, moving into East Beirut with the support of Maronite Christian leaders and militia. In August 1982, U.S. mediation resulted in the evacuation of Syrian troops and PLO fighters from Beirut. The agreement also provided for the deployment of a multinational force comprised of U.S. Marines along with French and Italian units. A new President, Bashir Gemayel, was elected with acknowledged Israeli backing. On September 14, however, he was assassinated. The next day, Israeli troops crossed into West Beirut to secure Muslim militia strongholds and stood back as Lebanese Christian militias massacred almost 800 Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. Then Israeli Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon was held indirectly responsible for the massacre by the Kahane Commission and later resigned. With U.S. backing, Amin Gemayel, chosen by the Lebanese parliament to succeed his brother as president, focused anew on securing the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces. The multinational force returned.

On May 17, 1983, Lebanon, Israel, and the United States signed an agreement on Israeli withdrawal that was conditioned on the departure of Syrian troops. Syria opposed the agreement and declined to discuss the withdrawal of its troops, effectively stalemating further progress. In August 1983, Israel withdrew from the Shuf (southeast of Beirut), thus removing the buffer between the Druze and the Christian militias and triggering another round of brutal fighting. By September, the Druze had gained control over most of the Shuf, and Israeli forces had pulled out from all but the southern security zone, where they remained until May 2000. The virtual collapse of the Lebanese Army in February 1984, following the defection of many Muslim and Druze units to militias, was a major blow to the government. With the U.S. Marines looking ready to withdraw, Syria and Muslim groups stepped up pressure on Gemayal. On March 5 the Lebanese Government canceled the May 17 agreement; the Marines departed a few weeks later. This period of chaos witnessed the beginning of terrorist attacks launched against U.S. and Western interests. They included the April 18, 1983 suicide attack at the U.S. Embassy in West Beirut (63 dead), the bombing of the headquarters of U.S. and French forces on October 23, 1983 (298 dead), the assassination of American University of Beirut, President Malcolm Kerr on January 18, 1984, and the bombing of the U.S. Embassy annex in East Beirut on September 20, 1984 (9 dead). It also saw the rise of radicalism among a small number of Lebanese Muslim factions who believed that the successive Israeli and U.S. interventions in Lebanon were serving primarily Christian interests. It was from these factions that Hizballah emerged in 1982 from a loose coalition of Shi'a groups. Hizballah employed terrorist tactics and was supported by Syria and Iran.

Between 1985 and 1989, factional conflict worsened as various efforts at national reconciliation failed. Heavy fighting took place in the "War of the Camps" in 1985 and 1986 as the Shi'a Muslim Amal militia sought to rout the Palestinians from Lebanese strongholds. The Amal movement had been organized in mid-1975, at the beginning of the civil war, to confront what were seen as Israeli plans to displace the Lebanese population with Palestinians. (Its charismatic founder Imam Musa Sadr disappeared in Libya 3 years later. Its current leader, Nabih Berri, is the speaker of the National Assembly.) The combat returned to Beirut in 1987, with Palestinians, leftists, and Druze fighters allied against Amal, eventually drawing further Syrian intervention. Violent confrontation flared up again in Beirut in 1988 between Amal and Hizballah. Meanwhile, on the political front, Prime Minister Rashid Karami, head of a government of national unit set up after the failed peace efforts of 1984, was assassinated on June 1, 1987. President Gemayel's term of office expired in September 1988. Before stepping down, he appointed another Maronite Christian, Lebanese Armed Forces Commanding General Michel 'Awn, as acting Prime Minister, contravening Lebanon's unwritten "National Pact," which required the Prime Minister to be Sunni Muslim. Muslim groups rejected the move and pledged support to Salim al-Hoss, a Sunni who had succeeded Karami. Lebanon was thus divided between a Christian government in East Beirut and a Muslim government in West Beirut, with no President. In February 1989 'Awn attacked the rival Lebanese Forces militia. By March he turned his attention to other militias, launching what he termed a "War of Liberation" against the Syrians and their Lebanese militia allies. In the months that followed, 'Awn rejected both the agreement that ultimately ended the civil war and the election of another Christian leader as president. A Lebanese-Syrian military operation in October 1990 forced him to take cover in the French Embassy in Beirut and later into exile in Paris, where he remains.

The Ta'if Agreement of 1989 marked the beginning of the end of the war. In January of that year, a committee appointed by the Arab League, chaired by Kuwait and including Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco, had begun to formulate solutions to the conflict, leading to a meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, where they agreed to the national reconciliation accord in October. Returning to Lebanon, they ratified the agreement on November 4 and elected Rene Mouawad as President the following day. Assassinated in a car bombing in Beirut on November 22 as his motorcade returned from Lebanese independence day ceremonies, Mouawad was succeeded by Elias Hrawi, who remained in office until 1998. In August 1990, parliament and the new president agreed on constitutional amendments embodying some of the political reforms envisioned at Ta'if. The National Assembly expanded to 108 seats and was divided equally between Christians and Muslims. In March 1991, parliament passed an amnesty law that pardoned all political crimes prior to its enactment. The amnesty was not extended to crimes perpetrated against foreign diplomats or certain crimes referred by the cabinet to the Higher Judicial Council. In May 1991, the militias (with the important exception of Hizballah) were dissolved, and the Lebanese Armed Forces began to slowly rebuild itself as Lebanon's only major nonsectarian institution. In all, it is estimated that more than 100,000 were killed, and another 100,000 handicapped by injuries, during Lebanon's 16 year civil war. Up to one-fifth of the pre-war resident population, or about 900,000 people, were displaced from their homes, of whom perhaps a quarter of a million emigrated permanently. The last of the Western hostages taken during the mid-1980s were released in May 1992.

Postwar social and political instability, fueled by economic uncertainty and the collapse of the Lebanese currency, led to the resignation of Prime Minister Omar Karami, also in May 1992, after less than 2 years in office. He was replaced by former Prime Minister Rashid al Sulh, who was widely viewed as a caretaker to oversee Lebanon's first parliamentary elections in 20 years. By early November 1992, a new parliament had been elected, and Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri had formed a cabinet, retaining for himself the finance portfolio. The formation of a government headed by a successful billionaire businessman was widely seen as a sign that Lebanon would make a priority of rebuilding the country and reviving the economy. Solidere, a private real estate company set up to rebuild downtown Beirut, was a symbol of Hariri's strategy to link economic recovery to private sector investment. After the election of then-commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces Emile Lahoud in 1998 following Hrawi's extended term as President, Salim al-Hoss again served as Prime Minister. Hariri returned to office as Prime Minister in November 2000. Although problems with basic infrastructure and government services persist, and Lebanon is now highly indebted, much of the civil war damage has been repaired throughout the country, and many foreign investors and tourists have returned.

If Lebanon has in part recovered over the past decade from the catastrophic damage to infrastructure of its long civil war, the social and political divisions that gave rise to and sustained that conflict remain largely unresolved. Parliamentary and more recently municipal elections have been held with fewer irregularities and more popular participation than in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, and Lebanese civil society generally enjoys significantly more freedoms than elsewhere in the Arab world. However, there are continuing sectarian tensions and unease about Syrian and other external influences. Lebanese Forces (LF) leader Samir Ja'ja, convicted in 1994 for civil war-related offenses, remains imprisoned, and the LF is still banned. In the late 1990s, the government took action against Sunni Muslim extremists in the north who had attacked its soldiers, and it continues to move against groups such as Asbat al-Ansar, which has been linked to Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida network. On January 24, 2002, Elie Hobeika, another former Lebanese Forces figure associated with the Sabra and Shatilla massacres who later served in three cabinets and the parliament, was assassinated in a car bombing in Beirut. An estimated 25,000 Syrian troops remain in position in many areas of Lebanon, notwithstanding Ta'if stipulations that called for agreement between the Syrian and Lebanese Governments on their redeployment by September 1992. They did not leave greater Beirut until mid-2001, a year after Israel withdrew from the south, where armed elements of Hizballah are still present.

