Spring 1999

• Outline and critically evaluate Nietzsche's critique of truth. To what extent does this critique depend on doctrines about language, and specifically about reference? Does it make sense to claim that all language is metaphorical? Are metaphors false? Are they literally false? Explain Clark's take on this. Why must truth be about things-in-themselves (distinguished from thing themselves) and why is this not possible? To what extent does N's argument depend on concepts inherited from idealistic philosophers (Kant, Schopenhauer) like appearances/things-in-themselves or the representative theory of perception?

• Explain what nominalism is. If humans were to cease to exist, would their still be rabbits? Stars? How would a nominalism answer this question? Is the philosophical position that truth is an illusion consistent? Explain. What is a reduction to absurdity argument. How can such an argument be applied to the claim that all truths are false.



• Explain what a Gettier counterexample is an give an example. Describe the various modifications and "improvements" made by Feldman and Pollack, and the reasons for them. Is knowledge true justified belief? Explain. Discuss and critically evaluate Pollock's inclusion of "socially sensitive information" in his definition of knowledge.



• Describe Alston's deontological concept(s) of justification, and explain why he takes them to be ultimately untenable. Give Alston's own preferred view, and evaluate his arguments in favor of it. Explain what Alston's internalism amounts to, and what reliablism is. Explain why reliablism conflicts with internalism?



• Describe Goldman's descriptive scheme for epistemic folkways. How does it differ from plain old reliabilism? Describe some supposed counterexamples to reliabilism and decide whether Goldman's view can handle them better than plain old reliabilism. In what way is Goldman's view normative, if at all?



• Describe Corlett's view of social knowledge, including reliablism, summative collective belief, espistemic responsiblity, truth "all things considered," etc. What sort of groups can come to know, on his account? Are the conditions he imposes reasonable? If not, can you propose better ones?



• Describe Lewis's view on truth. In what sense is truth personal for Lewis? How do a priori truths differ from a posteriori ones? Is it possible that the qualia I experience when I see red are the same a those you experience when you see green? Lewis says that both the Ptolemiac and Copernican systems describe the astronomical facts, but they differ (only?) in convenience and simplicity. (p. 241) Is this an accurate account of why the Copernican system replaced the Ptolemiac? Why or why not? What is the role of conceptual or meaning change in Lewis's paper? What objections is he trying to avoid by use of conceptual change? Does he succeed? What assumptions about harmony of interests might be required for Lewis' view of truth to make sense?