College of Business Administration

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Pietra Rivoli

Labor standards in the global economy: Issues for investors Journal of Business Ethics #43, March, 2003: 223-232

ABSTRACT. In the mid-1990s, global labour standards emerged as a new and important are of concern for socially responsible investors, especially with respect to investments in the "problematic" footwear, apparel, and toy industries. In this paper, I elucidate the primary areas of concern for investors and discuss a framework for evaluating firms' labor standards performance. In addition, I argue that today's sweatshop debates follow closely those of centuries ago, with the standard economic defense of low wage manufacturing on the one hand, and the activists' protests against poor conditions and wages on the other. An examination of this historical context reveals a promising middle ground in this ongoing debate.

Since the mid-1990s, global labor standards have emerged as a new and important area of concern for socially responsible investors. In particular, the proliferation of alleged "sweatshops" and exploitive labor practices, especially those related to the manufacturing and distribution systems of U.S. and Europeans retailers, has attracted increasing attention from public pension funds, religious investors, mutual funds, educational institutions, and individuals. For example, preliminary data show that the number of shareholder resolutions on these topics in the 2001 proxy season is likely to be at least double the number seen in 2000 (IRRC, 2001). As recently as the mid-1990s, in contrast, this issue was receiving virtually no attention from SRI investors.

Concerns about abusive or exploitive labor practices are, of course, not limited to investors. Since the mid-1990s, and in particular since the 1999 World Trade Organization meetings in Seattle, a prime focus of the globalization "backlash" been the alleged exploitive effects of rapidly liberalizing trade, especially in products utilizing a high degree of unskilled labor. According to the "backlash" arguments, the recent liberalization of trade has released competitive pressures that are sending unskilled workers into a downward spiral of low wages and poor working conditions. The main targets of the activists have been U.S. apparel and footwear firms, especially those with brand name recognition. GAP, Nike, Liz Claiborne, and The Limited have all been recent targets of anti-sweatshop protests by labor, consumer, and student groups. Fueling the flames, of course, has been a steady stream of stories from the factory floor.2

The manufacturing and distributions systems now employed by U.S. firms complicate the issue considerably. As recently as the early 1980s, most firms owned and operated the factories in which their apparel and toys were made. Today, however, virtually all "name brand" firms employ independent contractors in the manufacturing process. Typically, these subcontractors are locally owned and produce for a variety of retailers. As a result, while the U.S. firms certainly have influence over factory labor conditions through their bargaining power as purchasers, they do not directly control working conditions in the factories. Indeed, in the early 1990s, it was relatively common for U.S. firms to disavow responsibility for conditions in subcontractors' factories. By the late 1990s, however, pressure from consumers, activists, and shareholders had led to significant changes to U.S. firms' approaches to the controversy.

My objective in this paper is to elucidate some of the major "sweatshop" issues facing investors. In general, how may investors make sense of the complex moral, economic, and social issues surrounding the sweatshop debate? More specifically, how might investors evaluate U.S. firms on this issue?

Finally, how may investors contribute to fruitful discourse on this complex and important topic?

What is a sweatshop?

The rallying cry to "stamp out sweatshops" is well-intentioned but less than helpful to investors and others who seek to understand the specific practices in factories around the world today. Investors must clarify the aspects of work life that they wish to document or change, identify the practices that they find acceptable or not acceptable, and communicate to corporations regarding the attributes of work life that should be measured and monitored.

For most investors involved with this issue, the fundamental matter of concern is the protection of human rights in the workplace. These rights may be civil, economic, political, or social. The extent to which workers are or are not accorded these rights may be assessed by a number of measurable criteria, including those discussed below.

Wages and wage practices

Perhaps the most defining attribute of a sweatshop is low wages. Figure 1 shows wages for apparel workers from a number of countries as of 1996. Figure 2 shows employment patterns in the textile and apparel industry. Consistent with economic theory, textile and apparel production has indeed between shifting rapidly to lower wage countries. In general, employment in high wage areas such as the U.S. and Europe has been falling compared to employment in low wage countries in Latin America and Asia. Long run patterns of dislocation in these industries have followed the predictions of neoclassical trade theory, which suggests that countries with a relative abundance of low skill and unskilled labor will specialize in the production and export of goods using this factor intensively. In China, for example, the world's biggest clothing exporter, labor accounts for more than half of value added in the apparel industry (Yang and Zhong, 1998). Because of its labor intensity, production in the apparel industry is concentrated in low wage countries.