Today, Lebanon is a parliamentary republic in which, based on the unwritten "National Pact of 1943," the President is a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shi'a Muslim. President Emile Lahoud took office in 1998 after an election by Parliament that was heavily influenced by Syria. The Parliament consists of 128 deputies, equally divided between Christian and Muslim representatives. In parliamentary elections in 2000, incumbent Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss lost his seat in a contested election, and former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was named Prime Minister by President Lahoud in October 2000. According to international observers, the elections were flawed and the outcome was heavily influenced by the Syrian Government; however, there reportedly were fewer voting irregularities than in the 1996 parliamentary elections. The judiciary is independent in principle; however, in practice it is subject to political pressure.

By the mid-1980s, more than a decade of war had reduced drastically the authority and ability of the central government to enforce law and to implement justice. The unofficial militias and foreign occupying armies that governed much of Lebanon's civilian populace tended to enforce their own version of justice, without regard to the central government or legal norms. Nevertheless, Lebanese law still pertained in some limited venues. In 1987 Lebanon's police forces had been virtually assimilated into the armed forces and worked closely with the Syrian occupation force.

Under Lebanese law, a suspect must be arraigned before a committee composed of three judges and a prosecutor within fortyeight hours of being arrested. Nevertheless, government prosecutors sometimes held suspects for interrogation for indefinite periods of time without notifying judges. Every prisoner had the right to legal counsel, but there was no public defender's office. Bail was permitted in most cases. In practice and custom Lebanese law provided the right to a fair public trial, but many cases remained unadjudicated. Trial delays resulted from the difficulty of conducting investigations when most of the country remained outside government control, from a shortage of judges, and from the general breakdown in security. Courts existed in most parts of the country, but the disposition of criminal cases depended ultimately on the local power group. Militias frequently intervened to protect their members from prosecution and detention.

Common crime, to the extent that it could be distinguished from political violence, was rampant. In 1986 the Lebanese press described a surge in violent crime, including a rash of over eighty well-organized armed bank robberies in a two-year period and numerous kidnappings for ransom.

The definition of terrorism is fraught with controversy, particularly in the Middle Eastern context. But by almost any definition, Lebanon is an epicenter of terrorist activity. Assassination is an occupational hazard for politicians. The slaying of Prime Minister Karami on June 1, 1987, when a bomb exploded aboard his helicopter, was but another in a long string of political murders. Car bombings, known in the Lebanese lexicon as "canned death," were occurring almost on a daily basis. The United States embassy had twice been attacked by suicide truck-bombers. And the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in June 1985 was only the most brazen of a long series of airliner hijackings originating in Beirut. Over the years, literally hundreds of groups have claimed responsibility for various acts of terrorism committed against civilian targets. Most of the names, however, were merely code words or noms de guerre meant to conceal the true identity of the organization behind the attack.

In the judgment of most informed observers, a few men or families have been responsible for masterminding the majority of terrorist operations. For example, the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction, a terrorist organization that assassinated United States and Israeli officials in Western Europe in 1982 and 1984 and staged numerous other attacks, was revealed eventually to be run by a single Maronite extended family, the Abdallah clan from the northern Lebanese town of Al Qubayyat. In March 1987, ringleader George Ibrahim Abdallah was sentenced by a French court to life imprisonment. Likewise, virtually all of the Shia terrorist attacks against Western interests in Lebanon since 1982, claimed in the name of the Islamic Jihad Organization and a dozen other groups, have been attributed by intelligence experts to two related Shia families, the Mughniyyahs and the Musawis. Two leaders of these families, Imad Mughniyyah and Husayn al Musawi, were widely believed to be responsible for holding twenty-three Westerners hostage in 1987.

One of the most spectacular terrorist tactics in the 1980s was a series of suicide vehicle bombings. The first occurred on April 18, 1983, when a pick-up truck driven by a suicide bomber exploded in the driveway of the United States embassy in West Beirut. The explosives detonated with a force equivalent to 2,000 pounds of trinitrotoluene and destroyed the chancery building, killing 63 people, including 17 Americans, and wounding 100, about 40 of whom were Americans. The Islamic Jihad Organization claimed responsibility for the attack. Informed sources believed that the Islamic Jihad Organization was a nom de guerre for Husayn Musawi's Islamic Amal organization, while others believed that it was a cover name for Hizaballah.

On October 23, 1983, Shia terrorists struck the United States Marines compound and the French MNF headquarters in devastating, near-simultaneous suicide bombing attacks. The attack on the United States Marines compound took 241 lives and wounded over 100. The bombing was carried out by a lone terrorist driving a stakebed truck that penetrated the central lobby of the building and exploded. United States Federal Bureau of Investigation experts announced that the blast, with the force of over 12,000 pounds of trinitrotoluene, was the largest non-nuclear explosion ever detonated. The attack on the French contingent claimed fifty-eight dead. On November 4, 1983, the suicide bombing tactic was used once again. Near Tyre in southern Lebanon, an explosives-laden pickup truck crashed through an Israeli guard post and detonated near an IDF headquarters building, killing twenty-eight Israeli soldiers and thirty-two Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners. On September 20, 1984, a suicide vehicle bomber attacked the new United States embassy building in East Beirut, killing eight and wounding dozens. On March 10, 1985, Israel was struck again when a suicide bomber drove a car packed with explosives into an IDF convoy at the border crossing point, near the Israeli town of Metulla. Twelve Israelis were killed and fourteen wounded. The initial spate of Shia suicide bombings was so successful that it inspired other, secular organizations--particularly the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party- -to adopt the tactic in 1984 and 1985. As the frequency of suicide attacks rose, however, their effectiveness and impact waned. Lebanese groups abandoned the tactic and concentrated on a more effective technique, hostage-taking.

On June 14, 1985, American attention was riveted on Lebanon once again. A TWA airliner, Flight 847 en route from Athens to Rome, was hijacked by Shia terrorists of the Hizballah organization who demanded the release of Shia prisoners held in Kuwait, Israel, and Spain. The airliner was forced to fly to Beirut, where nineteen passengers were released, then to Algiers, where twenty-two more were freed. It then returned to Beirut where on June 15 one of the passengers, a United States Navy diver, was murdered. Seven American passengers, who, according to the terrorists, had Jewish- sounding surnames, were taken off the jet by Hizballah terrorists and sequestered in Beirut. Then, about a dozen Amal members joined the hijackers on the airplane, and the pilot was forced once again to fly to Algiers, where sixty more passengers were freed. On the following day the airplane returned to Beirut with the thirty-two remaining passengers. Approximately 200 Lebanese Army soldiers withdrew from the vicinity of Beirut International Airport, leaving the area in the control of Amal. In response to suspicions that the United States was planning a military rescue of the hostages, the terrorists moved the passengers off the airplane and sequestered them in various groups dispersed throughout Beirut. Amal and Hizballah members mined the runways at the airport to prevent a rescue attempt.

