Second Theorem. The finite rational being cannot ascribe to itself a free causality in the sensuous world unless it also ascribes that causality to others, and therefore assumes the existence of finite rational beings outside himself.

Proof

[III,30] I. a. According to the proof conducted in §1, a rational being can posit (perceive or conceive) no object without ascribing to itself at the same time a causality in the undivided synthesis of that positing.

b. A rational being cannot, however, ascribe a causality to itself without having posited an object on which this causality is to operate. The positing of objects as determined through that positing, and restricting to that degree the free activity of the rational being, must take place at a prior point in time. Only through that earlier point of time, at which the concept of causality is grasped, can the present positing be grasped.

c. All comprehending is through the positing of the causality of a rational being, and all causality is conditioned by a previous comprehension of it. Thus every possible moment of consciousness is conditioned by a previous moment of consciousness, which is already presupposed as actual. Consciousness can only be explained through a circle. Therefore it cannot be explained in general, and appears as impossible.

The problem was to show how self-consciousness is possible. We have answered that self-consciousness is possible if a rational being can ascribe to itself a causality in one and the same undivided moment, in which it posits something opposed to this causality. Suppose that this happens at moment Z.

[III,31] It is now asked further, under what condition what we was just demanded should be possible. It is immediately clear that the causality to be posited can only be posited in relation to some particular object on which that causality operates. One must not say that a causality in general, a mere possible causality could perhaps be posited. That would be an undetermined thinking, and by this time arguing from [unproved] presuppositions has damaged philosophy enough. A mere possible causality or a causality in general is posited only through abstraction from a certain [case of] causality or from all actual causality. But something must be posited before it can be abstracted from. Here, as always, a particular actual concept precedes the undetermined concept in general, and the latter is conditioned by the former.

Just as little would one want to say that causality could be posited as operating on an object [yet] to be posited at moment Z, since B is posited as an object only in so far as no causality [yet] operates on it.

Consequently the moment Z must be explained from another moment in which an object A has been posited and comprehended. But A can also only be comprehended on the condition under which B could be comprehended, that is, the moment in which it is comprehended is also only possible on condition of a previous moment, and so on to infinity. We find no possible point at which we could connect the threat of self-consciousness, through which all consciousness first becomes possible, and our problem is therefore unsolved.

It is of first importance for the sake of the whole science is to be set out here that one provide himself with a clear insight into the reasoning just explained

II. The basis for the impossibility of explaining consciousness without already having presupposed it lay in the fact that to be able to posit its causality, the subject of self-consciousness must have already posited an object, merely as such. Consequently, we must always be driven back from the moment in which we want to connect the thread [of self-consciousness], to a previous moment where the connection must have already been made. This basis must be removed. It can only be removed, however, if it is assumed that the causality of the subject should be synthetically united with the object in one and the same moment. If [in consciousness of self] the causality of the subject is itself the perceiving and comprehending object, then that object can be nothing else but this causality of the subject, and thus they are both the same. Only from such a synthesis would we not be driven back to something prior. This alone contains everything that conditions self-consciousness in itself, and would give a point to which the thread would allow itself to be connected. Self-consciousness is possible only under this condition. In order for self-consciousness to occur, we must certainly assume what we have described. The strict synthetic proof is thus complete, since what was described was substantiated as the absolute condition of self-consciousness.

The only question that remains is what the indicated synthesis may mean, what is to be understood by it, and how what is required in it will be possible. Accordingly, from now on we have only to analyze what has already been proved.

III. Instead of merely removing incomprehensibility, the synthesis we are undertaking seems to produce a complete contradiction.

What is set out through that synthesis is an object. It is the character of the object, however, that the free activity of the subject is posited as restricted by means of it. This object is a causality of the subject, but it is the character of such a causality that the activity of the subject is absolutely free and self-determining. Both should be united here. Both the restricted character and the free character should be maintained, and neither should be lost. How is this possible?

Both characters are united when we think to ourselves [III,33] the subject's being determinated to self-determination, a demand on the subject to be resolved to a causality.

In so far as what was required is an object, it must be given in sensation, in fact, in outer, not inner sensation. Since all inner sensation originates directly through reproduction of an outer sensation, the former presupposes the latter. Hence in this assumption self-consciousness, whose possibility is to be explained, is once again already presupposed.

What is demanded is not comprehended, and cannot be comprehended except as a mere demand on the subject to act. To the extent to which the subject comprehends this demand, he has the concept of his own freedom and self-activity, and comprehends a demand given from outside him. He obtains the concept of a free causality, not as something that is in the present moment, since that would be a true contradiction, but as something which ought to be in the future.