Of course, wage data alone are not sufficient to allow analyses of economic income. Perhaps the most important adjustment that is necessary is a correction for varying degrees of purchasing power across countries. The burgeoning research to develop a "living wage" methodology explicitly attempts to account for the purchasing power of wages across countries.3 In addition, wage rates alone may not provide information about alternative economic benefits associated with employment, such as housing and meal subsidies, medical care, and so forth. Another confounding factor, particularly in the apparel industry, is the practice of "piece rate" compensation, which complicates attempts to standardize wage data. Finally, in a number of countries, including the United States, apparel producers have often been found to be in violation of minimum wage laws (Ross, 1997). Some activists also point out that legally-mandated minimum wages, even when paid, may not be sufficient to sustain workers and their families. As a result, activists have argued for the implementation of a "living wage" or at a minimum, some attention by corporations to the issue of sustainable employment..

Many investors do not view compensation levels per se as an appropriate topic for investor activism, and the SEC has consistently disallowed shareholder resolutions addressing the level of wages (IRRC, 2001). Therefore, investors must draw the important distinction between wage levels, which some believe to be outside the purview of investors activists, and wage practices, which are an appropriate area of questioning for investors concerned with labor issues. Wage practices garnering recent attention include unexplained or arbitrary fines and deductions from workers' paychecks, the practice of "training wages" that do not meet minimum wage requirements, as well as significant delays in compensation.

Health and safety

Standards of occupational health and safety, as well as the enforcement of those standards, are prime issues for many labor activists. Fire safety - or lack thereof - has become a common cause for concern in factories, particularly in Asia. In a number of cases, blocked fire exits have resulted in deaths and injuries.4 Particularly in shoe and toy factories, exposure to toxic materials under conditions of poor ventilation also may constitute a threat to workers' health. Another issue relates to the availability of potable water. In factories with dormitory facilities, the safety and cleanliness of the living facilities have also been criticized by some observers. Various forms of mental abuse and humiliation have also been widely reported.5 In general, problems lie not with occupational health and safety laws, but with their consistent enforcement.

Freedom of association

With the very significant exception of China, most countries engaged in large scale apparel and toy production for the world market have legal protection for independent unions and union members. At the same time, however, very few workers in apparel and toy factories in developing countries are actually represented by independent unions. In practice, a variety of tactics suppress union activity in many countries. In addition to firing union activists, workers also report that union members and activists are discriminated against in other ways (ILO, 2000). In many cases, local governments are loathe to protect workers' rights to union activity because a compliant labor force is seen as a comparative advantage in attracting foreign investment.

Captive and child labor

In a number of countries, labor market transactions are entered into unwillingly and/or unknowingly, or under conditions wherein basic rights are violated. Debt bondate, an arrangement whereby workers are kept in servitude to pay off debts incurred, has been widely reported in Asia as well as in the U.S. (Kwong, 1997). The use of involuntary prison labor continues to be problematic (ILO, 2000). Arrangements governing migrant labor have also been called into question by human rights groups.6 Finally, child labor has been widely reported in the textile and apparel industries, particularly in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh (Hobbs et al., 1999). A related problem, particularly around holiday periods, has been the practice of "forced overtime" wherein employees are required to exceed legal hours of work limits to meet production quotas (Varley, 1998).

How common?

How common are the types of "sweatshop" abuses discussed above? Unfortunately, there are few reliable data to help in addressing this question. First, most of the evidence surrounding the most egregious abuses is anecdotal and therefore does not allow for generalization to an entire industry or country. Certainly it should be noted that the more systematically gathered evidence, such as publicly available monitoring reports, have generally identified some areas requiring attention, but have not uncovered the types of "worst case" abuses often publicized by activists. Indeed, the worst case abuses are newsworthy often because they do represent departures from the norms.

It is also important to note that the U.S.-based apparel industry generates its fair share of "sweatshop" anecdotes. For example, in 1995, more than 70 Thai immigrants were found working in captivity for approximately 70 cents per hour in El Monte, California. In the New York garment district, evidence of debt bondage, physical threats, and below minimum wage work is widespread (Kwong, 1997). In any country, of course, it would unfair to tar an entire industry with the brush from these anecdotes. At the same time, investors seeking not to be associated with practices such as those described above, or those seeking to change such practices, should systematically evaluate firms, particularly in the more problematic apparel, toy, and footwear industries.