On June 17, the third day of the crisis, Amal leader and Lebanese minister of justice Nabih Birri agreed to "mediate" and take responsibility for the safety of the hostages. Birri's intervention appeared hypocritical because his men were holding most of the hostages and controlled the hijacked jet. Nevertheless, the Hizballah organization retained control of seven kidnapped Americans, leaving Birri unable to negotiate independently. Accordingly, Birri adopted a hardline stance and refused to release any hostages until Israel released 700 Shia detainees. Indeed, on June 24 Birri actually added another condition for the hostages' release, stipulating that United States warships leave Lebanese waters.

The deadlock was finally broken through a series of complex and controversial political maneuvers. The United States, determined not to concede to the terrorists' demands, refused to request Israel to release its Shia prisoners but acknowledged that it would welcome such a move. Israel, also unwilling as a matter of policy to negotiate with terrorists, refused to release its prisoners unless requested by the United States to do so. The thirty-nine hostages were ultimately freed on June 30. On July 1, Israel announced that it was ready to release the Shia detainees from its prison. Over the next several weeks, Israel released over 700 Shia prisoners, but Israel denied that the prisoners' release was related to the hijacking.

Hostage-taking has become commonplace in Lebanon. By 1987 the International Committee of The Red Cross estimated that 6,000 Lebanese had been kidnapped and or had disappeared since 1975. The systematic kidnapping of Western civilians began a few years after the Civil War. Perhaps the first victim whose case was widely publicized was American University of Beirut president David Dodge, abducted by Shia terrorists in 1981 and freed in 1982. As of September 1987, twenty-three foreigners--most of whom were journalists, diplomats, or teachers--were believed to be held hostage by various terrorist organizations in Lebanon. Of this total, nine were American. Terry Anderson, chief Middle East correspondent for the Associated Press, had been in captivity the longest. Anderson, seized on March 16, 1985, by the Shia fundamentalist Islamic Jihad Organization, was one of six hostages who had been held for more than two years. American television correspondent Charles Glass was seized on June 17, 1987. A previously unknown group, the "Organization for the Defense of Free People," claimed responsibility. Three hostages were Britons, including Anglican Church envoy Terry Waite, who disappeared January 20, 1986, while on a negotiating mission to free the other kidnap victims. Other hostages included one of two citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) abducted in January 1987 by an organization calling itself "Strugglers for Freedom." The West Germans were seized shortly after the West German government arrested Muhammad Ali Hamadi, a Shia terrorist leader who allegedly masterminded the 1985 TWA hijacking. Six French citizens, two of whom were diplomats, also remained in captivity in late 1987, as did an Indian professor, an Irish professor, an Italian businessman, and a Republic of Korea (South Korea) diplomat.

Little information was available concerning the circumstances of the hostages. In late June 1987, the Lebanese magazine Ash Shira reported that some American hostages had been transferred from Beirut to Iran where they were being put on "trial" and that Imad Mughniyyah and Abdul Hadi Hamadi, security chiefs of the Hizballah organization, had visited Tehran to testify in the "trial."

Since 1982 seven kidnapped foreigners are believed to have been murdered by their captors. On October 3, 1985, the Islamic Jihad Organization claimed to have killed the United States Central Intelligence Agency Beirut chief of station, William Buckley, whom it had abducted on March 16, 1984. The Islamic Jihad Organization later released to a Beirut newspaper a photograph purporting to depict his corpse. Press reports stated that Buckley had been transferred to Iran, where he was tortured and killed. One of four Soviet diplomats kidnapped by the Islamic Liberation Organization on September 30, 1985, was killed by his captors; the other three were released a month later. On February 10, 1986, the Islamic Jihad Organization released a photograph that claimed to show the body of French citizen Michel Seurat, who had been kidnapped earlier. On April 17, 1986, the bodies of three American University of Beirut employees, American citizen Peter Kilburn and Britons John Douglas and Philip Padfield, were discovered near Beirut. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims claimed to have "executed" the three men in retaliation for the United States air raid on Libya on April 15, 1986. On April 23, 1986, a Beirut newspaper received a videotape film showing a man being hanged. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims claimed the man was British citizen Alec Collet, who had been kidnapped more than a year earlier.

A few fortunate Western hostages have escaped from their captors. American citizen Frank Regier, engineering professor at the American University of Beirut, was freed after several months in captivity by Amal militiamen, who raided the Beirut hideout of his extremist captors on April 15, 1984. On February 14, 1985, American journalist Jeremy Levin escaped from his captors in the Biqa Valley. On April 11, 1986, French captive Michel Brillant escaped several days after his abduction when his captors were surprised by a party of hunters in the Biqa Valley. On July 16, 1986, a Saudi Arabian diplomat was freed when the Lebanese Army caught his captors. On September 26, 1986, British journalist David Hirst escaped by bolting from his captors' automobile in a Shia neighborhood of Beirut, and several days later French television correspondent Jean-Marc Sroussi escaped from a locked shed days after his capture. American Charles Glass escaped in August 1987, two months after his capture.

Only a few hostages have been released by their captors. On May 20, 1985, Saudi Arabian consul Husayn Farrash was released by Muslim fundamentalists after over a year in captivity. In mid- September 1985, the Reverend Benjamin Weir, a Presbyterian minister held hostage since May 1984, was freed by the Islamic Jihad Organization; on July 26, 1986, the same group released Father Lawrence Martin Jenco, who had been held since January, 1985; and on November 2, 1986, American University of Beirut hospital administrator David Jacobsen was released after more than a year and a half in captivity. Americans Weir, Jenco, and Jacobsen had been held by the same Islamic Jihad Organization cell, as Terry Anderson and Thomas Sutherland, who in September 1987 remained in captivity. Several other hostages have been released by various groups, including a Spanish diplomat, a French journalist, two British women, a West German Siemens employee, and two Cypriot students.

Lebanon has a competitive and free-market regime and a strong laissez-faire commercial tradition. The Lebanese economy is service-oriented; main growth sectors include banking and tourism. There are no restrictions on foreign exchange or capital movement, and bank secrecy is strictly enforced. Lebanon has recently adopted a law to combat money laundering. There are practically no restrictions on foreign investment. There are no country-specific U.S. trade sanctions against Lebanon.

Lebanon was unable to attract significant foreign aid to help it rebuild from both the long civil war (1975-89) and the Israeli occupation of the south (1978-2000). In addition, the delicate social balance and the near- dissolution of central government institutions during the civil war handicapped the state as it sought to capture revenues to fund the recovery effort. Thus it accumulated significant debt, which by 2001 had reached $28 billion, or nearly 150% of GDP. Unfortunately, economic performance was sluggish in 2000 and 2001 (zero growth in 2000, and estimates between 1.0-1.4% in 2001, largely attributed to slight increases in tourism, banking, industry, and construction). Unemployment is estimated at 14% for 2000 and 29% among the 15-24 year age group, with preliminary estimates of further increases in 2001.

The government also has maintained a firm commitment to the Lebanese pound, which has been pegged to the dollar since September 1999. In late 2000, the government substantially reduced customs duties, adopted export promotion schemes for agriculture, decreased social security fees and restrictions on investment in real estate by foreigners, and adopted an open-skies policy, with positive effects on trade in 2001. Nonetheless, the relative appreciation of the Lebanese currency has undermined competitiveness, with merchandise exports falling from 23% of GDP in 1989 to 4% in 2000.