(The question was: how can the subject find itself as an object? In order to find itself, it could only do so as self-active. Otherwise it would not find itself, and since in general it would not find anything unless it found itself, it will find nothing at all. In order to find itself as object (of its reflection), it could not find itself as determining itself to self-activity (as the matter in itself might be from the transcendental viewpoint, which is not the question here, but only how it must happen for the investigating subject), but only as determined through an external obstacle, which must allow, however, his complete freedom for self-determination. Otherwise the first point becomes lost, and subject does not find itself as an I.

In order to make this last point clearer, I only anticipate here what we will come back to later. The subject cannot be forced to find itself, nor in general be forced to actually act. If it were forced, it would neither be free nor an I.

[III,34] If it is resolved to act the subject can still less find itself compelled to act in this or that particular way. Otherwise it would be neither free nor an I. How and in which sense is it thus determined to causality in order to find itself as an object? Simply as far as it finds itself as something that could produce the result demanded, but can just as well refrain from doing this.)

IV. A rational being is to realize its free causality. This requirement is part of the concept [of rational being], and as certainly as it grasps the intended concept, it is realized in one of two ways: The first is through actual action. Only activity is required in general, but it is expressly part of the concept that in the sphere of possible actions of the subject, one be chosen through free self-determination. It can act only in one way. It can only determine its faculty of sensation, which is here the sensuously effected faculty, in one way. Thus it certainly acts, choosing through absolute self-determination this one way, and is to that extent an absolutely free and rational being, and posits itself as such.

Or, the concept can be realized through non-action. The rational being is also free in that case, since according to our presupposition, it is to have grasped the concept of its causality as something required and expected. While it now proceeds against this expectation, and abstains from acting, it likewise freely chooses between action and non-action.

The indicated concept is one of free mutual causality of the highest precision, which is thus no other than this. I can think of a free countereffect to any one free effect as accidental, but that is not the required precise concept. If the concept is determined precisely, then the effect must not be allowed to be thought of as isolated from the countereffect. It must be that both [effect and countereffect] thus form integral parts of one whole occurrence. This occurrence will now be postulated as a necessary condition of the self-consciousness [III,35] of a rational being. This must happen, according to our proof.

Only in an occurrence of this kind is it possible connect the thread of conscious-ness, which will then also be able to run without difficulty through the other objects.

This thread is connected through our presentation. Under this condition, the subject can and must posit itself as a freely causing being, according to the present proof. If it posits itself as such, then it can and must posit a sensuous world, and posit itself in opposition to that sensuous world. And now all the business of the human spirit goes on without trouble, according to its laws in its stead, after this principle problem is solved.

V. Our analysis of the indicated synthesis was up to now merely clarifing. We had to make clear to ourselves what we had thought in the mere concept of that synthesis. The analysis goes farther still, but will be deduction from now on. That is, on account of the posited influence on itself, the subject must perhaps posit much else. How does this take place, or what does it posit according to the laws of its essence, as a consequence of its first positing?(*)

The influence referred to may be comprehended as a demand on the subject to exercise a free causality, and all which depends on it could not be otherwise comprehended and would not generally be comprehended if it were not comprehended in this way.

The demand is the content of the influence, and its goal is a free causality of a rational being to which it is directed. This goal is not to be in any way determined or necessitated to act by the demand, as an effect would come about through the cause in the concept of causality. Instead a rational being only determines itself as a result of this demand. But if it does this then it must first understand and comprehend the demand, and must count on previous knowledge of it. The cause of the demand, which is posited as outside the subject, must therefore at least presuppose the possibility that the subject could understand and comprehend it; otherwise the demand would not have a goal at all. The suitability of that goal is conditioned by the understanding and the free being of the being to which it is addressed. This cause must therefore necessarily have the concept of reason and freedom. Hence that cause must be a being capable of concepts, an intelligence, and since this was previously proved to be impossible without freedom, also to be a free and thus in general a rational being which is posited as such.

We posit the type of reasoning which is set down here as a necessary one, originally based in the essence of reason, and following securely without any essential intervention from us. Still we give a few words to it explain it further.