A framework for evaluating U.S. firms

I suggest that investors with concerns over global labor standards should evaluate U.S. firms on four dimensions: (1) the code of conduct applicable to the firm's manufacturing operations as well as its contractors, (2) the dissemination of the code of conduct, (3) the disclosure mechanisms in place, and (4) the monitoring scheme employed. I discuss each of these in turn.

Codes of Conduct

Most U.S. firms have adopted codes of conduct governing their international business relationships. Firms in the industries most vulnerable to sweatshop charges, particularly apparel and toys, generally have adopted codes specific to their supplier relationships. Some codes represent collective efforts of firms through industry associations, some represent the work of human rights or religious groups, while some codes are company-specific.

Perhaps the most basic question for investors is, what code of conduct governs the firm's supplier relationships? A number of industry, religious, and human rights groups have compiled recommended codes of conduct in recent years. These groups include the American Apparel Manufacturers Association, the Fair Labor Association, and the Workers' Rights Consortium. Other widely regarded codes include the Global Sullivan Principles, which are modeled on the Sullivan Principles proposed for Business in South Africa during the 1980s, the Social Accountability 2000 code, as well as the Caux Principles.

In general, these codes have a high degree of overlap. For example, most of the codes have a prohibition on child labor, prohibit discrimination on the basis of race or sex, and require adherence to minimum health and safety standards. However, there are significant differences as well. Perhaps the most striking (and controversial) difference among the codes is the inclusion, in the case of the Worker's Rights Consortium, of a requirement that employers pay a "living wage."

It is far more common for firms to adopt company specific codes. A study by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) as well as a study sponsored by the ILO (Sajhau, 1997) found a high degree of variation in both the stringency and the content of supplier and manufacturer codes across firms.7 For example, while the great majority of corporate codes had stated requirements related to worker health and safety, only a small number explicitly supported the workers' rights to organize collectively. Figure 3 shows the issues represented in 121 corporate codes of conduct studied by the IRRC. The study also showed that the specificity of the codes varied considerably, as did the strength of the language used.

It is important to note that the codes of conduct proposed by activists, and especially those adopted by firms, do not represent a set of radical demands. The great majority of the codes' requirements relate to matters already protected by the labor laws of most countries. The codes are also quite consonant with the provisions of the ILO's core labor standards. The primary case in which a code goes beyond legally mandated principles, or at least widely accepted principles, is the "living wage" clause included by the Workers Rights Consortium code.

[IMAGE GRAPH] Captioned as: Issues Covered in Company Codes of Conduct

Dissemination

The mere existence of a code of conduct, of course, is insufficient reassurance to those concerned with labor standards. In particular, investors should also assess how the codes of conduct are disseminated, and to whom. Of particular interest is whether workers or employees of subcontractors are aware of the provisions of the code. Both IRRC and the ILO found that few U.S. companies have written provisions for translating and posting codes of conduct.

Disclosure

The level and types of disclosure by firms have emerged as significant issues in student and shareholders campaigns. For example, should U.S. firms publicly disclose the names and addresses of all subcontracting factories? When factories are monitored for compliance with codes of conduct, who should receive the results and in what forms? Many activists argue for maximum disclosure, believing that exposure is a powerful tool for changing firm behavior.8 According to this view, the publicity associated with maximum disclosure serves as a powerful incentive for firms to adhere to high level standards. On the other hand, many firms are reluctant to share large amounts of raw data about internal operations with the general public. A key issue for investors is the attempt to balance the companies' legitimate needs for propriety with demands for disclosure. Investors should also be aware that more liberal disclosure requirements may lead to less in-depth monitoring. In other words, the wider the disclosure, the less forthcoming firms may be in the monitoring process.9

Another disclosure issue, indeed the issue most widely addressed by shareholder resolutions, relates to the level and type of information that should be provided to the firm's shareholders. During the 2000 and 2001 proxy season, at least 60 resolutions calling for reports to shareholders on international labor issues were introduced at U.S. firms. The issues relating to the types of data or analyses such reports to investors should include, remain unresolved.

Monitoring and enforcement

Who should monitor factories for compliance with corporate codes of conduct? The great majority of U.S. manufacturers monitor compliance with an internal audit system. Often, managers charged with responsibility for general issues of quality control are also given oversight responsibilities for labor standards issues. When subcontractors are employed, the codes may be a part of the contractual agreement between the supplier and the U.S. firm. This system, in effect, "outsources" the monitoring of the code to the subcontractor (DeSimone, 1999). Predictably, labor activists question the objectivity of these internal monitoring mechanisms.