In 2001, the government turned its focus to fiscal measures, increasing gasoline taxes, reducing expenditures, and approving a value-added-tax that became effective in February 2002. Slow money growth and dollarization of deposits have hampered the ability of commercial banks to finance the government, leaving more of the burden to the Central Bank. This monetization of the fiscal deficit has put enormous pressure on Central Bank reserves, mitigated only slightly with the issuance of new Eurobonds over the past 2 years. The Central Bank has maintained a stable currency by intervening directly in the market, as well as low inflation, and succeeded in maintaining investors' confidence in debt. It has done so at a cost, however, as international reserves declined by $2.4 billion in 2000 and by $1.6 billion in the first half of 2001.

For 2002, the government has put primary emphasis on privatization, initially in the telecom sector and electricity, with continued planning for sales of the state airline, Beirut port, and water utilities. The government has pledged to apply the proceeds of sales to reducing the public debt and the budget deficit. In addition, it projects that privatization will bring new savings as government payrolls are pared, interest rates decline, and private sector growth and foreign investment are stimulated. The government also is tackling the daunting task of administrative reform, aiming to bring in qualified technocrats to address ambitious economic programs, and reviewing further savings that can be realized through reforms of the income tax system. The Lebanese Government faces major challenges in order to meet the requirements of a fiscal adjustment program focusing on tax reforms and modernization, expenditure rationalization, privatization, and improved debt management.

The U.S. enjoys a strong exporter position with Lebanon, generally ranking as Lebanon's fourth-largest source of imported goods. More than 160 offices representing U.S. businesses currently operate in Lebanon. Since the lifting of the passport restriction in 1997, a number of large U.S. companies have opened branch or regional offices, including Microsoft, American Airlines, Arthur Andersen, Coca-Cola, FedEx, UPS, General Electric, Parsons Brinckerhoff, Cisco, Eli Lilly, and Pepsi Cola.

Today, the country of approximately 3-3.5 million has a market-based economy, in which the majority of the private sector work force is employed in the service sector such as banking and commerce. There is a small industrial sector, based largely on clothing manufacturing and food processing. Following 2 years of recession, the economy is showing faint signs of recovery. Growth was estimated at between 0.5 and 1.5 percent during the year 2001--compared to flat growth in 2000. The central bank maintained currency stability by intervening on the foreign exchange market to meet a strong dollar demand, thus placing a drain on its reserves. Inflation remained low, and was estimated at 1 percent. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was an estimated at $5000 in 2000, and the unemployment rate was estimated at about 15 to 20. Approximately 30 percent of those unemployed are under age 26. Lebanon suffers from a crippling debt burden, which reached about $28 billion by the end of the year, reaching approximately 172 percent of the GDP. The budget deficit reached 45.6 percent of expenditures, compared to 51 percent in 2000. Government deficit as a percentage of GDP is estimated to be about 24.8 percent.

Divisions within the Christian and Muslim faiths were considerable, but most observers accepted the Christian-Muslim dichotomy as the most salient in Lebanese society. Even so, identification by religious affiliation often blurs subtle social and economic considerations.

Religion in Lebanon is not merely a function of individual preference reflected in ceremonial practice of worship. Rather, religion is a phenomenon that often determines social and political identification. Hence, religion is politicized by the confessional quota system in distributing power, benefits, and posts.

A sectarian group binds its members together on the basis of their professed allegiance to the teaching of the faith and their common location within the sectarian social and political map. Ethnicity does not strictly apply to Lebanon's confessional communities, since more than 90 percent of all Lebanese are ethnically and linguistically Arabs. But the distinctiveness of Lebanon's confessional communities approximates the notion of sect to that of ethnicity. The exceptions are Kurds, Armenians, and Jews, who constitute ethnic groups in the classical sense. In sum, an understanding of the Lebanese mosaic requires an awareness of ethnicity and confessionalism because the similarity between the two concepts has become clearer in present-day Lebanon, where each sectarian group has its own agenda, political culture, and leaders.

The exact number of Lebanon's sects has always been disputed. In 1936, the French Mandate established the first official law regarding sects in Syria and Lebanon. The sects were enumerated as follows: nine patriarchal sects, one Latin church, the Protestant sect (including eleven Christian denominations) and five Muslim sects (Sunni, Shia, Druze, Alawi, and Ismaili). At that time, the Muslims rejected their division into separate sects, and consequently they were excluded from the appendix of the law.

Following independence, only non-Muslims were included in a 1951 law enumerating officially recognized sects in the following order: Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Orthodox (Gregorian), Armenian Catholics, Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites), Syrian Catholics, Chaldean Catholics, Nestorian Assyrians, Latins (Roman Catholics), Protestants, and Jews. The law specified that each sect was free to manage its waqf (religious endowment) properties, as well as its personal status laws for its members. The Alawi and Ismaili sects were considered numerically insignificant, which left them without legally sanctioned institutions. Other Muslim sects, Sunnis, Shias, and Druzes were considered still covered by the provisions of Ottoman Law.

With the important exception of murder, the over crime rate in Lebanon is very low compared to industrialized countries. An analysis was done using INTERPOL data for Lebanon. For purpose of comparison, data were drawn for the seven offenses used to compute the United States FBI's index of crime. Index offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The combined total of these offenses constitutes the Index used for trend calculation purposes. Lebanon will be compared with Japan (country with a low crime rate) and USA (country with a high crime rate). According to the INTERPOL data, for murder, the rate in 1999 was 6.33 per 100,000 population for Lebanon, 1.00 for Japan, and 4.55 for USA. For rape, the rate in 1999 was 2.14 for Lebanon, compared with 1.47 for Japan and 32.05 for USA. For robbery, the rate in 1999 was 8.16 for Lebanon, 3.34 for Japan, and 147.36 for USA. For aggravated assault, the rate in 1999 was 14.00 for Lebanon, 15.97 for Japan, and 329.63 for USA. For burglary, the rate in 1999 was 31.02 for Lebanon, 206.01 for Japan, and 755.29 for USA. The rate of larceny for 1999 was 123.27 for Lebanon, 1267.95 for Japan, and 2502.66 for USA. The rate for motor vehicle theft in 1999 was 52.18 for Lebanon, compared with 34.01 for Japan and 412.70 for USA. The rate for all index offenses combined was 237.10 for Lebanon, compared with 1529.75 for Japan and 4184.24 for USA. (Note: data were not reported to INTERPOL by the USA for 1999, but were derived from data reported to the United Nations for 1999)

Between 1995 and 1999, according to INTERPOL data, the rate of murder decreased from 7.2 to 6.33 per 100,000 population, a decrease of 12.1%. The rate for rape increased from 1.01 to 2.14, an increase of 111.9%. The rate of robbery increased from 5.51 to 8.16, an increase of 48.1%. The rate for aggravated assault decreased from 22.39 to 14.00, a decrease of 37.5%. The rate for burglary decreased from 41.53 to 31.02, a decrease of 25.3%. The rate of larceny increased from 17.08 to 123.27, an increase of 621.7%. The rate of motor vehicle theft decreased from 92.43 to 53.18, a decrease of 43.5%. The rate of total index offenses increased from 187.15 to 237.1%, an increase of 26.7%.