It is right to raise the question of which effects can only be explained by rational causes. The [III,37] answer: "Those effects which must be preceded by a concept of them" is correct, but not sufficient, since the higher, somewhat more difficult question remains to be answered: "What are the effects which must be judged to be possible only according to a previously drafted concept?" Every effect can certainly be judged once it is there, and the manifold in it submits to the unity of a concept all the more cleverly and happily the more understanding the observer has. This is a unity which the observer himself has brought into the manifold through what Kant calls the power of reflecting judgement. He must necessarily bring unity into the manifold if there is in general to be one effect there. But who guarantees him that before the effect and prior to the ordering of the manifold he perceives by an understanding through concepts of the manifold, the manifold would be ordered under the unity of a concept which he himself thinks just as the actual manifold is now ordered under a concept? What could justify such a conclusion? Some higher ground of justification must be found or the conclusion that there is a rational cause will be, in general, groundless. It may be said in passing, however, that it would be physically impossible for a rational being to use reason incorrectly, according to its own compulsory law, unless he used it correctly in some sphere of knowledge. Otherwise reason would not be available to a rational being at all.

There is do doubt that a rational cause, as certainly as it is a rational cause, traces out the concept of the product that is to be realized through its activity, and constantly regards its actions and directs itself according to that concept. This concept is called the concept of a goal.

Now, however, a rational being can grasp no concept of his causality unless he has knowledge of the object of this causality. A rational being cannot determine itself to activity--obviously, this means to determine itself while being conscious of this self-determination, since it would otherwise not be a free [III,38] activity-it cannot thus determine itself unless it has posited this activity as restricted. But what it posits when it posits a particular activity as restricted is an object outside of it. About this it may be said in passing that even if one wanted to attribute intelligence and freedom to nature, the faculty of grasping the concept of a goal could not be attributed to nature (and just for that reason must intelligence and freedom be denied of her), since there is nothing outside nature which could effect it. Whatever can effect nature is itself nature.

A secure criterion of being the effect of a rational being would therefore be this, that the effect could be thought possible only under the condition of a knowledge of the object. There is, however, nothing except knowledge itself which can be thought of as possible directly through knowledge, rather than through mere powers of nature. Hence if the object produces knowledge, then a rational cause must necessarily be assumed, since here as well the goal of an effect could only be that effect.

Just the assumption that knowledge be intended must be necessary, that is, the rational being itself must think no other goal of the action, and the action itself must not be able to be comprehended and actually not be comprehended, if it is not comprehended as intending knowledge.

Thus one says that nature gives us this or that theory, but no one wants to say that natural events have no other goals than giving us the theory. Instead one says that, if one perhaps wills and directs his free consideration to this goal [of being given a theory] among the others, he may teach himself something.

Now the described case comes in here. The cause of the influence on us would have not goal at all if it had not had the goal, first of all, that we are to know it as such. It must therefore be assumed that a rational being is this cause.

What was to be proved has now been proved. A [III,39] rational being cannot posit itself as a rational being unless a demand for free action is directed to it, according to I - IV. If such a demand for action is to be directed to it, then a rational being outside must necessarily be posited as the cause of that demand. Thus in general, a rational being outside it must be posited, according to V.

Corollaries

1) Man (an thus all finite beings in general) becomes a man only among men. And since he can not be anything but a man, and would not be at all if he were not a man-if there are any men at all, then there must be several. This is not an arbitrary assumption taken from previous experience or an opinion constructed on a probable basis, but it is a truth strictly proved from the concept of man. As soon as one determines this concept perfectly, one will be driven by the thought of an individual to the assumption of a second individual in order for the first to be explained. The concept of man is consequently not at all the concept of an individual, since only one man is unthinkable, but the concept of a species.

-----------

* Kroeger inserts several paragraphs of extra material at this point.

Passages from Fichte and Herder that are relevant to the master/servant dialectic

Fichte, Contributions to the Correction of the Public's Judgement of the French Revolution, Danzig, 1793:

"Cultivation means application of all powers to the goal of complete freedom, the complete independence of everything which [87] is not we ourselves, our pure self. Let me make this clearer.

Our true ultimate goal is set for us by and in the form of our pure self,* through the moral law in us. Thus everything in us which does not belong to this pure form, everything what makes us a sensuous being, is not the goal, but merely the means for our higher spiritual goal. That sensuous being should never determine us, but should only be determined through reason, by what is higher in us. The sensuous being should never be active except at the command of reason, and never act from other kinds of commands except according to the norm that reason prescribes. We can say of sensuousness what the savage of Marmontel says of danger in his death song: "Since we were born, it has summoned us for a long, fearful duel for freedom or slavery. If you win," it says to us, "then I want to be your slave. I will be able to be a very useful servant, but I remain an unwilling one, and as soon as you lighten my yoke, I will rise up against my lord and conqueror. If I defeat you, however, I will insult and dishonor you, and trample you underfoot. Since you can be of no use to me, I will try to destroy you completely by the right of a conqueror."