An alternative approach to monitoring utilizes independent monitoring by non-profit, non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Arguably, these "independent" monitors would come to the task with greater objectivity than company-sponsored monitors. However, a number of observers to these processes have noted that while the NGOs are not biased in favor of the firms, they come to the monitoring task with an unfair bias against the corporation. Both Rev. David Shilling, Director of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, and Professor Prakash Sethi, an academic expert on the topic, have noted that the relationships between monitoring NGOs and corporations are confounded by adversarial and confrontational relationships which may impede rather than facilitate the gathering of high quality data (DeSimone, 1999). A third alternative for U.S. firms is to turn to the for- profit monitoring services of consulting and audit firms. The clear leader in the industry is PriceWaterhouse Coopers (PWC). PWC believes that the extension to labor standards represents a natural extension of its significant presence in the financial and environmental audit business. Social and labor activists, however, again question the impartiality of a process which employs monitors with which firms have other business relationships.

In addition to questions regarding who should undertake the monitoring activities, there are a large number of unresolved issues surrounding the process and mechanisms of monitoring. One issue, for example, concerns the question of whether the visits by monitors should be surprise "unannounced" visits or those for which factory managers should prepare. A second issue relates to the extent to which sampling is or is not a valid method of drawing inferences. Related to this question is the issue of the frequency with which monitoring should take place. While it is clearly not possible for all factories to be visited in every year, is it sufficient, for example, for 10% of a supplier's factories to be visited? If so, how should the 10% be selected? A further issue is who should bear financial responsibility for monitoring costs. Some observers believe that if firms pay monitors directly, an inevitable conflict of interest will ensue. An alternative mechanism is for industry associations or non-profit organizations to pay independent monitors using proceeds from corporate dues or memberships.

The sweatshop debate in a broader context

It is worthwhile for investors to address not only the operational issues relating to monitoring, codes of conduct, and so forth, but also to give thought to the sweatshop debate in a broader context. Brian Langille (1997) has very correctly noted the relatively low quality of the discourse related to global labor standards in which protagonists on different sides of the debate have repeatedly failed to engage one another. Labor activists on the one hand and "mainstream" economists on the other, have made relatively little progress in reconciling their views and prescriptions on this important issue. Investors, however, have a unique vantage point from which a reasoned middle ground can proceed. I suggest that the quality of the dialogue may be enhanced by examining the sweatshop issue in a broader historical context. At least some middle ground emerges from an examination of this historical context.

To many free trade economists, as well as others, the credibility of the labor standards movement, in particular the anti-sweatshop activism, is undermined by the identity of many of its protagonists. For example, much of the leadership and support for activism in the apparel industry has been from UNITE (Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees) and is believed by many to be thinly veiled protectionism rather than well-motivated concern for workers in developing countries. Relatedly, many observers note that developing country workers and their representatives are rarely well represented in discussions or governing boards of active organizations. While the validity of the arguments presented should not depend on the identity of their protagonists, many point out that the problems inherent in relying on U.S. labor unions for data and analyses on developing country labor issues should be apparent.

A far more serious and complex charge that has dogged the anti-sweatshop movement from the beginning is the "perversity thesis" that the movement risks leaving in worse straits the very people allegedly being helped by the movement.10 This position is that, however objectionable certain labor conditions may be to U.S. observers, low-skill factory work represents the best alternative available to many citizens in developing countries. In general, particularly in the apparel and toy industries, the alternative available to these workers is rural poverty. However well-intentioned, attempts to help improve the lots of workers may reduce employment and, therefore, be detrimental to the working poor. The activists have long argued, correctly, that manufacturing of apparel and toys flows to low cost, low wage locations. If demand for unskilled labor is indeed price-elastic, as observers on both sides of the debate agree, then increasing wages to meet, for example, a "living wage" target, will reduce employment in these sectors.