Non-Lebanese military and paramilitary forces retain significant influence over much of the country. In 1989 the Arab League brokered a peace settlement at Taif, Saudi Arabia, to end the country's civil war. According to the Taif Accord, the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were to determine the redeployment of Syrian troops to specified areas of the Biqa' Valley, with full withdrawal contingent upon subsequent agreement by both governments. The Syrian Government has not carried out this partial redeployment and has prevented implementation of other political reforms stipulated by the Taif Accord. Strong Syrian influence over Lebanese politics and decision makers makes officials unwilling to press for further progress on fulfilling Taif agreements, including Syrian withdrawal. Since the Taif Accord was signed, no government has requested formally the withdrawal of Syrian forces. The Government's relationship with Syria does not reflect the will of most of the country's citizens.

In 1991 the Governments of Syria and Lebanon concluded a security agreement that provided a framework for security cooperation between their armed forces. Approximately 22,000 Syrian troops are stationed in locations throughout the country, excluding the south; during the year 2001, some Syrian troops redeployed from positions in Beirut and Mount Lebanon to Syria and to more eastern positions in Lebanon. An undetermined number of Syrian military intelligence personnel in the country continue to conduct their activities independently of a 1991 security cooperation agreement between the governments of Syria and Lebanon.

Until May 2000, Israel exerted control in or near its self-proclaimed "security zone" in the south through direct military action and support for its surrogate, the South Lebanon Army (SLA). Prior to the Israeli withdrawal, with the tacit support of the Government, the Iranian-backed Shi'a Muslim faction Hizballah, and, to a much lesser extent, the Lebanese Shi'a group Amal and some Palestinian guerrillas were locked in a cycle of attack and counterattack with Israeli and SLA troops. In May 2000, after 22 years of occupation, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) troops withdrew from the south and West Biqa', and the SLA disbanded. Following the withdrawal, the Government deployed more than 1,000 police and soldiers to the former security zone, and Hizballah guerrillas maintained observation posts and conducted patrols along the border with Israel. The United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was established in 1978, also increased its area of operations following the Israeli withdrawal. The Government has not attempted to disarm Hizballah.

Palestinian groups operate autonomously in refugee camps throughout the country. Several armed Palestinian factions are located in the refugee camps, although their freedom of movement is restricted significantly. The Government has not attempted to assert state control over the Palestinian camps.

Hizballah, Palestinian groups, and the influence of the Syrian Government all undermined the authority of the central Government during the year 2001 and interfered with the application of law in those areas not completely under the Government's control.

The security forces consist of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), which may arrest and detain suspects on national security grounds; the Internal Security Forces (ISF), which enforce laws, conduct searches and arrests, and refer cases to the judiciary; and the State Security Apparatus and the Surete Generale, both of which collect information on groups deemed a possible threat to state security. The Surete Generale is responsible for the issuance of passports and residency permits, the screening and censoring of foreign periodicals, plays, documentaries, television programs, and movies, and the censoring of those parts that address national security issues and "morals." The security forces committed serious human rights abuses.

The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the domicile; however, authorities frequently interfere with the privacy of persons regarded as enemies of the Government. Laws require that prosecutors obtain warrants before entering homes, except when the security forces are in close pursuit of armed attackers; however, in practice the law is not respected.

The Government and Syrian intelligence services use informer networks and monitor telephones to gather information on their perceived adversaries. The Army Intelligence Service monitors the movements and activities of members of opposition groups. The Government concedes that telephone calls are monitored by security services but claims that monitoring occurs only with prior authorization from competent judicial authorities. During September 1999 parliamentary hearings, the Speaker of Parliament, the Minister of Interior, and the Surete Generale Director General publicly acknowledged that government officials frequently monitor citizens' private telephone conversations.

Politicians and human rights advocates report increasing and more overt government intelligence services' surveillance of political meetings and political activities across the religious and political spectrum. In October 1999, the Parliament passed a law that authorized surveillance in national security and law enforcement cases but banned its use against government ministers and parliamentary deputies; however, the Government has not yet adopted the necessary implementing decrees.

Militias and non-Lebanese forces operating outside the area of central government authority frequently have violated citizens' privacy rights. Various factions also use informer networks and the monitoring of telephones to obtain information regarding their perceived adversaries.

The law requires security forces to obtain warrants before making arrests; however, the Government uses arbitrary arrest and detention. Military intelligence personnel make arrests without warrants in cases involving military personnel and those involving espionage, treason, weapons possession, and draft evasion. The Parliamentary Commission for Human Rights stated in May, 2001, that of the 7,230 persons being held in prison, only 2,500 have been convicted.

Under the former Code of Criminal Procedures, which was replaced by a new code in November, 2001, authorities could detain suspects for an unlimited period before referring them to an examining judge. Although the former Code permitted interrogation only by an examining judge, the police and prosecutor regularly interrogated suspects. Bail was not available in criminal cases. A new Code of Criminal Procedures was enacted by the Parliament in August, 2001, and entered into force in November, 2001. The new law provides greater legal protection to suspects, including the right to a lawyer, to a medical examination, and to inform next of kin. Under the Code, arresting officers are required to refer a subject to a prosecutor within 48 hours of arrest, unless there were witnesses to the crime, in which case the suspect may not be held in custody more than 24 hours. The period may be extended to 48 hours with the concurrence of the public prosecutor's office. If a suspect is held more than 48 hours without formal charges, the arrest is considered arbitrary and the detainee must be released. In such cases, officials responsible for the prolonged arrest may be prosecuted on charges of depriving personal freedom. A suspect caught in hot pursuit must be referred to an examining judge, who decides whether to issue an indictment or order the release of the suspect. Under the Code, bail is available in all cases regardless of the charges. Many provisions of the new Code are not being observed in practice. Some police and members of the judiciary have claimed that they were not properly informed of the new provisions.

Defendants have the right to legal counsel, but there is no state-funded public defender's office. The Bar Association operates an office for those who cannot afford a lawyer, and the court panel on many occasions has asked the Bar Association to appoint lawyers for defendants.

As of year 2001, security forces continued the practice of arbitrary detention and arrest. On several occasions during the year, security forces detained and arrested protestors. The Government also detained, interrogated, and beat journalists.

In August security forces arrested, interrogated, and searched the homes of more than 100 citizens, predominately Christian supporters of exiled General Michel 'Awn, and jailed commander of the disbanded Lebanese Forces, Samir Ja'Ja'. Most of the arrests and searches took place without warrants, and those arrested claimed that they were not given access to lawyers. The authorities allegedly forced most of them to sign affidavits stating that they would abstain from politics and released them within 2 weeks after their arrests. Some were blindfolded and forced to sign the affidavits without reading them; some of those who refused were beaten until they submitted to signing. Retired General Nadim Lteif, Coordinator of the Awnist movement, and Tawfiq Hindi, former political advisor of Samir Ja'Ja', were among those arrested. At least 77 of those detained were referred to both military and civilian courts. All but five of those arrested were released within weeks. Two persons were held until November 30, when they were released on bail; they face indictment for allegedly concealing information regarding collaboration with Israel. Three of those arrested remained in custody at year's end 2001.

In 1999 police officials detained and allegedly tortured a number of Sunni youths for suspected involvement in church bombings; however, the youths later were released due to a lack of evidence.

The Government initially held incommunicado most of the 3,000 SLA members who surrendered to the authorities following the IDF's withdrawal from the south in May 2000; however, lawyers and family members have since been provided access. The authorities often detain without charges for short periods of time political opponents of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. All of the former government officials who were detained in 1999 on charges of embezzlement or misuse of power have been acquitted or released on bail. The former officials were detained without charge for prolonged periods of time in Roumieh prison, in violation of the law. Legal action against them remains pending; however, they are free to travel abroad.

