Reasonsable applies to the fair terms of cooperation, it has a fundamentally collective chareacter. These reasonable terms are built into the original position. The requirement that the parties do not know their natureal or social advantages, for example, measns that they agree to can not be absed on these conditions, so tthat the reasonable tersm of cooperation will exclude these "contingencies."

Rational applies to what is to an individual's advantage, and how he tries to acheive that advantage. The parties are rational to the extent that principles of rational choice guide each person's decisions.

The Reasonable presupposes ther Rational since only individuals with ends and plans to persue could deliberate. The Reasonable limits the Rational, since only right ends may be persued by the deliberating individuals (or those real people they represent).

The parties in the original position have to decide what counts as a good moral argument. (DL 519, 548)

Rational Autonomy applies to the artificial situation of the original position. Full Autonomy is the kind that applies to the person in the well-ordered society. Rational Autonomy meas (a) the parties aren't constrained by prior or external principles of justice (DL 524). (b) Their desires for primary goods derive from their highest-order (moral personality) interests, and are therefore neither egoistic nor hetronomonous. (DL 527, 533).

Kantian Ideal of the Person: (a) gives a highest-order interest to realizing one's moral personhood, which means among other things choosing one's own goals and rational plan for achieving them. After basic needs are fulfilled, this interest is greater than that of realizing one's own conception of the good! (DL 525, TJ 543). Exercising my human capacity for self-determination is more important than achieving whatever good I adopt as I exercise this capacity. Doppelt, pp. 288-9, points to two conflicting strains in TJ, the Kantian interpretation, and a more anthropological one that picks out the primary goods empirically. If you take this more empirical view, it will be open to question whether equal liberty is sufficiently valuable to come first before other primary goods, such as wealth, opportunity to compete in the market, or participate in cooperatively-determined work. Rawls own Aristotilian principle or Marx un-alienated labor could also be on this list of fundamental primary goods that at least compete with the right to hold office! At DL 526-7. Rawls makes clear that the ideal of the person determines the primary goods, not empirical anthropology.

Freedom of thought and conscience (civic liberties or Lockean liberties) are key because they are necessary to select and pursue a conception of the good. They are more important than political liberties, because political liberties are not as important to realizing the Kantian ideal of the moral person. Self-respect seem to be demoted to 5th place at DL 526.

A theory of human nature is not the same as an ideal of the person, although the latter must be compatible with the former. (DL 535, 566)