Both sides agree that recent trends in liberalizing trade have facilitated a "race to the bottom" in low skill manufacturing industries. It is useful, however, to put this "race" in appropriate historical context. Today, Great Britain has virtually no position as an export-competitive producer of textiles and apparel. Yet, as recently, as the late 1800s, Great Britain dominated world trade in these sectors. British dominance was lost, first to New England and then, in the early 1900s, to the southern United States. After World War I, the textile producers in the American south were challenged by Japanese producers. Japanese firms, by the 1960s, had been seriously challenged by the so-called Asian tigers. In each case, the dislocation was facilitated by an abundant and low wage labor force in the next location. Today, China is the world's largest exporter of apparel. Yet wage rates, particularly in eastern China, are increasing, and production is shifting to even lower-cost locations. Thus, the "race to the bottom," far from being a "90s" phenomenon, is, at a minimum, a 200 year old process. In addition, countries occupying a place at the bottom have, in virtually all cases, used low skill manufacturing as their entree into the industrialized economy. In brief, without a race to the bottom, all of the world's textile factories would still be clustered around Manchester, England. In 1748 David Hume extolled the virtues of the race to the bottom:

There seems to be a happy concurrence of causes in human affairs, which checks the growth of trade and riches, and hinders them from being confined entirely to one people . . . When one nation has gotten the start of another in trade, it is very difficult for the latter to regain the ground it has lost because of the superior industry and skill of the former. . . . But these advantages are compensated in some measure, by the low price of labor in every nation which has not had an extensive commerce . . . Manufacturers therefore gradually shift their places, leaving those countries and provinces which they have already enriched, and flying to others, whither they are allured by the cheapness of provisions and labor, till they have enriched those also, and are again banished by the same cause . . . (Hume, 1748)

Today's mainstream economists largely concur with the views expressed by Hume 250 years ago: They key point is that low wage manufacturing enriches rather than exploits workers; that the race to the bottom is to be facilitated rather than checked if the working poor are to helped.

At the same time, democratic processes have since the beginning served as traction in the race to the bottom. And, in virtually all cases, the impetus for these democratic processes has come from labor and social activists. For example, child labor laws, occupational safety regulations, minimum wage laws and maximum hours of work laws have arisen not organically through the competitive market mechanism but instead through the work of political activists attempting to check the effects of the competitive market mechanism. And as Albert Hirschman (and later Brian Langille) have eloquently pointed out, this progressive activism (as well as activism relating to a large number of other issues, from civil rights to political rights) has rather predictably been challenged by the pervasity thesis. In summary, both the competitive market "race to the bottom" in manufacturing, as well as the political reaction to the race by activists, are part of a very long historical process.

There is a middle ground to be found in the observation that both the "race" (resulting from the competitive market mechanism) and the reaction to the race (resulting from political activism) have over time also been very effective processes: the race has been effective in providing employment to the poorest, raising living standards and ameliorating poverty, while the reaction has been very effective in expanding our common conception of the inalienable rights of workers. For example, even the most progressive New England textile factory in the 1800s would today grossly violate most codes of conduct provisions as well as a large number of labor and occupational health and safety laws. In addition, the freedoms accorded the women mill workers in early New England industry were far more limited than those granted in even the most repressive regimes today. On virtually any dimension, today's textile and apparel factories in developing countries are better places to work than their historical counterparts in New England, the American south, Great Britain, Japan, and 1949 China.11

Many alternative labor arrangements, including indentured servitude, slavery, and child labor, have been defended at one point or another on the basis of the perversity thesis. However, during the past 150 years, labor and social activists have been markedly successful in gradually expanding our common conceptions of the basic rights of workers so that today such practices are far outside the legal and moral boundaries of society. As a result, arguments that such practices are economically efficient means of production, or arguments that the elimination of such practices would leave the affected group in worse straits, are of course not sufficient defenses given our conception of inalienable rights. Economic efficiency is but one of many criteria that a production system must satisfy, while the perversity thesis, if true, simply obligates us to design an effective system for dismantling the practice, not to continue the practice.

A middle ground emerges with the proposal that participants involved on both sides of the global labor standards debate should hope for history to continue to repeat itself: that manufacturing will continue to flow to low wage locations so that workers in the poorest countries may participate in the process of economic growth and industrialization, and that political activism will continue to provide the traction necessary for the race to the bottom to take place against a steadily expanding backdrop of rights and economic resources for all workers.

The time we are required to labor is altogether too long. It is more than our constitutions can bear. If anyone doubts it, let them come into our mills on a summer's day, at four or five o'clock, and see the drooping, weary persons moving about . . . and many times have I had girls faint in the morning, in consequence of the air being so impure . . .1

Notes

1 "R", Voice of Industry, March 26, 1847, quoted in Dickerson, 1999.