Palestinian refugees are subject to arrest, detention, and harassment by state security forces, Syrian forces, and rival Palestinians.

There were no allegations during the year 2001 of the transfer of citizens by government authorities to Syria. In December 2000, the Syrian Government transferred 46 Lebanese citizens, 7 Palestinian residents of Lebanon, and 1 Egyptian citizen from Syrian prisons to Lebanese custody. The Government announced that it would review each case; those who had completed their sentences would be released, others would complete their sentences in government custody. Nine of those turned over remained in custody at year's end 2001, including Abu Haytham Karara, an official of the Progressive Socialist Party. No formal charges were brought against them. Human rights activists believe that there are still Lebanese detainees in Syrian prisons; however, the exact number is unknown. Amnesty International reported in 1999 that "hundreds of Lebanese, Palestinians, and Jordanians have been arbitrarily arrested, some over two decades ago, and remain in prolonged and often secret detention in Syria." According to Amnesty International, Syrian forces operating in Lebanon carried out searches, arrests, and detentions of Lebanese nationals outside any legal framework. The Government formed a committee in December 2000 to investigate cases of those who disappeared during the civil strife. The committee solicited applications from concerned families. Although it was due to issue a report on its findings by year's end, the Government granted the committee an additional 6 months to complete its report.

In August 2000, Syria released Shaykh Heshem Mingara, a radical Sunni member of the Islamic Unification Movement ("Tawheed"), who was arrested by Syrian forces in 1985 and transferred to Syria.

Abuses occurred in areas outside of the State's authority, including the Palestinian refugee camps. There were reports during the year 2001 that members of the various groups who control the camps detained their Palestinian rivals.

There were credible reports that Hizballah detained numerous former SLA militiamen in 2000 before handing them over to government authorities for trial. There were no reports that Hizballah conducted arbitrary arrests in areas outside central government control during the year 2001.

Prior to the Israeli withdrawal, the SLA operated its own detention facility, al-Khiam prison. There were frequent reports of torture and mistreatment of detainees. Following the disbandment of the SLA in May, 2001, all of the prison's 140 inmates were released. A number of former inmates publicly recounted incidents of abuse by prison officials.

In April 2000, the Israeli Government released 13 Lebanese detainees who were held without charge in Israel for as long as 14 years; the former detainees returned to Lebanon under the auspices of the ICRC. Israel continues to hold 21 Lebanese citizens, including Sheikh Abed al-Karim Obaid and Mustafa Dirani.

Forced exile is not practiced regularly; however, in 1991 the Government pardoned former army commander General Michel 'Awn and two of his aides on the condition that they depart the country and remain in exile for 5 years. 'Awn was accused of usurping power. He remained in France at year's end 2001. Former President Amine Gemayel, who lived in France in exile for the past 12 years, returned to the country in July 2000 and again became active in political life.

The legal system of Lebanon is based upon a mixture of Ottoman law, canon law, Napoleonic code, and civil law. The judiciary is independent in principle; however, it is subject to political pressure. The Constitution provides for a constitutional council to determine the constitutionality of newly adopted laws upon the request of 10 members of Parliament, and stipulates that judges shall be independent in the exercise of their duties; however, influential politicians as well as Syrian and Lebanese intelligence officers at times intervene to protect their supporters from prosecution.

The judicial system consists of the regular civilian courts; the Military Court, which tries cases involving military personnel and security-related issues; the Judicial Council, which tries national security cases; and the tribunals of the various religious affiliations, which adjudicate matters of personal status, including marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody.

The Judicial Council is a permanent tribunal of five senior judges that adjudicates threats to national security. Upon the recommendation of the Minister of Justice, the Cabinet decides whether to try a case before this tribunal. Verdicts from this tribunal are irrevocable and may not be appealed.

The Ministry of Justice appoints all other judges according to a formula based on the religious affiliation of the prospective judge. A shortage of judges has impeded efforts to adjudicate cases backlogged during years of internal conflicts. Trial delays are aggravated by the Government's inability to conduct investigations in areas outside of its control.

In general, trials are public, but judges have the discretion to make a court session secret. Defendants have the right to be present at trial and the right of timely consultation with an attorney. Defendants may confront or question witnesses against them but must do so through the court panel, which decides whether or not to permit the defendant's question. Defendants and their attorneys have access to government-held evidence relevant to their cases and have the right of appeal. These rights generally are observed in practice.

Defendants on trial for security cases, which are heard before the Judicial Council, have the same procedural rights as other defendants; however, there is no right to appeal in such cases. The testimony of a woman is equal to that of a man.

Persons arrested by military intelligence are referred to the Military Court. The Military Court has jurisdiction over cases involving the military as well as those involving espionage, treason, weapons possession, and draft evasion. In June 2000, the Military Court began trying the cases of the approximately 3,000 SLA militiamen who surrendered to the Government following the Israeli withdrawal from the south. Some of the former SLA militiamen were charged under Article 273 of the Penal Code for taking up arms against the State, an offense punishable by death; others were charged under Article 285 of the Penal Code for trading with the enemy, an offense punishable by a minimum of 1 year in prison. Domestic human rights groups and international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) reported that the trials were open to journalists and members of the public but were not fair. Amnesty International reported that such summary trials, with barely 7 minutes spent on each individual, neither allowed the innocent to be acquitted nor ensured the discovery of those who may be guilty of war crimes. According to Amnesty International, the court tried between 23 and 43 persons each day. SLA lawyers who requested an adjournment to study the files of detainees were granted additional time. However, in most cases, defense lawyers received the file shortly before trial and consequently were unable to argue the cases individually. The standard defense presented by lawyers for the militiamen was that the Government had been unable to defend citizens living under Israeli occupation for the last 22 years. Therefore the residents had no choice but to work with the occupiers.

Prison conditions are poor and do not meet minimum international standards. The Ministry of Interior operates 18 prisons with a total capacity of 3,840 inmates. However, prisons are overcrowded, with a total population of approximately 7,230. Inmates lack heat, adequate toilet facilities, and proper medical care. The Government has not allocated funds for the reform of the prisons. In September, 2001, the Beirut Bar Association organized a conference composed of local and international participants to underscore the need for local penal reform. The head of the Association described the country's prison facilities as "unfit for animals."

In May 2001, members of the Parliamentary Commission for Human Rights visited all prisons in the country with the exception of those controlled by the Ministry of Defense. The Interior Ministry denied the press permission to accompany the delegation. The Chairman of the Commission subsequently stated that "the health conditions of the prisoners are deplorable and require continuous care. We hope the women's prisons will be emptied and the prisoners transferred." He also indicated that of the 7,230 persons being held in prison, only 2,500 have been convicted.

Amnesty International issued a report in August, 2001 on prison conditions for women. The report stated that women in pre-trial detention are routinely denied the protection of the law and held for long periods incommunicado. Many have been coerced to confess guilt or to testify against themselves. Amnesty International also reported that conditions in the four women's prisons "have serious shortcomings, including overcrowding, lack of hygiene and inadequate medical attention." Individual accounts contained in the report described physical and psychological torture by prison officials, including severe beating, threats, and the use of sexually abusive language. Amnesty International claimed that the safeguards contained in the Constitution and the laws against incommunicado detention, torture, and ill-treatment are insufficient and frequently are breached in practice. Amnesty International went on to report that when police, prosecutors, or judges are notified of violations, they fail to take sufficient actions against those responsible.