2 See Pamela Varley, ed., The Sweatshop Quandary, IRRC, 1998, especially Chapter 4, "Tales from Factory Floor."

3 See, for example, the methodology proposed in www.sweatshop watch.org/swatch/wages/formula.

4 Varley, p. 66-67.

5 Ibid., p. 68-69.

6 http://www.hrchina.org/reports/cleanup

7 See Varley (1998) for a summary of the results of both studies.

8 Maximum disclosure is clearly one of the organizing principles of the Workers Rights Consortium. See www.workersrights.org.

9 Ms. Heather White, the Director of Verite, a non-profit monitoring organization, has found that, in general, "the only way to get access to factories is to agree reports will be released publicly" (Van Der Werf, 2001).

10 For a statement of this view, see material from the Academic Consortium on International Trade at www.spp.umich.edu/rsie/acit.

11 For descriptions of early factory life in the textile industry see Hareven and Langenbach (1978) for New England, Tsurumi (1990) for Japan. Hall et al. (1987) for the American South, Inglis (1971) for the United Kingdom, and Honig (1987) for China.

References

Anderson, Kym: 1992, New Silk Roads: East Asia and World Textile Markets (Cambridge Press, New York).

Hobbs, Sandy, Jim McKechnie and Michael Lavalette: 1999, Child Labo:/A World History Campanion (ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara).

DeSimone, Peter: 1998, Global Environmental and Labor Standards, Social Issues Background Report F (Investor Responsibility Research Center, Washington, DC).

DeSimone, Peter: 1999, Global Environmental and Labor Standards, Social Issues Background Report F (Investor Responsibility Research Center, Washington, DC).

Dickerson, Kitty G.: 1999, Textiles and Apparel in the Global Economy (Prentice Hall-Inc, Upper Saddle, New Jersey).

Hall, Jacqueline Dowd: 1987, Like a Family: The Making of a Southern Cotton Mill World (Norton, New York).

Honig, Emily: 1986, Sisters and Strangers: Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mills, 1919-1949 (Standford, Standford, CA).

Hareven, Tamara K. and Langenbach Randolph: 1978, Amsokeag: Life and Work in an American Factory Cit (University Press of New England, Hanover and London).

Hirschman, Albert O.: 1991, The Rhetoric of Reaction (Harvard, Cambridge).

Hume, David: 1748, Essays Moral and Political, ed. E. Rotwein, London, Nelson, 1955, 34-35.

Inglis, Brian: 1971, Poverty and the Industrial Revolution (Hodder and Stoughton, London).

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Kwong, Peter: 1997, Forbidden Workers: Illegal Immigrants and American Labor (New Press, New York).

Langille, Brian A.: 1997, 'Eight Ways to Think About International Labour Standards', Journal of World Trade 31(4) (August 1997), 27-53.

Ross, Andrew (ed.): 1997, No Sweat: Fashion, Free trade, and the Rights of Garment Workers (Verso, New York).

Sajhau, Jean-Paul: 1998, Business Ethics in the Textile, Clothing and Footwear Industries (International Labor Organization, Geneva).

Tsurumi, Patricia E.: 1990, Factory Girls: Women in the Threat Mills of Meiji Japan (Princeton, Princeton, NJ).

Van Der Werf, Martin: 2001, 'Anti-Sweatshop Groups Find it Difficult to Turn Campus Idealism Into Real Change', Chronicle of Higher Education (January 5, 2001).

Varley, Pamela (ed.): 1998, The Sweatshop Quandary/Corporate Responsibility on the Global Frontier (Investor Responsibility Research Center, Washington, DC).

Yang, Yongzheng and Chuansui Zhong: 1998, 'China's Textile and Clothing Exports in a Changing World Economy', The Developing Economies XXXVI-1 (March), 2-23.

Pietra Rivoli is Associate Professor of Finance at Georgetown University's McDonough School of Business. Dr. Rivoli teaches in undergraduate, graduate, and executive programs in the areas of corporate and international finance. Her academic research is in the fields of socially responsible investment as well as corporate finance. Dr. Rivoli serves on Georgetown University's Committee on Social Responsibility in Investing, which is responsible for voting on shareholder resolutions on social issues. She is also a member of the University's Apparel Licensing Committee, which is attempting to improve conditions for workers involved with the production of University products. Dr. Rivoli received her Ph.D. in finance and international economics from the University of Florida.

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