The Government made an effort to carry out rehabilitation for some inmates. Inmates at Roumieh prison participated in vocational activities, such as computer training courses, to provide them with skills upon release. In September 2000, 36 inmates in Roumieh prison received certificates of accomplishment following completion of a computer training program.

In May, 2001, the Government concluded its investigation into the deaths in custody of three SLA detainees in 2000.

The Surete Generale, which is in charge of border posts, operates a detention facility. Hundreds of foreigners, mostly Egyptians and Sri Lankans, are detained there pending deportation. The Surete Generale opened a new detention facility during the year 2001, which reportedly provides somewhat better conditions than the old facility.

Former Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'Ja', who is serving four life sentences for the murder or attempted murder of various political figures during and after the civil war, is kept in solitary confinement in a prison in the basement of the Ministry of Defense. He is permitted minimal exercise and allowed only periodic visits from his family and lawyers. He is not allowed to read newspapers or listen to the radio. Government officials stated that his solitary confinement is necessary for his own protection. During the year 2001, the Prosecutor General granted Ja'Ja' permission to receive The Economist, provided that all political content is removed.

Local journalists and human rights organizations were given access to certain prisons during the year 2001. Access to prisons that are controlled by the Ministry of Defense was not permitted. Following the Israeli withdrawal from the south in 2000, the Government did not grant independent monitors access to former SLA soldiers in custody. In December 2000, government officials stated that International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) representatives would be allowed to visit all SLA detainees; however, this had not occurred by year's end.

Prior to the Israeli withdrawal from the south, Hizballah detained and reportedly mistreated SLA members and suspected agents at unknown locations. The SLA operated its own detention facility, al-Khiam prison, and there were frequent allegations of torture and mistreatment of detainees.

Hizballah did not permit visits by human rights monitors to those persons in its custody. Before its May 2000 dissolution, the SLA allowed representatives of the ICRC and family members of inmates to visit detainees at al-Khiam prison.

The law does not specifically prohibit domestic violence; however, violence against women is a common problem. The press reports cases of rape with increasing frequency, and cases reported are believed to be only a fraction of the actual number. There are no authoritative statistics on the extent of spousal abuse. Most experts agree that the problem affects a significant portion of the female population. In general battered or abused women do not talk about their suffering due to fear of bringing shame upon their own families or accusations of misbehavior upon themselves. Despite a law prohibiting battery with a maximum sentence of 3 years in prison for those convicted, some religious courts legally may require a battered wife to return to the house in spite of physical abuse. Many women are compelled to remain in abusive marriages because of social and family pressures. Possible loss of custody of children and the absence of an independent source of income also prevent women from leaving their husbands. Doctors and social workers believe that most abused women do not seek medical help because of shame or inability to pay for treatment.

The Government has no separate program to provide medical assistance to battered women; however, it provides legal assistance to victims who cannot afford it regardless of the gender of the victim. In most of the cases, the police ignore complaints submitted by battered or abused women. The NGO the Lebanese Council to Resist Violence Against Women has worked actively to reduce violence against women by offering counseling and legal aid and raising awareness about domestic violence.

Foreign domestic servants often are mistreated, abused, and in some cases, raped. Asian and African female workers have no practical legal recourse available to them because of their low status, isolation from society, and because the labor laws do not protect them. Because of such abuse, the Government prohibits foreign women from working if they are from countries that do not have diplomatic representation in the country.

The law prohibits rape, and the minimum sentence for a person convicted of rape is 5 years in prison. The minimum sentence for a person convicted of raping a minor is 7 years.

The legal system is discriminatory in its handling of so-called "honor crimes." According to the Penal Code, a man who kills his wife or other female relative may receive a reduced sentence if he demonstrates that he committed the crime in response to a socially unacceptable sexual relationship conducted by the victim. However, in 1999 the law was amended to increase the severity of the sentence for perpetrators of "honor crimes." Several instances of honor crimes are reported in the media every year, and reportedly there were an average of two to three cases of honor crimes each month during the year 2001. No person has been convicted in a case legally considered as an honor crime.

Prostitution is legal but regulated; in practice most prostitution is unlicensed and thus illegal. Thousands of foreign women, primarily from Russia and Eastern Europe, engage in prostitution.

The country is a destination for trafficked persons, primarily women.

Women may own property but often cede control of it to male relatives for cultural reasons and because of family pressure. Husbands may block foreign travel by their wives. The testimony of a woman is equal to that of a man in court. During 2000 the Government amended some labor laws affecting women. For example, maternity leave was extended, and women no longer are forbidden from working at night. During the year 2001, Parliament adopted a law providing equal pay for equal work for men and women.

Only men may confer citizenship on their spouses and children. Accordingly, children born to citizen mothers and foreign fathers are not eligible for citizenship. Citizen widows may confer citizenship on their minor children.

Religious groups administer their own family and personal status laws. There are 18 recognized religious groups, each of which differs in its treatment of marriage, family, property rights, and inheritance. Many of these laws discriminate against women. For example, Sunni inheritance law provides a son twice the inheritance of a daughter. Although Muslim men may divorce easily, Muslim women may do so only with the concurrence of their husbands. There is no law that permits civil marriages, although such ceremonies performed outside the country are recognized by the State. Only religious authorities may perform marriages.

The plight of children remains a serious concern; however, the Government has not allocated sufficient resources to address the situation. Education is free in public schools and compulsory until the age of 12. However, public schools generally are inadequate, and the cost of private education is a significant problem for the middle and lower classes. Many children, particularly in rural areas, take jobs at a young age to help support their families. UNICEF reported that in the 2000 school year, approximately 85 percent of children between the ages of 3 and 5, and approximately 98 percent of children between the ages of 7 to 11 were enrolled in school. In some families with limited incomes, boys receive more education than girls. Illiteracy rates have reached 37.5 percent. The minimum for child employment is 13 years of age.

The Ministry of Health requires the establishment of health records for every child up to 18 years of age.

An undetermined number of children are neglected, abused, and exploited. The normal procedure for adoption is through religious homes or institutions authorized to arrange adoption; however, the demand to provide infants for adoption abroad results in illegal international adoptions. There are no statistics available concerning the prevalence of the illegal adoption of infants. Poor children often are compelled by their parents to seek employment and often take jobs that jeopardize their safety, including in industry, car mechanic shops, and carpentry. Because of their ages, wages earned by such children are not in conformity with labor regulations. The Government does not have specific child protection laws to remove children from abusive situations and does not grant NGO's adequate legal standing to litigate on behalf of abused minor children.

There are hundreds of abandoned children in the streets nationwide, some of whom survive by begging or by working for low wages. The Center for Street Children has been active in gathering children from various regions and providing a home for them. The Center places children with disabilities in institutions and refers children with police records to juvenile courts.

During the year 2001, the police discovered and broke up several child prostitution rings.

Juvenile delinquency is rising; many juveniles wait in ordinary prisons for trial and remain there after sentencing. Although their number is small, there is no adequate place to hold delinquent girls; therefore, they are held in the women's prison in Ba'abda. Limited financial resources have hindered efforts to build adequate facilities to rehabilitate delinquents. The Government operates a modern juvenile detention facility in Ba'asir.

The Committee for Children's Rights, formed by prominent politicians and some local NGO's, has been lobbying for legislation to improve the condition of children. The Ministry of Social Affairs oversees the Higher Council for Childhood and the National Committee for Literacy. The Higher Council for Childhood prepares legal studies and produces progress reports on national compliance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child. During the year 2001 it published a report documenting the follow-up to the World Summit for Children.

The law does not specifically prohibit trafficking in persons; however, the Penal Code stipulates that "any person who deprives another of freedom either by abduction or any other means shall be sentenced to temporary hard labor." If forced prostitution or forced rendering of sexual services occurs as a result of the abduction, the Penal Code stipulates that the abductor be sentenced to at least 1 year in prison. The country is a destination for internationally trafficked persons, primarily women. There is illegal prostitution involving foreign women, primarily from Russia and Eastern European countries.

Foreign domestic workers are not protected by labor laws. Their passports usually are confiscated by recruitment agencies or employers when the workers arrive at the airport. Employers sometimes falsely accuse employees who leave their jobs of crimes so that the police will help locate them and the employer is able to exert pressure to coerce them to return.

Lebanon was removed from the list of major illicit drug-producing or drug-transit countries affecting the U.S. (the "majors list") in November 1997. The key factor leading to Lebanon's removal from the list was a determination that opium cultivation had been all but completely halted in Lebanon. At present, there is some minor resumption of cannabis cultivation in certain areas, though at a very low level. The primary product is hashish. There is no known significant poppy cultivation. There are some small drug laboratories of little importance. Law enforcement initiatives backed by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have thwarted a recurrence of cultivation and trafficking. However, established smuggling routes remain available.

In 1998 Lebanon's Parliament passed anti-narcotics legislation requiring severe sentences for narcotics trafficking, including forfeiture of any assets connected to drug proceeds. The legislation addresses money laundering without affecting bank secrecy. The GOL depends on the Bankers' Association with its informal agreement among its members to discover and combat the laundering of funds. The detection of laundered moneys relies on the honesty and vigilance of the banking community.

Lebanon is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but expressed formal reservations on certain provisions, including bank secrecy

The Lebanese government, with the assistance of Syrian military forces, appears to have controlled and suppressed drug-producing capabilities. The 1997 Syrian-Lebanese effort to eradicate cannabis and poppy cultivation in the Bekaa Valley was a success, and the Lebanese Internal Security Force (ISF) and Lebanese Armed Forces appear concerned and motivated to preserve their victory. Drug seizures and arrests of traffickers and users are reported regularly in the media. However, some small-scale growth of cannabis has resumed. No accurate data is available on cultivation as farmers in these areas are very secretive. The primary product is hashish. There is no known significant poppy cultivation.

The Lebanese Ministry of Health, the Lebanese Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and Lebanese Customs are cognizant of DEA guidelines regarding precursor chemicals. They recognize that these chemicals require approval prior to importation, and close monitoring if manufactured in Lebanon. A few drug laboratories exist in Lebanon, but they are considered to be of little importance.

Lebanon continues to take aggressive steps in the war against drugs. This year the Parliament passed anti-narcotic legislation that imposes severe penalties for those who are connected with the drug trade, including money laundering. The new law addresses persons who either direct money laundering or who knowingly aid or participate in money laundering schemes. However, the new law is more of an implement for punishing identified drug traffickers and co-conspirators for money laundering than a mechanism for permitting aggressive investigations to expose assets of suspect traffickers. The GOL depends on the Bankers' Association with its informal agreement among its members to discover and combat the laundering of funds. The Central Bank Governor stresses that there is no money laundering in Lebanon. However, under the current liberal regulatory environment, it is impossible to establish this fact independently.

In July 1998 Lebanese armed forces eradicated some 40,000 square meters of cannabis at Yamouneh/Biqa'. They also raided the offices of Hizballah spiritual leader Sheikh Tufali, whose supporters in 1997 had started the illicit cultivation of opium and cannabis in the mountains of Biqa'. Some smugglers who live in the occupied border area under the control of the Israeli Army have been monitored and arrested for drug smuggling when entering areas controlled by the central government.

Corruption is endemic in Lebanon. The government of Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss, installed in 1998, has made an anti-corruption drive one of its central objectives. The UN has initiated an anti-corruption project with the GOL to assist with this problem.

Lebanon and the United States have no existing formal bilateral agreements for narcotics or extradition. In May 1995 Lebanon acceded to the 1988 UN Drug Convention with reservations on bank secrecy disclosures. There were no known extraditions from Lebanon during 1998. There were some repatriations of persons involved in narcotic crimes. There were some renditions, but few were involved with narcotics. Lebanese courts are following each case.

The eradication of illicit opium crops started in 1989. A UNDCP program for integrated rural development and crop substitution started in 1992; the funds allocated for this project were not spent efficiently. There is no significant poppy cultivation in the Biqa' plain, but there is a resumption of illicit crop cultivation in certain areas where tobacco is grown, though at a very low level. It is estimated that the total area cultivated with hashish is about 250 hectares (about 618 acres, in El-Hermel, Deir el Ahmar, Ainata, Mar Chhim, Ersal, Haam, and other areas). There is no poppy cultivation. There are some unimportant processing laboratories.

Lebanese and Syrian enforcement agencies continue in their successful suppression of illicit cultivation of opium and cannabis in the Biqa' Valley. However, two factors are eroding this campaign. First, crop substitution, especially in the most remote and impoverished regions, remains inadequately funded and planned. The police, knowledgeable persons, and the media warn that dissatisfied and frustrated farmers may reintroduce prohibited crops. Second, the government has not yet gained day-to-day control over these rural areas.

The price of one green bushel of marijuana (ten green bushels equals one hectare) is approximately $1200-$1250 (farm gate). The return per hectare is between $12,000-$18,000. No accurate data is available on cultivation as farmers in these areas are very secretive. There are tribes who have their own channels for marketing their production. Solidarity of the tribe prevents access to such information. Aerial pesticides cannot be used against illicit crops, given inadequate security in the area. Lebanese authorities deny that significant local processing occurs and have offered to pursue any U.S. law enforcement leads-to the point of tendering an offer to U.S. law enforcement personnel to participate as observers on search operations. During July 1998, the Narcotics Department reported the eradication of 40,000 square meters of cannabis in Yamouneh/Biqa'. In 1998 in the Biqa' Valley and parts of extreme northern Lebanon approximately 260,000 square meters were eradicated.

Established smuggling routes remain available. Sale, transport, and financing of hashish continue across the Syria-Lebanon border, albeit in greatly reduced quantities. It is estimated that ten to twenty percent of Lebanese hashish is exported to Europe and Arab countries. Opiates from Southwest Asia have been smuggled into Lebanon in the past, but it is believed that current trafficking is negligible.

Heroin and cocaine have been routed through Lebanese sea and airports concealed in cargo containers. A positive development is the improved security at Beirut International Airport. Customs seized six kilograms of cocaine from Brazil and one kilogram of hashish from Africa. A drug smuggling network of 75 persons was broken, with thirty-five persons arrested.

The Chief of the Judicial Police Drug Office reports that most drugs reach Lebanon by air, sometimes with Lebanese expatriates from South America and from Turkey. Some of the opium coming from Turkey is smuggled to Jordan through Lebanon and Syria. Small amounts of opium have been seized.

Domestic drug abuse is not a major problem and drug offenders are subject to severe penalties. There are few public programs to raise awareness and combat use. There are some private treatment facilities. Domestic drug abuse has subsided with the end of the civil war.

Internet research assisted by Stacy Nicol